



**DELHI UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY**

Presented by :

Dr. S. N. VERMA

DELM UNIVERSITY LIBRARY SYSTEM

41-40 $\sqrt{54210 \cdot 2 \cdot N^2}$ { F-S }

AC. M. 14 566

Object of the Bureau of the

This book should be returned on or before the due date stamped below.
An overdue charge of 10 np will be charged for each day the book is
kept overdue.

THE NATIONS OF TO-DAY
A New History of the World
EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN

**BULGARIA
AND
ROMANIA**

THE NATIONS
OF TO-DAY

A New History of the World

EDITED BY

JOHN BUCHAN

FIRST LIST OF VOLUMES

GREAT BRITAIN (Two
Volumes)

FRANCE

JAPAN

ITALY

INDIA

BELGIUM AND LUXEM-
BOURG

BRITISH AMERICA

YUGOSLAVIA

THE BALTIC AND CAU-
CASIAN STATES

IRELAND

BULGARIA AND RO-
MANIA

Other Volumes in Preparation



ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKY,
Premier of Bulgaria, who signed the Peace Treaty in Paris in 1920.

BULGARIA AND ROMANIA

THE NATIONS OF TO-DAY
A New History of the World
EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN



LONDON
THE WAVERLEY BOOK COMPANY, LIMITED
96 FARRINGDON STREET, E.C.4

*Made and Printed in Great Britain.
Haskell, Watson & Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury.*

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THIS series has been undertaken to provide for the ordinary citizen a popular account of the history of his own and other nations, a chronicle of those movements of the past of which the effect is not yet exhausted, and which are still potent for the peace and comfort of the present. The writers conceive history as a living thing of the most urgent consequence to the men of to-day; they regard the world around us as an organic growth dependent upon a long historic ancestry. The modern view of history—apart from the pedantry of certain specialists—is a large view, subordinating the mere vicissitudes of dynasties and parliaments to those more fateful events which are the true milestones of civilisation. Clio has become an active goddess and her eyes range far. History is, of course, like all sciences, the quest for a particular kind of truth, but that word “truth” has been given a generous interpretation. The older type of historian was apt to interest himself chiefly in the doings of kings and statesmen, the campaigns of generals and the contests of parties. These no doubt are important, but they are not the whole, and to insist upon them to the exclusion of all else is to make the past an unfeatured wilderness, where the only personalities are generals on horseback, judges in ermine and monarchs in purple. Nowadays, whatever we may lack in art, we have gained in science. The plain man has come to his own, and, as Lord Acton has put it, “The true historian must now take his meals in the kitchen.”

The War brought the meaning of history home to the world. Events which befell long ago suddenly became disruptive forces to shatter a man’s ease, and he realised that what had seemed only a phrase in the textbooks might be a thing to die for. The Armistice left an infinity of problems, no one of which could be settled without tracing its roots into the past. Both time and space seemed to have “closed up.” Whether we like it or not, our isolation is shattered, and not the remotest nation can now draw in its skirts from its neighbours. The consequence must be that even those who are averse to science, and prefer to settle everything by rule of thumb, will be forced

to reconsider their views. Foreign politics have become again, as they were in the age of Pitt and Castlereagh, of Palmerston and Disraeli, urgent matters for every electorate. The average citizen recognises that the popular neglect of the subject contributed in no small degree to the War, and that problems in foreign affairs are as vital to him as questions of tariff and income tax. Once it used to be believed that a country might be rich while its neighbours were poor; now even the dullest is aware that economically the whole world is tightly bound together, and that the poverty of a part lessens the prosperity of the whole. A merchant finds his profits shrinking because of the rate of exchange in a land which was his chief market; he finds his necessary raw material costly and scarce because of the dislocation of industry in some far-away country. He recognises that no nation is commercially sufficient to itself, and he finds himself crippled, not by the success, but by the failure of his foreign colleagues. It is the same in other matters than commerce. Peace is every man's chief interest, but a partial peace is impossible. The world is so closely linked that one recalcitrant unit may penalise all the others.

In these circumstances it is inevitable that interest in foreign countries, often an unwilling and angry interest, should be compulsory for large classes which up to now have scarcely given the matter a thought. An understanding of foreign conditions—though at first it may not be a very sympathetic understanding—is forced upon us by the needs of our daily life. This understanding, if it is to be of the slightest value, must be based upon some knowledge of history, and Clio will be compelled to descend from the schools to the market-place. Of all the movements of the day none is more hopeful than the spread through all classes of a real, though often incoherent, desire for education. Partly it is a fruit of the War. Men realise that battles were not won by “muddling through”; that as long as we muddled we stuck fast, and that when we won it was because we used our brains to better purpose than our opponents. Partly it is the consequence of the long movement towards self-conscious citizenship, which some call democracy. Most thinking people to-day believe that knowledge spread in the widest commonalty is the only cure for many ills. They believe that education in the most real sense does not stop with school or college; indeed, that true education may only begin when the orthodox curriculum is finished. They believe, further, that this fuller training comes by a man's own efforts and is not necessarily dependent

upon certain advantages in his early years. Finally, they are assured that true education cannot be merely technical or professional instruction ; that it must deal in the larger sense with what are called the "humanities." If this diagnosis is correct, then the study of history must play a major part in the equipment of the citizen of the future.

I propose in these few pages to suggest certain reasons why the cultivation of the historical sense is of special value at this moment. The utilitarian arguments are obvious enough, but I would add to them certain considerations of another kind.

Man, as we know, is long-descended, and so are human society and the State. That society is a complex thing, the result of a slow organic growth and no mere artificial machine. In a living thing such as the State growth must be continuous, like the growth of a plant. Every gardener knows that in the tending of plants you cannot make violent changes, that you cannot transplant a well-grown tree at your pleasure from a wooded valley to the bare summit of a hill, that you cannot teach rhododendrons to love lime, or grow plants which need sun and dry soil in a shady bog. A new machine-made thing is simple, but the organic is always subtle and complex. Now, half the mischief in politics come from a foolish simplification. Take two familiar conceptions, the "political man" and the "economic man." Those who regard the citizen purely as a political animal, divorce him from all other aspects, moral and spiritual, in framing their theory of the State. In the same way the "economic man" is isolated from all other relations, and, if he is allowed to escape from the cage of economic science into political theory, will work havoc in that delicate sphere. Both are false conceptions, if our problem is to find out the best way to make actual human beings live together in happiness and prosperity. Neither, as a matter of fact, ever existed or could exist, and any polity based upon either would have the harshness and rigidity and weakness of a machine.

We have seen two creeds grow up rooted in these abstractions, and the error of both lies in the fact that they are utterly unhistorical, that they have been framed without any sense of the continuity of history. In what we call Prussianism a citizen was regarded as a cog in a vast machine called the State, to which he surrendered his liberty of judgment and his standard of morals. He had no rights against it and no personality distinct from it. The machine admitted no ethical principles which might interfere with its success, and the

citizen, whatever his private virtues, was compelled to conform to this inverted anarchy. Moreover, the directors of the machine regarded the world as if it were a smooth, flat high-road. If there were hollows and hills created by time, they must be flattened out to make the progress of the machine smoother and swifter. The past had no meaning; all problems were considered on the supposition that human nature was like a mathematical quantity, and that solutions could be obtained by an austere mathematical process. The result was tyranny, a highly efficient tyranny, which nevertheless was bound to break its head upon the complexities of human nature. Such was Prussianism, against which we fought for four years, and which for the time is out of fashion. Bolshevism, to use the convenient word, started with exactly the same view. It believed that you could wipe the slate quite clean and write on it what you pleased, that you could build a new world with human beings as if they were little square blocks in a child's box of bricks. Karl Marx, from whom it derived much of its dogma, interpreted history as only the result of economic forces; he isolated the economic aspect of man from every other aspect and desired to re-create society on a purely economic basis. Bolshevism, though it wandered very far from Marx's doctrine, had a similar point of view. It sought, with one sweep of the sponge to blot out all past history, and imagined that it could build its castles of bricks without troubling about foundations. It also was a tyranny, the worse tyranny of the two, perhaps because it was the stupider. It has had its triumphs and its failures, and would now appear to be declining; but it, or something of the sort, will come again, since it represents the eternal instinct of theorists who disregard history, and who would mechanise and unduly simplify human life.

There will always be much rootless stuff in the world. In almost every age the creed which lies at the back of Bolshevism and Prussianism is preached in some form or other. The revolutionary and the reactionary are alike devotees of the mechanical. The safeguard against experiments which can only end in chaos is the wide diffusion of the historical sense, and the recognition that "counsels to which Time hath not been called, Time will not ratify."

The second reason is that a sense of history is a safeguard against another form of abstraction. Ever since the War the world has indulged in a debauch of theorising, and the consequence has been an orgy of catchwords and formulas, which,

unless they are critically examined, are bound to turn political discussion into a desert. The weakening of the substance of many accepted creeds seems to have disposed men to cling more feverishly to their shibboleths. Take any of our contemporary phrases—"self-determination," "liberty," "the right to work," "the right to maintenance," "the proletariat," "class consciousness," "international solidarity," and so forth. They all have a kind of dim meaning, but as they are currently used they have many very different meanings, and these meanings are often contradictory. I think it was Lord Acton who once said he had counted two hundred definitions of "liberty." Abraham Lincoln's words are worth remembering: "The world has never yet had a good definition of the word 'liberty,' and the American people just now are much in want of one. We are all declaring for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. We assume the word 'liberty' to mean that each worker can do as he pleases with himself and the product of his labour, while, on the other hand, it may mean that some man can do as he pleases with other men and the product of other men's labour." Are we not in the same difficulty to-day? Perhaps the worst sinner in this respect is the word "democracy." As commonly used, it has a dozen quite distinct meanings, when it has any meaning at all, and we are all familiar in political discussions with the circular argument—that such and such a measure is good for the people because it is democratic; and if it be asked why it is democratic, the answer is, "Because it is good for the people." "Democratic" really describes that form of government in which the policy of the State is determined and its business conducted by the will of the majority of its citizens, expressed through some regular channel. It is a word which denotes machinery, not purpose. "Popular," often used as an equivalent, means merely that the bulk of the people approve of a particular mode of government. "Liberal," the other assumed equivalent, implies those notions of freedom, toleration and pacific progress which lie at the roots of Western civilisation. The words are clearly not interchangeable. A policy or a government may be popular without being liberal or democratic; there have been highly popular tyrannies; the German policy of 1914 was popular, but it was not liberal, nor was Germany a democracy. America is a democracy, but it is not always liberal; the French Republic has at various times in its history been both liberal and democratic without being popular. Accurately employed, "democratic" describes a

particular method, "popular" an historical fact, "liberal" a quality and an ideal. The study of history will make us chary about the loud, vague use of formulas. It will make us anxious to see catchwords in their historical relations, and will help us to realise the maleficent effect of phrases which have a fine rhetorical appeal, but very little concrete meaning. If political science is to be anything but a vicious form of casuistry it is very necessary to give its terms an exact interpretation, for their slipshod use will tend to create false oppositions and conceal fundamental agreements, and thereby waste the energy of mankind in empty disputation.

The third reason for the study of history is that it enables a man to take a balanced view of current problems, for a memory stored with historical parallels is the best preventive both against panic and over-confidence. Such a view does not imply the hard-and-fast deduction of so-called laws, which was a habit of many of the historians of the nineteenth century. Exact parallels with the past are hard to find, and nothing is easier than to draw false conclusions. A facile philosophy of history is, as Stubbs once said, "in nine cases out of ten a generalisation founded rather on the ignorance of points in which particulars differ, than in any strong grasp of one in which they agree." Precedents from the past have often been used with disastrous results. In our own Civil War the dubious behaviour of the Israelites on various occasions was made an argument for countless blunders and tyrannies. In the same way the French Revolution has been used as a kind of arsenal for bogus parallels, both by revolutionaries and conservatives, and the most innocent reformers have been identified with Robespierre and St. Just. During the Great War the air was thick with these false precedents. In the Gallipoli Expedition, for example, it was possible to draw an ingenious parallel between that affair and the Athenian Expedition to Syracuse, and much needless depression was the consequence. At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution there were many who saw in it an exact equivalent to the Revolution of 1789 and imagined that the new Russian revolutionary armies would be as invincible as those which repelled the invaders of France. There have been eminent teachers in recent years whose mind has been so obsessed with certain superficial resemblances between the third century of the Christian era and our own times that they have prophesied an impending twilight of civilisation. Those of us who have been engaged in arguing the

case for the League of Nations are confronted by its opponents with a dozen inaccurate parallels from history, and the famous plea of the "thin edge of the wedge" is usually based upon a mistaken use of the same armoury.

A wise man will be chary of drawing dapper parallels and interpreting an historical lesson too rigidly. At the same time there are certain general deductions which are sound and helpful. For example, we all talk too glibly of revolution, and many imagine that, whether they like it or not, a clean cut can be made, and the course of national life turned suddenly and violently in a different direction. But history gives no warrant for such a view. There have been many thousands of revolutions since the world began; nearly all have been the work of minorities, often small minorities; and nearly all, after a shorter or longer period of success, have utterly failed. The French Revolution altered the face of the world, but only when it had ceased to be a revolution and had developed into an absolute monarchy. So with the various outbreaks of 1848. So conspicuously with the Russian Revolution of to-day, which has developed principles the exact opposite of those with which it started. The exception proves the rule, as we see in the case of our own English Revolution of 1688. Properly considered, that was not a revolution, but a reaction. The revolution had been against the personal and unlimited monarchy of the Stuarts. In 1688 there was a return to the normal development of English society, which had been violently broken. It may fairly be said that a revolution to be successful must be a reaction—that is, it must be a return to an organic historical sequence, which for some reason or other has been interrupted.

Parallels are not to be trusted, if it is attempted to elaborate them in detail, but a sober and scientific generalisation may be of high practical value. At the close of the Great War many people indulged in roseate forecasts of a new world—a land fit for heroes to live in, a land inspired with the spirit of the trenches, a land of co-operation and national and international goodwill. Such hasty idealists were curiously blind to the lessons of the past, and had they considered what happened after the Napoleonic wars they might have found a juster perspective. With a curious exactness the history of the three years after Waterloo has repeated itself to-day. There were the same economic troubles—the same rise in the cost of living, with which wages could not keep pace; the same shrinking of foreign exports owing to difficulties of

exchange ; the same cataclysmic descent of agricultural prices from the high levels of the war ; the same hostility to profiteers ; the same revolt against high taxation, and the same impossibility of balancing budgets without it. The Property tax then was the equivalent of our Excess Profits tax, and it is interesting to note that it was abolished in spite of the Government because the commercial community rose against it. There was the same dread of revolution, and the same blunders in the handling of labour, and there was relatively far greater suffering. Yet the land, in spite of countless mistakes, passed through the crisis and emerged into the sunlight of prosperity. In this case historic precedent is not without its warrant for hope.

One charge has been brought against the study of history—that it may kill reforming zeal. This has been well put by Lord Morley : “ The study of all the successive stages and beliefs, institutions, laws, forms of art, only too soon grows into a substitute for practical criticism of all these things upon their merits and in themselves. Too exclusive attention to dynamic aspects weakens the energetic duties of the static. The method of history is used merely like any other scientific instrument. There is no more conscience in your comparative history than there is in comparative anatomy. You arrange ideals in classes and series ; but the classified ideal loses its vital spark and halo.” There is justice in the warning, for a man may easily fall into the mood in which he sees everything as a repetition of the past, and the world bound on the iron bed of necessity, and may therefore lose his vitality and zest in the practical work of to-day. It is a danger to be guarded against, but to me it seems a far less urgent menace than its opposite—the tendency to forget the past and to adventure in a raw new world without any chart to guide us. History gives us a kind of chart, and we dare not surrender even a small rushlight in the darkness. The hasty reformer who does not remember the past will find himself condemned to repeat it.

There is little to sympathise with in the type of mind which is always inculcating a lack-lustre moderation, and which has attained to such a pitch of abstraction that it finds nothing worth doing and prefers to stagnate in ironic contemplation. Nor is there more to be said for the temper which is always halving differences in a problem and trying to find a middle course. The middle course, mechanically defined, may be the wrong course. The business of a man steering up a difficult estuary is to keep to the deep-water channel, and that channel

may at one hour take him near the left shore and at another hour close to the right shore. The path of false moderation sticks to the exact middle of the channel, and will almost certainly land the pilot on a sandbank. These are the vices that spring from a narrow study of history and the remedy is a broader and juster interpretation. At one season it may be necessary to be a violent innovator, and at another to be a conservative ; but the point is that a clear objective must be there, and some chart of the course to steer by. History does not provide a perfect chart, but it gives us something better than guess-work. It is a bridle on crude haste ; but it is not less a spur for timidity and false moderation. Above all it is a guide and a comforter to sane idealism. " The true Past departs not," Carlyle wrote, " nothing that was worthy in the Past departs ; no Truth or Goodness realised by man ever dies, or can die ; but all is still here, and, recognised or not, lives and works through endless change."

JOHN BUCHAN.

BULGARIA

NOTE

THE history of Bulgaria, i.e. Chapters I to XI, up to the commencement of the Great War, as well as the last Chapter (XXV) and the Bibliography, is the work of Lady Grogan. Mr. G. C. Logic is responsible for the history of the country during the War, and Mr. H. J. Fisher for the section on Economics. (The names of the writers on Romania are given on page 194.)

The whole volume has been prepared under the care of Major-General Lord Edward Glichen.

C O N T E N T S

	<small>PAGE</small>
GENERAL INTRODUCTION	V
NOTE	4

I. HISTORY

<small>CHAPTER</small>	
INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL	11
I. THE BULGARIAN KINGDOMS AND EMPIRES	15
II. UNDER OTTOMAN RULE	28
III. THE BULGARIAN NATIONAL CHURCH	29
IV. THE LIBERATION OF BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN	34
V. PRINCE ALEXANDER OF BATTENBERG	41
VI. STAMBULOV AND PRINCE FERDINAND	49
VII. MACEDONIA	55
VIII. THE BALKAN LEAGUE	64
IX. THE FIRST BALKAN WAR	69
X. THE RUPTURE OF THE ALLIANCE	76
XI. THE SECOND BALKAN WAR	82
XII. THE RADOSLAVOV CABINET	89
XIII. THE OUTBREAK OF THE GREAT WAR	94

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
XIV. THE PRO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN	99
XV. THE NEGOTIATIONS	108
XVI. THE FIGHT OF THE OPPOSITION	109
XVII. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1915	114
XVIII. THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR	118
XIX. ROMANIA'S INTERVENTION, AND OPERATIONS IN THE DÓBRUJA, 1916	128
XX. THE FALL OF THE RADOSLAVOV MINISTRY	129
XXI. THE MALINOV CABINET AND THE REPUBLICAN ADVENTURE	136
XXII. THE COLLAPSE OF THE BULGARIAN FRONT	143
XXIII. THE AGRARIAN "RENOVATORS" AT WORK	149
XXIV. THE TREATY OF NEUILLY AND ITS ECONOMIC CON- SEQUENCES	154
XXV. RECENT HISTORY	160
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE	166

II. ECONOMICS

I. RESOURCES	169
II. INDUSTRIES	172
III. FINANCIAL	174
IV. TRADE	177

CONTENTS

7

III. MISCELLANEOUS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I. ARMY AND NAVY		185
II. BIBLIOGRAPHY		186
INDEX		189


MAPS

BULGARIA OF TO-DAY	<i>Opp. p. 11</i>
THE BULGARIAN KINGDOM, A.D. 1210	<i>p. 21</i>
THE BOUNDARIES OF BULGARIA, 1876-1913	<i>„ 87</i>
OPERATIONS IN ROMANIA, 1916	<i>„ 127</i>
OPERATIONS IN SERBIA, 1913-1918	<i>„ 147</i>

ILLUSTRATIONS

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKY, PREMIER OF BULGARIA WHO SIGNED THE PEACE TREATY IN PARIS IN 1920	<i>Frontispiece</i>
KRUM, THE MOST WARLIKE KHAN OF OLD BUL- GARIA. (RULED FROM ABOUT 800 TO 814) .	<i>Opp. p. 17</i>
STEFAN DUŠAN DENOUNCES A TRAITOR. AN IN- CIDENT DURING HIS CAMPAIGN IN 1336	22
THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1877-78	57
BALKAN WAR OF 1912. SHELTERS ERECTED BY THE BULGARIAN TROOPS	72
THE WORLD WAR. THE BEGINNING OF THE END IN THE NEAR EAST: THE BULGARIAN PEACE ENVOY AT THE BRITISH HEADQUARTERS SALUTES THE GENERAL IN COMMAND, SEP- TEMBER, 1918	148
M. BRATIANU, ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER. PEACE CONFERENCE DELEGATE FOR ROMANIA .	280
THE WORLD WAR. THE FAMOUS ROMANIAN REGIMENT OF THE BULL WITH ITS MASCOT .	272

I. HISTORY



INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL

THE Bulgaria of 1923 is only a portion of the Bulgarian Empires of the tenth and thirteenth centuries, and includes within her present limits only a portion of the Bulgarian-speaking people of those days. The present Bulgaria has an area of 42,000 square miles, that is, rather more than a third of the land area of Great Britain and Ireland. To the north, for almost the whole length of her frontier, she has the natural boundary of the Danube, which averages here about half a mile in width and 12 feet in depth, and is crossed by no bridge during the 300 miles of its course between Bulgaria and Romania. To the east lies the Black Sea. To the south and west, her present limits have been defined more by political considerations than by natural features or ethnical preponderance.

The Bulgars seem from early times to have been a prolific, energetic and essentially agricultural people. Their first incursions across the Danube from their settlements in Russia, in the fourth and fifth centuries, were followed by a definite migration, and they soon spread over the plains of what is now Bulgaria, and then made their way south along the valleys of the Maritsa, Mesta, Struma and Vardar, down to the *Ægean*, cultivating the fertile lowlands and forming villages. To the west of the Vardar they occupied the Monastir plateau, the country about the Macedonian lakes, the valley of the Bistritsa and the Salonika plain. Slav place-names, which often refer to some topographical feature—the oak, beech, lime, or fruit trees round the village or the river on which it stands—occur in Thessaly and in the recesses of the Grammos Mountains. The Bulgars were never the only inhabitants of Southern Macedonia; they mingled with and absorbed the earlier Slav inhabitants, and if the greater part of the agricultural lands were theirs, the Greeks, among whom the settlers had thrust themselves, maintained their position in the coast-towns and in the trade-centres. To the west, the rugged mountains of

12 INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL

Albania set a limit to the wanderings of the Bulgars, who preferred the more easily cultivated lowlands, though they were exposed to constant raids by the neighbouring clans whom they had dispossessed.

The history of Bulgaria has been greatly influenced by her geographical position. The country lies across the direct land route from Asia Minor and Constantinople into Europe, and was thus immediately exposed to the punitive expeditions of the Byzantine Emperors, and, in the fourteenth century, to the first advance of the conquering Ottomans; later, to the constant passage of Turkish troops. The countless tumuli which mark the highway between Constantinople and Sofia bear witness to the fighting of the past, much of it before the Bulgars came into Europe. The Bulgars were the first of the Balkan peoples to be subdued by the Turks and the last to regain their freedom. Their country lay within easy distance of the Turkish capital, and they were more completely conquered than were the Serbs, who were able to hold their own in their remoter fastnesses.

On the other hand, the physical configuration of the country is favourably adapted for the development of an agricultural and pastoral people. The fertile plains of Bulgaria are the basis of her prosperity. Her rivers, with the notable exception of the Danube, are not navigable, but the other river valleys form natural ways of communication with the Danube and the Black Sea and also towards the *Æ*gean. The main railway line to Constantinople follows the Maritsa valley, while the Sofia-Plevna line follows the Isker gorge northwards. The difficulties in the way of the construction of a railway to the *Æ*gean along the Struma or further east, from Khaskovo (utilising the valley of the Seughudlu), are political rather than physical in their nature; the Bulgar needs first to be assured that the terminal port will be in his own hands and not in those of a rival.

The mountains of Bulgaria, which in former times served as a refuge for malcontents, are still to a great extent clothed with a wealth of forest—beech, oak, and pine. The Balkan Mountains, properly so-called, which attain a height of 6,500 feet, cross the country from east to west; they are traversed by many passes, few of which, however, are practicable for wheeled traffic. North of this range well cultivated plains, intersected by rivers which flow in deeply cut gorges, descend to the Danube. South of the Danube Delta lies the Dóbruja, a region which, owing to the fact that it contained some of Bulgaria's richest

corn-growing country, always constituted a Naboth's vineyard for the neighbour who has now appropriated it.

South of the Balkan Mountains runs a parallel and rather lower range, the Sredna Gora or Central Mountains, which form the northern boundary of the plain of Eastern Rumelia, with Philippopolis as its trading centre, while to the south of the plain the confused mountainous region of the Rhodope extends beyond the political boundaries of Bulgaria almost to the Ægean. The geographical separation of Eastern Rumelia from the rest of Bulgaria provided the Turks with a pretext for retaining control of the province after the rest of the country had become, by the Treaty of Berlin, an autonomous principality. Westward, through the gap in the mountains formed by the Maritsa, the smaller plain of Sofia opens out, bounded on the north by the bare Stara Planina, or Old Mountains, with the isolated mass of Vitosh to the south. South again lie the Rilo Mountains, culminating in the peak of Musalla (over 9,000 feet), and connected with the Rhodope chain eastward.

The national character of the Bulgars has no doubt been moulded to no small degree by the nature of the country and the climate. About 90 per cent. of the population are agriculturists, and until recent years, when the rise in the standard of comfort altered conditions, each household was practically self-supporting. The plains and the narrow valleys, which are said to be the beds of ancient lakes, are separated from each other by considerable mountain ranges, and roads are bad; the peasant living in an isolated village or a remote holding, which he calls his *dershava* or state, has little time or desire for intercourse with the outside world. The winter is rigorous, the heat of summer intense. His solitary life of constant toil may make him seem reserved, self-centred, and narrow in his outlook, but he can endure hardship, he is uncomplaining and tenacious, and, above all, he has a strong sense of independence and a strong attachment to his native soil.

The Bulgarian plains produce rich crops of wheat, maize, barley, oats, and lucerne, and still afford abundant pasturage for livestock. The vine is grown in many districts, the ordinary European fruit trees abound, the silk-worm is reared in Eastern Rumelia, tobacco is cultivated about Khaskovo, Philippopolis, Kyustendil and Silistra, but the renowned tobacco and silk-worm regions of the Struma valley and Western Thrace have now passed into Greek hands. On the sheltered southern slopes of the Balkans the *rosa damascena* is grown for the distillation of attar, which is carried on at Kazanlik; very few other places

in Europe have been found suitable for this industry, for, though the culture of the rose is simple in itself, a slight variation of climate or soil suffices to alter the strength and quality of the scent obtained.

Industries connected with the mineral products of the country have existed since the Middle Ages in the places where they are still carried on to-day: leather work at Shumla, cutlery at Gabrovo, copper work at Stara Zagora, iron work at Samakov. Weaving, which forms the main occupation of nearly every Bulgarian home, has its chief centres at Gabrovo and Sliven. In olden days the cloth made by the women on their own looms was prized throughout the Balkans, and was carried by humble caravans of laden donkeys or by individual pedlars. From the ninth century onwards, the Bulgars seem to have acted as middlemen for the exchange of produce between east and west, rather than as exporters of their own goods; but Bulgarian traders were heard of in Ragusa and in Italy, and wherever a Slav tongue was spoken in Europe. In later days intercourse with other countries was developed by the annual visits of Bulgars, who could not find agricultural work throughout the year at home, to Constantinople and to Hungary, where they easily obtained employment as masons, carpenters and gardeners. Since her independence, Bulgaria has developed her coal mines at Pernik, and has extended her cereal cultivation, and has become an exporter of some of her natural products. It is significant that, whereas in 1905 three-fourths of her tobacco crop was kept for home consumption, in 1919 she exported four-fifths of her total production of that commodity.

The Danube forms a natural highway from Bulgaria into the heart of Europe, and it is obvious that her trade will, as it has done in the past, take this direction, unless she obtains an outlet on the *Æ*gean, whereby communication with Mediterranean countries would be shortened by four hundred miles, in comparison with the present route from Varna or Burgas *via* Constantinople. Bulgaria's geographical position makes it essential for her own well-being that she should live on good terms with her neighbours; but these, as matters now stand, can practically, much to her detriment, control her intercourse with the outside world.

CHAPTER I

THE BULGARIAN KINGDOMS AND EMPIRES

THE early home of the Bulgars lay probably far to the East, for they are thought to be akin to the Magyars, Finns and Turks, who themselves came originally from the confines of China. The Bulgars were driven southwards from their settlements on the Volga by the Avars, and in the early centuries of the Christian era they seem to have made almost annual incursions into the Roman Empire for plunder. In A.D. 559 their chief, Zabergan, crossed the frozen Danube with his horsemen and reached the walls of Constantinople, which was only saved from capture by the resource of Belisarius. The Bulgars are first mentioned as permanent settlers south of the Danube towards the end of the seventh century.

The invaders found themselves among a population which was already mixed, for Slavonic tribes had settled in Balkan lands some two centuries before, and had already to a great extent absorbed the earlier inhabitants, the Illyrians and Thracians. The Bulgars, though they came as conquerors, soon adopted the language and customs of the Slavonic settlers. Before long they came to look on themselves as part of the great Slavonic family, although to this day a Bulgar retains to a certain degree the physical features of his Asiatic ancestors, and the national character differs widely from that of the Serbs and other Southern Slavs.

The Roman Empire, within whose boundaries the Bulgars now settled themselves, had been weakened during the seventh century by long wars with the Persians, and, later, by the loss of the Eastern Provinces to the Saracens. The last wave of northern barbarian incursion spread without great difficulty through the Slavonic population along the Danube into Thrace, Macedonia, part of Albania and even into Italy.

The newcomers were not altogether barbarians; they obeyed their recognised leaders and their armies were well

16 THE BULGARIAN KINGDOMS AND EMPIRES

disciplined, but their horsemen, with their long lances and the horse-tails which floated from their turbans, caused terror wherever they appeared. Though they delighted and excelled in war, the Bulgars became before long a pastoral and agricultural people, industrious and ready to trade; above all, they soon showed a passionate attachment to the soil which they owned or cultivated. Very few original Slavonic records of early Bulgarian history exist. Jireček, the Czech historian of the Bulgars, was aware of only seven such documents, and the little that is known of their primitive manners and customs is derived from Greek chronographers and historians, and from their own folk-lore.

The Tsar appeared as the first among his nobles or *boyars*. He was treated almost as if he were a deity. The boyars, greater and less, were the ruling class, and six of them formed the Tsar's Council; the young boyars were sometimes educated in Constantinople, and such luxury or culture as the Bulgars possessed in dress or mode of living came from Byzantine sources. The favourite amusement of the nobles was hawking; the people, when not engaged in war, kept their herds and cultivated the soil.

How far the folk-lore of the Bulgars was their own and how far it was absorbed from the Slavs it is impossible to say. They lived, it seems, in an atmosphere of supernatural enemies, against whom they must be on their guard always; everywhere they apprehended evil, which could only be averted by offerings or charms, or, in later days, by the sign of the Cross.

Their folk-lore shows a world peopled by strange beings, not many of them good or helpful to man: the *samovila*, half nymph, half goddess; the *juda*, a beautiful woman dwelling in lake or forest regions; the *lamia*, a mammoth-like creature with a single horn; demons, fates, vampires, serpents, spirits of fountains, rivers and caves and of the seasons, to whom offerings even now are made.

The history of the Bulgars until the extinction of their independence in the fourteenth century is a chronicle of war with the Byzantine Empire, with but few intervals of peaceful development. Three times in these centuries a Bulgarian Empire became for a while the most powerful state in the Balkans, and the names of their Tsars, Simeon, Samuel, and Asen, fill a large space in the histories of the period. These Balkan Empires, where practically the same Slav tongue was spoken everywhere and where conquest was not followed by elaborate demarcation of frontiers, were easily formed, but each in turn



KRUM, THE MOST WARLIKE KHAN OF OLD BULGARIA
(Ruled from about 800 to 814.)

fell to pieces when the vigorous personality of the Tsar who formed it was removed. Serbian Tsars in the twelfth and again in the fourteenth centuries ruled over much the same territory as Bulgarian Tsars in the tenth and thirteenth centuries, and the Bulgars have more than one legendary hero in common with the Serbs.

The Bulgars were from the first troublesome and formidable neighbours ; the walls of Constantinople had always to be kept in repair against their attacks, and there were but few of the Byzantine Emperors who were not obliged to undertake a campaign against them. Only three of the Emperors defeated them in their own country, and several times the Empire was glad to purchase peace by payment of tribute. Constantine V in the eighth century found it necessary to collect a fleet of 2,600 vessels to carry his troops up the Danube to invade their country. In the ninth century Bulgarian forces under their Tsar Krum destroyed an Imperial army and killed the Roman Emperor Nicephorus ; and Krum, it is said, fashioned a drinking cup out of the Emperor's skull.

Boris I (852) is generally called the founder of the first Bulgarian Kingdom, which under his rule extended from the Danube as far south as the town of Castoria. The most important event of the reign was the conversion of Boris and his subjects to Christianity. Tradition says that Boris was converted by a picture of the Last Judgment which was painted for him by the monk Methodius. So vivid was the realism of the picture that Boris, who saw a resemblance to himself and his warriors among those who were being consigned to torture and eternal fire, asked Methodius to teach him how to escape such a fate. Perhaps the many Christian prisoners whom Krum and others had brought into Bulgaria had paved the way for the movement, though it is said that the conversion of the Bulgarian chiefs was made at the point of the sword. It is known that SS. Cyril and Methodius, the missionary brothers from Salonika, who had already converted the Serbs, preached to the Bulgars also. Slav nations owe a lasting debt of gratitude to these monks, for it was they who first reduced a Slav tongue to writing and who translated the Gospels and Acts into Slavonic.

Boris himself eventually became a monk ; his second son, Simeon, who had been educated in Constantinople, succeeded him in 893. Simeon's reign is regarded as the first golden age of Bulgarian history. He was distinguished as a soldier, as an administrator and as a writer of books in his own language.

18 THE BULGARIAN KINGDOMS AND EMPIRES

His capital was at Preslav (Peristhlaba), a town on the northern slope of the Balkans between the Danube and the Black Sea ; his palace there has been described as ornamented with stone and wood and paintings without, and with marble and precious metals within. The pictures of the Tsar show him richly decked with jewels.

The Bulgars had now become the recognised intermediaries in commerce between Asia and the northern states of Europe ; the words of a Russian chief at a rather later period give some idea of the trade of the time : “ Greece sends her silk, her wines and her fruits ; Bohemia and Hungary their steeds ; Russia her furs and her wax, her honey and her slaves.” A commercial dispute led to war with the Byzantine Empire, and three times Simeon’s armies reached the walls of Constantinople, till finally the Emperor Romanus had to ask for peace. The discipline of the Bulgarian armies and the silver armour of Simeon’s body-guard are said to have greatly impressed the Byzantines.

Simeon carried on wars in the west against the Serbs and Croats, and at one time his empire extended from the Danube to the Ægean, but it was held together by his personal ascendancy, and, when he died, Bulgarian power waned. The Magyars overran the country, and the Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus II asked the assistance of the Russian chief Sviatoslav against his Bulgarian neighbours. The Russians thus first came into Bulgarian territory in 967 as victorious enemies, and if the next Byzantine Emperor, John Zimiskes, had not intervened, a Russian occupation of Bulgaria might have taken place. Boris, Simeon’s grandson, was taken prisoner, resigned his crown and became a pensioner of Constantinople.

But though the power of Bulgaria had now for a time disappeared in the east, Tsar Shishman and his descendants held the western portion of Simeon’s empire for fifty years longer. It was the ambition of Basil II, known as the Bulgar Slayer, one of the strongest and most cruel of the Emperors, to complete the conquest of all the Slav people of the Balkans. Samuel, the last survivor of Shishman’s four sons, became King in 976, and between him and Basil began a struggle in which the forces and the character of the leaders were nearly equally matched—a struggle which lasted intermittently for nearly forty years. These campaigns of nine centuries ago derive a fresh interest from the fact that the Balkan wars of 1912–13 and the Serbian and Salonika campaigns of the Great War were carried on in the same general area.

Samuel won a victory over the Imperial troops in the Balkans

in the early days of his reign, but he realised that the advantage would ultimately lie with his enemies if they fought on the plains of Bulgaria. He accordingly moved his capital into Macedonia, first to Prespa and then to Okhrida (Achris), a town which stands on the margin of a lake surrounded by mountains. The massive walls and towers of Samuel's castle high above the lake are still standing, and it was in Okhrida that, till 1767, the Bulgarian National Church retained its last stronghold. Okhrida occupies a strategical position on the Via Egnatia, and from it Samuel was able to carry on operations in Albania; he took Durazzo (Duras) and opened relations with Italy, and he replenished his stores by plundering incursions into Thessaly.

But in 996 the Imperial forces caught and destroyed the Bulgarian army between Larissa and the Pindus mountains, and the tide began to turn. During the eighteen years that followed, Basil concentrated his efforts on the defeat of Samuel, and carried on a series of campaigns which involved the movement of thousands of men from Constantinople to Salonika, and from Bulgaria to Macedonia, through country where up to the time of the Great War roads hardly existed.

In 1001 Basil took command of his troops and gradually won the passes leading into Pelagonia and Thessaly. In 1002 he severed Samuel's communications with Bulgaria proper and also took Vidin. Samuel, hoping to relieve Vidin, made a hasty march north and surprised Adrianople; but he was hampered with his plunder, and Basil overtook him at Skoplje (Scapia), where he recaptured the treasure and seized the town. Samuel was now hemmed into Northern Macedonia, where he fortified all the passes. It was not till 1014 that a decisive battle took place. Basil advanced from the north and met Samuel's army in the defile of Demirhissar (just N. of Serrhae); but, being unable to force his way through that pass, he detached a force across the hills round the enemy's flank and rear. Samuel's army was surrounded, he himself escaping to Prilep (Prilapus), and Basil took 15,000 prisoners. The Balkans have witnessed many cruel scenes, but none more pitiable in its horror than the vengeance which Basil took on the enemies who had so long defied him. He ordered the eyes of all the prisoners to be put out, with the exception of one man in each hundred, who was left with a single eye, so that he could act as guide to his blind comrades. He then sent them back to Samuel at Okhrida. When the old King saw the blinded host before him, it is said that he fell to the ground in despair, and

20 THE BULGARIAN KINGDOMS AND EMPIRES

a few days later died of a broken heart. The campaign against the Bulgars lasted four more years, and it was only in 1018 that Basil reached Ohrida, the kingdom having been already surrendered to him. By that time his vengeance seems to have exhausted itself, and he treated the survivors of Samuel's family and the nobles and people in a conciliatory way.

From 1018 onwards, for about a hundred years, the kingdom of Samuel was ruled by a Byzantine Viceroy at Skopje. There was an unsuccessful Bulgarian rising in 1040, and in 1186 the brothers Asen and Peter, descendants of Shishman, were stirred to revolt by the exactions of Isaac Angelus, one of the weakest and basest of the Byzantine Emperors. Only a half-hearted attempt was made to put down the rebellion; the movement spread and the Bulgars regained a part of their Empire.

Asen's younger brother, Kalojan, belonged to the old type of fierce fighting Tsar. He won back more territory from the Greeks, and, to make his position more secure, he tried to obtain recognition from the Pope, and was crowned at Trnovo by a Cardinal. For a short time the Bulgarian Church was actually allied with Rome. A Bulgarian Tsar once again killed or at least took prisoner a Byzantine Emperor, for Kalojan, this time fighting with the Greeks and not against them, captured Baldwin of Flanders, the Crusader Emperor of Constantinople.

The Empire which was ruled by Asen II (1218-1240) equalled that of Simeon or Samuel in extent, but surpassed both as regards conditions of prosperity and progress. Bulgarian traders were to be found in Ragusa, Venice and Genoa. Asen II is remembered by his countrymen not for his wars but as a builder of churches, monasteries and schools. His capital of Trnovo (Turnow), on the northern slope of the Balkans, still bears witness to his piety and patriotism. Trnovo, which is one of the most picturesque cities in the Balkans, is built on three steep hills, on a double bend of the river Yantra, the banks of which are partly precipitous bare rocks and partly wooded. The town is surrounded by old fortifications, natural and artificial; on the height of Trapezitsa, which dominates the city, are the ruins of many churches and monastic cells, in some of which portions of crude fresco are still visible.

In 1204 Constantinople had fallen into the hands of the Crusaders and, though the Byzantine Empire was restored in 1261, the hold of the central authority had become very weak. After Asen's death, his empire resolved itself, as Simeon's had

22 THE BULGARIAN KINGDOMS AND EMPIRES

done before, into several small states, gradually losing power and territory as the Serbian influence grew stronger. In 1330 the Serbs defeated the Bulgars at Velbuzhd or Belesbudium (Kyustendil), and the Bulgarian Tsar Michael was killed. During the next year the great Serbian Tsar Stefan Dušan became master of most of the Balkan lands, but Bulgarian Tsars seemed to have retained some form of local authority. When Dušan died and his empire dissolved, two Bulgarian states existed in Macedonia, one at Trnovo, one at Vidin and another in the north, the Dóbruja, so-called after its ruler Dobroditius.

The Turks, who during the thirteenth century had gradually forced their way through Asia Minor, entered Europe about the middle of the fourteenth century. They found the Byzantine Empire weakened by long wars and by a succession of degenerate rulers, while beyond Constantinople there lay a number of small Slavonic states, divided among themselves. By 1362 the Turks had overrun all Eastern Rumelia, and in 1366 the Tsar Shishman became a Turkish vassal. Only at the last moment did the common danger avail to unite all the Slavonic peoples of the Balkans against the Turks. In 1389 a Bulgarian force fought beside the Serbs and Montenegrins on Kósovo Polye,¹ the Field of Blackbirds, when the Sultan Murad I defeated the combined Christian hosts with terrible slaughter. Trnovo was taken in 1393, and the Bulgarian lands passed into the power of the Ottomans.

The fortunes of the Bulgarian kingdoms and empires, as they rose and fell from the ninth to the fourteenth centuries, had little or no influence on the destinies of the rest of Europe, and the present-day Bulgar does not lay great stress on his historical claims in the Balkans. He is not like the Serb or the Greek, who seems to live in the actual presence of his past, for the Bulgar is above all a practical person, with short views and a rather narrow outlook. He has not, as both Serb and Greek have, many monuments of the past about him, nor has he so rich a literature; but he too remembers that his Tsars held their own against the Roman Empire and ruled over people of Bulgarian race in dominions that stretched from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and from the Danube to the Ægean.

¹ Forty miles N.N.W. of Skoplje



STEFAN DUŠAN DENOUNCES A TRAITOR

An incident during his campaign of 1336

CHAPTER II

UNDER OTTOMAN RULE

AFTER the Turkish conquest the Bulgars passed out of the consciousness of Europe for nearly five centuries. Even the name of their country was obliterated, and a Turkish governor in Sofia ruled over what had been the Bulgarian Empire as the Province of Rumelia. In some ways the lot of the conquered Christians was no worse under the Sultan than that of his Mohammedan subjects. Ottoman rule, founded as it is on the unchanging tenets of the Koran, must always be a negation of progress. Nowhere in Europe was the fate of the peasant in the Middle Ages a happy one, and the Bulgar's life under his own rulers had been one of toil and war and exactions. It was only when other nations advanced in prosperity and civilisation, that his fate, under a system in which progress was impossible, became exceptional and increasingly cruel by force of contrast.

The first object of the Government was the collection of taxes ; obligations to the taxpayer were seldom recognised. If the officials were corrupt, extortionate and cruel, the Turkish peasant suffered nearly as much as the Christian. The system of tax-collecting was liable to every kind of abuse ; fortune and life depended on the caprice of local officials or landlords. Islam regarded all land as theoretically belonging to God, or at least to his representative, the Sultan ; the Sultans gave large grants of land to the *spahi*, or landlords, who in return were bound to perform military service and to furnish so many horsemen every year ; the *rayah*, the Christian peasant, cultivated the ground and was not dispossessed as long as he could pay his taxes. Taxes were paid in kind on all that the peasant grew or owned ; when the Sultan's tithe had been levied and seed for sowing reserved, the landlord took half of what was left. The landlord and government authorities had the right to an unspecified amount of forced labour. The payment of a tax in kind is in

itself no hardship to a Balkan peasant, but an unscrupulous tax-farmer can bring him to ruin by delay or by exactation.

The Christian had, however, to bear special burdens. As Mohammedan Civil Law was until lately based on Religious Law, an unbeliever's evidence could not be accepted in the Courts, and he had little chance of a verdict in his favour. He was exempt from military service, but he paid a poll-tax as the price of his exemption. Every fourth year, until 1676, one out of every five Christian boys between the ages of six and nine was carried away from his parents to be brought up as a Mohammedan and to be trained for the corps of Janissaries. As the Christian might not bear arms and had small prospect of legal redress, he and his family were obviously at the mercy of the *zaptiehs* (police) or soldiers or officials, all of them ill-paid, who lived at the expense of the villagers. The Turk of former days was deeply convinced of his moral superiority over the Christians: they had to make way for him in the town, or to dismount if they met him on the country road.

The few European travellers who realised the existence of a Bulgarian population during the centuries of their subjection speak of them as timid, sullen and downtrodden in appearance, but they mention their untiring industry and their frugality and the virtue of their women. They note the apparent depopulation of the country along the highways and by the banks of the Danube, and there are occasional allusions to the "vampires", which was sweeping away thousands in 1440, 1450, 1460. Almost the only mention of the Bulgars in the fifteenth century is the invasion of their country by Vlad V of Walachia, who carried away 25,000 Bulgars and Turks—men, women and children—all of whom were impaled by his orders. The Bulgars have at least contributed titles to two conquering kings, Basil the Bulgar Slayer and Vlad the Impaler.

The Bulgarian village system, which they themselves had adapted from the system of their Slav predecessors, does not seem to have been disturbed under Turkish rule. The Bulgarian Tsars had been wont to make grants of lands and all the families on them to their nobles or to the Church. These families were not exactly serfs, for they cultivated what they came to regard as their own land, although they could not sell it, nor were they allowed to move from it. In addition to the individual holding, which varied considerably in extent, each town or village possessed communal land, for which no rent was paid, and over which each member of the community had

rights of pasturage and of cutting fuel. The village was practically self-supporting, thanks to the local craftsmen who could supply the peasants' simple wants and to the women who wove their own cloth and linen ; the weekly visit to the bazaar in the chief town was rather a social custom than an economic necessity. The villages were large and, as a measure of security, generally at some distance from the high road. Every town or village had its own elected *chorbaji* (mayor) and Council, who dealt with all that concerned the communal land, churches and schools, if such existed, and sometimes even assessed the taxes. Although the *chorbaji* had no legal status in the Turkish system, his authority was in practice recognised by the Turks.

If some of the injunctions of the Koran had been taken literally by the conquerors, not one Christian would have been left alive in the Ottoman Empire. When any of the Christian population, which it must be remembered always outnumbered the Mohammedans in Turkey in Europe, rose against their masters, it was easy to kindle resentment and to justify punishment by an appeal to religious sentiment. The individual Turk, however, is in ordinary times neither cruel nor fanatic, and Turks and Bulgars have often lived side by side in one village on terms of mutual toleration, if not of actual friendship.

The Bulgarian peasant was left on the soil to which he was passionately attached, and apparently no definite effort to bring over the mass of the people to Islam was made by the conquerors. The latter contented themselves with the conversion of certain villages in strategical positions, and of many of the *boyars*, who accepted Islam as the price of their lands. It is from these renegades that the Pomaks of Bulgaria and Macedonia are descended.

As a reward for their conversion, which was apparently a gradual process extending over three centuries, the Pomaks of the Rhodope were left undisturbed in their mountains. They were governed by their own Beys, they paid no taxes, they performed no military service except of their own free will. There is no purer Bulgarian blood than that of the Pomak, and there has been little or no intermarriage between the true Turks and the Slav Mohammedans. In their dress, in their bearing, even in the cut of their handsome features, the Bulgarian Pomaks and the Slav *beys* of Bosnia and the Hercegovina can hardly be distinguished from the Turks, whose faith they hold with fierce conviction. But they have kept their own Slav tongues, and the traveller is sometimes surprised

to hear Bulgarian or Serbian speech issuing from the folds of a Mohammedan's woman's veil. They remember, too, the traditions of their race, more perhaps than is the case with their Christian kindred, whose memories are rather of their long subjection.

The slender thread of Bulgarian history is now lost for a time in the tangled web woven by the intrigues and ambitions of the Great Powers across the fabric of the Ottoman Empire.

The wars, in which the Turks were engaged almost continuously from the time of their entry into Europe, affected the Christian rayahs mainly when the armies passed through their villages, and took away their animals and their stores. The peace of Karlowitz in 1699, by which the Turks were excluded from Hungary, marks the first shrinkage of the Ottoman Empire.

Throughout the eighteenth century Turkey was constantly at war with Austria or Russia—wars in which these Christian Powers appear sometimes as enemies and sometimes as allies—but these wars were fought for the most part at a distance from Bulgarian lands. The national movement towards independence of the nineteenth century would have had little chance of success, if the rivalries of the Great Powers had not been slowly undermining the foundations of the Ottoman Empire by intrigue or open warfare during the previous hundred years.

In 1774, by the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, which ended a war between Russia and Turkey, the right of Russia to make representations to the Porte on behalf of the Christian races of Turkey was recognised. The Turks themselves regard this Treaty as disastrous and humiliating in the extreme for their country, and they date the birth of the Eastern question from the moment when sanction was given for the intervention of a foreign Power in the internal affairs of Turkey.

The Sultans Selim III (1788) and Mahmud II (1808) were reformers, but, by the irony of fate which attends the rulers of the Turkish Empire, reforms have always meant, on the one hand, opposition to them on the part of the conservative element among the Turks themselves, and, on the other, increased agitation among the nationalities, to whom a taste of better things gives a desire for yet more, for concessions always seem to the oppressed a sign of weakness on the part of the oppressor. The reforms of Sultan Selim only made the sufferings of the peasants the greater, for they roused the resentment of the Janissaries, against whose power they were directed, and the reactionaries found a leader in a Bosnian Mohammedan, by name Pasvanoglu. For some years the whole country

from Belgrade to Adrianople was exposed to the exactions and cruelties of the lawless bands of Pasvanoglu, whom the Sultan, in the hope of conciliating him, had made Pasha of Vidin. Internal trouble among the Mohammedans themselves thus helped to prepare the way for revolutionary movements among the Christians.

From 1774 onwards, Russia, actuated by an irresistibly strong combination of interested and disinterested motives, namely, a desire to extend her commerce and her frontiers and a desire to benefit oppressed fellow Christians, began to make her influence more and more felt in the Balkans. The wars between Russia and Turkey in 1812 and 1829 were fought in part on Bulgarian soil, but the historians of the campaign seem to have been scarcely aware of the existence of a Bulgarian population.

The Crimean War was directly brought about by the insistence of Russia on her right to intervene on behalf of the Orthodox Church in a dispute with the Latins about the Holy Places in Jerusalem. This right of intervention she lost by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, when the signatories collectively and individually renounced all claims to intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey, in the belief that the Sultan would execute the reforms set forth in the *Hatt-i-Humayun* (Charter of Reforms). Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the great ambassador who for many years had held his own at Constantinople against the intrigues of Russia, appreciated the fact that these reforms, like those of the *Hatt-i-Sherif* of 1839, would never be carried into effect ; but the proclamation of religious toleration and equality, of the abolition of taxes and of the opening of public office to all Ottoman subjects served for a time to disarm external criticism, though it did not check internal trouble.

The influence of Great Britain, through her ambassador at Constantinople, was seldom exercised on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Porte, chiefly because support to the Orthodox Christians meant, for the British Foreign Office, support to Russia. The official attitude of the Embassy, after Lord Stratford's retirement in 1858, was to discourage agitation and to discredit stories of oppression and injustice. It is true that a Christian representative was now allowed to sit on the *Mejlis* or local council ; his position, however, was thus described in a British consular report in 1860 : " The Christian member of the *Mejlis*, being a nonentity and not allowed to differ in his opinion from his Mussulman colleagues, is unable to come forward and protect his co-religionists from any act of injustice."

But by the time the Treaty of Paris in 1856 was signed, the number of the Christian subjects of the Porte in European Turkey had been already greatly reduced. The Serbs, whose struggle for freedom dates from 1804, found a leader in Kara George, though it was not till 1830 that the Sultan officially recognised Miloš Obrenović as hereditary Prince of Serbia. In the same year, Greece obtained her freedom. In 1859, Walachia and Moldavia were united in the one state of Romania, and in 1866 Prince Charles of Hohenzollern obtained his recognition as its sovereign. The Bulgars alone, out of all the Christian peoples in the Balkans, remained under the rule of the Sultan. They had found no Kara George to lead them, and the repeated small risings which had taken place throughout the country had led only to severe reprisals. Von Moltke, writing in 1854, thought that the Bulgars "would not easily be moved to rise against their formidable masters, unless they could reckon with certainty on foreign aid."

CHAPTER III

THE BULGARIAN NATIONAL CHURCH

Two things sustained the Bulgar's sense of nationality during his long submergence—the preservation, at great cost and with a continual struggle, of his own language and the preservation of his own Church. The continuity of Bulgarian national existence may be traced in the history of the Bulgarian Church through the centuries when all political independence had been lost. For this reason, its origin and development must be briefly traced.

When in 864 the Bulgars embraced Christianity, the movement towards separation of the Eastern and Western Churches had reached an acute stage, although the final rupture did not come till 1054. The new Christians came into a troubled atmosphere. The coronation of Charlemagne in 800 had marked the division of the Empire into East and West. The rise of many heresies in the East and the storm of iconoclasm which had just blown over had shown that, though the Church was still one, there was a wide difference between Greek and Latin mentality. It was evident even to a new convert that the Pope and the Patriarch did not see eye to eye, and Boris was at pains to inquire from each what the nature of the true faith was. The Pope at once sent Latin missionaries into Bulgaria, who dispossessed the Greek priests already at work there; but the Patriarch Photius, in spite of the vicissitudes of his own career and a thrice-repeated excommunication by the Pope, was determined at all costs to maintain his hold over the Bulgarian Christians. He accused the Pope of heresy, and induced successive councils of the Church to declare that the Bulgars belonged to his Patriarchate.

Twice, at least, when the Bulgarian Empire had reached its greatest power, in the tenth and again in the thirteenth centuries, the independence of the Bulgarian Church was recognised for a time by Constantinople. Once, soon after the

Latin Conquest of Constantinople, the Bulgarian Tsar made submission to Rome, but then, as was the case in later years, the motive for negotiations with Rome was frankly material and prompted by a desire for political protection. The Bulgarian Patriarchate, which, together with many of the sees, dates from the reign of Simeon in the ninth century, had its seat successively at Preslav, Sofia, Monastir, Okhrida, and Trnovo.

The Bulgars, like the Serbs, were great builders of monasteries, and, though few of the original structures now exist, it is still as a rule possible for the traveller in the by-ways of Bulgaria and Macedonia to end each day's journey in a monastery. The monasteries played a great part in Bulgarian history. Built in remote and often almost inaccessible spots, they made an ideal refuge for conspirators or insurrectionary bands, or for the *haiduks* (outlaws) whose doings form the chief subject of Bulgarian poetry. The old Tsars are said to have bestowed many gifts on the churches, but very few ornaments or Slavonic manuscripts have survived the perquisitions of Turks, Albanians and Greeks.

Pilgrimage has a great importance in the life of Orthodox peasants, and there are fixed days when certain monasteries must be visited. The most celebrated centre for pilgrimage is the Rilo Monastery, which stands surrounded by forest in majestic seclusion, at the head of a long gorge, and beneath high mountains. Rilo was founded in the ninth century by the hermit St. John of Rilo; but the oldest part of the present monastery, a weather-beaten wooden tower, dates only from the fourteenth century, while the present great four- and five-storied building, half fortress and half Byzantine palace, was begun as recently as 1833. It is remarkable that this stately Christian monument should have been raised on Turkish soil at a time when the political outlook for the Bulgars was very dark. But the Sultans had always protected the Rilo foundation, and Mohammedan pilgrims, who revere a wonder-working saint almost as much as Christians, have always been among the visitors to St. John's Shrine. Such learning as there was in the Middle Ages was confined to the monks, and, in later days, certain monks did more than anyone to re-kindle the spirit of nationality among their compatriots: such were Father Paissi of the Bulgarian monastery of Zografa, on Mount Athos, who in 1762 wrote the first *History of the Bulgarian Peoples, Czars, and Saints*; Father Sofronii, Bishop of Vrattsa, the pupil who continued Father Paissi's work, and, later still, Father Neophyt of Rilo, who as a schoolmaster did

much for the education of young Bulgarians before the Liberation. Pious Bulgars cherish the hope that when the revival comes to the Eastern Church, Rilo may become a centre for religious training and spiritual life.

The Bulgar's attachment to his Church is to a large extent due to his considering it the symbol of his nationality. It does not greatly influence his moral conduct, but it regulates his life in many outward particulars. It imposes long fasts upon him, when even his youngest children must abstain from meat, milk and eggs. The only holidays he knows are Church Festivals or rather, often enough, festivals which the Slav peoples kept long before their conversion to Christianity and which, by an easy transition, have merged into Christian observances. The Museum at Sofia contains an interesting series of votive tablets, which show the "Thracian Rider" with his hound chasing some wild beast, the Rider and wild beast being transformed in due course into St. George and the Dragon. St. George's Day, as it is still kept in the Balkans, is the direct descendant of the ancient Festival of the Spring; the peasants deck their houses with greenery and celebrate the day in the woods with their immemorial dance, the *choro*, and their national songs. Church customs among the Bulgars are indeed inextricably interwoven with superstitious observances. The peasant's dwelling must be sprinkled and blessed by the pope, graves must be visited in due season and ceremonial meals eaten or left there; certain observances must be carried out, the meaning of which is obscure to the peasant; certain disputes relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance are settled by the local Church authority, although he may be as ignorant and in no way a better man than his fellow villagers. The church itself may be ill-kept and not well attended, or defaced by Turkish soldiery, but, in Macedonia especially, it is always the chief object in the village. It must not be forgotten that, after the first centuries of Ottoman rule, even when Bulgarian men and women had everything to gain by a change of faith, cases of apostasy were practically unknown.

The strange heretic sect—dualistic, mystic, ascetic—known as the Bogomils, found many adherents among the Bulgars from the eighth century onwards, and many thousands of them perished in the persecutions organised by successive Emperors, Patriarchs and Popes.

For purposes of convenience, the Ottoman Government divided their Christian subjects into their different religious communities or *millets*, and gave to the head of each millet

religious and, to a certain extent, civil jurisdiction over his flock. The head of each millet was an Ottoman official ; he acted as intermediary between the Porte and his fellow-believers ; he decided their internal disputes, and he was liable to be punished for their misdeeds. The Porte thus took cognisance of creed and not of nationality, and as the Bulgars belonged to the Orthodox Church, they were classified with the Greeks, who formed the most influential section of the Orthodox community.

The Greeks, as representing an older and far higher civilisation, were determined to impose their authority, culture and language on the Bulgars whom the Ottoman Government had thus delivered into their hands. The struggle for the preservation of a national Church and tongue from now onwards lay, not between the Bulgars and the Turks, but between the Bulgars and the Greeks. The Patriarchs were aided in their efforts to Hellenise the Slav population by the policy of the Porte, which, in order to widen the breach between Catholics and Orthodox and to prevent concord among the Orthodox themselves, was willing to favour and support the Greeks at the expense of both Catholics and Bulgars. The Greek Patriarchs of the period were almost without exception rapacious and unscrupulous, and the minor clergy took their tone from Constantinople. What the Church did not accomplish was completed by the Phanariots—the rich Greek merchants of Constantinople, who in the eighteenth century held some of the most important appointments under the Porte. The Bulgars were forbidden the use of their own liturgy and their churches. Their bishoprics were sold to the highest bidder. Greek priests were everywhere imposed upon them, their schools were closed, their books and manuscripts were burnt, they could hold no public office, and in 1767 the archbishopric of Okhrida, the last stronghold of their Church, was suppressed. For one hundred years the Bulgars were deprived of the last outward sign of their national existence.

About the middle of the nineteenth century the Bulgars, whose position had, for reasons which will appear elsewhere, gradually grown much stronger, began to agitate for the recognition of their Church, and as the Porte and the Patriarch were equally unwilling to consider this as a possibility, they started negotiations with the Pope, once more in the hope of gaining political protection if they transferred their allegiance to Rome. As a consequence of these negotiations, the Uniate Church was established among the Bulgars ; this Church, which is under

the jurisdiction of Rome, uses the Slavonic ritual and language and her priests may marry. Russia, however, became alarmed at the prospect of a great schism and brought her influence to bear at Constantinople, with the result that in 1870 the Firman or decree recognising the independence of the Bulgarian Church was granted. The Bulgars then became for the first time a separate millet or community. The Head of the Church was to be called the Exarch ; he was to live in Constantinople and to have jurisdiction over all districts where Bulgars had a two-thirds majority, not only in Bulgaria but in Macedonia as far south as Florina. The Patriarch at Constantinople pronounced the Bulgarian Church to be schismatic, although no alteration in doctrine or ritual had been made.

The creation of the Exarchate was an event of first-rate importance for the Bulgars. They now had their own representative with the Porte and with the Ambassadors at Constantinople. They were no longer voiceless as they had been for nearly five hundred years. They were fortunate in finding a man of strong character and remarkable attainments as their representative in the first troubled years of the existence of the Exarchate. Antim, Metropolitan of Vidin, was well known for his learning and his eloquence, and it needed all his great tact and courage to hold his own, almost single-handed, in the long controversies, ecclesiastical and political, which followed with the Patriarch and the Porte. It was the Exarch Antim who first made known the details of the Bulgarian risings of 1876 and of the massacres following them, and who, at the risk of his own life, pressed for foreign protection for his flock. It was on account of his fearless activities that in 1877 the Porte deposed him and exiled him to Asia Minor. Monsignor Joseph, who succeeded him, was also a man of conspicuous ability, and he had an equally difficult part to play during the Macedonian troubles of recent years, when, in his capacity of Exarch of all the Bulgars, he served as a connecting link between the Bulgars of the Principality and those who still remained under Ottoman rule.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIBERATION OF BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN

THE Bulgars were the last of the Balkan people to regain their freedom, and it has been a common reproach to them that, whereas neighbouring countries had won their independence unaided, it was the Russian and Romanian armies, almost without the help of the Bulgars themselves, which set Bulgaria free. Greece, Romania and Serbia, however, in their struggle for freedom each owed something to the moral or material support of one or other of the Great Powers. It should be remembered also that it was at the cost of at least 12,000 Bulgarian lives that the country won her freedom. Nothing less sensational than the massacre at Batak in 1876 would have stirred the conscience of Europe so deeply that even the intervention of Russia seemed a lesser evil than the continuance of conditions under which such barbarous acts were possible.

The propaganda for freedom had long been going on quietly among the Bulgars themselves. Bulgars have a respect for education which almost amounts to a passion, and early in the nineteenth century young Bulgarian students were to be found in Athens and Constantinople and in Russian universities. The histories of Bulgaria written by Father Paissi and by Uri Venelin, a Slav from the Ukraine, began to be read by Bulgars at home and abroad and to kindle an interest in the past, and a great desire awoke among the people to regain their own tongue and their own schools. In 1835 a group of Bulgarian merchants who had settled in Odessa, after long difficulties with the Greek authorities, started a school in their native country where children could learn their own history in their own language. At first, the Bulgars only asked that their children should learn their own tongue in the Greek schools, but, when the Greeks objected to the use of that "barbarous and dissonant language" in their schools, the persistent Bulgars

determined to have schools of their own. Bulgarian schools had never been entirely stamped out; in 1750 some thirty cloister schools were to be found in the villages throughout Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia; in 1834 there were nearly two hundred schools, and after 1850 the number increased so rapidly that in 1876 there were nearly nineteen hundred primary schools in Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia—more, that is to say, than in either Greece or Serbia, and more in proportion than Romania could show at that period. Gymnasia were started in the larger towns, and it became the boast of the Bulgars that there was hardly a village throughout the country without its own school. These schools were maintained by a voluntary tax paid by the villagers themselves.

The teachers soon became suspect in the eyes of the authorities, and with good reason, for a study of history and a wider education increased the feelings of discontent and the wish for freedom which had long been dormant everywhere. It is not surprising that schoolmasters and schoolmistresses were persecuted by the Turks and that many were imprisoned or exiled. The exiles continued their patriotic work from without; revolutionary committees were organised in Odessa and Bucharest, and three times in the 'sixties forlorn attempts to raise the country against the Turks were made. The names of Rakovski, Levski, Botev and Luben Karavélov are among those of the many young men who hold an honoured place in Bulgarian history as leaders of the movement.¹ To add to the discontent of the Bulgars, about half a million Circassians, refugees from Russian territory, were settled among them between 1855 and 1864; the hearts of the Bulgars were not warmed to the lawless newcomers by being compelled to build villages for them.

Apart from the schools, propaganda was carried on in the reading-rooms and other organisations which were formed throughout the country, and a further impetus to the national movement came in the establishment of Robert College at Constantinople in 1863, and in the work of the American Board of Foreign Missions. From the first, Robert College was thronged by young Bulgars, and when by degrees schools were opened by the Board in various places the influence of American teaching became evident, not only in the growing desire for freedom but in a higher standard of life and conduct than had

¹ Vasov's celebrated novel *Under the Yoke*, in which historical characters mix with imaginary figures, paints with the fidelity of a Dutch artist a picture of village life at this time.

been known before. Bulgaria owes a great debt to the quiet work of these American missionaries, who attach less importance to the making of converts than to the training of character, and who have identified themselves with the life of the people. The translation of the Bible by Dr. Riggs and Dr. Hamlin was looked on by natives themselves as the standard of good Bulgarian. The fact that the educational movement, intensely nationalistic and progressive in its character, could be carried on openly shows that the influence of the Phanariot was growing weak, and that the Porte had not been insensible to the pressure for reforms which had been intermittently imposed upon it by the Powers.

The steps leading up to the war between Turkey and Russia which set Bulgaria free belong to European rather than to Bulgarian history. The growth of the Pan-Slav movement after the Treaty of Paris in 1856; the increasing interest of Russia in Balkan affairs; the counter-movement in Turkey itself headed by Midhat Pasha, with its theories of reform within the Empire and Ottomanising of all Ottoman subjects; the reaction; the insurrection of 1875 in Bosnia and the Hercegovina and its severe repression; the sympathetic fighting in Montenegro and Serbia; the Treaty of Reichstadt in 1876 between Austria-Hungary and Russia, by which the eventual reversion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was promised to the former as a price for her neutrality; the war between Russia and Turkey—all marked stages on the way to the inevitable conflict between the Porte and the Power whose interests were most concerned.

The situation became critical when, in the summer of 1876, the terrible details of a massacre of Bulgars at Batak¹ were made known through the instrumentality of Mr., afterwards Sir Edwin, Pears, correspondent of the *Daily News*. An abortive rising in South Bulgaria had been followed by the indiscriminate massacre of the inhabitants of a village, which had not been actively concerned in the rising, at the hands of the Bashi-Bazuks and Pomaks—a massacre that was countenanced, if not actually ordered, by the Turkish authorities. The British Government and the British Embassy were at first inclined to discredit or minimise the story, but ultimately one of the Embassy secretaries was sent to make inquiries on the spot; his report stated that fifty-nine villages had been burnt and he estimated that 12,000 people had been killed. The impression of horror created in England was intensified by the passionate

¹ Thirty-two miles south-west of Philippopolis.

speeches and writings of Mr. Gladstone and the championship of the Duke of Argyll. But though public opinion was deeply moved throughout Europe, none of the Powers wished for war, and again a Conference of Ambassadors was held to press reforms on the Porte. Their efforts were, however, nullified by an astute move on the part of Midhat Pasha, who persuaded the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, to proclaim a liberal constitution, and thus to put an end to all outside suggestions.

But it was now over a hundred years since Russia had begun her efforts on behalf of the Christian people of Turkey, and Count Ignatief, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, had little faith in the promises of the Porte. On April 24, 1877 the Tsar, Alexander II, announced that, having exhausted all pacific measures, Russia was "compelled by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more definite acts," and war was declared. Romania had agreed to allow the passage of Russian troops and in May General Gurko entered Bulgaria.

In the campaign that followed, the Bulgars themselves took little part. A Bulgarian Legion, consisting of six regiments, which won the admiration of the Russians for their courage, was formed, but no general rising was possible, for there were some 225,000 Turkish troops in the theatre of war—without counting the armed Mussulman villagers—and the Christian peasants were unarmed. General Gurko met with little opposition at first; he took Trnovo, crossed the Balkans by the low pass of Hainkoi¹ and then, turning back into the mountains, took the Shipka Pass from the south. His advance on Adrianople was checked, and, after some severe fighting at Stara Zagora, in which the Bulgarian Legion suffered heavily, the Russians and Bulgars were driven back into the heights of the Shipka Pass, which they held through the hardships and dangers of a Balkan winter.

Osman Pasha, who proved the hero of the campaign, had meanwhile entrenched himself in July round the open town of Plevna with 50,000 men, and here he held out with the utmost courage and through great privations for five months. The Russians lost heavily in their first attempts to take the town, and finally were glad to ask the help of the Romanians, although the Grand Duke Nicholas had some 70,000 men under his command about Plevna. Prince Charles of Romania, with his 50,000 men, after severe fighting captured the strongest of the Plevna defences, the Grivitsa Redoubt, and on the same day Skobelev was equally successful on the Russian left; but the assault

¹ Thirty-five miles south-east of Trnovo.

entailed 16,000 casualties. It was only after the complete investment of the town under the direction of Todleben and after a desperate *sortie* that, on December 10, Osman Pasha was forced to capitulate owing to the exhaustion of his supplies. Gurko's army then advanced on Sofia, and Skobelev's divisions, crossing the Balkans by rough goat-tracks along which the troops climbed in single file, surprised a force of 100,000 Turks to the south of the Shipka Pass at the village of Shenovo, and took 80,000 prisoners. The Turkish peasants in some parts of the country are said to have suffered heavily at the hands of the Cossacks and of the Bulgarians themselves. When the Russian headquarters moved on to Adrianople, the Powers became alarmed at this threat to Constantinople itself, and for some days war between England and Russia seemed imminent. Count Andrassy's proposals for a congress of all the Great Powers averted the danger for a time.

Before the Congress met, the Treaty of San Stefano¹ between Russia and Turkey had been signed on March 3, 1878. This Treaty, which was drawn up chiefly by Count Ignatiev, was, as might be expected, a settlement entirely in favour of the Slavs, whereby the Turkish Empire lost practically all its hold over its European provinces. The Treaty promised Bulgaria a restoration of her former Empire, for though she was to remain a tributary state she was to be ruled by a Christian Governor, and her boundaries were to stretch from the Danube to the Aegean and from Okhrida to the Black Sea. The new State would thus include almost all Bulgarian-speaking people, and, with the example of neighbouring countries before them, the Bulgars might well have felt that their vassalage would not last long.

Protests from all the Powers against the Treaty at once arose, in which the British Government took a leading part. The British attitude at this time was influenced by three considerations: a sentimental regard for the Turks, as former Allies in the Crimea; a conviction that, to use Sir Henry Layard's words, it would be "very difficult to replace Turkey in Europe"; and a genuine dread of Russia. To Lord Beaconsfield a Greater Bulgaria, which he imagined would be a mere dependency of Russia, implied a Russian occupation of Constantinople and a threat to the Indian Empire. Before the Congress met, secret diplomacy had prepared the way for far-reaching changes in the Treaty. So convinced was Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador in London, that England would go to

war rather than see the Treaty carried out, that he not only signed a secret document by which the project of a Greater Bulgaria was given up, but also induced the Tsar to accept the agreement. A secret Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey, which was signed on May 4, supplied further proof that England was determined to guarantee Turkey against Russia.

The Congress of Berlin brought together the most distinguished statesmen of Europe. Very few of them, except Prince Gorchakov and Count Shuvalov, representing Russia, and Count Andrassy, representing Austria-Hungary, had any personal knowledge of the countries whose fate they were about to decide, and certainly no altruistic interest in them. Greece, Romania and the Bulgars themselves had no voting powers. Great Britain was represented by Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, whose policy it was to support Turkey and to thwart Russia, and who returned to London with the unexpected prize of Cyprus as the reward of their efforts on behalf of the Porte. Lord Beaconsfield, who was, his biographer states, recognised as the pivot on which the Congress turned, regarded the question of Bulgaria as the foremost and most vital issue of the negotiations ; he looked at the question, however, not from a humanitarian or nationalistic point of view—indeed, so little known were the Bulgars to the rest of Europe, that one of the most distinguished personalities of the time could speak of them as “hardly even Christians”—but as a means of breaking up a great continental alliance and of rehabilitating Turkey, and thereby safeguarding British interests in the East. But if the attitude of Bismarck as President and of some of the chief delegates was cynical in the extreme, the atmosphere was often heated, and it needed all the President’s tact to keep the Congress together, although the chief collaborators were already in general agreement as to the terms of the compromise.

It was more than a compromise : it was the sacrifice of the main idea of the Treaty of San Stefano. The Treaty of Berlin,¹ which was signed in July 1878, created the autonomous and tributary Principality of Bulgaria, under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The province to the south of the Balkans was separated from autonomous Bulgaria, and its name of Southern Bulgaria was, at the instance of the British delegates, changed to that of Eastern Rumelia ; it was to remain under the direct control of the Porte, though with a Christian Governor.

¹ *v. Map, p. 87.*

Macedonia was, with a promise of reforms, to be placed once more in the hands of the Turks. Lord Salisbury was able to point out triumphantly that Bulgaria did not possess a single port of commercial value, and that Turkey had now been provided with a "defensive frontier." It says much for the generosity of the Bulgars that they have almost forgotten the share Great Britain took in depriving them of the united national existence which seemed within their grasp, while the portrait of Mr. Gladstone, who championed their cause in 1876, hangs beside that of the Tsar Liberator in many a Bulgarian home. By articles in the Treaty, reforms which were to benefit all subjects of the Porte were to be introduced into all the provinces of Turkey, and the Powers, in the case of the Armenians, undertook to superintend the application of such improvements and reforms. The Treaty recognised the complete independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, but, always with the fear of a Pan-Slav movement, precautions were taken to prevent the formation of a Greater Serbia. Prince Gorchakov's comment on the Treaty is significant: "We have sacrificed 100,000 picked soldiers and 100,000,000 of money for an illusion."

The Treaty of San Stefano, and the Treaty of Berlin which four months later reversed it, decided the course of Balkan events for the next four decades. The first Treaty stimulated Slav national spirit throughout the Balkans and beyond, and gave a definite form to Slav aspirations; the second Treaty attempted to quench the hopes that had been raised, and to fix conditions on lines which had little reference to the desires of those concerned.

The creation of a Greater Bulgaria would have meant a blow to Hellenic ambitions, and would have entailed hardship on the Greek population along the *Ægean* coast and scattered through Southern Macedonia, for the lot of minorities in the Balkans is never happy. Had the Treaty of San Stefano been carried into effect, it is unlikely that the troubles of recent years would have been altogether averted; for there were forces at work, both within and without the Turkish Empire, which an essentially Slavonic settlement could not long have held in check; but there could be no hope of permanence in an arrangement which set one-third of a people free and left the other two-thirds in subjection.

CHAPTER V

PRINCE ALEXANDER OF BATTENBERG

RUSSIAN arms had set Bulgaria free, and it was as natural that the organisation of the new State should be left in Russian hands as that the Bulgars should gratefully accept the help and advice of their benefactors. The events of the first decades of Bulgaria's independence show, however, a series of anomalies and inconsistencies, of changes of sentiment and of rôle, which can be explained in part by the temperament of the Bulgarian people and in part by the personal relations and characters of the rulers of Bulgaria and Russia.

The Treaty of Berlin placed the provisional administration of Bulgaria under the direction of a Russian Commissary, assisted by a Turkish Commissary and by Consuls representing the Signatory Powers, until the completion of the Organic Law. Russian troops to the number of 50,000 men were to occupy Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia for the ensuing nine months, and Russian officers were sent to organise and train the Bulgarian Army. Russian officials were brought in to fill the administrative posts of the whole country, for there were few Bulgars who had any practical experience of public life or office. To all intents and purposes, Bulgaria was administered as a Russian province.

The Organic Law which the Russian Commissary, Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, and his advisers presented to the Constituent Assembly at Trnovo in 1879, and which they accepted, surprised everyone on the one hand by its liberality, and on the other by the safeguards which had been devised to control the powers of both the Prince and the Sobranje. Those who suspected Russian designs saw in the Constitution an ingenious scheme, by which Prince and Sobranje could be played off against each other at the will of Russia; but to the Bulgars their Constitution became from the first a sacred thing, which no one, Prince or Minister or foreigner, could touch with impunity.

By the Constitution, the Prince is head of the Army and can appoint and dismiss all officers ; he nominates and can dismiss his Ministers, who need not be members of the Sobranje but who are responsible to him only ; he can dissolve the Sobranje and order fresh elections at his pleasure ; he need not change his policy, even in the event of a continued parliamentary majority against him ; and no law is valid without his sanction.

The Sobranje or Assembly consists of a Single Chamber elected by universal manhood suffrage ; all literate citizens of thirty years of age are eligible for election ; members of the House are paid ; freedom of speech and from arrest during session, except by consent of the House, are guaranteed. The Sobranje passes laws and raises funds by taxation or loan. The Constitution does not, it is true, provide for the contingency of a disagreement between Prince and Sobranje, and of his refusing his assent to any measure, but, having a democratic Assembly and a democratic Army to reckon with, the limitations to an apparent autocracy are sufficiently evident. The Grand Sobranje is an elected assembly, which is convoked for the decision of specific questions only—territorial or constitutional or dynastic changes, or the appointment of a regency.

Certain general principles were laid down in the Constitution as a basis for future legislation—complete liberty of worship, equality of all men before the law, inviolability of property, freedom of the press, right of public assembly, prohibition of slavery and torture, prohibition of titles, universal military service, compulsory free primary education. The Russian Imperial Commissary who compiled the draft Constitution was thus responsible for providing Bulgaria with an autocratic ruler, and at the same time with a free parliament and advanced liberal principles.

The Bulgarian people were hardly ready for the liberality of their Constitution, and their practice as regards free elections and rights of citizens was not, at first at all events, in accord with the principles embodied in it. But if corruption and violence were by no means unknown under the Constitution, it must be remembered that the people had emerged from their long subjection as a natural democracy. Their nobles had for the most part become Mohammedans five hundred years before ; the rest had sunk together and had now risen together. The only superiority, if we except a few rare cases of wealth, lay in character and education.

Bulgars are as a rule fluent speakers, and they took to

debate and party politics with a vehemence that did not always stop short at words. The violence of the first few years of their modern history is easily explained by their past, for political power under the old régime had usually meant power to punish opponents. Even under Turkish rule they had gained some experience in the management of their own affairs, and it says much for the good sense and economy of the first Sobranjes that after eleven years of independence they could show a surplus of over a million and a quarter sterling. The mass of the people naturally took at first but little interest in their political rights and privileges ; it was enough for them that the conditions under which they cultivated their land were better.

The Prince whom the Trnovo Assembly elected as Bulgaria's first ruler was Alexander of Battenberg, son of Prince Alexander of Hesse and an officer in the Prussian Army. In many ways the Prince seemed an ideal figure-head for the new State. He stood well with Russia, for he was the favourite nephew of Tsar Alexander II ; he was a good soldier, tall and handsome, with an attractive personality, frank, generous and enthusiastic. He had in some degree the defects of his qualities ; he was impulsive, impressionable and not always discreet in the expression of his views ; sometimes he was obstinate ; at the age of twenty-two he was naturally inexperienced in affairs, and though never wanting in physical bravery he lacked the political courage and firmness which were essential for success in dealing with the very difficult conditions existing in Bulgaria.

Until Alexander II's death in 1881 the Prince was not forced to face the situation which was to prove the tragedy of his reign, and it was only gradually that he came to realise that he must choose between Russia, the protector of Bulgaria, and Bulgaria herself. The Russian officials who still occupied most of the responsible posts in the country and the Russian officers who were organising the Army had not won the affections of the Bulgars. The Russians did not disguise their contempt for a people who seemed to them rude and backward and uncivilised ; they were not tactful in dealing with them ; they did not disguise their conviction that they had come into Bulgaria to stay. The Bulgars knew well that they had at first everything to learn as to the art of government and war ; but they knew also that they were quick learners, and they were confident that they would soon be able to direct their own affairs. They resented the masterful attitude of the Russians ; they resented the expense entailed by foreign officers and officials ; and they had no intention of exchanging Turkish

rule for Russian domination. Gratitude to Russia as the deliverer was tempered by dislike of the Russians as rulers. There was, however, always a party in Bulgaria, not in itself less patriotic than the party which took the opposite view, which derived its ideals from Russia and which believed that Russian protection was essential for the new State. But those who belonged to this party did not fear absorption into the Empire, because they knew the independent, intensely nationalistic spirit of their countrymen. Almost from the first, politicians in Bulgaria were divided into two camps, Russophobe and Russophil, and it is not necessarily a reproach to some of her foremost statesmen that they have sometimes belonged to one camp and sometimes to the other.

The three statesmen who exercised most influence on the fortunes of Bulgaria for the next twenty years were Zankov, Karavélov and Stambulov. Zankov, who had been a Turkish official, has been described as a born intriguer and conspirator ; Karavélov, whom his countrymen call the incorruptible, was a man of marked ability, a good linguist, a student of philosophy, by profession a schoolmaster. Both he and Zankov lived and died poor ; both were at times Russian in their sympathies, but in 1885 Karavélov took as his watchword "Bulgaria for the Bulgars." Stambulov, who as a youth had risked his life in revolutionary movements, was a lawyer by profession. To his enemies he appeared as a cruel tyrant, respecting neither Prince nor Constitution nor individual liberty ; but if indeed Russia had intended to absorb Bulgaria, it is to Stambulov more than to any other man that Bulgaria owes her independent existence to-day.

At the outset Prince Alexander was entirely dominated by Russia, to whom he imagined that he owed his throne. In 1881, after a long conflict with the Liberals, then led by Zankov, he declared that the Constitution was unworkable and suspended it. He obtained the assent of a packed Sobranje to a seven years' period of absolute rule, and made a Russian general his Prime Minister. But two years under the dictation of Russian officials sufficed to show the Prince his mistake, and in 1883 he restored the Constitution, with first Zankov and then Karavélov as Prime Ministers. Alexander III, who had now succeeded his father as Tsar, lost no opportunity, from this time onwards, of showing his personal hostility to his cousin. An attempt was even made by two Russian generals to kidnap the Prince and was only frustrated by the courage of the sentry on duty at the palace.

In September 1885 matters came to an inevitable crisis in Eastern Rumelia, the province which the Treaty of Berlin had arbitrarily separated from the rest of Bulgaria. A bloodless revolution took place in Philippopolis. Gavril Pasha, the Turkish Governor-General, was deposed and Major Nicolaiev, who had organised the movement with the cognisance of at least some of the authorities at Sofia, proclaimed the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria under Prince Alexander. The Prince, foreseeing difficulties with the Powers, hesitated before he accepted the union. Stambulov, to whom hesitation and scruples were alike unknown, told him that two roads lay before him, "the one to Philippopolis, and as much farther as God may lead; the other to the Danube and Darmstadt."

The effect of the union on the Powers was the reverse of what might have been expected. Turkey, the suzerain, whose Governor-General had been deposed, was unwilling or unable to resent the movement. Russia, the Power which had originally planned a yet greater Bulgaria, instantly showed her displeasure by recalling her officers from the Bulgarian Army and by removing the Prince's name from her army list. Great Britain, formerly the opponent of the Greater Bulgarian idea, had by this time altered her attitude and had come to see that Bulgaria, far from being an outpost in a Russian advance on Constantinople, meant, on the contrary, a barrier to Russian progress in that direction, and that the stronger the barrier the better it would be. Lord Salisbury, acting on the advice of Sir William White, British Ambassador at Constantinople, stood firmly by the Prince and the union. King Milan of Serbia, however, using an insignificant border dispute as pretext, on November 14 declared war on the neighbour whose frontier policy had already annoyed him and whose accession of territory seemed to threaten his own predominance in the Balkans.

It was an extremely difficult moment for Bulgaria: the union with Eastern Rumelia was barely two months old, and the reorganisation of the new province was by no means complete. The recall of the Russian officers had left the Bulgarian Army with scarcely an officer above the rank of captain, for all the higher posts had been filled by Russians; but the Army had nevertheless been mobilised in October in anticipation of a Turkish attack. The Russian officers had done their six years' work so well that the young Bulgars whom the Prince now chose for command were full of confidence in themselves and their men. The peasants came in readily, for the

action of Russia had served to unite the whole country ; many Mohammedans and 3,000 Macedonians joined the Army. Transport was improvised from country carts and peasants' horses, for the railway went no further than Sarembei, 120 kilometres from the Serbian frontier.

At first the Bulgars, who were outnumbered--most of the troops being in East Rumelia--retreated before the Serbian invaders, but, after three critical days' fighting on the bare rocky hills near Slivnitsa, reinforcements began to arrive from the east. One regiment marched 95 kilometres in thirty-two hours, only 62 men out of nearly 4,500 falling out on the way. The Serbian Army became demoralised before the vehemence of the Bulgarian attack, the Dragoman Pass was taken, Tsaribrod recaptured and, a fortnight after war had been declared, Bulgarian troops crossed the Serbian frontier and Pirot was taken. Already diplomatic efforts for an armistice had been made, but the Prince would not hear of peace till he should be on Serbian soil. On November 27 Count Khevenhuller, the Austrian diplomatic representative at Belgrade, whose suggestions had inspired King Milan to make war, told Prince Alexander that if he advanced further he would find himself face to face with Austrian troops, who were ready then to enter Serbia. The Prince had to yield, and Bulgaria gained nothing from Serbia in the Treaty of Bucharest which was concluded in March 1896. Serbian and Bulgarian losses had been about 6,000 in each case, and the cost to Bulgaria was 25,000,000 francs. The success of the Bulgarian Army was not without influence on the Powers, and the Sultan solved the question of Eastern Rumelia by naming the Prince Governor-General for five years, in spite of the persistent opposition of Russia.

As a doubtful compensation for the loss of the province, the greater part of the wild region in the Rhodope which was inhabited by the Pomaks, and which had been assigned to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Berlin, was given back to the Sultan. This cession of territory, though it meant no loss of revenue to Bulgaria and the gift only of an Albania on a small scale to Turkey, was nevertheless regarded as a false step on the part of the Prince, and his popularity suffered in consequence. It was not till 1893 that the Pomak district which remained in Bulgarian hands was finally "pacified."

But although the Bulgars north of the Rhodope Mountains were now united and the Prince's position apparently secure, Russia had decreed his downfall and was willing to stoop to criminal methods to compass this end. To the Russian people

he had come to personify the ingratitude of the Bulgars and the frustration of Pan-Slav ambition. A plot organised by a Russian officer to kidnap or murder him having failed, efforts were made to corrupt the Army, and tools were found in certain officers who were dissatisfied with their advancement. On August 21, 1886 the Struma Regiment was brought to Sofia and, possibly under false pretences, compelled to disarm some loyal troops ; the palace was surrounded, and the Prince, after being aroused from his sleep by a party of cadets, many of whom were intoxicated, was forced to sign his abdication, and was then driven to Rahovo on the Danube, and thence conveyed in his yacht to Russian territory.

The news of his abdication came as a complete surprise to the country at large ; a provisional government formed by the conspirators, among whom were Zankov and the Metropolitan Clement, gave place on the 24th to a Regency composed of Karavélov, Stambulov and the Minister of War. Within a few hours regiments in all parts of the country declared their loyalty to the Prince, and Stambulov telegraphed to him at Lemberg, begging him to return. On the 29th he was again on Bulgarian soil and each stage of his journey was marked by an enthusiastic welcome. But he had already taken a false step. From Ruschuk—at the instigation probably of the Russian Consul—he had telegraphed to the Tsar, expressing his willingness to return his crown to Russia which had given it to him. The Tsar replied that he could not approve the Prince's return to Bulgaria and would refrain from all intervention in the sad state of affairs to which the country had been reduced.

Those who saw the Prince on his return to Sofia spoke of him as a man unnerved and broken by the long strain of combating Russian intrigue, by the treachery of some of his own officers and by the indignities and sleeplessness of the last few days and nights. The manifesto in which he took leave of Bulgaria left no room for doubt as to the part which he attributed to Russia in his misfortunes :—

“ Having become convinced of the painful truth that my departure from Bulgaria will facilitate the re-establishment of good relations between Bulgaria and Russia, and having received from the Government of the Empire of Russia the assurance that the independence, freedom and rights of our State shall remain intact, I declare to my much beloved people that I have renounced the Bulgarian throne.”

On September 8 Prince Alexander, who was accompanied

by a long train of sympathising subjects as far as Vidin, took leave of Bulgaria. He entered the Austro-Hungarian Army and, after a short married life in retirement, died in 1893. His body was brought to Sofia for burial, where there were still many who felt that the country had been lacking in loyalty to its first Prince.

The Prince was probably right in his decision to leave Bulgaria. He had, it is true, the support of Stambulov, the strongest man in the country; and he was personally popular with the mass of the people and especially with the soldiers, whose hardships and dangers he had shared at Slivnitsa, and with his Mohammedan subjects, to whom he had been a generous protector. But he had an implacable enemy in Russia, the scurrilous Zankovist press had created an atmosphere of opposition to him within the country, and there were many among the more educated who could not forgive him for his action in suspending the Constitution in 1881.

When once Bulgaria had decided that she would not be a Russian province, a conflict with Russia was inevitable, and it was equally inevitable that she should incur the charge of black ingratitude to her deliverer. The facts that her Prince was a German and that the Tsar disliked him did not help matters, but they did not create the difficulty. If he had in the end to own himself beaten by Russia, the Bulgars knew that he had identified himself with the movement for national unity in 1885, and that the success of the Army which had given Bulgaria her place as an equal among Balkan nations was in great part due to his energy and enthusiasm.

CHAPTER VI

STAMBULOV AND PRINCE FERDINAND

NEARLY a year passed between Prince Alexander's abdication and the arrival of his successor, during which time Stambulov remained supreme in the Regency of Three. It was a stormy year for the country, marked by plots and military revolts, in all of which Russian agents were thought to have been concerned. The disturbances were followed by executions of officers and punishment of suspects. Karavélov, the ex-Regent, with some of his friends and rivals, was thrown into prison, where, it is alleged, he was cruelly ill-treated. Directly after Prince Alexander's departure Russia had made a determined effort to reassert her supremacy. General Kaulbars was sent from St. Petersburg as special Commissioner to help the Bulgars with his advice in their difficulties. In spite of his efforts to prevent it, a Grand Sobranje met to elect a prince. Russia contended that, as the elections for the Sobranje had been held without her consent, they were invalid. She refused, therefore, to recognise any decision taken by the Sobranje and finally recalled Kaulbars and her Consuls.

It proved no easy matter to find a prince willing to take the throne, who would be acceptable at once to the people and to the Powers. The Prince ultimately chosen who decided to accept the venture was Ferdinand of Coburg. He stipulated that his recognition should first be obtained from the Porte and from the Powers, but as it soon appeared that recognition would not be accorded without great difficulties, he decided to throw in his lot with the Bulgars and risk the future. For Stambulov, the important thing was to secure a prince as head of the State; the Powers had condemned the union with Eastern Rumelia in 1885, but had soon acquiesced in a *fait accompli*, and he was content again to wait.

Ferdinand was the youngest son of a member of the house of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, with large estates in Hungary. His mother

was Princess Clémentine, the youngest daughter of King Louis Philippe, a gifted lady, whose influence at the Courts of Europe was of great value to her son ; and her purse was always at his disposal. Ferdinand will probably be remembered by the Bulgars as the King whose miscalculations led his people into a disastrous war, which lost for them their natural outlets on the Ægean and their natural heritage in Macedonia. It is not possible to say how far his policy was guided by personal and dynastic ambition, and how far by ambition for his adopted country ; but both ambitions led along the same road, and both, if report was true, were in some degree held in check by an unsoldierly disposition.

The Prince was in all respects a contrast to his predecessor, and an even greater contrast to the man who called him to the throne and who was for seven years his Premier. Ferdinand was proud of his Bourbon descent ; he was accustomed to the easy luxury of life in Vienna or on a great Hungarian estate. He insisted on a certain degree of Court ceremonial, which was not altogether to the liking of his new subjects ; he was contemptuous of solecisms in manners and customs, autocratic and often inconsiderate and ungrateful to those about him. Some of his personal tastes showed him, however, in a different light. He was a keen observer of nature and a pleasant companion on a mountain excursion. He had a genuine liking for botany and natural history, and far more than an amateur's knowledge of both subjects ; his zoological garden was in some respects one of the best in Europe. As a politician and diplomat, he had more than a few of the qualifications for success—intelligence, shrewdness, patience, knowledge of affairs—but there were few who trusted him, and many who thought him to be without scruples or strong moral convictions.

The Prince took the oath at Trnovo on August 14, 1887. Stambulov was with difficulty persuaded to remain in charge of the administration ; but he became Premier of a Cabinet which, in spite of many internal changes, lasted till 1894. He had been willing to retire into private life, but, if he accepted office, it was certain that his power would be absolute. The Prince, who was, of course, ignorant of the language and conditions of the country, was seldom consulted ; if Stambulov conceded a point to him, it was with the warning that it should not be considered as a precedent. There was, from the first, little liking between the Prince and the Dictator, but the former realised that there was no one in the country to compare with him in experience, ability and strength of character.

Stambulov had to face a continuance of the difficulties with which he was already familiar. One intrigue and conspiracy followed another, and always with the suspicion or certainty of the connivance of Russia. Attempts to overthrow the Government were organised by Zankov and his followers, but were quickly suppressed. When the Holy Synod refused to pay their respects to the Prince on the pretext that he was encouraging Catholic propaganda, Stambulov arrested the recalcitrant bishops and sent them back to their own dioceses. The Metropolitan Clement, an ex-Regent and consistent Russophil, was interned for many years in a monastery by his orders. A serious plot, in which the greater part of the Army was involved, was discovered at the last moment, and Major Panitsa, the ringleader, though he had been a personal friend of Stambulov, was shot. The prisons were said to have been filled with the Dictator's political opponents, and the country permeated by his spies and secret agents. The number of his enemies grew every year. In 1891 Belchev, the Finance Minister, was murdered at Stambulov's side, in mistake for the Premier himself; the next year, his friend, Vulkovich, the Bulgarian agent at Constantinople, was assassinated. Stambulov realised that his own turn would come before long.

In external affairs Stambulov—now that Russia had ceased from overt interferences—concentrated his efforts on establishing better relations with Turkey. The Porte had contented itself with protests as to the Prince's position and as to the taking over of a section of the Oriental railway, and the Sultan at last consented to receive Stambulov as representative of the vassal State. The most important result of the better understanding was the restoration by the Porte of several Bulgarian bishoprics in Macedonia. The price paid to the Porte for this concession was the sacrifice of a Greco-Bulgarian agreement as to the partition of Macedonia, which had been suggested by Tricoupis, the Greek Prime Minister.

The tension between the Prince and his Premier grew more acute each year, and Ferdinand's hand was seen, it was thought, in the sordid intrigue which ended in the resignation of Savov, the Minister of War, who as a young officer had distinguished himself at Slivnitsa. Stambulov and Savov had drawn up a law for the reorganisation of the Army, with a view to curtailing the Prince's arbitrary control of the appointment, promotion and dismissal of officers—a measure which naturally kindled his resentment. Petrov, who succeeded Savov in the Cabinet, was a favourite of the Prince, and the avowed enemy of Stam-

bulov. In spite of Petrov's promises of loyal co-operation, it at once became evident that a wedge had thus been inserted into Stambulov's Cabinet which would before long succeed in breaking up his power. It is true that Stambulov did all in his power to promote the Prince's marriage with Princess Marie Louise of Parma, and had even prevailed on the Sobranje and the Exarch to consent to the children of the marriage being brought up in the Catholic, instead of the Orthodox, Church. But Ferdinand bitterly resented the courtesy and tyranny with which he was treated, and when the birth of a son in 1894 seemed to assure his dynasty, he felt himself strong enough to dismiss his Minister.

Stambulov's fall was followed by a violent reaction against him; crowds insulted him in the streets, his house was searched, his movements were watched and restricted. He took his revenge on the Prince in an attack—as unjustifiable as it was venomous—which was published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. For this he was prosecuted, and the Prince then, it is said, withdrew his protection from him. On July 15, 1895 three men, armed with knives, set upon Stambulov and his friend Petkov, as they were driving home at night; Stambulov was almost cut to pieces and died three days later. The *Svoboda*, which had been his newspaper organ, did not hesitate to publish the following: "Who are the murderers of Stambulov? Who took the life of such a man as Bulgaria will never see again? Who lifted the *yalaghan* against him? They are officially unknown, but all Bulgaria knows them. For the last seven months, we have repeatedly and openly declared that the Government was keeping the assassins of Belchev and Vulkovich to murder Stambulov." Several years passed before any one of the murderers was brought to justice; in 1901, Hallio Stavrov was condemned to death for the crime, but his sentence was commuted to fifteen years' imprisonment. In 1907 Petkov, who was with Stambulov when he fell, and who shared some of his friend's characteristics, was himself assassinated.

A few months after Stambulov's death Prince Boris, then two years old, was "converted" from the Catholic to the Orthodox Church. This step caused a lasting grief to his mother, and brought temporary excommunication on his father, but it led to reconciliation with Russia and recognition for the Prince. After the reconciliation, the old classifications of Russo-phil and Russophobe naturally lost their meaning, but the name of Stambulovist still served as a party label. Political parties

became greatly subdivided, the differences between the various platforms and programmes being, however, less marked than the dislike of each party for the other. The masterful personality of Stambulov, his fierce rivalries with other public men and with Ferdinand himself, the stories of his brutality of address, his cruelty and his courage, his unflinching challenge to Russia, dominated the stage, as far as Bulgaria was concerned, as long as he lived. It was from Stambulov that the rest of Europe evolved the idea of a typical Balkan statesman—a violent, barbarous person, living in an atmosphere of intrigue and plot and assassination. But though Stambulov's imposing figure filled the foreground, it is the background of the scene which possessed the more real importance.

During the first two decades of Bulgarian independence, in spite of the war with Serbia and of strained relations with Russia and the Porte and in spite of internal troubles, great progress along regular lines had been made. To an observant foreigner who visited the country in 1894 the rapidity of development in Bulgaria seemed comparable with that of a recently opened district in the New World. Stambulov's Government had spent money freely on public works; roads and bridges had been made, banks established, public safety improved by the suppression of lawless bands, a few factories had been started, the town of Sofia had been modernised and partly rebuilt, and primary schools had been opened in nearly every village, although it was difficult at first to find competent teachers for more advanced education.

The strength of Bulgaria lies in her agricultural population, and though the peasant is slow to adopt modern methods, his ceaseless toil does much to atone for the deficiency. The land was until recently ploughed by oxen, the grain was sown and reaped and bound by hand, was trodden out by a team of horses driven round in a circle, and tossed into the air by a spoon-like implement to winnow it. The country carts, drawn by oxen or buffaloes, retained their primitive form. An English traveller, writing in 1850, says that the ploughs and harrows were formed from branches of trees, without iron, and with twisted osiers for ropes, and that the cart-wheels were solid blocks of wood. Plums and apples and pears were passed through the rudest presses and stills to make the *slivovitsa* or *rakia*, which the peasant loves. Every article of clothing that the peasants wore was made by the women of the family; each house had its own loom, for cloth or linen or silk, and the women even on their way to the fields or to the bazaar were

rarely without their knitting-needles or spindles. The national dress, as it is still worn to-day, dates back, as old pictures show, in form and ornament to the Middle Ages at least. The long coats of cloth, the designs of the embroidery which adorns the linen garments at the neck, front and sleeves, the brilliantly coloured woven aprons and elaborate socks and stockings, not less than the heavy silver clasps and buckles and rings are all traditional in form, and often peculiar in detail to a single village. The tireless industry of the women was not limited to household tasks ; they always did their full share in the fields, but if the men had to go to war, the women took their places, and the harvest did not suffer. Even with old-fashioned methods, the frugal peasant grew prosperous from the proceeds of his wheat and maize and tobacco and vines and livestock, which were his own, as they had never been in Turkish days.

CHAPTER VII

MACEDONIA

THE history of Bulgaria is closely bound up with the fate of Macedonia. The Treaty of San Stefano in 1878 had raised the hopes and recognised the claims of the Bulgarian peasants of Macedonia ; but the provisions of the Treaty had been altered, not on the merits of the case, but for reasons which admittedly had no bearing on the interests of those immediately concerned. The responsibility for what proved to be the worst period in all the history of Macedonia must therefore rest with the Powers which signed the Treaty of Berlin, and in no small measure with Great Britain—to whose attitude the changes in the Treaty were mainly due.

External and internal considerations forbade a solution of the Macedonian question in the simple way in which the Eastern Rumelian problem had been solved, viz. by a proclamation of union with Bulgaria. On the one hand there were the interested Powers, on the other the Balkan peoples themselves. There was, moreover, the large Turkish garrison of Macedonia to be reckoned with. The Powers which were deputed to see that the reforms promised to Macedonia by the Berlin Treaty were carried out were Austria-Hungary and Russia, as being those which were most interested in the Balkans. Unfortunately, the interest of these two Powers was more personal than altruistic. Austria-Hungary held Slav provinces of her own by force rather than by loyalty, she had difficulties with Serbia, and she desired the port of Salonika. Russia was the liberator, but not at that time the friend, of Bulgaria ; she was the special patron of Serbia, and was credited with the wish to possess Constantinople. Austria-Hungary and Russia could be trusted to neutralise each other's efforts in the Balkans, and thus to preserve the *status quo*, which was then the main object of European diplomacy.


Although the majority of the rural inhabitants were

undoubtedly Bulgarian—numbering almost a million souls—there were in Macedonia representatives of all the Balkan nationalities. There was a large and active Greek population along the Ægean coast and for some distance inland in all the chief towns, and also in scattered villages throughout Southern Macedonia. There were the Vlachs, representing the Romanians, who were mainly inhabitants of mountain settlements or wandering shepherds; there were the Albanians, who filled a dangerous borderland to the west and north; there were Serbian villages to the south of Old Serbia; there were the Turks themselves, who were the Government officials and landlords and military, dwellers chiefly in towns, but the poorer class sometimes sharing a village with their Christian neighbours. It must be admitted that it would be impossible to draw boundaries in Macedonia so as to provide each nationality with a water-tight compartment to live in, and at the same time to ensure to each any degree of economic prosperity.

Each of the Christian Balkan countries desired expansion, and each looked on Macedonia as the most promising field for enterprise. Historical claims to the country on the part of Greeks, Serbs and Bulgars are mutually destructive, and need not be seriously considered; for ethnographic maps are often coloured by the sympathies of those who draw them.

Whatever they may have called themselves in the far past, or even in the days when the Patriarchate suppressed the Bulgarian Church and language, there is no doubt that in 1876 and during the thirty years following the mass of the Slav population of Macedonia believed themselves to be Bulgars. It is a good rule in the Balkans to consider that a man is what he believes himself to be and, above all, that he is what he has suffered for being. In physical characteristics, dress, manners and customs and speech, the Slav peasants were Bulgarian. It was as Bulgars that they rose against the Turks in 1878, 1880 and 1908; it was as Bulgars that the Greek bands attacked them in 1904 and the years following; it was as Bulgars that the young Turks alternately favoured and persecuted them from 1908 onwards. It would be no great consolation to these peasants to tell them that certain learned ethnographers have lately decided that they are neither Bulgars nor Serbs, but "Macedonian Slavs," and that, though they may call themselves Bulgars, they are ignorantly using the word in a wrong sense.

The chief bane of Macedonia may be said to have been propaganda and reprisals—propaganda which made a man change his tongue and his Church and his nationality, often



THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN (1877-78)

at the muzzle of a revolver, and reprisals which punished him and his persecutors for the conversion so effected. It was a vicious circle out of which for many years the Macedonian peasant had no way of escape.

It was impossible for Bulgaria to remain indifferent to what went on in Macedonia. Half the population of Sofia is said to have been of Macedonian origin, and there have always been Macedonians among the Cabinet Ministers and chief officers of the Army. The school teachers of Macedonia had for the most part been educated in Bulgaria. When matters became intolerable in Macedonia, refugees came across the frontier in hundreds, and sometimes in thousands. The tale of their sufferings was known at first hand. Troubles in Macedonia meant public meetings and agitation in Bulgaria; a massacre by a Greek band near Kastoria¹ meant the burning of the Greek quarter of Philippopolis.

Since relations with Turkey and Greece and Serbia were frequently critical, the Bulgarian Army had to be kept in a state of constant readiness. Apart from the anxiety which the state of Macedonia created for the rulers of the country, to the people as a whole the thought of the sufferings of their own kith and kin was a shame and a grief, an open sore which could not heal.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, the interest and the action of Bulgarian history shift from Bulgaria to Macedonia, and an outline of events there must be given, in order to understand the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and the attitude of Bulgaria in 1914.

The Bulgars of Macedonia did not accept the decisions of the Treaty of Berlin as final. At first, in their despair, they took matters into their own hands; but the hopeless risings in the Struma valley and in central Macedonia were put down with the usual severity. Then for a time they returned to the old methods of patient preparation, entrusting the maintenance of the national spirit to the churches and schools. As long as Stambulov lived they could hope for no support from Russia, nor was he likely to disturb relations with the Porte by pressing for reforms or encouraging separatist movements.

In 1893 the "Internal Organisation," better known under the general name of the "Committee," began its work in Macedonia. It was formed in the first place under the leadership of two well-educated Macedonians, Damian Gruev and Christo Tatarchev. Before long its branches spread through

¹ Forty-eight miles south-west of Monastir.

the whole country. In the objects, formation, methods and influence of the Committee there is much that resembles the Sinn Fein organisation. The aims of the Committee were to hasten the work of the schools, to put pressure on the Bulgarian Government, to keep the Macedonian question before the Powers generally and, eventually, to have an armed force ready which, with or without outside help, would be able to overthrow Turkish rule and set the country free. The form of freedom which the Committee contemplated was autonomy under a Christian governor, who should be responsible to the Powers; Moslems and Christians of all nationalities were to have equal rights within the Province. It was, however, a foregone conclusion in each Bulgar's mind that the dominant influence in Macedonia should be Bulgarian. The idea of annexation to Bulgaria was less popular, although it found favour as an alternative.

The Committee was a secret society controlled by elected members, who met at uncertain intervals, always in different places. Funds were raised partly among the well-to-do Macedonians of Sofia, partly among the peasants and merchants in Macedonia; sometimes the contributions were voluntary, sometimes they took the shape of forced levies. Although help came at times from Bulgaria, the whole organisation was worked from within Macedonia itself. The Bulgarian Government knew a great deal, but they did not control the movements of the bands, and on the whole their policy was rather to check the activity of the Committee, to prevent volunteers from crossing the frontier to join the bands, and certainly to discourage the embarrassing stream of refugees which was always pouring into Bulgaria.

Each Bulgarian village in Macedonia had to supply a contingent of men and rifles; there was secret drilling, and most of the able-bodied men served for a time with the local band. The system of communication—telegrams as they were called—was complete and secret. Discipline was severe; spies and traitors were tortured and killed; occasionally a foreigner or notable was kidnapped and held to ransom. The strength and genuineness of a movement can often be gauged by the attitude of women towards it. The Macedonian women knew as much as their men about the plans and movements of the bands; they acted as messengers; they carried provisions to the hiding-places; they suffered more than the men when punishment came. There was a common saying among the men: "If we did not want to go with the bands, our women would make us go."

Some of the leaders were educated men ; some were peasants, brave and simple people, whom their followers loved and trusted ; others were cruel and unscrupulous desperadoes. In the early days it was a struggle to be free as their brothers in Bulgaria were free, a struggle that called forth qualities of self-sacrifice, courage and devotion for which few had given credit to the Macedonian peasant. Instances could be multiplied of the way in which the people faced torture or death for their cause—priests and women who endured the bastinado but did not speak, leaders of bands who shot their own followers with their full consent and finally themselves, rather than fall into the hands of their enemies. The band system became in later years tyrannical and terroristic even among co-nationals, when the people had been exhausted and goaded to death by rival propaganda. Later on, too, the struggle was complicated by a renewal of the old conflict between Greeks and Bulgars and became peculiarly cruel and bitter in character. All Balkan peoples are cruel and hold life in light esteem, and rival Christian nationalities have suffered at each other's hands fully as much as at the hands of their Turkish masters.

It was not till 1897 that the Turkish authorities became definitely aware of the existence of the Committee ; names and plans were revealed under torture, and a period of house-to-house perquisition and punishment followed, in which the priests and school teachers naturally suffered most. The authorities—Turkey was then at war with Greece—could not be blamed for dealing severely with a widespread insurrectionary movement ; nor could the Porte be expected to realise that only by granting a large measure of autonomy at once could Macedonia be retained for the Sultan.

In 1902 a band of some 400 men under General Tsonchev crossed from Bulgaria into Macedonia, and carried on a guerrilla warfare for a few weeks ; but the Internal Organisation did not support the movement and there was no general rising. Again the people suffered from cruel reprisals. The movement served an end, however, for in 1903 Austria-Hungary and Russia, now acting as the medium through which pressure was to be applied to the Porte, were moved to draw up a scheme of reform. But the extremists of the Committee did not wish for reforms which would perpetuate Turkish rule. Dynamite outrages at Salonika were followed by strong measures. Hilmi Pasha, the Viceroy, was by this time thoroughly alive to the situation ; the reserves were called out, troops were brought over from Asia Minor, the prisons were filled to overflowing

with Bulgars. The artisans who were accustomed to work abroad were not allowed to leave their homes, the schools were closed, and massacres occurred in two of the villages. It was a reign of terror throughout Macedonia.

The Committee decided on a general rising in the Monastir vilayet; preparations were carefully made, and on August 2, 1903 the telegraph lines were cut, communications interrupted, and for three weeks the 5,000 men who formed the various contingents held a district of some two days' ride across against ten times as many Turkish troops. The movement was doomed to failure, but the Macedonian peasant was at that time so confident in himself, so intoxicated with the spirit of nationality and so desperate, that to him everything seemed possible. The Turkish commander organised drives through the country, forcing the bands from place to place till the men were all killed or dispersed, and the villages concerned in the movement were burnt. Some 70,000 people were left homeless and took to the mountains. It was a winter of great suffering, mental and physical, but the spirit of the people remained unbroken. In Thrace, where a sympathetic movement had taken place, the same treatment was dealt out to the villagers, with the result that some 20,000 left their homes and took refuge in Bulgaria.

The events of the summer stirred Austria-Hungary and Russia to further action, and a scheme known as the Mürzsteg Programme of Reforms was evolved. Christians were admitted to a share in the Government; two "civil agents," representing Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, were attached as advisers to the Viceroy of Macedonia, Hilmi Pasha, and owing to the initiative taken by Lord Lansdowne, then at the British Foreign Office, officers were sent to reorganise the Turkish Gendarmerie, chosen not only from the "interested" but from each of the Signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty. A year later, the Sultan was compelled to accept financial advisers, also nominated by the Powers. In some respects the situation became far worse as a direct result of the arrival of foreigners.

There was another factor in the case which made it certain that no great change in the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte would take place. From 1886 onwards Germany, with a view to her schemes for a Berlin to Baghdad railway and for concessions in the Middle East, had become the patron and supporter of Turkey. In conformity with her attitude as "the friend for ever" of all Mohammedans, she opposed any step that might be displeasing to the Sultan, and it was fully

realised by the Great Powers that undue pressure on the Porte would be resisted by Germany and might lead to European complications.

In 1904 Greek bands were organised in Greece and sent over the frontier to operate against the Bulgarian villages, thus to counteract the prestige which the Bulgars had won even from their unsuccessful rising. From the north, Serbian bands began to operate in what was considered the Serbian sphere of influence; Vlach bands took their place in the general anarchy; Albanian bands had always existed; and when Sir Edward Grey's proposals for effective control and the meeting of the Tsar and King Edward at Reval in 1908 portended that there would soon be foreign interference in real earnest, a national spirit arose among the Turks also, and Moslem bands began to make their appearance. Raids, burning of villages, murders, massacres on a small scale were of daily occurrence, and the various consulates were occupied in drawing up lists of outrages committed by bands of one nationality upon bands or villages of another, and balancing the result in their monthly reports. Macedonia was in the grip of a band system which made life in a Greek or Bulgarian village intolerable.

The situation was relieved in a way that took Europe by surprise, although signs had not been wanting of an impending movement. The Young Turk Revolution, which had been skilfully and secretly organised by the Committee of Union and Progress, was proclaimed at Salonika on July 23, 1908. The Albanians and the 2nd and 3rd Army Corps supported the Committee, the Sultan yielded and restored the Constitution of 1876. It was a moment of great emotion and great joy and sincerity throughout Macedonia, although it was a moment only. The Turks, old and new, the Albanians, the Greeks, even the suspicious Bulgars felt for a short space that it would be possible to live peaceably as Ottoman subjects in a world in which there was a free parliament, and in which no spies or corrupt officials or foreign intervention existed.

In October 1908 Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary severed ties with the Ottoman Empire which had long been merely nominal. Ferdinand declared the independence of Bulgaria and was proclaimed Tsar of the Bulgars (October 5) at Trnovo, the capital of their former kings; and the Emperor Francis Joseph formally annexed the Serb provinces of Bosnia and the Hercegovina, which had been occupied by Austria-Hungary since the Treaty of Berlin. The course of action had been decided on a few weeks earlier at a meeting between the Emperor and

Ferdinand. When Russia encouraged Serbia in her natural resentment at the blow to her national ambitions, it became evident at once that Germany had approved and would support all that had been done.

Peace in Macedonia only lasted for a few weeks. Even if the Young Turks had shown exceptional administrative ability, the first delirious happiness could not have continued. There was fundamental opposition between the idea of the union of all as Ottoman subjects and the nationalistic ideas which dominated all Christian peoples in the Balkans, free or not free. Things had now gone too far ; the sufferings of the last five years and the fierce campaigns of propaganda which had been carried on by the rival nationalities had made what might have been possible even after the rising of 1903 an impossibility now. Among the Mussulmans themselves all was not well. Within a year of the proclamation there had been war with the Arabs ; a counter-revolution, organised by the forces of reaction, had broken out in Constantinople and had been put down by the Salonika Army ; the Sultan had been deposed ; the Albanians were in the midst of a savage war with the Government which lasted for two years ; and the bands were again active in Macedonia. In 1911 came the war with Italy, which ended in the cession of Libya.

The Young Turk Government had, in the first year of its power, declared all revolutionary associations to be illegal ; but though these had been ostensibly dissolved, they reappeared under the guise of clubs. In 1909 the clubs, too, were for obvious reasons suppressed, and a law was passed, dealing drastically with the formation of bands. Village authorities were made responsible for what a band did in their neighbourhood, and for harbouring a member of a band ; a family with a missing member might be punished ; perquisition for arms and the usual penalties were authorised. The peasants soon found that the methods of the Young Turk General, who had pacified the Albanians, were in no way different from those with which they had grown familiar during the last ten years. The situation was made yet worse by the arrival of thousands of Mohammedan refugees, many of them escaping from the régime of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Turkish Government found land for these unfortunate people, often at the expense of the Bulgarian tenants or would-be tenants, thereby creating a new grievance and one which acutely affected the land-loving Bulgarians. The suppression of the

national clubs, the persecution of suspects, the settlement of the *mohajirs* (refugees), were all measures which were as justifiable from the Young Turk point of view as they were unbearable from that of the Bulgars, who were once more awaiting their opportunity to make another effort for freedom.

It was not only the Bulgars of Macedonia who were affected by the measures taken by the Young Turk Government, though it was mainly against them, as the most dangerous of the nationalities, that these were directed. The Greeks, who had never sympathised with the Young Turk Movement, had fallen into special disfavour owing to events in Crete, and had been punished by an economic boycott and by repressive treatment as regards their churches and schools. Two years of Young Turk Government had destroyed illusions on all sides, and it seemed clear that intervention or war was again imminent.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BALKAN LEAGUE

It was naturally to Bulgaria that the Bulgars of Macedonia looked for deliverance, and it may well be asked why, if indeed they were all one people, did not Bulgaria come to their help? It was not that she was unmindful of her obligations, for practically her whole policy was influenced by the condition of affairs beyond the mountains. The many Cabinets which had succeeded each other since Stambulov's death had, each and all, been concerned chiefly with the two questions which were closely connected with each other, finance and Macedonia. When the harvest was bad and financial difficulties began, the Government naturally wished to keep out of trouble with Turkey and so held aloof from Macedonian affairs; but public opinion was always in sympathy with the movement, and it often seemed likely that the people would force the hands of those in power. The Danev Cabinet fell in 1903 largely because of the Premier's repressive policy towards the Bulgarian bands in Macedonia. The Racho Petrov-Petkov Cabinet, which succeeded it, had a difficult part to play during the rising of 1903, and at the time of the Greek atrocities in 1904. It is said that, as a race, the Bulgars are neither generous nor emotional; but at that time they were ready for any sacrifice and any adventure, and it was only the calculating coolness of the Prince which kept them from war in 1903 and 1904. Prudence prevailed, and instead of war a convention was signed with Turkey, by which it was agreed that Bulgaria should check the band movement, and that Turkey should release Macedonian prisoners in Asia Minor. The convention, which was never carried into effect, showed at least that the Porte acknowledged Bulgaria's right to intervene in Macedonian affairs.

The situation was difficult enough owing to the perpetual mental tension with regard to Macedonia and the financial

strain involved by large military expenditure. It has been estimated that in 1909 Bulgaria was "maintaining a peace effective, proportionately to the population, half as much again as France, and a slightly larger proportionate annual charge for the Army than that of the wealthiest European countries."¹ This could not go on indefinitely, and yet Bulgarian statesmen realised that, single-handed, Bulgaria could not set Macedonia free.

The idea of a Balkan alliance was no new thing; it dated back to the days of Prince Michael Obrenović. Greece and Bulgaria, and Serbia and Bulgaria, respectively, had at different times begun negotiations to this end, but on each occasion foreign influence had been able to undo what had been begun. The position of Serbia had been essentially altered in 1908 by the annexation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary; her hopes of reunion with peoples of her own blood and of outlets on the Adriatic seemed now shattered for ever, and she had begun to look for expansion in Macedonia instead. The miserable condition of the Serbs among the Albanians in Old Serbia fully justified intervention, and Serbia was beginning to make good her claims to the south by the usual Balkan methods. But she, too, realised that alone she could accomplish little, and the inspiration came to both Serbia and Bulgaria to transform rival into common action.

But no Balkan question could be decided by Balkan countries alone. Behind them stood, like guardian angels or evil geniuses, the great rival Powers of Austria-Hungary and Russia. Austria-Hungary was the enemy of Serbia, and Russia had shown little cordiality to Bulgaria, and little sympathy with Macedonian sufferings. In 1909, however, it became evident that Russia—perhaps with a view to finding a *revanche* for the success of Austria-Hungary's recent move—was renewing her interest in the Balkans. She intervened in a friendly manner in the discussion between Turkey and Bulgaria as to the indemnity to be paid to the former for loss of sovereign rights, took over the responsibility for the debt to Turkey at the figure suggested by Bulgaria—the latter having to repay her by easy instalments—and paid Turkey the balance herself. Isvolski, the Russian Foreign Minister, was able to boast that Russia had freed Bulgaria a second time. In April 1909 the independence of Bulgaria was recognised by the Powers.

In March 1911 the Malinov Cabinet, which had been in office since 1908, gave place to a Government which was

¹ *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, by "A Diplomatist."

formed by a coalition between the Geshov party, or Nationalists, and the Danev party, or Progressists, the latter being Russophil in policy. Danev was regarded by those who did not like him as being imbued with more than the average share of Bulgarian obstinacy and self-confidence. During the summer an important step, which indicated coming developments, was taken when the Grand Sobranje sanctioned a change in the Constitution by which the King was empowered to make secret treaties with foreign countries, without submitting them to the Sobranje. The only opposition to this measure came from the Socialists and the Agrarian Party, who were now beginning to make their influence felt in the country.

A secret treaty between Bulgaria and Serbia had existed since 1904, but, though friendly conversations had taken place in 1909 in Belgrade, it was not till October 11, 1911 that Geshov and Milovanović, the Bulgarian and Serbian Premiers, came to an agreement as to the principles on which an offensive and defensive alliance could be made. No special action was to be taken for the moment, but Russia was to be kept informed and any partition of Macedonia was to be reserved for the arbitration of the Tsar of Russia. But when the details of the alliance came to be worked out difficulties arose. Speaking generally, Bulgaria was in favour of autonomy for Macedonia, while Serbia wished to create three zones: an uncontested Serbian zone, an uncontested Bulgarian zone, and a contested zone which should be subject to the arbitration of the Tsar. Serbia recognised Bulgarian rights over the vilayets of Adrianople and Salonika, and Bulgaria recognised Serbian rights over the vilayet of Scutari and that of Kosovo to the north of the Šar mountains. Discussions, which were conducted with a great deal of suspicion and obstinacy on both sides, went on for several months as to the places which should be assigned to each country. Neither side was willing to make concessions, but nevertheless there remained a sufficient stock of goodwill to prevent a rupture. Gradually the idea of autonomy gave place to a scheme of partition. An autonomous Macedonia meant, probably in the minds of both parties, a repetition of the story of Eastern Rumelia. The news that Russia was treating independently with Turkey hastened matters, and in March 1912 the Treaty was signed.

Negotiations with Greece, which had begun earlier than those with Serbia, and which were even more delicate in their nature, had followed a very different course. They were initiated in a series of conversations in Athens between

Venizelos and J. D. Bourchier, the *Times* correspondent, whose long and intimate knowledge of Balkan politics gave him a unique position in the Peninsula. In the spring of 1911 Venizelos' proposal, which was known only to King George of Greece and to Bourchier, was sent by hand by Bourchier to the Bulgarian Legation in Vienna, together with long letters to King Ferdinand and Geshov. Both Bulgarian and Greek Cabinets were kept in the dark, and the greatest secrecy was observed even after the matter had been put on a diplomatic footing. Bourchier visited Sofia in September 1911, and induced the King and Geshov to entrust him with a verbal request to Athens that the agreement should be made formal. On his way back to Athens, Bourchier visited both the Patriarch and the Exarch in Constantinople, in order to enlist their influence in favour of an understanding on general lines. The Patriarch declared his readiness to abolish the Bulgarian "schism," but some of his conditions would not have been acceptable to the Bulgars, and it seemed best not to bring the Church into the negotiations. King George and Venizelos finally agreed to put the matter on a diplomatic basis, and in October 1911—a few days after Geshov's preliminary talk with Milovanović—the Greek Minister at Sofia made, on behalf of his Government, a verbal offer of a defensive alliance against Turkey. This was accepted on reciprocal terms, and in May 1912, after considerable discussion as to "the eventual demand by Bulgaria of administrative autonomy for Macedonia and the vilayet of Adrianople," the Treaty with Greece was concluded. The Treaty was anything but precise, but, in view of later events, not much was lost on either side owing to the vagueness of its conditions.

An agreement with Montenegro, which did not take the form of a signed treaty, was arranged verbally in a series of interviews during the summer of 1912. As to all these treaties, absolute secrecy had been observed towards the world at large, with the exception that the Russian Government had throughout been kept informed.

Russia, while sympathising warmly with the idea of a general agreement, advised caution and delay; but the events of the summer forced the hands of the Balkan Governments. In June, the Young Turk Cabinet fell; the Albanians rose once more and overran the country as far as Üsküb, and their demand for autonomy was granted; in August, a massacre of Bulgarians at Kotshana (N. Macedonia)—whether provoked or not, is uncertain—roused great indignation in Bulgaria; and in

September the Turks began preparations for holding manœuvres in Thrace, near the Bulgarian frontier. The Powers, to whom the existence of the Balkan League had now become known, promised, at the eleventh hour, to "take into their hands" the execution of reforms, and they made proposals by which the autonomy of Macedonia should be guaranteed. Had the welfare of Macedonia been of more value to the Balkan Allies than their own hopes of territorial gains there, they might even now have given up the idea of war; but, on the other hand, they must be forgiven if, looking back on thirty-four years of unfulfilled promises, they preferred a new method of obtaining reforms.

The proposals from the Powers came too late. Agreements between the Bulgarian and Serbian General Staffs and a Military Convention between Bulgaria and Greece were hurriedly pushed through, and on October 8 Montenegro, the smallest and most adventurous of the Allies, declared war on Turkey. Her army advanced into the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, and on the Albanian town of Scutari, which had been strongly fortified by the Turks. On the 17th the Porte declared war on Serbia and Bulgaria, and on the 18th Greece declared war on Turkey.

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST BALKAN WAR

THE general plan of the Allied campaign was that the Bulgars should advance as rapidly as possible on Constantinople, while the Serbs (supported by a small Bulgarian force) and the Greeks should advance from the north and south respectively on Salonika. The Montenegrins were to advance on Scutari. Under the terms of the military convention with Serbia, Bulgaria promised to supply an army not less than 200,000 strong.

The King was nominally Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army, but in practice everything was left to the assistant Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Savov. Savov had retired to Austria after leaving Stambulov's Cabinet in 1898, and had been out of touch with Bulgarian affairs for some years. As a soldier, he was esteemed as a man of great powers of organisation and of strong character and quick decision. General Fichev, his Chief of Staff, who belonged to the same political party—the pro-Austrian, as distinguished from the pro-Russian—had completed his military education at Turin. He was credited with a good grasp of detail and knowledge of theory, while his prudence and honesty were such that, at a critical moment in November 1912, he fell into disfavour with King Ferdinand.

The Bulgarian mobilisation—it is officially stated that Bulgaria eventually mobilised 620,000 men (out of a population of about 5,000,000)—was effected with great rapidity. Popular enthusiasm would have been still greater had the advance been made into Macedonia and not into Thrace, but it had long been realised that it was in Thrace that the main Turkish Army must be defeated before Macedonia could be set free. The Bulgarian forces were divided into three armies: the First under Kutinshev, 68,000 strong; the Second under Ivanov, 65,000, and the Third under Radko Dimitriev, 53,000 strong. All of

these were to operate in Thrace, while another force of about 50,000 was to co-operate with the Serbs in the Vardar Valley; in point of fact, the Bulgarian troops in the Vardar theatre did not exceed 32,000. It was expected that the main Turkish force would concentrate near Kirk-Kilisse, a town some twenty-six miles east of Adrianople, on a branch line from the Constantinople-Adrianople railway. Savov's plan was that the First and Third Armies should seek out and dispose of this main force, while the Second Army should mask the fortress of Adrianople.

The railway from Bulgaria to Constantinople follows the line of the river Maritsa, passing the strongly fortified town of Adrianople about twenty miles beyond the Turkish frontier. Roads along the course of the rivers Maritsa and Tunja, coming from the west and north respectively, converge on Adrianople, so that as long as that city remained in the hands of the Turks the railway and main roads from Bulgaria into Turkey were blocked. The Bulgars, who were ill supplied with siege artillery, did not attempt to take Adrianople in the first instance, but were content to invest it with the Second Army under Ivanov. The Third Army, commanded by Radko Dimitriev,¹ a man of great personal courage and energy, and very popular with the troops, had for its objective the envelopment of the Turkish right flank, while the First Army advanced eastwards from the Tunja Valley on Kirk-Kilisse. The Third Army made its way through the Istranja Mountains, and approached Kirk-Kilisse from the north and north-east. The Istranja Mountains do not reach more than 2,000 feet in altitude, but they are thickly wooded and are crossed only by the roughest of tracks. The sudden appearance therefore of a Bulgarian Army from this direction took the Turks by surprise, and Kirk-Kilisse was occupied on October 24 with but little difficulty.

The Turks retreated from Kirk-Kilisse in a disorder which bordered on panic, but they succeeded in making a stand, some twenty miles further off, on the Kara-Agach River, where their position extended from Lüle Burgas north-eastwards for a distance of close on twenty-five miles. This Turkish force has been variously estimated from 48,000 to about 70,000 men, and was under Abdullah Pasha. The Bulgarian Third Army

¹ On the outbreak of war in 1914, Radko Dimitriev, who was then Minister Plenipotentiary in St. Petersburg, resigned his post and entered the Russian Army. He eventually commanded an army corps and fought near Riga and on the Galician front; after the fall of Kerenski he retired. On his refusal to enter the Red Army, he was assassinated by the Bolsheviks.

waited three days before continuing its advance; the First Army had not yet come up and the transport was still far behind. Thus it was not till the 29th that the Third Army began to attack the Turkish position. The battle of Lüle Burgas lasted five days. By the second day the position of the Third Army had become critical; but the First Army, which had been delayed by bad roads and heavy rains, was now beginning to arrive on the field. On the fourth day the superiority of the Bulgarian artillery made itself felt, and the river was crossed, with the result that, on the fifth day, the Turkish defence collapsed completely, and the Turks retreated in confusion towards the Chatalja Lines. The Bulgars now found it necessary to wait five days, partly to rest their tired troops and partly to allow their transport, which had experienced great difficulties, to come up. This respite from pursuit enabled the Turks to reorganise their troops, to bring up stores and to strengthen their position at Chatalja.

The Turkish position at Chatalja, which covers Constantinople at a distance of nearly twenty-two miles, follows a low range of hills stretching from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, a distance of about twenty-one miles. The front of the position is, in the main, protected by a wooded and difficult marshy region. The defences had to be entirely remade, for the old forts, which had been hastily constructed during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, were found to be useless. On November 17 the Bulgars launched their assault, but, after three days' desperate fighting and the loss of at least 10,000 men, they gave up the attempt to advance on Constantinople, and withdrew to a defensive position. Without heavy guns or support from the sea, it was, as Fichev had foreseen, impossible to break through the Lines. The Bulgars had a superiority in artillery over the Turks by two to one; but the German war critics claim that on this occasion, when the Turkish Krupp guns were well handled, they proved more effective than the Bulgarian Creusots.


Europe had been amazed by the rapid and apparently complete success of the Bulgarian advance, and the Press, which had hitherto shown little sympathy with Bulgarian affairs, had, after Lüle-Burgas, predicted that nothing could prevent the victorious troops from entering Constantinople. If the Bulgars had been able to follow up their success at Kirk-Kilisse immediately, it is thought that the Turkish forces—whose movements then seemed to a German Staff officer to be more like the migration of a people than the march of an army—

could never have been reorganised, and that such troops as were not captured would have dispersed without making any further stand. But the Bulgars, even if they had fully realised that the main Turkish force was in disorganised retreat, were incapable of rapid pursuit, owing to great transport difficulties and to sickness, due to a complete absence of sanitary precautions and medical equipment.

After leaving railhead at Yamboli all supplies and ammunition had to be transported by ox-wagon over a roadless hilly country, which heavy rains had rendered even more difficult. The mortality amongst oxen had been extremely heavy. It took an ox-wagon six days to reach Kirk-Kilisse, and ten days to reach Lüle-Burgas, from railhead. No one can be less exacting than a Balkan soldier as to his rations—bread and cheese is all he asks—or more enduring of fatigue ; but hunger, dysentery and cholera had told cruelly on the men, and it was evident to the few foreigners who saw them at Chatalja, and to Fichev himself, that the Bulgarian effort was spent, and that the army would be unable to deal the final blow. The Third Army alone had had 28,000 cases of cholera. But if the Bulgars had suffered, the Turkish soldiers, than whom none are braver and more uncomplaining, had suffered a hundredfold more from the same causes ; there was lack of food, equipment, ammunition, medical aid and organisation generally, and there was, moreover, a total absence of training and even a grave dearth of officers. The scenes between Kirk-Kilisse and Chatalja were pitiable in the extreme.

By the end of November the Bulgars were in possession of the greater part of Thrace, but Adrianople still held out, while Chatalja still protected Constantinople. On December 4 an armistice was signed.

Colonel Immanuel, the German military critic, attributes the collapse of the Turkish forces in Thrace, in the first place, to a loss of *moral*, consequent on the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, who had been the supreme head of the Army ; also to the presence of Christians in the ranks—an admission, that is, of the principle of equality, tending to diminish the fanatical enthusiasm which had formerly distinguished Mussulman troops. In the second place he contends that the German military mission had not had time to complete the reorganisation of the Army, and that when war broke out nothing was ready. General von der Goltz, who had acted as Instructor to the Turkish Army from 1883 to 1895, had returned to Constantinople in 1909 with thirteen German instructors for the



BALKAN WAR OF 1912

Shelters erected by Bulgarian troops

purpose of reorganising the Army. Colonel Immanuel also points out that, whereas Savov was working on a definite and prearranged plan, the Turkish Minister of War constantly interfered between the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders, and that, in the case of the Turkish Army, both unity of command and *liaison* between fighting units were absent. Immanuel concedes, moreover, that, man for man, the superiority lay with the Bulgars and Serbs. It is admitted by all critics that, in military training, the Bulgars had a great advantage over the Turks, many of whom had never fired a rifle, whereas for many years past the Bulgars had called out several classes of reservists for the annual manœuvres.

In the other theatres of war the Allied Armies had been equally successful. The Greek Army, numbering 60,000 under the Crown Prince Constantine, had taken all the small towns in Southern Macedonia near the Greek frontier, with no serious engagement except when a detachment came in contact with a superior Turkish force from Monastir: Salonika had capitulated, practically without resistance, early in November. A Bulgarian division had reached Salonika a few hours after the surrender, a detachment remaining in garrison for the rest of the war. The Greek fleet performed valuable service by preventing the transport of Turkish reinforcements from Asia Minor to Thrace across the *Æ*gean Sea.

To the Serbs who, according to the terms of the Military Convention, were to employ an army of not less than 150,000 men and to operate in Macedonia, Üsküb (Skoplje) had been assigned as first objective. The First Serbian Army under the Crown Prince had fought a two days' battle at Kumanovo, north-east of Üsküb, where the main Turkish force in Macedonia had concentrated. This battle cost the Serbs 4,000 casualties and the Turks about 12,000. The Turks then uncovered Üsküb and fell back towards Salonika and Monastir in demoralised retreat. The Serbian advance through difficult country to Prilep resulted, on November 18, after a three days' battle, in the capture of Monastir, together with some 8,000 prisoners. These operations, in which the Serbs displayed characteristic gallantry and endurance, have been described by Immanuel as the "best performance of the entire Balkan War." What remained of the Turkish Army retreated into the fastnesses of Albania, a portion reaching Yannina, where the Turkish garrison was still holding out. Further north the Serbs had joined hands with the Montenegrins, and two Serbian expeditions, pursuing a political rather than a military objective, penetrated

through the wild regions of Albania and reached the Adriatic at Alessio and Durazzo respectively.

The position at the time of the armistice signed by Turkey with Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro was that the authority of the Porte had ceased to exist in Thrace and in Macedonia, and that the remains of the Turkish forces were concentrated within the Chatalja Lines covering Constantinople, and also in three fortresses, in which supplies were already running short viz. Adrianople, Scutari and Yannina. Greece did not sign the armistice, as she wished to make good her claims in two directions first, namely, by the occupation of Yannina and of the Aegean Islands.

It is not surprising that the Allied demands were great, and that they were obstinately pressed by the delegates, who met in London in December. The Bulgars asked for the vilayet of Adrianople, the port of Rodosto on the Sea of Marmara and the islands of Samothrace and Thasos, while both friends and enemies credited Ferdinand with designs on Constantinople itself. The Turkish delegates fought for time so as to allow other situations to develop. Russia and Germany were equally concerned, for different reasons, that Bulgaria should not come too near Constantinople; the autonomy of Albania, which the Conference recognised, might well lead to a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; Romania was pressing for compensation from Bulgaria, as a reward presumably for her inaction; and there was every prospect of trouble between the Allies in the partition of Macedonia. A diversion came in an unexpected way. The Young Turk Party, led by Enver Bey, turned out the Old Turk Cabinet under Kiamil Pasha by a *coup d'état*, and the War Minister¹ was murdered. As the Young Turks seemed still less conciliatory than their predecessors, the Balkan delegates broke up the Conference, and the terms which Bulgaria seemed on the point of obtaining, namely, Adrianople and Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line, slipped from her grasp.

On February 3, 1913 hostilities were resumed. The Turks made an attempt to move on Adrianople from the isthmus of Gallipoli, but the Bulgars repulsed the attack on their positions at Bulaïr with great gallantry, and Turkish troops which had been landed to the north of Bulaïr from the Sea of Marmara were re-embarked next day. The siege of Adrianople was again pressed; and the arrival of the Serbian siege-train in February meant the beginning of the end. On March 25 the

¹ Nazim Pash.

Bulgars and Serbs, after long bombardment and repeated assaults, entered the city almost simultaneously, and Shukri Pasha surrendered with over 39,000 officers and men. Yannina had, three weeks before, capitulated with a garrison of 23,000 men to Crown Prince Constantine, who had been in command of operations there since January. The capture of Yannina ranks as the most important Greek success of the war. At the end of April, when Scutari fell to the Montenegrins, the triumph of the Allies was complete.

Turkey had asked for the mediation of the Powers when Adrianople had surrendered. The delegates again met in London, and after a fortnight's discussion the Treaty of London, the provisions of which had already been drawn up by the Powers, was signed on May 30, 1913. By this Treaty the whole of European Turkey passed into the hands of the Allies, up to what was called the Enos-Midia line, that is, a line drawn from Enos on the *Æ*gean near the mouth of the Maritsa to Midia on the Black Sea, passing within about seventy miles of Constantinople itself. The Young Turks had gained nothing by the reopening of the war, except in so far as the Bulgarian Army had been weakened by several additional weeks of fighting. The Bulgarian losses were heavy both at Bulair and Adrianople, and the troops had suffered greatly from short rations, from sickness and from want of shelter in the inclement weather. It was in Thrace that the longest and most important of the Allied campaigns had been fought. The Bulgarian official statement gives their casualties as 93,000 as against the Serbian official figure of 31,000 Serbian casualties, and the Greek official figure of 29,000 Greek casualties during the war. The Bulgars had been given the post of honour—from their geographical position it could hardly have been otherwise—and their quality as soldiers had been proved; but the length and difficulty of their task had debarred them from taking part in the Macedonian fighting.

CHAPTER X

THE RUPTURE OF THE ALLIANCE

ANY inquiry into the causes of the rupture of the Balkan Alliance and of the calamitous war waged by Bulgaria against Serbia and Greece must deal to a great extent with comparisons of dates and documents and interpretations of treaties and conventions, but even more with the psychology of the peoples concerned. It is not merely a question as to which country struck the first blow or which country began the first intrigue that led to discord ; the root of the matter lies rather in national character and national aspirations.

The wonder was, not that the victors should dispute over the division of the spoils, but that, given the conflicting aims, the recent and extremely bitter hostilities, and the widely divergent temperaments of the three peoples, they should ever have found a common basis of action, and should have worked together loyally even for the space of a few months. The Serbs and the Greeks with their highly strung temperaments, their impetuosity, their susceptibility to art and poetry and sentiment, live on a different plane from the Bulgars, with their narrow outlook, their uncompromising obstinacy, their self-confidence—the defects of a character which, in its strength and power of resistance and its severe practicality, has nevertheless elements of great national value.

A Bulgarian peasant is a suspicious person, for suspicion of other people's motives and conduct is part of his inheritance from Turkish times ; he thinks every man's hand is against him. He is very sure of his own case and will give up none of his points, but he is not a good advocate for himself with the outside world. He is a hard bargainer, but he will fulfil his own share of the bargain, and he expects the other party to do the same. When he is fairly beaten he will not say much about it ; but he will try to make good what he has lost by other means, and he will bide his time. If suspicion and

obstinacy marked the Bulgarian side of the negotiations between the Allies, it must at least be remembered that grounds for suspicion existed and that obstinacy meant a conviction of the justice of the case.

The three Premiers, on whose negotiations so much depended, were all men of past middle age, and each had served his country for many years in various capacities. Geshov, a man of English education, of business training and experience of foreign countries, was cautious, slow to act, moderate and pacific in his attitude of mind. Paslić, impressive and dignified in appearance, was deeply versed in the game of politics and diplomacy of the old Oriental school and was supposed to be Bulgarophil in his tendencies. Venizelos, with his quick intelligence and great vigour, his liberal views, his eloquence, his power over men's minds, was the fitting leader of a nation whose increasing purpose it was to win back their ancient Empire.

The personality of King Ferdinand counted for much at every stage of the negotiations, for he possessed a complete ascendancy as regards the policy of Bulgaria. This ascendancy was based not on popularity with his subjects, for he had never won their affections, but partly on his close acquaintance with Bulgarian affairs and his absolute control of the Army, and partly on his own undeniably ability. His marriage in 1908 with Princess Eleonora of Reuss-Köstritz, a philanthropic lady who was deeply interested in hospital work, had been prompted by the wish to strengthen ties with Austria not less than with Germany, for Princess Eleonora had lived a great deal in Vienna. The marriage had not led Ferdinand to modify his way of living, nor had it altered his character. In spite, however, of frequent prolonged visits to his Hungarian estates and of the seclusion of his life when in Sofia—in later years he was often inaccessible to the foreign diplomatic representatives and even to his own Ministers—Ferdinand had an intimate knowledge of the characters and careers of Bulgarian politicians and of all the details of public affairs, a knowledge of which he often made an unscrupulous use. The morality of public life, according to those who denounced his government as a system of favouritism and corruption, weighed far less with him than the material aggrandisement of his kingdom. It was here only that the Bourbon King, who despised his subjects, and the Bulgarians, who desired reunion with their kinsmen beyond their frontiers, found common ground; but while the people were thinking of Macedonia, those who knew Ferdinand best

believed that his ambition was centred in the advancement of his dynasty.

In each of the countries concerned public opinion was divided into parties in much the same way : the military party, supported in each case by the sovereign, and with them the political chauvinists, who would hear of no compromise and who desired their last pound of flesh ; and the moderates, who, in peasant states like Serbia and Bulgaria, must always be the most numerous, but who have not been, up to the present time, the best represented class.

The success of the war had been far greater than the Allies had ever expected—so great indeed that the provisions of the Treaties of Alliance could not be made to cover the new conditions ; and with the extent of their conquests the ambitions of the conquerors had grown also. The second article of the secret Annexe to the Treaty of Alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia, dated February 29, 1912, decreed that all territorial gains acquired by combined action should constitute common property (*condominium*) between the two Allies, and that their partition should take place on given lines within three months after the restoration of peace. Serbia was, however, by force of circumstances, in actual possession of much of the territory which the second article went on to attribute to Bulgaria. Serbia contended that, as Bulgaria now held Adrianople and Thrace—a situation which had not been contemplated in the Treaty—new conditions had arisen, and that the Treaty should be revised. Serbia was willing to submit all matters in dispute, and not only the contested zone, to the arbitration of the Tsar.

According to the letter of the Treaty, Bulgaria was within her rights when she claimed as her own all the territory attributed to her in the second article. She did not sufficiently take into consideration the facts that as Serbia was now, by the creation of Albania, definitely cut off from the Adriatic, Salonika had become of great importance to her as an outlet, and that she would naturally prefer access to it through one foreign country rather than through two. It was asking a great deal to require Serbia to give up not only Monastir, which she had taken by a brilliant feat of arms, but also simple access to Salonika and the ports which she had occupied on the Adriatic. It was asking still more to require Bulgaria, after her immense sacrifices, to give up Macedonia, which Russia had in 1878 assigned to her, and on which she had always looked as part of herself. To neither country did the

idea of a permanent alliance and a customs union, which would do away with the economic difficulties, come within the region of possibilities.

The fourth article of the Military Convention of April 29, 1912 provided that Bulgaria and Serbia should each, "if no other special arrangement be made," send at least 100,000 men to the Vardar theatre of war. Serbia pointed out that Bulgaria had only sent 32,000 men to the Vardar region, while she, on her part, without being obliged to do so by the Treaty, had sent 60,000 men to Adrianople to help the Bulgars. To this it might well be replied that, when the issue of the war was in doubt, both Bulgaria and Serbia regarded their undertakings as having a single front, and that, as success in Thrace was of paramount importance to all the Allies, neither the retention of more Bulgarian troops in that theatre than was contemplated by the Treaty, nor the voluntary help of Serbian troops there, ought to be reckoned as a reproach to Bulgaria. Moreover, the original arrangement had, in point of fact, been modified by a subsequent agreement between the two General Staffs.

The Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bulgaria and Greece and the Military Convention which followed it were intentionally vague as regards Macedonia; nothing was put down in black and white as to autonomy or partition. In the meantime Greek troops had occupied Salonika and had extended the Greek sphere of influence in all Southern Macedonia. The Greek proposals as to division of spoils did not commend themselves to Bulgaria, for they would have meant a gain of population of 2,000,000 for Greece, against a gain of 1,300,000 for Bulgaria.

The Serbs were willing to submit their case to the arbitration of the Tsar; the Bulgars, who doubted the impartiality of the arbitrator, insisted that the arbitration should, as was actually laid down in the Treaty, refer only to the contested zone, and absolutely refused to consider any general revision. Meanwhile the Tsar, through his representatives, Nekludov at Sofia and Hartwig at Belgrade, and by direct telegrams, urged moderation on both parties by argument and, finally, by threats. There was on the Serbian side a feeling that Bulgaria could have made an advantageous peace with Turkey at an earlier date had she not harboured the ambition of entering Constantinople, and also a feeling of resentment that she had not pressed Serbia's claim to an Adriatic port. The Bulgars on their part were growing increasingly anxious as to Serbian and Greek plans in Macedonia: the Serbs had established their

own officials, priests and schoolmasters there; and the Greeks were pushing up to the north and east of Salonika. What the Treaty had spoken of as a condominium had every appearance of being a permanent occupation by two of the Allies at the expense of the third. The Serbs had already suggested a revision of the Treaty. Venizelos, with a sense of justice which his more chauvinistic followers did not approve, had on three occasions offered to Bulgaria the port of Kavalla—a Greek town with a hinterland which was largely Bulgarian, and which from the economic point of view was most desirable—if she would give up her claims to Salonika.

Such, on broad lines, were the ostensible differences and the underlying motives which agitated the Allies; but within and around there was a tangled network of intrigue and distrust and secret negotiation, which, sooner or later, was sure to involve them in war. It is not possible from the material at present accessible to point out the exact document or interview which started the fatal movement, but some sequence of events can be traced through the rival records of "Balkanicus," a well-known Serbian statesman, and of Ivan Geshov, the Bulgarian Premier, the "*Diplomatic Reminiscences*" of Nekludov, Russian Minister at Sofia, forming an important and interesting commentary on both writers.

According to Geshov, the first seed of distrust was sown in the minds of the Bulgars by a circular letter from Pashić to Serbian representatives abroad, dated September 28, 1912, in which the towns of Prilep and Okhrida, the latter of which had strong historical associations for the Bulgars, were spoken of as being in Old Serbia, whereas the Treaty had assigned them to Bulgaria. In December the Serbs became uneasy as to the good faith of their Ally, secret negotiations, of which not even Geshov was at the time aware, having taken place between a Bulgarian emissary and the Porte. In January 1913, and again in March, there was a meeting between Prince Alexander of Serbia and Prince Nicholas of Greece; in March the murder of King George of Greece had removed a pacific influence; in April King Ferdinand held a Cabinet Council at Adrianople, at which, according to General Savov, resolutions were passed deciding to retain "in Thrace only such armed forces as are absolutely necessary for defence and to transfer the rest of the Army, as quickly as possible, against the Greeks and Serbs in Macedonia." This concentration, General Savov afterwards stated, would take from twenty-five to thirty-five days, and during May he continued to urge the Government to make

the necessary preparations for the troops on the Macedonian frontier, warning them at the same time that there was dissatisfaction among the men, who were anxious to get home for the harvest. All through June the movement of troops from Thrace continued. The personal contact of Serbian and Bulgarian troops both before Adrianople—the Bulgars had denied the Serbs full credit for the important part they had taken in the capture of the town—and in Macedonia had given rise to several unpleasant incidents and had by no means increased feelings of good-fellowship.

It is evident that by the spring of 1913 the military party with the King at their head—who were now convinced that war must come, and who naturally desired that the military initiative should rest with them—had the upper hand in Bulgaria; and, after a Crown Council had been held without his knowledge, Geshov, who, in common with others, disliked and feared the extremist policy, sent in his resignation. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, had not ceased to expostulate and to warn each Government in turn; at one time a meeting between the Balkan Premiers was urged, at another demobilisation, and at another arbitration. On June 1 the Serbo-Greek Treaty was signed at Salonika; on the 8th the Tsar, foreseeing what was coming, telegraphed to the Kings of Serbia and Bulgaria: “A war between the Allies would not leave me indifferent. In fact, I should like to make it clear that the State which commences war will be held responsible before the Slav cause and that I reserve to myself full liberty concerning the attitude which Russia will adopt at the end of such a criminal war.” The Press of both countries contributed not a little to inflame feeling. On the 19th Count Tisza flung down the gauntlet to Russia in a speech in the Hungarian Parliament, by proclaiming that the Balkan States were “free to choose their own methods of settling their difficulties.” On the 22nd King Ferdinand, whose attitude to Russia had of late shown increasing arrogance, offered to accept the Tsar’s arbitration, provided he would give his decision within a week. Sazonov thereupon said to the Bulgarian Minister in St. Petersburg: “You are acting on the advice of Austria. You are free. Russia and Slavdom are rejected. . . . Do not expect anything from us, and forget the existence of any of our engagements from 1902 till to-day.”¹

¹ In 1902 a secret agreement had been signed between Russia and Bulgaria, by which Russia guaranteed the integrity of the latter.

CHAPTER XI

THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

FOR some months past Serbian and Bulgarian troops, remaining mobilised, had faced each other across the rivers Zletovska and Bregalnica, which rise in the mountainous region south of the old Bulgarian frontier, and unite below Kochana to flow into the Vardar. The Greek Army had similarly been kept in positions of readiness on the outskirts of Salonika, with advanced troops about Kukush and Karasuli and along the Lower Struma.¹

The plan of General Savov, the Bulgarian Commander-in-Chief, was to force the Serbs back by a sudden blow behind the frontier which had been agreed upon in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, while another army advanced, via Gevgeli and also across the Lower Struma, in order to occupy Salonika, where some 1,800 Bulgarian troops were already quartered. On June 29, 1913 the Fourth Bulgarian Army under Kovachev, about 100,000 strong, acting on orders issued by Savov, attacked the Serbs, during the night and without previous warning; only a few hours before, Serbian officers had been dining with their Bulgarian comrades. The Serbs, however, can hardly be said to have been surprised. General Putnik, the Serbian Commander-in-Chief, had, in his secret instructions to his commanding officers issued some ten days earlier, laid down what should be done in case of a sudden attack by the Bulgars, and a proclamation by King Peter in which the date was left blank, but which was issued to the troops on July 1, showed that war had been regarded as a certainty. The Serbs had moreover made use of the time since the completion of their task in the late war to entrench themselves very strongly in the Ovče-Polje, the down country which lies to the west of the Zletovska river.

The first night's fighting caused 3,000 casualties to the Serbs, and the Bulgarian Fourth Army reached the Vardar on the

¹ *v. Map on p. 147*

following day. On July 1 Savov, acting on orders received from Sofia, ordered hostilities to cease ; but the Serbs were then ready to counter-attack, and, after a week's fierce fighting in very difficult mountainous country, the Bulgars were driven back towards their former frontier near Egri Palanka.

To the south also the Bulgarian plan failed completely. The Bulgarian troops in Salonika were forced to capitulate after great loss, but their officers fled. The Second Army under Ivanov, about 60,000 strong, after a first success, was unable to hold its own against the Greeks, who outnumbered it by over two to one, and was forced back northwards to the frontier through the Rupel Pass, across the Belashitsa Mountains and through Strumitsa, pursued by the Greeks. The Greek losses, some 10,000 in three days, speak for the severity of the fighting.

The civil population, which has always had its full share of suffering in Balkan wars, suffered even more cruelly than usual in Southern Macedonia during this war between the Allies when passions were at their height—Greeks at the hands of Bulgars, and Bulgars at the hands of Greeks, while in Serbia itself, which had been invaded by a Bulgarian force under Racho Petrov, great cruelties were committed by some Bulgarian troops which had got out of hand.

Fighting continued throughout July in the confused mountain region along the Bulgarian frontier. In some ways the Bulgars' position was not now unfavourable ; they were back on their own frontier and their lines of communication were much shortened, whereas the Greeks were feeling the strain of the pursuit and cholera had broken out among the Serbs. During the last week of July the Bulgars fought offensive actions against both Greeks and Serbs, with apparently increasing success. If Bulgaria had had only two, instead of four, enemies to deal with at this time, it is possible that the operations in Macedonia might even now have been decided in her favour ; but Romania and Turkey had seized this moment to come in against her. On July 10 the Romanians, who had given Bulgaria a general warning some weeks earlier, had crossed the Danube and advanced unopposed on Sofia, whilst on July 12 the Turks had crossed the new frontier and, after retaking Adrianople, had advanced into Eastern Rumelia.

Why did the Bulgars, who had lately been triumphantly successful in Thrace, fail so disastrously in Macedonia ? There are critics who assert that Savov, or those who directed him, sacrificed the purely military point of view to political considerations ; that it was believed in Sofia that when once the

Bulgars had occupied their objectives in Macedonia the Powers would intervene and accept a *fait accompli*, as they had already done in the case of the Greek and Serbian occupation. It is further asserted that, owing to blind confidence in the result of the Bregalnitsa attack, Savov employed only one of his five armies for this purpose, and that he failed to realise that it was not merely a question of occupying territory but of defeating an army which was as efficient and as ably commanded as his own. Savov's own reports written from Thrace and Kovachev's orders shortly before hostilities began are clear evidence of the fall in *moral* of the Bulgarian troops, who were strongly disinclined to continue campaigning. The troops were weary after the war in Thrace, with its privations and difficulties ; for there is a limit even to the Bulgars' endurance of hardship, however callous they may generally be to suffering. The forced march in summer-heat from Thrace to Macedonia had exhausted them yet further, and cholera had accompanied them all the way. Many were dismayed at the new situation, and it needed something more than Kovachev's assertions as to the baseness and cowardice of the Serbs to kindle enthusiasm for a war against fellow-Slavs. The Serbs themselves noted that the Bulgars did not fight with their former vigour and obstinacy.

How far was the Government at Sofia responsible for the surprise attack ? It has been officially stated that the reports of the Ministerial Council contain no minute ordering the opening of hostilities on June 29 ; Danev, the Premier, categorically denied that the attack was ever contemplated by his Government (*Le Temps*, December 9, 1913) ; and the Bulgarian authorities tried at first to fix the blame for the attack on the Serbs. Certainly, the movement was countermanded by Savov on July 1 and he himself was recalled a few days later.

There were many in Bulgaria who condemned the fratricidal war throughout, and some attributed it to the personal initiative¹ of the King, who, as the soldiers themselves said, was neither Slav nor Orthodox. Whether the attack had a higher authority than that of Savov or not, and whether, as some people hold, Austria-Hungary had held out promises of support in the event of war with Serbia, the consequences to Bulgaria were the same. By her obduracy she had forfeited

¹ The Bulgarian Court of Inquiry which was held in 1914 came to the conclusion that the actual order to attack was given by Ferdinand himself, in his capacity of Generalissimo of the Army.

the protection of Russia, if indeed she had ever had it ; Austria-Hungary had made no move in her favour ; and, moreover, she had alienated the sympathy of Europe by her treacherous attack on her Allies. In her hour of need there was none to help her and her enemies had closed her in on every side. Daney, the Premier, after a vain appeal to Russia, resigned ; his successor, Radoslavov, in order to obtain an armistice, had no choice but to submit unconditionally to all Romania's claims. On July 28, a month after Bulgaria had rushed upon her fate, a peace conference had met at Bucharest.

By the Treaty which was signed on August 10, Bulgaria ceded to Romania a tract of the Dóbruja, from Tutrakan on the Danube to Balchik on the Black Sea—a fertile region where one-sixth of the best Bulgarian cereals had been grown. Romania's claim to this part of the Dóbruja was not based on grounds of conquest nor of nationality, only a very small proportion of the inhabitants being of Romanian origin. Serbia and Greece divided most of Macedonia between them, leaving to Bulgaria the wild regions of the Perim Dagh and Dospad Dagh, and a coast line on the Ægean between the Mesta and the Maritsa, with the single shallow-water port of Dede Agach. The Treaty with Turkey deprived Bulgaria of most of her Thracian conquests, including Adrianople.

It was as if Bulgaria's action had automatically cancelled all previous treaties. The country with most at stake in the war, which had gained the most signal successes and had made the greatest sacrifices, lost by her own action most of what she had stood to gain materially, and lost, moreover, her good name and her national ideal. The gains of the country which had suffered least were, potentially, unlimited. According to figures given by "A Diplomatist" in *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, the net results of the wars in 1912 and 1913 represented an increase of territory for Serbia and Montenegro by four-fifths, for Bulgaria by one-fifth, and for Greece by almost double ; and an increase of population for Serbia and Montenegro by three-sevenths, for Bulgaria by one-twentieth, and for Greece by two-thirds. Turkey forfeited two-thirds of her population in Europe. The total casualties of both wars for three of the Balkan States are estimated as follows : Bulgaria, 150,000 ; Serbia, 79,500 ; and Greece, 50,000.


The war of the Balkan Alliance in 1912 had begun with higher motives than is the case with most wars, for patriotic ambitions were then certainly tempered with humanitarian desires. It had ended in an undisguised struggle among the

Allies for the fruits of their victories. Macedonia had been, it is true, set free from Turkish rule ; but in the settlement there was no question of self-determination for the Macedonians nor of the rights of nationalities, and the Bulgars of Macedonia had to suffer for the crime of Bulgaria. The manner of Bulgaria's attack on her Allies cannot be condoned ; but it can at least be said that there was every indication of warlike intentions against her on the part of her Allies, and that her action, though totally unjustifiable in method, did but forestall a declaration of war against her by Serbia and Greece.

The peculiarity of Balkan warfare is that it has no beginning and no end. Treaties do not bring peace to the Balkans ; they hand over tracts of country from one Power to another, as though the human beings who inhabit them were no better and no wiser than the goats and wildfowl of their own mountains and lakes. War means the burning of villages and death and suffering for the peasants on a large scale. Peace in a newly acquired territory means the closing of churches and schools, the imposition of another language, forced declarations of loyalty, compulsory military service in an alien army, the agitation of bands, the ferment which in time leads on to war once again, or, often enough, to the last desperate step of the Balkan peasant—wholesale emigration and the bitter lot of an unwanted refugee.

In the months that followed the war the usual shifting of population took place ; hundreds of Pomaks were turned out of Bulgaria, many of them dying of privations at Adrianople, and thousands of Greeks from Thrace and Adrianople escaped to the Aegean Islands, while some 100,000 Bulgars from Macedonia and Thrace crossed the frontier into Bulgaria.

The history of the year after the second Balkan War showed that Bulgaria was trending more and more in the direction of an Alliance with the Central Powers. The Radoslavov-Génadiev Government, which succeeded Danev's Cabinet, was frankly Austrophil in policy. It contained some of the Ministers against whom proceedings had been taken for corruption some years earlier, and it was entirely subservient to the King's wishes. For many years past there had been great dissatisfaction with the uncontrolled power exercised by Ferdinand as to promotions in the Army and with certain financial transactions in which he was concerned, and there were many who put the blame for the second Balkan War entirely on his shoulders. The Agrarian Party under their leaders, Stamboliiski and Dragiev, were outspoken in their denunciations of the King's policy,



but in vain; and though in the elections of December 1913 the Opposition secured fourteen more seats than the Government, the latter succeeded in those of March 1914—as will be shown in this next chapter—in forcing a majority which enabled them to carry out a policy in favour of the Central Powers which was not in accordance with the evident will of the country.

Over and above the considerations, political and economic, which were drawing Bulgaria into the orbit of the Central Powers, was the question of Macedonia. Macedonia continued to be, as had been the case since the Treaty of Berlin, the controlling factor in the policy of Bulgaria, and it was certain that Bulgaria would, when the chance came, ally herself with those Powers who, in her opinion, would be most likely to help her to regain what she had lost.

CHAPTER XII

THE RADOSLAVOV CABINET

IN order better to understand the policy pursued by the Bulgarian Government during the fateful months preceding Bulgaria's intervention in the Great War, it is necessary to throw some light on the motives which actuated its members. Many of the men composing it had either been condemned and subsequently pardoned, or were awaiting trial for the illegalities and peculations they had committed when previously in office. Their reappearance in the Government in any constitutional State other than Bulgaria would have been a material impossibility, and here it was due to their readiness to obey implicitly Tsar Ferdinand's behests, since they were unable to count on any other support than his while in office. They thus became the tools of an unscrupulous monarch, whose aim was largely the satisfaction of his own ambitions.

Tsar Ferdinand was still smarting under the humiliation he had suffered in Bucharest, and his policy was to a considerable extent dictated by a desire to revenge himself on Serbia and her protectress, Russia, whom he held responsible for the mortifications he and his country had undergone in 1913. This hope could materialise only through an understanding with the opponents of these two States, i.e. by a close co-operation with the Central Empires. This was equally the programme of Radoslavov and his colleagues, as plainly set forth in their letter of July 5, 1913, to Ferdinand: "We think to-day, as we thought then, that the salvation of our State can only be found in a policy of intimate friendship with Austria-Hungary." The close co-operation of Crown and Cabinet, and their refusal to be influenced by the general will of the nation, is thus explained.

No surprise need therefore be felt at the insincerity and covert hostility which the Bulgarian Government showed in its dealings with the Entente, and at its unwillingness to come to an understanding with it.

Had even an agreement been arrived at with the Entente Powers, it would have been necessary to entrust another Ministry with its execution, as the Radoslavov Cabinet after its pro-Austrian declarations could not be expected to execute loyally a policy so contrary to the views it publicly proclaimed. The prospect of losing office, therefore, formed an additional deterrent to an understanding. Such an eventuality would have been, in fact, most unwelcome to the Cabinet, for a number of its supporters were awaiting trial, and their only hope of salvation from the heavy hand of the Law lay in the cancellation of the State trial, which could be effected only through their remaining in office and voting the requisite measure in the Sobranje. And as a matter of course, after the forcible and illegal voting of the German loan described below, the Sobranje voted the annulment of the trial of the Stambulovist deputies and that of Génadiev, their leader.

How foreign the Bulgarian people as a whole were to the Austrophil policy of their rulers may be gauged by the fact that they twice disavowed the policy which was being foisted on them. When on December 5, 1913 the Radoslavov Cabinet appealed to the country for its support, it failed to obtain a majority at the polls in spite of all the pressure it exerted on the electorate. Finding it impossible to rule the country with a Chamber in which the majority was hostile, the Cabinet dissolved it as soon as the Parliamentary Opposition refused to vote the credits needed for the government of the country. The dissolution of the Chamber was made possible through the Opposition's inability to present a united front, and by the unwillingness of the Agrarians, the most numerous Opposition party, and of the Socialists to participate in the formation of a new Cabinet. This was a grave mistake on the part of these two parties, for not only did they paralyse the action of the democratic elements in the Chamber, but by their shortsightedness they assisted reaction to establish itself more firmly in the country.

At the next general election, held early in March 1914, the verdict pronounced by the voters was no less decisive than the last. Out of a total of 764,810 votes cast, only 345,588¹ were

¹ The following table shows the relative strength of parties at the election of 1914:

Liberal Coalition (Radoslavists, Tonchevists and Stambulovists)	345,588	Communists	.	.	.	43,273
Agrarians	147,778	Nationalists	.	.	.	39,035
Democrats	86,676	Radicals	.	.	.	27,364
Social-Democrats	45,247	Danevists	.	.	.	23,298
		Others	.	.	.	6,051

in favour of the Government, and even this result was attained through flagrant violations of the Constitution. The Cabinet, being aware that it could not count on success, decided to extend the franchise to the inhabitants of the territories allocated to Bulgaria at the conclusion of the Balkan wars, though there had been no census returns made, and the administrative authorities had only been partly installed. This decision was clearly opposed to the spirit of the law, for the incorporation of this territory had not yet been voted by the Sobranje, and could, therefore not be considered as a part of the State. The Government committed even a further illegality by assigning to the new province eight more mandates than its population warranted—the total number of parliamentary representatives was reduced at the subsequent general election of 1919 from 245 to 237—and made use of extreme measures in order to stifle the voice of the nation. In some districts voters were arrested and beaten, voting-urns were smashed and voting-papers destroyed. In Nevrokop the Government agents went to the extreme of kidnapping the Opposition candidate. In Gorna-Juma the election was annulled because the electors voted solidly for the Opposition. And so on.

In spite of these illegalities, however, the Government only obtained a bare majority of ten in the Chamber,¹ including some forty Moslem deputies, who had been mostly returned from the new province. Thus the Moslem deputies, most of whom belonged to the Committee of Union and Progress, found themselves in the important position of holding the casting vote as between the Government and the Opposition. In this way the King's Austrophil Cabinet came at the same time under Turkish influence. Within the old confines of Bulgaria, the mandates won by Government supporters were even reduced by two as compared with the results obtained in December 1913.

So uncertain was the Government as to its ability to grapple with the Opposition in the new Chamber that steps were taken to organise a military league with the object of effecting a *pronunciamiento* and dissolving the Sobranje by military force in case it showed itself intractable. General Lukov, then president of the Military Academy in Kniajevo, was appointed leader of the party, but owing to some indiscretion on his part was subsequently removed from his post. The necessity for such a drastic step, however, did not arise, the Opposition,

¹ Subsequently increased to thirteen by the Government invalidating the election of three Opposition members.

owing to its heterogeneity, showing itself weak and irresolute despite its impressive array. The Government, by offering in turn advantages to the various Opposition groups, further increased their disunion, and the absence of conscience amongst most politicians facilitated the employment of such underhand methods.

In order better to entangle Bulgaria in the meshes of Germany's net, Ferdinand and his Ministers now opened negotiations for the conclusion of a state loan of 500,000,000 francs in Berlin. It is true that the Bulgarian Government did also sound French, British and Russian financial circles, but these did not respond at first very readily to these overtures, though finally a French bank offered money on considerably easier terms than the German financiers. Tonchev, the Minister of Finance, endeavoured to dishearten the representative of the French firm by falsely declaring to him that the loan had been already concluded. He even attempted to mislead the Sobranje on the terms offered by the French. This was considered as a slight towards the Entente Powers, and the Russian Ambassador promptly sent a strongly-worded communiqué to the Sofia Press denouncing Tonchev's attitude.

The Parliamentary Opposition realised at once that the conclusion of a loan in Germany was not only a financial but also a political act which might entail far-reaching consequences for the country, and unanimously decided to obstruct the voting of this measure by all possible means. When the loan came up for discussion in the Chamber on July 2, 1914 Tsanov, the leader of the Radicals, made a long protest in the name of the Opposition—but without avail. The Government took no heed of his arguments, but endeavoured to get the Bill voted by the Sobranje, with the result that it came into violent collision with its opponents, and was only able to put the Bill on the Statute Book through an utter disregard of Parliamentary rules, as is made evident by the report of the sitting of July 3 published in the Sobranje's records.

Though no political clauses appear in the convention attached to the loan, there is little doubt that it aimed at rendering Bulgaria more amenable to German influence. The German Government must, at any rate, have received assurances that Bulgaria would follow a benevolent policy towards the Central Powers, and this view is to some extent corroborated by the following statement of v. Tschirschky to the Bulgarian Ambassador in Vienna, recorded in the Bulgarian Orange Book, issued in September 1920: "Even when the loan was

advanced to you, it was understood that your policy would assume an unhesitating course," etc. (Document 735). The German Syndicate, it may be added, in return for the loan secured the control of all State coal-mines, of the railway which was to be built from Central Bulgaria to the *Æ*gean, and of Porto Lagos, the terminal port. A further German demand—a monopoly of the tobacco export—was withdrawn in consequence of the general outcry against it.

Even after its defeat the Opposition repeatedly brought up the question of the loan in the Sobranje, and urged the Government to take advantage of the non-fulfilment of certain clauses by Germany in order to annul this onerous transaction; but all its efforts proved unavailing.

CHAPTER XIII

THE OUTBREAK OF THE GREAT WAR

THE outbreak of the War found Bulgaria paralysed and helpless. Internally, there was an acute conflict between the people and an unconstitutional Government which endeavoured to hinder every manifestation of the national will. Externally, the country was surrounded by enemies watching for an opportunity to attack and dismember it. It was natural, therefore, that the great bulk of the people should from the very first express themselves decidedly in favour of neutrality. A few militarists laid stress on the advantages which would accrue from a co-operation with Austria against Serbia, but found little favour in the eyes of the public, and these warlike agitators were quickly silenced by the timely declarations of the Greek and Romanian Ministers in Sofia that their Governments would uphold the Treaty of Bucharest. Radoslavov, in replying to these warnings, formally announced that the Bulgarian Government would maintain a strict neutrality, and ironically hinted that such admonitions had better be addressed to Vienna, for it was Austria, and not Bulgaria, who was threatening the Treaty of Bucharest.

The leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition were unanimous in their demands for the maintenance of neutrality, as may be ascertained from their declarations in the Sobranje on July 31, 1914. Geshov declared that he would support the Government if it fulfilled its promises and avoided adventures. Malinov expressed himself in favour of neutrality in case the conflict could be localised ; if the war was to spread, however, he thought that the formation of a broad Coalition Ministry was the best means by which the interests of the country would be protected. Tsanov, the leader of the Radicals, considered that neutrality was imperatively needed, dilated on the advisability of forming a Balkan League and condemned the Government for publishing in its Press organ veiled threats against

Serbia. And finally, Chr. Kabakchiev, Socialist, warned the Government that if it pursued an Imperialist policy and acted as a blind instrument of Austria it would inevitably involve Bulgaria in a fresh catastrophe.

The Agrarian leader, Stamboliiski, declared among other things that the Government had imparted a new direction to Bulgaria's foreign policy. It had bound itself to the Central Powers, and he called in question the wisdom of such an aggressive policy. He did not believe in a *rapprochement* between Bulgaria and either Romania or Turkey. Bulgaria needed friends, and sooner or later she would be obliged to turn to Serbia, with whom she was connected by racial affinities. It was in Bulgaria's interest not to become involved in the conflict, but to take advantage of future events in order to reap some material benefits.

Stamboliiski's statement that "the Government had bound itself to the Central Powers" appears to have been more or less warranted, judging from its attitude. Early in August 1914 the Russian Embassy decided to offer in its private chapel public prayers for the success of the Russian arms, and invited the choir of the Sofia Cathedral to take part in the religious ceremony, as it was its wont in such circumstances. The Government immediately issued strict orders prohibiting in future the participation of the choir in these religious festivals, thereby arousing the wrath not only of Russia's representative, who felt that such an act was an open affront, but also of the Sofia population, which convoked public meetings and indignantly protested against such an unfriendly attitude towards a great Power, the traditional protectress of Bulgaria.

The arrival of Talaat Bey from Constantinople, and the cordiality with which the Government and the Court received him, formed a marked contrast with the attitude they had shown towards the Russian Ambassador. This visit of the Turkish Minister had certainly the most weighty consequences. He had long conversations with Radoslavov and his colleagues and with the representatives of Austria and Germany, and he must have left with explicit assurances that the Bulgarian Government would not assume an aggressive attitude towards Turkey. As the Radoslavov Cabinet had to humour the Turks, since its hold on the Sobranje depended on the support of the forty Moslem deputies, who naturally received their *mot d'ordre* from Constantinople, the conclusion of a Turco-Bulgarian agreement was easily attained, especially if it be kept in mind that Bulgaria's rulers were always ready to sacrifice their

country's interests to their own. That a *rapprochement* was effected at the time between Bulgaria and Turkey is certain, for Talaat repeatedly refers to it in his conversations with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Constantinople, though the latter always expresses astonishment and doubt at the existence of such an understanding. Extracts from the Bulgarian Orange Book dispel every doubt on the subject, and it has since been revealed that a formal treaty was concluded between Bulgaria and Turkey on August 19, 1914, the two contracting parties promising mutual support in case of an aggression on either party by another Balkan state.

Talaat's visit excited widespread comment in Sofia, and led the Opposition leaders to demand the holding of a Crown Council to deliberate on the general policy of the country. This demand was rejected, and as the Opposition began to show some signs of unrest the Government proclaimed martial law, by means of which it was able to control public manifestations and prevent all demonstrations in favour of Russia. Almost simultaneously the Government approached the Chamber with a demand for an extraordinary credit of 50,000,000 francs wherewith to cover the expenses of a possible mobilisation of the Army. This demand raised many protests among the ranks of the Opposition, as not being in keeping with the maintenance of neutrality and likely to throw grave doubts on the Government's sincerity. The mining of the Varna harbour and the passage through Bulgaria of German sailors and war material *en route* for Constantinople further intensified the suspicion of the Opposition leaders as to the aims of the Government, and they addressed a communiqué to the nation exposing the Cabinet's partiality and laying stress on the necessity of maintaining a strict neutrality. The Government, on the other hand, organised a so-called "National League," whose object was to inflame public opinion against Russia by representing her as the chief cause of the disaster of 1913. While public meetings were prohibited, the "National League" was given a free hand in the matter. At one of the first meetings held under its auspices the Opposition leaders were denounced as traitors, and a resolution was moved urging the Government to prosecute them for the anti-national spirit in which their recent communiqué was drafted. The pro-German proclivities of this organisation became more clearly defined when it began publishing manifestoes and pamphlets full of scurrilities against the Entente Powers; one of these publications, a booklet entitled *Bulgaria and Russian Intrigues*, being a compilation of

the foulest accusations against Russia and her representative in Sofia.

These machinations against Russia, however, had the opposite effect to what was intended. The benevolence with which official circles countenanced all propaganda in favour of the Teutons raised the nation's suspicion as to the secret intentions of the Cabinet, and the fear of seeing their country involved in the war on the side of the Central Powers led many Bulgarians to conclude that the best preventive was to declare themselves openly in favour of the Entente.

It was not only among the peasantry that sympathy for Russia was all-dominant, but also among a large number of the intellectuals, whose views found expression in the Opposition Press.

Another source of irritation between Government and Opposition was the former's refusal to start negotiations with the Entente, giving as a pretext that such a course was inconsistent with a declaration of neutrality. The Opposition was loudly insistent on the necessity of negotiating with the Entente because of the fear lest Bulgaria should be confronted with the same dilemma as Belgium. The danger of a Russian Army appearing on the Romanian frontier and asking for a free passage through Bulgaria in order to attack Turkey, or succour Serbia, had to be faced, as well as the eventuality of an Austro-German Army breaking through Serbia, and marching to the relief of Turkey. The prevailing views are best reflected by the speeches of the Opposition leaders in the Sobranje in the latter half of November 1914, Stamboliiski in especial calling for a Coalition Government and stating that the Government would not have remained neutral had not its belief in Germany's victory been shaken by England's adherence to France and Russia. No one could foresee which side would win, though the bulk of the Bulgarian people felt almost intuitively that the Entente would be victorious owing to England's power of endurance.

The autumn of 1914 was undoubtedly the most favourable time for winning over Bulgaria to the cause of the Allies. In spite of Russia's recent unfriendly attitude towards Bulgaria and the scant consideration which Bulgarian claims had hitherto received from France and Britain, there was a strong and deep feeling among the masses in favour of Russia, whilst a large portion of the intellectuals had been won over to the cause of the Allies by the latter's declaration that they were fighting for the liberty of small nations, and the upholding of the

principle of nationality, the application of which would fully satisfy Bulgarian aspirations. The enthusiasm and deep admiration for the Allied cause which their loudly-proclaimed championship of the liberties of small nations evoked in Bulgaria found expression in an article in the *Preporets*, which was written on the announcement of the first victory of the Marne: "Not only France, but the entire world will remember the date, September 13, 1914, as one of the most glorious in history. This is a date of spiritual renovation for humanity. There is a Providence in this world, which punishes those who have forgotten honour and law, a Providence which to the cult of force opposes the invincible God of justice and reason."

Had the Allies, and especially Russia, departed from the dark paths of diplomacy and openly appealed to the nation, instead of to its unpopular Government, to participate in a joint attack on Turkey, there is little doubt that all the cunning of Ferdinand and his Ministers would have proved insufficient to stem the current of sympathy such an appeal would have aroused. Unfortunately, whatever communications the Entente Powers deemed opportune to make to Bulgaria were kept secret. The nation, believing that the Entente neglected Bulgaria and that it evinced little sympathy for her aspirations, began to lose faith in the possibility of realising its country's unity with the assistance of the Allies, and began to lend ear to the underhand machinations of the pro-German agents. This propaganda was daily growing more intense, for not only had the so-called "independent" Press been suborned by the Germans, but also prominent members of the Government; and as the Entente took no steps at first to counter this baneful agitation, it spread to quarters which were most inflammable and dangerous—to the Macedonian immigrants. Maddened by the oppressive régime the Serbians had introduced in Macedonia, they left no stone unturned to involve Bulgaria in a war against Serbia, which would bring freedom to their long-suffering country. And it was not long before the Bulgarian Government began to find in the ranks of these Macedonians some of its staunchest supporters, and to recruit some of its most dangerous agitators for the furtherance of its pro-German policy.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PRO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

THE behaviour of the Entente Powers towards Bulgaria after the second Balkan war furnished admirable material to the Teutons with which to work up popular feeling against the Allies. And the ill-advised visit of Tsar Nicholas of Russia to Constantsa in June 1914, in the course of which he accepted the honorary colonelcy of a Romanian cavalry regiment, the first to enter the formerly Bulgarian town of Siliстра, supplied an additional argument to the Russophobe party in power with which to convince the public that Russia was the arch-enemy. The Government partisans decried Russia's attitude towards Bulgaria in 1913 as treasonable. After the Bulgarian attack of June 29, 1913, it was affirmed, the Russian Ambassador influenced Daney to order the withdrawal of the Bulgarian troops, being assured that Russia would intervene. The promised intercession, however, never came, and the fratricidal struggle started afresh. To make matters worse, Romania was invited to complete Bulgaria's discomfiture and allowed to share in her despoliation. All this in spite of the fact that Russia, by her treaty of 1902 with Bulgaria, guaranteed the latter's territorial integrity. This territorial inviolability had even received further sanction by the St. Petersburg protocol, concluded in 1913, under Russia's auspices, by which a slice of Bulgarian territory had been transferred to Romania as compensation for Bulgaria's expected acquisitions in Macedonia. The hostile attitude of the French Press since 1913 and the unfortunate suggestion made by a French Minister for a partition of Bulgaria were likewise recalled, and used to spread distrust as to the aims of the Allies. Great Britain's behaviour was also held up to criticism. It was remarked that through the Treaty of London (May 1913) she had committed herself to supporting Bulgaria's claim to the Enos-Midia Line, yet when the Turks took advantage of Bulgaria's helplessness to

reoccupy Adrianople, nothing was done to defend Bulgaria's cause.

The war, as far as the Balkans were concerned, was a struggle between Russia and Austria, and Bulgaria, who had since her liberation wavered between a pro-Austrian and a pro-Russian policy, had to make a choice when the two great opponents had joined in final combat. A Russian victory seemed to hold out the worst prospects for Bulgaria, as it would have entailed the establishment of Russia in Constantinople and Thrace. The immediate neighbourhood of Russia was regarded as fraught with grave danger, owing to Russia's policy of expansion and denationalisation. A Russian victory would likewise result in the creation of a large Yugoslav State on Bulgaria's western frontier, a consummation which was anything but agreeable to the Bulgarian point of view, since it would have rendered the eventual retrocession of Macedonia to Bulgaria extremely problematical.

An Austro-German victory on the other hand would involve the extinction of Serbia as an independent State, and a territorial increase of Bulgaria proportionate to the services she would have rendered to the Central Powers. The risk of denationalisation from Germany was infinitesimal as compared with that from Russia, for between Germany and Bulgaria lay the compact masses of Austrian Slavs, Hungarians and Romanians.

These and similar arguments, as well as the most exaggerated reports of the exploits of the German arms, were daily circulated through the medium of the "independent" Press, and contributed to a gradual cooling of the pro-Entente sympathies, which had been so readily aroused by the chivalrous proclamation of the Allies on behalf of oppressed nationalities.

The Parliamentary Opposition was still working in favour of the formation of a Coalition Cabinet, not only because it desired to counterbalance the pro-German proclivities of the Ministry, but also in order to become acquainted with the propositions which had been communicated to the Government, and which the latter had only partly divulged. This demand for the formation of a Coalition Ministry was more than justifiable, considering the renewed agitation in favour of an invasion of Macedonia. The Macedonians took, as was to be expected, a prominent part in it, and one of the most attractive arguments advanced by them to justify such an act was that Serbia would soon succumb to the Austrian onslaught, and that it was necessary to forestall an Austrian occupation of Macedonia, an

action to which the Entente would not take exception, for it was to its advantage to have Bulgarians rather than Austrians in Macedonia.

The cooling of the pro-Russian enthusiasm was partly due to the polemics in which the Russian Press was indulging against Bulgaria. One of her most virulent detractors was the well-known Russian writer Leonid Andreyev, who maliciously dubbed Bulgaria "the Slav Judas," obviously forgetting that the history of other Slav States is not particularly edifying when viewed from the point of Slav solidarity.

The strengthening of the German hold on the country could also be detected by the intensified propaganda which was carried on by German emissaries under the benevolent protection of the Government. In spite of the prohibition of political meetings, permission was granted to Parvus, the notorious German propagandist, to make speeches advocating Bulgaria's intervention in the war on the side of the Germanic Powers. Parvus' argument was that a German victory was the only guarantee for the independence and free national development of the Balkan States, and that Russia's installation in Constantinople was fraught with the gravest danger for their national liberties. These speeches of Parvus were re-echoed throughout Bulgaria, and practically secured for the Germans the support of the extreme Socialists.

Considering the clever and methodical manner in which the German agents were working to win over public opinion, one marvels at the paucity of the results they obtained. So deep-rooted were the sympathies of the masses for Russia that nothing could alienate them, and it was an unpardonable omission on the part of the Entente Powers, and especially of Russia, not to have followed the example of Germany and sent a few emissaries to stir up the dormant pro-Russian feelings of the peasantry. Such a course would have set the country ablaze with enthusiasm, and would in all probability have resulted in the discomfiture of the Government, which maintained itself in power by the goodwill of the Crown, the financial help of the Germans, and the support of the Moslem deputies in the Chamber. Unfortunately the Entente never attempted to exploit the immense advantage it possessed in Bulgaria, the deep and sincere affection of the peasantry and of most of the intellectuals for the Russian people. It chose to carry on pourparlers in secret, never making known its intentions to the public, and thereby played into the hands of its enemies, for whenever under the stress of public opinion

the Bulgarian Government felt constrained to make a communication about the negotiations it carried on with the Entente, it did so in a half-hearted way, always distorting maliciously the gist of these propositions, and thereby powerfully contributing to strengthen the disillusion of the Ententophils.

CHAPTER XV

THE NEGOTIATIONS

THE first note the Entente addressed to Bulgaria was handed in by the Russian Ambassador in Sofia on August 7, 1914. It invited Bulgaria to renew her traditional ties with the Tsardom and begin pourparlers in order to adjust the interests of the two countries, and warned her not to stir up troubles in Macedonia. The Sofia Government answered two days later, stating that it would do everything possible to prevent the passage of armed bands into Macedonia, but passed over in silence the subject of pourparlers. This guarded reply did not at all please the Russian Government, and on August 12 it forwarded another note expressing its displeasure. Bulgaria was invited to preserve a benevolent neutrality, and to oppose every aggressive movement on the part of Turkey, Russia offering in exchange to secure for Bulgaria at the termination of the war extensive territorial acquisitions conforming to her national aspirations. In answer to the above the Bulgarian Cabinet officially proclaimed on the following day its decision to observe a strict neutrality. This was undoubtedly a very discourteous way of answering a proposition emanating from a Great Power like Russia, and clearly characterised the unfriendliness of official Bulgarian circles. Their hostility was further emphasised when, after ignoring the invitation to negotiate with Russia, they started conducting pourparlers with the Turkish Minister Talaat Bey and entered into an understanding with him. The Sofia Cabinet was entirely in the hands of Ferdinand, who, after the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), must, it was believed, have secretly, and without the knowledge of his Ministers, bound himself to Austria: at any rate Austrian influence was paramount in Bulgaria in 1914, and this was acknowledged by all.

As the Russian soundings received no response, the representatives of the three Entente Powers made further advances

to Bulgaria in November 1914, promising, provided she observed a strict neutrality, to compensate her on the termination of the war with the cession of Thrace as far as the line Enos-Midia, and certain territories in Macedonia. The three notes were not identical in form. The British preceded the French and Russian notes by ten days, and stated that the compensations offered were to be granted in case Bulgaria associated herself with the Entente against Turkey: this proviso not appearing in the notes of the two other Powers.

To all these, the Sofia Cabinet curtly replied that it did not consider it advisable to depart from the neutrality it had proclaimed.

The Russian Government tried next to approach Bulgaria through its Minister in Serbia. It suggested on December 19, 1914 that if Bulgaria would decide to attack Turkey, the Entente would guarantee to Bulgaria the retrocession of the uncontested zone in Macedonia, of the Southern Dóbruja, and of Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line. It met, however, with scant success, judging from the answer it evoked, which clearly proved that the Bulgarian Government meant to prevaricate. At about the same period the *Reichspost* published an interview with Momchilov, the vice-president of the *Sobranje*, couched in the most friendly terms for Austria, and expressing suspicion of Russia. Notwithstanding these repeated rebukes the Russian Ambassador in Serbia seriously set to work to induce the Serbian Government to make large territorial concessions to Bulgaria, in Macedonia, with the object of winning her over to the Entente. This attempt met with a stubborn refusal on the part of Serbia. The difficulties the Russian Minister had to contend with were further increased by the pro-German declarations which Génadiev, a member of the Bulgarian Government, made at the end of January 1915 in Rome. In spite of all these obstacles, however, the Entente Powers continued to use their influence with Serbia to wring concessions from her on behalf of Bulgaria, and this diplomatic pressure increased when the hope of Bulgaria joining the Entente appeared to materialise; for the Bulgarian Government, labouring under the anxiety caused by the rumoured Dardanelles expedition, showed itself more inclined than formerly to pursue negotiations, and intimated that it must have some more definite and tangible offers. For a short period, and while it appeared that the Straits would be forced, the Sofia Cabinet showed itself more tractable; there was even some talk in the spring of 1915 of the formation of a Coalition Government, which

would inspire more confidence in the Allies. Unfortunately the failure of the Dardanelles expedition brought about a reaction, and the hope of Bulgaria altering her standpoint vanished.

The Allied Powers made a further attempt on May 29, 1915 to win over Bulgaria by the offer of Thrace as far as the line Enos-Midia, and of the uncontested zone in Macedonia, subject to Serbia's obtaining Bosnia and Hercegovina. They further promised to use their good offices to secure Kavalla and the Dóbruja for Bulgaria. In order to dispel any favourable impression this offer might have made, Austria submitted on June 6, 1915 a more alluring proposal. Bulgaria in return for her neutrality was to obtain at the end of the war the whole of Serbian Macedonia, and a part of the territories attributed to Greece and Romania by the treaty of Bucharest (1913), in case these States declared war on the Central Powers.

A reply was returned to the Entente note on June 14, containing no binding statement, and asking for further explanations. These were furnished on August 3, and the Allies added to their previous communication the assurance that they would not permit either Serbia or Greece to annex any territory before they had handed over to Bulgaria the regions promised by the Entente to the latter.

In the meantime the Sofia Government, under the auspices of the Central Powers, was conducting negotiations with Turkey for the retrocession to Bulgaria of the right bank of the River Maritsa near Adrianople. The Bulgarian claims were originally much more extensive, and comprised the whole of north-western Thrace, bounded to the east by the Enos-Midia line. These negotiations were bound up with those which Bulgaria was conducting with the Central Powers, and aimed at the formal entry of Bulgaria into the Central Alliance. The natural turn for bargaining in Oriental peoples contributed to an undue prolongation of these pourparlers, which began in May 1915 and dragged out until September. The territorial demands Bulgaria formulated were not regarded by the Turks as a bribe for her neutrality, but as the price of her active participation in the war on the side of the Central Powers. The Turkish Grand Vizier in a conversation with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Constantinople on June 5, 1915 is reported to have said: "Bulgaria pledged herself to maintain a benevolent neutrality towards Turkey in an agreement signed on August 19, 1914, and if Turkey is to make territorial concessions to Bulgaria, the latter must indicate what she will give in exchange."¹ Owing

¹ Bulgarian Orange Book, p. 702.

to the mutual suspicion with which both the negotiating parties viewed each other, every effort was made to render the Turco-Bulgarian agreement interdependent with that entered into between Bulgaria and the Austro-Germans. Rizov, the Bulgarian Ambassador in Berlin, reports as follows to his Government on August 26, 1915: "In my opinion the agreement with Turkey should not be signed now, but simultaneously with our impending agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The two compacts should even be made interdependent; in this manner our understanding with Turkey will receive the sanction of Germany and Austria, and the invasion of Serbia will be assured. This will also give us sufficient time to justify ourselves before Bulgarian and foreign public opinion for the conclusion of these two agreements."¹

The military convention and treaty between Bulgaria and the Central Powers were signed on September 6, 1915. They guaranteed to Bulgaria, in exchange for her active participation in the invasion of Serbia, the whole of Serbian Macedonia, and eastern Serbia as far as the River Morava. The date of the opening of the military campaign was fixed for October 6, 1915, on the part of the Austro-Germans, and for October 11 on the part of the Bulgarians. Germany bound herself to send German troops to the Bulgarian Black Sea Coast, and Turkish troops to Dede Agach, to oppose any landing on the part of Russian or of Anglo-French troops.

The Entente Powers had apparently not yet been put out of countenance by the mortifications Ferdinand and his Ministers had repeatedly caused them, and on September 14, 1915 made one more offer to Bulgaria. The offer was identical with that of May 31, but this time the cession of the uncontested zone in Macedonia was not made subject to Serbia's receiving Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Entente Powers pledged themselves to guarantee this territory to Bulgaria in case she concluded a military understanding with them and agreed to declare war on Turkey.

The Bulgarian Government made no reply until October 4. It had even proceeded to mobilise the Army in order to carry out its engagements to Germany, though it simultaneously issued the most formal assurances as to its resolve to remain neutral. These assurances, however, could hardly be taken seriously, for immediately on the issue of the mobilisation order Turkey, in accordance with an agreement come to, but not then signed, on July 17, transferred to Bulgaria all her territory

¹ Bulgarian Orange Book. Document 1036.

on the right bank of the Maritsa, as well as the triangle (just north of Adrianople) between the Tunja, the Maritsa and the frontier; it was therefore easy to guess that the cession of this region was the price paid by Turkey for Bulgaria's military intervention. Owing to the lack of trust Turkey only paid the agreed price after Bulgaria gave cogent proofs of her resolve to carry out her part of the agreement, and these proofs consisted in the mobilisation of her Army.

At last the truth began to dawn on the diplomatists of the Entente, and on October 4 the Russian Minister and his British and French colleagues addressed an ultimatum to Bulgaria, summoning her to break off relations with the Central Powers, failing which they threatened to leave the country. Such was the duplicity of the Bulgarian Government that on October 4, prior to its receiving the above ultimatum, it had the impudence to address a further note to the Allied Powers asking for further elucidation of their communication of September 14: the aim pursued being to fortify the delusion that still prevailed in some Entente quarters that the Sofia Government could yet be won over. The Bulgarian Government's reply to the ultimatum was permeated with the same spirit of double-dealing which had characterised all its dealings with the Entente. It refused to break off relations with the Central Powers, pretending that this would involve a violation of its neutrality, and indignantly denied the presence of German officers in Sofia, when it was known for a fact that the Sofia War Office was full of them. Naturally, such an answer would not be regarded as satisfactory. The representatives of the Entente departed from Sofia on October 7, 1915, and four days later, on the pre-arranged date, the Bulgarian Army crossed the Serbian frontier.

It must be noted, however, that Bulgaria's participation in the war against Serbia was only made possible by Romania's and Greece's inaction, and that the Governments of these two States are morally responsible for Bulgaria's murderous attack on Serbia. They might have again prevented Serbia's overthrow as they did at the beginning of the war through their timely warnings to the Sofia Government. Romania and Greece, however, had long since been hypnotised by Germany, and their attitude, instead of discouraging, on the contrary confirmed Tsar Ferdinand in his decision to stab Serbia in the back. Quotations from the Bulgarian Orange Book fully corroborate the above statement: *v. Documents 847, 881, 716, 1049, 1072 and 1099.*

Entente diplomacy is largely to blame for permitting Bulgaria to throw in her lot with the Central Powers, and thus unduly prolong the war. One cannot imagine why no steps were taken to encourage the Bulgarian Parliamentary Opposition in its struggle against Ferdinand, or, if this were not easily realisable, why a free hand was not given to Serbia to attack Bulgaria prior to the concentration of the Bulgarian Army. King Constantine was allowed without serious protest to break his treaty obligations to Serbia and, contrary to all reasonable expectations, to dismiss Venizelos from office, for no better reason than that the latter was resolved to prevent a Bulgarian attack on Serbia. And thus Entente politicians, after being hoodwinked by Tsar Ferdinand for a whole year, allowed themselves to be flouted by King Constantine for an even longer period, and thereby unwittingly provided the Kaiser and his confederates with an inexhaustible theme of jokes and merriment.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FIGIIT OF THE OPPOSITION

After the spirited fight which the leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition had undertaken against the Government's policy in the autumn of 1914 came a certain relaxation in their efforts, which was due partly to the Cabinet's implicit and reiterated promises that it would not undertake any important decision without consulting the Opposition. The Government even made capital out of its purported resolve to maintain neutrality by accusing the Opposition of cherishing warlike designs in favour of the Entente. At the municipal elections held in Sofia in May 1915 Radoslavov publicly declared that "whoever voted for the Opposition voted for war." The majority of the electors, however, in spite of their aversion from war, voted against the Government (11,733 votes for the Opposition as against 6,701 for the Government). Even this result gives only a faint idea of the unpopularity of Radoslavov, for it was attained only after several thousands of Macedonian refugees had been compelled to vote in favour of the Government candidates by the threat of having their allowances suspended. Hundreds of provincial officials were likewise brought to Sofia to swell the number of Government supporters and, to crown all, 400 gipsies were provided with voting papers, in spite of the law, which denies them the right to vote!

The sudden dismissal on August 19, 1915 of General Fichev, the War Minister, and the nomination in his stead of General Jekov, known as an extreme pro-German, again spurred on the Opposition to activity. After repeated consultations it addressed a long appeal to the nation, asking it to protest against Radoslavov's refusal to convoke the Sobranje, and against the foreign policy he was forcing on the country. The Agrarian organisation, the most numerous Opposition group in the Sobranje, held a conference on August 27, and decided to send a deputation to Radoslavov, bearing a strongly-worded

protest against the Government's policy. Unfortunately some members of this party acted in a manner which encouraged Radoslavov to assume that the protest was made for appearance' sake only, and that in reality he could count on the Agrarians. Turlakov, the present Minister of Finance, frightened by the tempestuous language of Radoslavov, endeavoured to calm him by assuring him that the wording of the resolution should not be interpreted as a threat, but as a demand for a few Ministerial portfolios !

On September 10 the Agrarian leaders, who at their previous interview with Radoslavov had received the most formal assurances that the Government would not depart from its policy of neutrality, had another meeting with him in order to obtain some elucidation on the object of the prolonged stay of the Duke of Mcclenburg and of German officials in Sofia. Then for the first time Radoslavov spoke frankly, and he informed his astounded visitors that everything had been settled, that Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers, and would declare war towards the middle of October. To the indignant protests of the Agrarians Radoslavov calmly replied that the war was drawing to its close, that Russia had been crippled, and that the Government's duty was to range the country on the side of the victors. The Agrarians immediately communicated this information to the rest of the Opposition, which met to deliberate on the measures to be taken. At this meeting the only decision arrived at was that of soliciting an audience from Ferdinand. The Opposition leaders, cowed by the terror which the Government was exerting, refused to listen to the Radical deputy Kosturkov, who entreated and enjoined his colleagues of the Opposition to organise mass meetings throughout the country, each party despatching delegates to all the provincial towns and arranging for a monster national protest in order to intimidate the Cabinet. This plan, Kosturkov admitted, might entail the imprisonment and even the death of the organisers, but the sacrifice of a few tens or hundreds of lives was, he thought, justifiable in view of the seriousness of the situation ; the country ought to be saved, even through a revolution, for the latter was by far the lesser evil. This proposal of the Radicals did not find favour ; even the leaders of the Social-Democrats, and of the Agrarians, Sakuzov and Stamboliiski, were averse from taking such extreme measures, and they decided to issue a manifesto in the joint names of these two parties on September 12. In this manifesto the nation was warned against the adventurous designs of the Cabinet.

A Balkan Alliance was pointed out as being the best safeguard against all foreign intervention. The Government, it was stated, was accepting orders from Vienna and was preparing to march against Serbia, becoming a blind tool of Austria, who was opposed to a Serbo-Bulgarian understanding. If Bulgaria became involved in the war she would have to fight not only her neighbours, but also the Great Powers, and this was beyond her strength. In conclusion, the people were asked by means of meetings and protests to influence the Government to convocate the Sobranje and let the representatives of the nation decide its fate. This manifesto had little effect on the public, for owing to the severe measures of the police it was found almost impossible to circulate it.

In answer to their request for an audience, Tsar Ferdinand received the Opposition leaders on September 17; they unanimously declared that it was essential to form a Coalition Ministry before taking any binding decision, and that they were opposed to the conclusion of an agreement with Germany. Geshov drew the King's attention to the danger of Bulgaria being forced to wage war on three fronts, and to the probable prolonged duration of the war owing to Britain's power of endurance. Tsanov, the leader of the Radicals, denounced in forcible words the premeditated action against Russia: "You wish to entangle Bulgaria in a war against her liberator. This you cannot do, for it is against our country's real interests and our secular traditions. If such an act is committed it will have the most terrible consequences, for it will inevitably entail the definite destruction of Bulgaria."

Stamboliiski was even more outspoken in his remonstrances, and he read a long resolution on behalf of the Agrarian organisation, which may be summarised as follows:

A war on the side of the Central Powers would be a veritable adventure, for it would hurl the nation, the State and the dynasty over a precipice. Bulgaria was not strong enough to fight against all her neighbours and four Great Powers. Such a decision not only did not meet with the nation's approval, but would even arouse its opposition. Heaps of telegrams had been received by him, as well as copies of those addressed to Radoslavov, in which the nation emphatically declared itself against the rumoured decision of the Government, and what was most significant was that these telegrams emanated also from partisans of Radoslavov. In 1913 the Agrarians were enjoined by the nation to search and punish those who were responsible for the catastrophe, and Ferdinand was con-

sidered the chief culprit. As the Agrarians were afraid that internal troubles might lead to a fresh invasion of the country they then resisted this demand. Ferdinand, however, should take note that if he again repeated the criminal act he committed in 1913, the members of the Agrarian Organisation would do nothing to appease the discontent of the nation, but they themselves would become its mouthpiece, and would not hesitate to communicate to the King the nation's severe but just verdict.

All the persuasiveness and all the threats of the Opposition proved unavailing in moving Ferdinand, and the decree for the mobilisation of the Army was made public on September 22. Two days later the *Narod*, the Press organ of the Social-Democrats, published a protest in the name of that party addressed to Radoslavov against the warlike policy of the Cabinet and its efforts to entangle Bulgaria in the war, contrary to her will. Peace was insisted upon, an understanding with the neighbouring States was advocated, and the convocation of the *Sobranje* was again strongly demanded.

At the same time the Opposition continued its deliberations. On September 27 Ferdinand endeavoured to seduce Malinov into granting his support to the pro-German policy. He was asked to enter the Radoslavov Cabinet, in which one or two portfolios would be reserved for him and his adherents. Malinov inquired whether his participation in the Cabinet could tend to influence the pro-German policy, and when he discovered that Bulgaria had been irrevocably bound to the Central Powers he refused to lend his support. The Opposition next empowered Malinov to visit, on behalf of all its members, the representatives of the Entente and persuade them not to break off relations with Bulgaria, but, on the contrary, to hasten the landing of Entente troops in Salonika for the purpose of occupying Macedonia, which step might influence the Bulgarian Cabinet to reconsider its decision. Had the Entente been able to despatch in time sufficient troops for this purpose, it is probable that it would have baffled the German plans; for the Bulgarian Government was counting largely on the Macedonians to carry through its schemes. The latter had, several months previously, made it known to the Entente representatives in Sofia that if British troops occupied Macedonia and promises were made that it would be ceded to Bulgaria at the end of the war, they would adopt the necessary measures to render ineffective any resistance on Ferdinand's part. And this was no empty threat on their part, for they

were all-powerful in Bulgaria, and would not scruple at the methods they employed to carry through their plans. The Entente, unfortunately, did not possess sufficient troops for this purpose at the time the proposal was made, but this did not discourage the Macedonians, who offered to send their own men instead, dressed in British uniforms. Had the Serbian Government given its consent to the eventual transfer of Macedonia to Bulgaria, a solution would have been found ; owing, however, to Serbia's persistent refusal it proved impossible for the Entente to come to a satisfactory arrangement regarding the Macedonians, so Bulgaria finally lost faith in the Allies, and turned to the Germans. The latter, who understood better the psychology of Balkan peoples, received them with open arms and made exceedingly good use of them. The Bulgarian Government was ordered to mobilise all Macedonians in Bulgaria, and when this armed force was ready, and in a position to overawe the non-contents, the mobilisation of the Bulgarian Army was decreed. Cowed and terrorised, without any real leaders, the Bulgarian peasantry submitted ; the few cases of mutiny and insubordination, such as happened in the 27th Infantry Regiment, were ruthlessly suppressed, and the nation allowed itself to be led to butchery. A revolution in Bulgaria, if it did not receive active help and moral encouragement from abroad, was not likely to succeed, as was admitted by all the Opposition, when the proposal was mooted by Kosturkov, one of the leaders of the Radicals ; but it must be admitted that the latter have ethically and mentally outdistanced the bulk of their countrymen, and that they reason more like Western Europeans than Bulgarians.

CHAPTER XVII

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1915

By October 11, 1915 the mobilisation and concentration of the Bulgarian Army had been completed, and military operations were ordered to begin. The Bulgarian forces operating against Serbia were divided into two armies; the First under Lieut.-General Boyajiev, 120,000 strong, occupied a front extending from the Danube to Stresha, a point south-west of Trn and near the junction of the old Bulgarian, Serbian and Turkish frontiers;¹ and the Second under Major-General Todorov, 60,000 strong, which held a front extending from Stresha to, and down, the valley of the Struma. To this Second Army were subsequently added two more Divisions, the 7th and 2nd, bringing up its strength to 120,000 men. Two Divisions, the 4th and 5th, were left to watch the Romanian frontier, and one Division, the 10th, was sent to guard the coast near Dede Agach. The 2nd Division, which was subsequently incorporated in the Second Army, was at the opening of hostilities in the Struma valley, entrusted with the task of watching the Greek frontier.

The plan of campaign was that the First Army should invade Serbia and effect a junction with the Austro-German forces, which had already crossed the Danube, while the Second Army cut the communications between Serbia and Macedonia, and prevented the Serbian forces from retreating into Macedonia, or any help reaching them from Salonika.

Between October 14 and 27, the First Army succeeded in penetrating into the valley of the Timok, and occupying the towns of Zaječar, Knjaževac² and Pirot, its northern wing effecting a junction with the Austro-German forces on October 27. The advance of the troops was greatly delayed by the heavy

¹ Some fifty miles north-west of Sofia. *v. Map on p. 147.*

² Pronounce Zayechar, Kniazhevats, etc. In Serbo-Croatian, c = ts, č = ch, š = sh, j = y, ž = zh, đ = t as in "creature."

rains and swollen streams. The Second Army's advance was more rapid. After giving battle at Kriva-Palanka, it advanced on Kumanovo, which it entered on October 20.

An independent force composed of three regiments and one cavalry brigade had also been formed with the object of operating between the First and Second Armies. Its objective was to occupy Vranja, on the railway line Nish-Salonika, cut the railway line, and turn north to support the action of the First Army. This operation met with success, Vranja being taken on October 16. Simultaneously a part of the 2nd Division, which was watching the Greek frontier, was directed to cut the railway line at Udrovo, on the Vardar, while a Cavalry Division concentrated at Kyustendil was ordered to advance on Veles (Köprülü) and protect the flank of the Second Army.

After the capture of Kumanovo the main forces of the Second Army were directed against Skoplje (Usküb) and Kachanik, while strong detachments were sent northward in support of the troops which had seized Vranja, and which were advancing north on Leskovac. Another detachment was sent southward towards Veles, to arrest the advance of Entente troops, which were moving up the Vardar valley, and had already reached Krivolak. On October 23, Skoplje was taken; as the Serbian forces opposing the Second Army had been dispersed, the latter was ordered to occupy defensive positions at Kachanik and concentrate its forces against the Entente troops. About that date it was reinforced by the 7th Division, and parts of the 5th brought up from the Romanian frontier. On October 30 Veles was taken.

After October 29 the operations developed as follows: The First Army was directed to take Nish, and began its attack on that town on November 3. It met with stubborn resistance on the part of the Serbians, but after heavy losses succeeded in breaking into the town on November 6. The Serbians continued, however, to resist in the sector Nish-Pirot, and it was only after the Second Army had begun to threaten Leskovac that the Serbians retreated. On November 7 Leskovac was occupied, and railway communications were established between the First and Second Armies and with the Austro-German troops. After the capture of Nish the First Army continued the pursuit of the Serbians in the direction Prokuplje-Kuršumlija.

After the splitting up of the Second Army its position became increasingly difficult, for the Serbians, in retreat from Nish, began to exert great pressure in the direction of Gujilane and Bujanovce (north of Skoplje). By November 6 new orders were

issued to the Second Army: to act on the defensive against the Entente troops, and take the offensive against the Serbians, with the object of impeding their retreat towards Priština and Prizren.

On November 9 the First Army holding the line Aleksinac-Nish-Leskovac was ordered to cross the Morava and advance on Priština. The Serbians opposed stubbornly the passage of the Morava. The 6th and 9th Divisions were unable to effect a crossing, and the 1st Division was then ordered to carry out a flank movement from Leskovac, while the 8th Division was sent south to Macedonia by way of Vranja and Bujanovce to support the Second Army. The Serbian resistance was finally overcome, and Prokuplje was taken on November 14 by the First Army, after which it continued its advance on Priština. The aim of this Army was to delay the withdrawal of the Serbians until the Second Army had cut off their retreat. By November 19 the encirclement of Priština began by both the First and Second Armies. After a vain effort on the part of the Serbians to break through towards Skoplje, they began retreating in the direction of Prizren. On November 23 the First Bulgarian Army entered Priština, and with the fall of this town the Serbian resistance broke.

The operations against Priština were supported also by those detachments of the Bulgarian Army lying in the neighbourhood of Leskovac which, after pressing westward and capturing Gujilane on November 15, participated in the taking of Priština. Parts of the First and Second Armies continued the pursuit of the retreating Serbians towards Prizren, which fell on the 29th. After this event the 3rd Division was sent to take up a position to the west of the town, while the rest of the Army was sent to Macedonia. The operations against the main Serbian forces were considered as terminated after the Serbian Army's withdrawal into Albania. A brigade was sent on November 22 from Skoplje to clear Western Macedonia. It occupied Debar and Okhrida on December 6, and Struga on December 11, driving the Serbian forces towards Elbasan, east of which town the Bulgarians stopped their pursuit and entrenched themselves.

The campaign in Macedonia developed as follows: towards the end of October, after the 7th Division and parts of the 5th had reinforced the Second Army, and Veles had been captured, orders were received to keep on the defensive until the operations in Serbia had been completed. No operations of any importance were made except the capture of Prilep on

November 16 by the Cavalry Division. The advance against the Entente troops began on December 4. The latter, realising that they could be of no further assistance to their Serbian Allies, who had withdrawn into Albania, had already begun to retreat, all the more since their retreat along the line of the Vardar was threatened by a Bulgarian advance from Prilep and the Cherna. Simultaneously the 2nd Division, reinforced by a brigade, resumed its attack on Udovo and the Vardar railway line, menacing the communications of the Entente troops. The attempt against Udovo, however, failed, and after some severe engagements with the rearguard of the Entente troops, the latter succeeded in withdrawing into Greek territory.

By December 12 the Greek frontier was reached, and the Bulgarian Army, having received strict orders not to penetrate into Greece, ceased its pursuit and began to take up positions along the Greek frontier. December 12 may be considered as the date on which the whole of Serbian Macedonia came under Bulgarian occupation, Monastir having already fallen on December 4. The total number of prisoners captured during the campaign in Serbia and Macedonia was about 50,000 Serbians and 1,200 British and French, and the number of guns taken 374.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR

AFTER Bulgaria's intervention the Opposition suspended the campaign it had hitherto waged against the Radoslavov Cabinet. This conciliatory attitude, however, did not mean approval of the Government's policy, for it was solely dictated by patriotic motives. It was generally held that it would be unpatriotic to place obstacles in the way of the realisation of the national aspirations. For both Opposition and Government were aiming, more or less, at the same object, viz. the unification of the Bulgarian nation. Their differences arose not from a diversity in aims, but in methods by which these aims should be realised. As the Opposition had been unable to apply its method—that of a co-operation with the Entente—it reconciled itself to what had occurred, and though it did not help, it did not hamper the work of the Government.

It is true that the territorial claims which the Government enunciated overlapped considerably those which the majority of the nation approved and considered as legitimate, but these extreme claims, such as the demand for the Moraya district and even that for the northern Dóbruja, which warrant the qualification of Bulgarian aspirations as imperialistic, did not find any widespread support among the ranks of the Opposition. On the other hand, the claims to Macedonia and to the southern Dóbruja were, and remain, justifiable, so long as the principle of nationality is held to be the criterion by which territorial pretensions are decided; it would therefore be unjust to condemn the Bulgarian people for lending its support to a policy whose apparent purpose was the unification into one body politic of the dispersed members of the Bulgarian nation.

It is a well-known fact that the ethnical frontiers of Bulgaria overflow to a great extent its political ones, and this is corroborated by official documents, whose importance is further emphasised by the fact that they were drawn up prior to the

creation of a Bulgarian State, and were therefore entirely due to the sincere conviction of their authors as to the ethnical boundaries of Bulgaria.

These documents are: (1) The Turkish Imperial Firman of February 29, 1870, establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate over regions mainly peopled by Bulgarians, and comprising part of Macedonia, the Morava district (which after its incorporation in Serbia in 1878 has been Serbised), and the entire Dóbruja. (2) The decision of the Constantinople Conference of 1876, creating two autonomous Bulgarian provinces, comprising practically the same territory as was placed under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate. (3) The Treaty of San Stefano (1878) which, though it excluded northern Dóbruja from the confines of Bulgaria, embraced all Macedonia in the Bulgarian State.

While Ferdinand and his Ministers aimed at securing for Bulgaria the hegemony of the Balkans under the aegis of Germany, the nation as a whole was inspired by much loftier motives, for its aim was not hegemony, but the liberation of its enslaved brethren, the Macedonians: an ideal which had continually been held before its eyes since Bulgaria's emancipation from the Turkish yoke. The people could neither conceive nor realise that their action tended to defeat the very purpose they were fighting for, and that by lending their support to a reactionary force which threatened to throttle the world's liberties they were unwittingly imperilling their own independence. For this reason, while no adequate terms can be found to express the righteous indignation of fair-minded men at the behaviour of Ferdinand and his acolytes, nothing but commiseration should be felt for their victims and dupes, whose chief fault was that they were politically minors, and unable to form a correct appreciation of events.

The manifesto¹ by which the declaration of war was announced to the Bulgarian people is in itself the greatest incriminating document against Ferdinand and his Ministers, being, in fact, a compilation of falsehoods intended to mislead the people, and clearly indicating the anxiety of Bulgaria's rulers to distort the truth. The Bulgarians were appealed to to defend their country from the Serbians, who were alleged to have invaded it, and they were asked to fight only against the Serbians in conjunction with the Austro-Germans. Macedonia was to be occupied with the apparent consent of both belligerent groups.

¹ The entire text of the manifesto is published in *Bulgaria, Problems and Politics*, p. 152. Heinemann, 1919.

It was further affirmed that the European war was drawing to its close, and the Bulgarians were given to understand that after a short scuffle with Serbia they would return to normal conditions.

There were few protests against the war which had been forced on the nation, though several cases of mutiny occurred in the Army ; the public passively acquiesced in what had been done. Even the Social-Democrats in their organ¹ stated :

“ Any effort to divert the 600,000 mobilised men from the path traced for them by the Government would be harmful. We hope, and believe, that such an attempt will not be made ; for, when a nation is going to join issue with others in fateful decisions, none of its members should dare to weaken its unity.”

In spite of the submissiveness of the Opposition, the Government did not dare convocate the Chamber on October 15, as was customary, but adjourned its convocation until December 15, in order to secure in the meantime some tangible results of its policy with which to silence the criticism of its opponents. The interval was used to institute proceedings against those deputies who had become implicated in the so-called Desclusières affair. For in the late summer of 1915 the Entente, taking a leaf out of Germany’s book, had attempted to suborn some of the Bulgarian deputies, using as their chief intermediary Génadiev ; but the result was only a deplorable waste of money.

It would not have mattered much after all if these activities had resulted only in the loss for the Entente of a few million francs, but unfortunately they had the most baneful influence on the Agrarian organisation. The Agrarian deputies who had been approached by the Allied agent were brought under the menace of a court-martial, and the Government, by threatening to prosecute them, whenever it was in difficulties obtained their support on questions in which the organisation they belonged to took the opposite view. This was the initial cause of the split in the Agrarian party. Those of its members who had once started on the wrong path let themselves be seduced by the offers made to them subsequently by the Government, and in a short time lost all compunction. The number of deputies against whom proceedings were instituted was forty, of whom thirty-nine were implicated in the Desclusières affair, and belonged either to Génadiev’s group or to the Agrarian organisation ; the fortieth was a solitary Radoslavist, Dr. T. Yankov, who had expressed in his newspaper, the *Balkanski Courrier*, his conviction that the Entente would win.

¹ *The Narod*, October 10, 1915.

The course of the trial was purposely delayed, and the legal proceedings dragged on for over a year, most of the incriminated deputies being allowed to participate all this time in the debates of the Sobranje. Among the implicated Agrarians was their leader Stamboliiski, who was also prosecuted for publishing and circulating the speech he made during the audience Ferdinand had extended to the Opposition leaders on September 17, 1915 (v. p. 111). Stamboliiski was tried and sentenced at once to life-long imprisonment.

The successes of the Bulgarian Army in Macedonia made the Cabinet's task of confronting the Chamber relatively easy, and when the Sobranje met on December 15, 1915, and was asked to vote the budget and the war credits, very few dissident voices were heard. Except for the Communists and the partisans of the Agrarian leader Dragiev, all the Opposition voted for these credits, though it still emphasised its disagreement with the manner in which the Government had elected to solve the Macedonian question. It is interesting to note that even the Communists were seized with the war fever, and though they, for appearance' sake, voted against the war credits, yet secretly they rejoiced at what had happened.

The enthusiasm which the liberation of Macedonia aroused began to wane rapidly as the people began to realise that peace was not likely to be easily attained. Considerable annoyance was felt towards the Germans for their not permitting the Bulgarian Army to occupy Salonika out of consideration for Greek susceptibilities. This was the greatest mistake committed by Bulgaria, for the Salonika expedition of the Allies might have ended in a disaster for them had the Bulgarian Army persevered in its attacks in December 1915. The absence of a Balkan front would have prevented both Greece and Romania from joining the Entente, and Bulgaria's situation would have remained exceedingly strong. The Germans, however, reckoned that if the Entente withdrew its army from Salonika, where it was engaged solely against Bulgarian troops, it would be used in France against the Germans, and they therefore viewed the maintenance of the Salonika front as highly desirable.

Dissatisfaction with the corrupt practices of the Administration now began to make itself felt, all the more since important misappropriations were discovered in the funds destined for the Army's supplies. Serious men began to calculate that the protraction of the war would create an unbearable financial burden, and thus when the Cabinet, in July 1916, asked the

Chamber to vote its budget it met with a serious check, which might have resulted in its defeat had not private interests once more bulked larger than national ones in the consideration of some politicians.

The trial of the deputies implicated in the Desclusières affair was drawing to its close, and as they began to realise that the Government had until then used them as a cat's-paw and had no intention of suspending their trial, they concluded that the best means of extricating themselves from their perilous position was to bring about the Government's fall through the rejection of its budget, with which the Opposition was likewise displeased.

When the budget therefore came up for vote the Opposition and the supporters of Génadiev declared themselves against it, and the Government would have found itself in a minority had not Todorov, Geshov's lieutenant, and his adherents turned round and voted in support of Radoslavov.

It is needless to say that this revolt on the part of the deputies compromised in the Desclusières affair sealed their fate ; for most of them were sentenced to imprisonment by court-martial at Sofia, and their seats in the Sobranje were filled by persons in whom the Government placed greater reliance.

CHAPTER XIX

ROMANIA'S INTERVENTION, AND OPERATIONS IN THE DÓBRUJA, 1916

ROMANIA's declaration of war against Austria-Hungary (August 27, 1916) led many influential persons to use their efforts to dissuade Radoslavov from involving Bulgaria in a fresh war. Malinov was the chief advocate of the policy of maintaining Bulgaria neutral in the conflict between Romania and the Central Powers, and he was encouraged in his attitude by Derussi, the Romanian Minister in Sofia, who intentionally circulated reports that his Government was willing to come to terms with Bulgaria for the preservation of friendly relations between the two States. He further invited Bulgaria to break off relations with the Central Powers, in which case she could rely on obtaining Macedonia from the Entente. These assurances, however, ceased to find credence when Russian and Romanian troops began to be concentrated in the Dóbruja in preparation for a campaign which could only be directed against Bulgaria, and Radoslavov, under pressure from Germany, finally declared war on Romania. It is affirmed that even some of the Ministers were averse from intervention, and that the Ministerial Council, being doubtful as to the expediency of its decision, prevented any minutes of its deliberations being taken when the question was discussed.

The campaign against Romania proved much more popular than that against Serbia, which was entered into without much enthusiasm on the part of the people. The Bulgarians, remembering Romania's utterly unjustifiable invasion of their country in 1913, at a time when they were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with their quondam allies, responded enthusiastically to the Government's call, and were not slow to show their eagerness to revenge themselves on Romania for her unwarranted aggression of three years before. In a few short months the whole of the Dóbruja was occupied, after a series of important defeats inflicted on the Romanians.

The following is a short account of the operations :

The presence of an enemy force in the Dóbruja constituted a serious menace to Bulgaria, and necessitated the mobilisation of a large number of troops to guard against a possible inroad. The invasion of Bulgaria from the north could be effected most easily through the Dóbruja ; this had been the path chosen by most invaders, and the Turks when in possession of the country found it necessary to erect a strong group of defences, the so-called quadrilateral, based on the four towns of Varna, Silistra, Ruschuk and Shumla, in order to bar any enemy advance from the north.

The Romanians, who had obtained possession of southern Dóbruja in 1913, thereby obtained an admirable *place d'armes* from which to launch an attack on Bulgaria, and by their holding of the three fortified bridge-heads of Tutrakan, Silistra, and Cernavoda, could rapidly concentrate their troops for such a purpose. The Russian Navy, which possessed a numerical superiority in the Black Sea, could further facilitate the concentration of an enemy force against Bulgaria by effecting the landing of Russian troops within a very brief period of time on the Dóbrujan coast. The great advantages which the possession of the Dóbruja conferred on Romania led the Bulgarians to wrest it from her by a rapid attack before the Romanians had time to make use of their privileged position.

The plan of operations was worked out by the staff of the Bulgarian Third Army, before the arrival of von Mackensen, who took over the command on August 26, 1916—the day before Romania declared war against Austria-Hungary. The total strength of the forces concentrated in Northern Bulgaria at the end of August 1916, including the detachments garrisoning all the Danubian towns, Varna and Shumla, amounted to 86 battalions, 27 squadrons, 123 batteries, and a small German force comprising 4 battalions, 6 squadrons and 1 battery. On August 31 the Bulgarian forces, which comprised the 1st and 4th Divisions, part of the 6th Division, and one Cavalry Division, were concentrated as follows :

The 1st Division, in the region Kamanlar-Sarvü-Hürsova, to the east of the highway Razgrad-Silistra.

The 4th Division, on the line Balbunar-Karakazlar-Kamanlar.

Part of the 6th Division, along the road Razgrad-Shumla.

The Cavalry Division, south-west of Dobrich (Bazarjik), along the line Karaja-At-Hambarlak.

The plan of the campaign, as it had been worked out by the Bulgarian Staff, under General Tochev, was to mask Dobrich

and deliver a rapid attack on Tutrakan,¹ and later on Silistra. General Mackensen, however, disagreed with this plan, and ordered a simultaneous attack on Tutrakan and Silistra, being under the impression that the Romanians had only nine battalions at Tutrakan. As the Bulgarians possessed information to the contrary, it was finally decided that the attack should be delivered against Tutrakan only, as there were not sufficient troops for a simultaneous assault on both towns, which were strongly fortified.

The troops which participated in the attack on Tutrakan consisted of the 4th Division, one brigade belonging to the 1st Division, and a detachment from the Ruschuk garrison, composed of one German and five Bulgarian battalions. The total strength of the force was 31 battalions and 4 squadrons, with 145 guns. The Bulgaro-Romanian frontier was crossed on September 1, and the attack of Tutrakan began on September 5. After a bombardment lasting one hour, the infantry launched an attack. After overcoming the first line of defences the infantry assaulted the line of forts which formed the main defences of the town. These were taken after a hand-to-hand struggle, and on September 6 an attack on the second line of defences was delivered, which resulted in the garrison's capitulation on the 7th. The number of prisoners captured at Tutrakan amounted to 28,000 soldiers and 450 officers; 151 guns and large quantities of war material were also taken. The casualties sustained by the Bulgarians were 7,873. The fall of Tutrakan had a great effect on the moral of the Bulgarian troops, it deepened the contempt they felt for the Romanians, and strengthened their belief that the latter were incapable of facing them in an open fight. The capture of Tutrakan must indubitably be considered as a great feat of arms, for forts were attacked and taken in hand-to-hand fight, with an artillery preparation of only one hour's duration, and before the complete investment of the fortress, the number of prisoners outnumbering the number of captors.

Four days after the taking of Tutrakan, the Bulgarians entered Silistra, the Romanians having evacuated it.

Between September 7 and 9 a few battalions from the Varna garrison advanced on Dobrich, supported by the Cavalry Division, and later by one brigade belonging to the 6th Division. These forces engaged a numerically superior composite force of Romanians, Russians and Serbians, which they put to flight after capturing Dobrich.

¹ *Turtucăi* in Romanian

By these successful operations the first aim, that of depriving the Romanians of their *place d'armes* in the Dóbruja, was attained ; the next object was to seize the narrowest part of the Dóbruja, between the Danube and the Black Sea. The Romanians had fortified the line Rasova-Cobadin-Tuzla Yol, and the Bulgarian Army advanced on September 18 to the attack. Though some detachments of the 4th Division were able to make their way through the enemy defences, it was found impossible to take advantage of the positions gained, owing to the numerical inferiority of the Bulgarian forces. They finally retired and took up defensive positions.

On October 19, after the arrival of two Turkish divisions numbering in all 11,000 men, a fresh attack was undertaken. Mackensen, who directed the operations, decided to launch the main attack on the eastern section of the Romanian position, and for this purpose deprived the Bulgarian 4th Division, which was to operate on the western section, of all its heavy artillery, much to the annoyance of the Bulgarian commander, General Tochev, who insisted that the main effort should be directed against the centre of the Romanian line, at Cobadin. In spite of the concentration of the artillery on the eastern sector, it was the 4th Bulgarian Division which pierced the Romanian defences, but being unsupported by artillery it was unable to press the advantages it gained. The Romanian Army managed to extricate itself, part crossing the Danube and part retreating northwards. Owing to the dispute which arose between Mackensen and Tochev, the latter was relieved of his command.

Following on the capture of the Cobadin position, and of Cernavoda on October 25, Mackensen ordered the cavalry to pursue the Romanians and clear the rest of the country ; this order, however, could not be carried out, as the Romanians were in considerable strength. On November 2 the Romanians having received reinforcements undertook an offensive and forced the Bulgarians to take up a line of defence between Bonashtik and Tasavlu. The Romanian attacks were repulsed, and finally, on December 15, Mackensen assumed the offensive ; and by January 5, 1917 the whole of the Dóbruja was cleared of the Romanians.

The operations which aimed at the capture of Bucharest began by the crossing of the Danube on November 25, 1916, at Sistova (Svishtov), of the 1st and 12th Divisions of the Bulgarian Army, the 217th German Division and 26th Turkish Division. After the fall of Bucharest on December 6, and the

advance to the river Siret (Sereth), the 1st Bulgarian Division returned to the Macedonian front, only one Bulgarian division being left in Romania. The maintenance of Bulgarian troops north of the Danube led to several incidents, the soldiers strongly resenting their employment in a campaign in support of interests that they considered foreign to Bulgaria. On many occasions they refused to obey orders, as was also the case in the summer of 1917, when a Bulgarian Division in the Dóbruja mutinied when ordered to relieve another division on the Siret front.

If the Dóbruja campaign met with general approval, the despatch of Bulgarian troops across the Danube aroused intense dissatisfaction in all quarters. There were serious mutinies even in the Army, soldiers in many cases refusing to pass into Romania, where they declared they were sent to defend not Bulgarian but German interests. And this was a correct appreciation of the then existing state of affairs; the Radoslavov Government, owing to its extreme subservience to the Germans, showing scant concern for the legitimate interests of the Bulgarian nation which it was entrusted to defend, but which it continually betrayed. The case of the Serbian campaign was still fresh in the minds of the Bulgarians, when their Teuton allies left them to deal practically single-handed with the Serbian Army after the fall of Nish. Owing to the Austro-Germans' disregard of their engagements, Bulgaria was then obliged, by force of circumstances, to employ twice the number of troops she was bound to provide in order to overcome the Serbian resistance.

CHAPTER XX

THE FALL OF THE RADOSLAVOV MINISTRY

THOUGH the year 1916 closed with the Bulgarians in occupation of a territory beyond the dreams of their wildest Chauvinists, yet anxiety and discontent were increasing among the masses. The absence of any response to the Central Powers' Peace Note of December 12, 1916 helped to strengthen the prevailing pessimism, which was further intensified by the food crisis under which the country was labouring. The shortage in the food-supplies was partly due to the partial failure of the crops, but mainly to the systematic plundering of Bulgaria by the Germans who, disregarding all regulations, smuggled immense quantities of produce out of the country. To facilitate this contraband the Germans took over the terminal sections of the Bulgarian railways and treated the Bulgarian authorities as those of a conquered country. Their exactions in the Dobruja, and especially in the Morava district, where the Germans had the sole right to collect foodstuffs, were such that to them must be ascribed many of the causes which led the Serbian peasantry to revolt in the spring of 1917. As the stenographic records of the Sobranje during the war have not yet been published, their publication being probably intentionally delayed because they would reveal facts which would not add to the credit of some of the present Agrarian Ministers, it is difficult to trace the development of the crisis which eventually culminated in the fall of the Radoslavov Cabinet in June 1918 ; but the main reasons which led to its collapse were its corruption, subordination to the Germans, and the growing Bulgaria and her Allies on territorial and political questions.

The growing dissatisfaction could only find expression in the Sobranje, the Press being strictly forbidden to express any opinion or pass judgment on the acts of the Government. The most forcible and enlightening speech made during the course

of the war was probably that of N. Tsanov, the venerable leader of the Radicals, on March 30, 1917. The following passages from this discourse will help to illustrate the disillusion of the Bulgarians regarding their Allies' behaviour, even at this early period.

"I have hitherto abstained from taking part in the debates, because it would have been aimless for me to condemn you [the Government] for the wrong steps you have taken, which you cannot retrace, and which are leading Bulgaria to destruction on the steep incline of an abyss. . . . Even if our speeches were published, they could hardly profit anyone, as those for whom they are intended are in the trenches, and our speeches would only add to their doubts and anxiety, thereby weakening their power of resistance. Besides, after you had imposed the present policy on the country, without consideration for its feelings, it was necessary to permit the results of this policy becoming manifest, so that you might be unable to justify your failure by the excuse that the carrying out of your programme had been hampered. . . .

"When we voted the second war credit we told you that Bulgaria had nothing to seek across the Danube, and that our troops should not cross it. You, however, owing to your abject subservience to the Germans, have not heeded us, and our Army has not only crossed the Danube, but it has reached the Siret, and no one knows where it will stop. By allowing this to take place you have converted Bulgaria into a mercenary, and forced her to participate in the solution of aims foreign to her.

"You have declared war for the realisation of our national unity, but you now seek the conquest of foreign territories, regardless of the wishes of their inhabitants. In the name of this policy of conquest you have committed a series of indefensible brutalities, thereby sowing the seed of perpetual disturbances and conflicts among the Balkan peoples. Can you believe that, lying between Germans and Turks, even though they be allies, we can secure for our country a free and peaceful development while we foster against us the undying hatred of our neighbours? Are we to live eternally with a knife in our hand? And is not this our lust for foreign territories going to compromise our existence? And after all, even if you decide to incorporate foreign countries in Bulgaria, cannot some more humane and cultural administrative methods be devised to attach them to us, other than by exiling their inhabitants to Asia Minor?

" You who have implanted and protected this unexampled corruption and turpitude in the administration, who have deprived Bulgarian citizens of all their constitutional rights, who protect yourselves by courts-martial, and who, through the censorship of the Press, prevent the publication of the speeches of deputies and of internal correspondence, . . . you, who in short have brought Bulgaria to an impasse, have no right to ask us to vote. . . ."

The above words, coming from the lips of the real leader of Bulgarian democracy, a man who rightly enjoyed the greatest respect and widest popularity in Bulgaria on account of his unrelenting fight against the corrupt régime of Ferdinand, show how foreign the idea of conquest and expansion at the expense of their neighbours was to large numbers of the Bulgarians, and how loath they were to lend their support to the imperialistic policy of the Radoslavov Cabinet.

One of the first causes which contributed to the cooling of relations between Bulgaria and Germany was the question of the Dóbruja. According to the Treaty between the two countries, southern Dóbruja was to revert to Bulgaria, but as she had helped Germany in the campaign against Romania, by despatching troops across the Danube, Bulgaria put forth claims for the entire region, basing them not only on the military help granted to Germany, but also on historical and ethnical considerations. Bulgaria's Allies, however, were altogether adverse to her obtaining the northern Dóbruja, as they wanted to keep under their own control the railway line to the Black Sea port of Constantza, so as to possess an extra line of communication with Constantinople independently of the one through Bulgarian territory. To counter the persistent demands of Bulgaria, and in order to render her more pliant, the Germans incited the Turks to lodge a counter-claim against Bulgaria.

The Turks took the matter up quite seriously, and in May 1917 despatched Talaat to Sofia to demand the retrocession of that part of the Maritsa valley which two years previously they had surrendered to Bulgaria, in consideration for the military help Turkey lent Bulgaria during the Dóbrujan campaign.

This demand aroused a storm of indignation in Bulgaria, and Radoslavov became so alarmed that he repaired to Berlin to ask for Germany's intercession. The Germans replied by the most profuse assurances that the Dóbruja would eventually be handed over to Bulgaria. These promises, however, in which the Germans were always wont to be lavish, did not at

all satisfy Bulgarian political circles, and their dissatisfaction further increased when the German and Austrian Press began unfavourably to criticise the Bulgarian war claims. The campaign initiated by the German Socialist Wendel, in the Viennese *Arbeiter Zeitung*, had the most painful effect on Bulgarian public opinion, and must have convinced many Bulgarians of the necessity of arriving at a separate peace with the Entente. Negotiations for this purpose were carried on by several Bulgarians in Switzerland, who had no official status, but who possibly had the tacit consent of Ferdinand. The latter could have used these negotiations as a means of wringing concessions from Germany, but he was resolved to remain true to his compact with the Teutons, since he himself declared after his abdication, in an interview with the *Pester Lloyd*, that for thirty-two years he had always worked for the consolidation of German influence in the Balkans. The conduct of these private negotiations was rendered easy by the collapse of the Tsardom, which had always been regarded with misgivings as being unfriendly towards Bulgaria's aspirations, and the advent of the pro-Bulgarian Miliukov to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Throughout the summer of 1917 these Bulgarians were busy preparing the ground for an understanding with the Entente, and the terms on which both sides seemed about to agree were that Bulgaria should remain in possession of that part of Serbian and Greek Macedonia of which she was in occupation, retain southern Dobruja and secure Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line. In exchange for these acquisitions Bulgaria was to guarantee the discontinuance of all military operations against the Entente, and help the latter if necessary in its fight against the Central Powers and Turkey. All this seemed very attractive to Entente politicians ; they even forgot their past experience with Génadiev in the Deselusière affair, and were so foolish as to advance some 4,000,000 frs. to one of his adherents for the purpose of his conducting a pro-Entente agitation in Bulgaria. Following in his leader's footsteps, this worthy pocketed the money and absconded. Naturally, nothing ensued from these negotiations, for no one among the Bulgarian negotiators was in a position to execute the stipulations set forth by the Entente. For not only were Ferdinand and his Ministers resolutely opposed to Bulgaria's abandoning the Central Alliance, but the country itself was entirely in the grip of the Germans, and any attempt to come to terms with the Entente would have been ruthlessly suppressed by them.

The friction between Bulgaria and her Allies over the Dóbruja and Maritsa questions continued to grow in intensity, and was tending to produce a rift which would have endangered the Alliance. In order to soothe the ruffled feelings of the Bulgarians and to quieten their apprehensions, the Kaiser paid a visit to Sofia in October 1917. By flattery and cajolery, and by a liberal dispensation of promises and decorations, he managed to calm for some time the growing suspicions of his Balkan allies and consolidate temporarily the tottering fabric of the Radoslavov administration. The unparalleled corruption of public servants, the endless abuses which were being committed in every branch of the administration, the systematic spoliation in which Government partisans indulged, had, however, undermined to such a degree the Government's authority that nothing could save it from decay, and the critical state of the food-supply tended further to accelerate its impending collapse. During the winter of 1917-18 large sections of the population were literally starving. The harvest had been deficient, and it was foreseen that a shortage of about 20 per cent. would result. Had there been an honest administration some attempts would have been made to remedy the evil by economising, and putting a stop to the wholesale smuggling which was being carried on by the Germans. The latter, taking advantage of the extreme cupidity and corruptibility of the functionaries, disregarded all regulations and threw all restraint to the winds. While the Bulgarian Army and the civil population were starving, whole truck-loads of foodstuffs were every day conveyed secretly out of the country, while groups of German soldiers drove entire herds across the Bulgarian frontiers. Germany had in fact been treating Bulgaria as if she were her colony. The German banks had taken control of all mines and of the export trade, they had established an indirect control over the finances, they had taken in hand the supply of war material, they seized and exported raw materials regardless of embargoes. Economically, politically, and militarily, Bulgaria was completely reduced to subjection. The Bulgarian Army had passed under the command of the Germans, and the Cabinet Ministers were simply figure-heads without any real power. Germany having captured Belgrade and Bucharest, and having insinuated herself into Sofia and Constantinople, considered herself the mistress of the Balkan Peninsula, and not only made her sway felt in Bulgaria but took all measures to stifle any manifestation of independence on Bulgaria's part. The following summary of

an official document sufficiently characterises the utter helplessness of Bulgaria in the hands of her Allies and exploiters. The Ministry of Finance wrote on July 13, 1916 (letter No. 4319), to the Food Control Office, complaining that it did not know what was being carried in and out of the country, because the Bulgarians were no longer masters of their frontiers and Custom-houses, their places having been usurped by the Germans. The Cabinet, before which these remonstrances were duly placed, did nothing to check the abuse, owing to its weakness and inability to cope with the Germans, who were the absolute masters of the country.

The Army was in as bad a plight as the civilian population, for not only had it to go on short rations, but it lacked clothing and boots. One may imagine, therefore, what the feelings of the Bulgarian soldiery must have been when they compared their condition with that of their German comrades, and to what an extent this comparison must have undermined their *moral*.

The chaotic state into which the country was falling aroused universal indignation. Amongst others Georgov, Radical, speaking in the Sobranje on March 18, 1918, denounced in forcible terms the Government's supineness and corruption, as well as its policy of annexation as follows: "We disapprove not only of the foreign but also of the home policy of the Government. Instead of order we have a parody of an administration, almost every member of which is busy enriching himself at the expense of the State and of the public. Owing to their addiction to bribery, the functionaries spread corruption among all the classes of the population with whom they come in contact. Within the old confines of the country they are forced to curb their instincts, owing to the opposition they meet with from the population, but in the new provinces there is nothing to check their excesses.

"Bulgarian democracy aimed at solving the question of Bulgaria's unification on the basis of an understanding between the Balkan peoples, through a federation. The Balkan War and the European War have, unfortunately, rendered the realisation of a Balkan federation more difficult. But the Government, which is entirely responsible for this war, must avoid putting forth claims to territories belonging to Serbia, for if it feels no compunction in demanding the annexation of lands which for forty years have formed part of Serbia, this proves that it is not ashamed to convert this war of liberation into one of conquest."

The Government's inability to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the Dobruja question tended to envenom Bulgaro-German relations, especially as a further cause of irritation appeared in Germany's refusal to declare war on Greece, and in her ignoring the situation created by the appearance of the Venizelist army on the Macedonian front. As the Bulgarians claimed the districts of Seres, Drama, and Kavalla, which, according to the Bulgaro-German convention, were to revert to them in case Greece joined the Entente, Germany's solicitude for King Constantine and Greece's interests exasperated Bulgarian public opinion, as everything tended to prove that Germany was resolved to baulk this aim of Bulgaria. To make matters worse Germany ceased from January 1, 1918 to extend her financial assistance in the shape of a monthly advance of 50,000,000 frs. to the Bulgarian Government, and from March 1, 1918 ceased to provide the Bulgarian Army with munitions and clothing, thus placing the Radoslavov Cabinet in desperate straits. If to the political difficulties be added the serious discontent which was manifesting itself in the Army and was fostered by the Communists, in whom the example of the Bolshevik Revolution had instilled a frenzied enthusiasm, and by the Agrarians, who, regardless of consequences, were attempting by every means to obtain Stamboliiski's release, as well as the general indignation at the corrupt practices of the administration, it is easy to understand why Ferdinand felt obliged, much to his regret, to part at last company with his subservient Ministers, and entrust the government of the country to other hands.

CHAPTER XXI

THE MALINOV CABINET AND THE REPUBLICAN ADVENTURE

ONE of the secrets of Ferdinand's power was his skill in grasping the psychological moment for changing his Ministers; in the case of Radoslavov, however, the customary change had been delayed to a dangerous extent. The phenomenal depravity of the Radoslavov administration had completely impaired the *moral* both of the Army and of the civil population, and no alteration in the Ministry would restore confidence among the masses, which had become completely disenchanted regarding the policy hitherto pursued.

The selection of Malinov as successor to Radoslavov was unavoidable, for, after his predecessor in office, Malinov was the most amenable among Bulgarian politicians to Ferdinand's influence. The latter, aware of this, had done his best to bring the leader of the Democrats and his adherents into favour with the Kaiser at the time of the German Emperor's visit to Sofia, in order that the sudden appearance of Malinov at the head of the Government might not give rise to any doubts in Germany as to Bulgaria's loyalty. Thus, while Malinov's advent to power on June 21, 1918 was hailed both in Bulgaria and in Entente countries as a portent of an impending change in Bulgarian policy, little concern was displayed by German official circles, and even if there were any hesitation this was rapidly dispelled by the official telegrams Malinov addressed to Count Hertling in which he affirmed his devotion to the Central Alliance.

Malinov's programme, which was supported by all the parties which had until then opposed Radoslavov, aimed at assuring the food supply, purifying the administration, and securing peace. The demand for peace had become so emphatic that no Government could any longer ignore it with impunity. Unfortunately Malinov lacked the moral courage necessary for

tackling such a difficult problem, and allowed himself to fall more and more under the influence of Ferdinand and the Germans.

The prospect of coming to terms with the Entente attracted him, but he would not face the risk such a decision entailed, though it must be admitted that he received little encouragement from the Entente, which no longer seemed disposed to make advances to Bulgaria. Besides, Bulgarian politicians seem to have been very badly informed regarding the military situation on the Western front, and to have entertained a belief in the invincibility of Germany to the last moment. This confidence in Germany's strength explains their fear of Bulgaria becoming a battle-ground between Entente and German troops, in case a separate peace had been concluded.

In order to form a true appreciation of the situation, however, it is necessary to take into account the difficulties in the way of a realisation of such a move. Malinov would have met with stubborn opposition from Ferdinand, the Chamber (which was packed with Radoslavov's supporters), and the military circles, so that any attempt on his part to conclude a separate peace was doomed to failure as long as he could not reckon on active external help; and this seemed hardly available, for the Entente did not display any inclination to come to terms. Moreover the local help Malinov could expect to secure in support of such an initiative was altogether inadequate to assure its success, and therefore there was little more for him to do than to assume a passive attitude; for it should be remembered that any insubordination on the part of the Bulgarian Government would have been promptly suppressed by the Germans, who could flood the country with their troops quartered in Turkey, Romania, the Ukraine, and the Black Sea littoral, all the more since the lines of communication of these troops would have been endangered by any subversive movement on the part of Bulgaria; and their safety had therefore to be secured at all costs.

By August 1918 alarming reports began to arrive from the front. The *moral* of the troops was wavering. The soldiers' patience had become exhausted. The strange version that Ferdinand had hired them out to Germany for three years was finding wide credence in their midst, and as the third anniversary of Bulgaria's entry in the war was approaching, the troops were announcing their determination not to permit a renewal of this imaginary contract.

The solemn proclamations of the Entente that it was fighting

for the right of free determination of peoples further undermined the *moral* of the Bulgarians, who were waging the war for the triumph of this very principle. It was natural for them, naively confiding in the promises of the Entente and America, to conclude that it was purposeless to prolong the struggle. The Bulgarian soldier neither shared in, nor approved of, the imperialistic schemes of his rulers ; all he sought was to liberate the enslaved Macedonians, his brethren by race, and since this object could apparently be attained through the application of the principle of nationality, in support of which the Entente was persistently declaring that it had gone to war, he came to view the continuation of the war as folly on his part.

The alliance with Germany and Turkey was not based on anything stable, either as regards interest or sentiment. The Dóbruja and Maritsa questions had proved to the Bulgarians that their interests could hardly be reconciled with those of their Allies, whose arrogance, moreover, had rendered them more hateful in the eyes of the Bulgarians than even the Serbians and Romanians, the desire for revenge against whom had been already satiated. Further, the Bulgarians had come to realise that a German victory would be tantamount to their complete economic subjugation by Germany, and that since the danger inherent in a Russian occupation of Constantinople had been eliminated, a defeat at the hands of the Entente would be associated with lesser evils for Bulgaria than a victory obtained with the assistance of Germany.

Deputies who had visited the front, among whom was the Social-Democrat Sakuzov, reported that it was essential to fix a time-limit for the conclusion of peace in order to pacify the Army, while the Radical Kosturkov admitted that : "We cannot and must not hope that the Army is in a position to endure the hardships of another winter campaign." Malinov, replying to these remonstrances, made it known that he would only move in the matter if Austria took the initiative, but finally, after prolonged deliberations, it was decided to convoke the Chamber on September 30, 1918, and leave it to decide as to what should be done. On August 12 Malinov sent a strongly-worded note to Germany complaining of the non-fulfilment of her engagements. For Germany had not only ceased sending money and munitions to Bulgaria, but, being hard pressed in the west, she was continually drawing on her contingent of troops in Macedonia, thereby compelling the Bulgarians to maintain under arms a much larger force than the treaty stipulations warranted. It may be incidentally

noted that, in lieu of the six German and six Austro-Hungarian Divisions and the undetermined amount of Turkish assistance which the Bulgaro-German military convention promised Bulgaria, the only military help she was then actually in receipt of was in the form of 3 battalions, 3 squadrons, 51 batteries, and 153 machine-guns manned by Germans and posted along the Macedonian front. It is also interesting to record, for it illustrates the utter inconsiderateness of the Germans for their Bulgarian Allies, that, while the German contingent had dwindled to a fraction of its original strength, the Germans insisted on the Bulgarian Government providing food for the total number of German troops they had promised to maintain, in spite of the desperate food situation in Bulgaria.

Under pressure from his supporters Malinov submitted a report to Ferdinand in which the situation was depicted as inspiring grave fears ; but to this Ferdinand jocularly replied that Malinov ought to pay a visit to the Kaiser, who would dispel his misgivings. The only apparent result of the steps undertaken by Malinov was the despatch to Sofia of the Kings of Bavaria and Saxony, whose presence in the Bulgarian capital, it was expected, would infuse fresh courage into the vacillating Cabinet. And it was while the latter was receiving the King of Saxony, and planning gala receptions, and exchanging high-sounding discourses that the Bulgarian front in Macedonia was collapsing under the blows of the Entente troops. The first news of the disaster was not taken seriously by the Cabinet, the Army headquarters affirming that the breach made by the enemy could be filled up. The irresolute Malinov simply yelled for German help, and had he obtained it would have probably persisted in fighting on the side of the Central Powers. Fortunately, the only immediate relief Hindenburg would promise was the despatch of some German troops from Odessa and Sevastopol. There are reasons to believe that the Germans were not averse from a partial Bulgarian defeat in Macedonia, which would have rendered the Bulgarians more dependent on Germany, and thereby impelled them to assume a less intransigent attitude on controversial questions. These motives must have largely influenced the Germans in their decision not to take the necessary precautions for parrying the Entente offensive which was known to be impending, and to have delayed the expedition of reinforcements, they being under the impression that a partial withdrawal of the Bulgarian Army would in no way compromise the stability of the Macedonian front.

As it was daily becoming more evident that the Bulgarian

Army was not in a position to retrieve the defeat which had been inflicted on it, or to arrest the advance of the Entente forces, the Cabinet, after hurried deliberations, decided on September 25 to conclude at once an armistice with the Entente, and on the following day the delegates of the Bulgarian Government started for Salonika in the company of the American Minister, Mr. Murphy. On September 25 the Cabinet succeeded in persuading Ferdinand to release Stamboliiski and the other political prisoners from their confinement, and Stamboliiski, as a leading member of a party supporting the Malinov Ministry, afterwards participated in all the subsequent sittings of the Ministerial Council. Owing to the demoralisation which had set in in the Army, it was decided that a committee of deputies should immediately leave for the Army front in order to allay the panic and induce the troops to arrest the advance of the Entente forces for a few days, until an armistice could be signed. Stamboliiski fully concurred in these decisions, and left for the front in company with the other deputies for the purpose of pacifying the soldiery. On his arrival, however, Stamboliiski took the unexpected step of proclaiming a republic, with himself as president, and R. Daskalov, later Minister of Agriculture, as Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army, regardless of the fact that such a step might have endangered the conclusion of the armistice ; for had the Bulgarian Government been overthrown, its delegates in Salonika would have had their credentials invalidated, and would no longer have possessed the right to negotiate with the Entente. This republican move was all the more dangerous since the Radoslavists, backed by Ferdinand, were secretly plotting the overthrow of Malinov and were awaiting the arrival of German reserves to execute their plan. Malinov and the parties supporting him, including the Agrarian deputies, perceiving the danger to which Bulgaria was exposed by this unexpected declaration of a republic, did their utmost to persuade Stamboliiski and Daskalov to retrace their steps. The other Agrarian leaders, Dragiev and Bakalov, issued a manifesto condemning the movement and appealing to the soldiers not to allow themselves to be carried away by the agitation. On September 28 Stamboliiski returned to Sofia with the intention of asking the Socialists and Communists to support the republican movement ; but, having failed to convince them of the wisdom of his undertaking, he calmly resumed his place in the council of the Ministers and the leaders of the parties supporting Malinov, and endeavoured to exonerate himself for his prank by explain-

ing that the revolted soldiery had forced him and Daskalov to proclaim a republic. He even approved of the despatch of a delegation to Daskalov with the object of persuading the latter to suppress the outbreak. The only result of this mad adventure was that a considerable body of troops, getting completely out of hand, sacked the towns of Kyustendil and Radomir,¹ and after breaking into and plundering various war depots, marched on Sofia with the intention of putting the capital to sack. The mutineers were met on the outskirts of the city by a few loyal troops, supported by the cadets and some Germans, who had begun arriving from Odessa, and they were finally dispersed after both sides had between them lost some 1,500 in killed. This mutinous outbreak was really an explosion of pent-up anger against those who had brought on the catastrophe, and the result of a natural desire for revenge on the guilty. It was a spontaneous movement without any leaders, and with no determined object, which an opportunist like Stamboliiski naturally seized upon for his own advancement.

Fortunately the proclamation of a republic did not interfere with the armistice, which was concluded on September 29. With the ensuing disbanding of the Army the danger of a counter-revolution instigated by the pro-German circles also vanished. Ferdinand, who had still hoped that he might succeed in reconstituting the front on the arrival of the German succour which was promised him, lost faith and, yielding to the demands of his Ministers, departed from Sofia on October 4.

The levity with which Stamboliiski had instigated the republican movement, and the dangers to which he so thoughtlessly exposed Bulgaria, were widely condemned, and the Government was even forced by public opinion to issue orders for his arrest and that of his friends, who had participated in the adventure. Shortly afterwards, however, a general amnesty was granted, and Stamboliiski, who in the meantime had been in hiding, eventually became a Minister in the reconstructed Cabinet.

It must be admitted that, had Bulgaria been declared a republic immediately after her collapse, better terms might have been offered her, for public opinion in Britain and America would have surmised that the Bulgarians had definitely renounced the misguided policy of their rulers and had resolved to make a fresh start. Such an alteration in the form of government, however, might have been effected by pacific means, for the majority of the nation, represented by the

¹ Twenty miles south-west of Sofia.

Agrarians, Socialists and Radicals, were very much in favour of such a change, and a Cabinet depending on the support of these three parties would have carried it with ease. But Stamboliiski cannot be justified on the ground that he was a zealous republican, and that he seized the first opportunity that presented itself to secure the realisation of an ardently desired ideal, for a few days after the fiasco of the republican movement he addressed a letter to Tsar Boris—Ferdinand's son and successor—in which Stamboliiski proclaimed his loyalty to the throne, and wished his new sovereign a long and happy reign !

CHAPTER XXII

THE COLLAPSE OF THE BULGARIAN FRONT

THE distribution of the Bulgarian forces on the Macedonian front towards the middle of September 1918 was as follows :

(1) The 11th German Army—German in command only, for practically the whole of the forces were Bulgarian—occupied the western sector, stretching from the Skumbi valley (Albania) to the Mala Rupa height, situated to the east of the bend of the Cherna. It comprised the “Mixed” and the 6th, 1st, 4th, 2nd and 3rd Bulgarian, and 302nd German Divisions. It was commanded by General Stoibel, whose headquarters were at Prilep.

(2) The First Bulgarian Army, holding the sector Mala Rupa-Gulemekl, a village to the east of Lake Doiran. It was composed of the 5th, the Chasseur or “Mountain,” and the 9th Bulgarian Divisions, and one brigade of the 11th Division. It was commanded by General Neresov, with headquarters at Dedeli.

(3) The Second Bulgarian Army, holding the front Gulemekl-Lake Tachino, and comprising the 11th, 7th and 8th Bulgarian Divisions, with General Lukov in command, whose headquarters were at Sveti-Vrats.¹

(4) The Fourth Bulgarian Army, quartered in the region between Lake Tachino and the River Mesta¹ and composed of the 10th Bulgarian Division and a force of 10 battalions and 19 squadrons which were guarding the district to the east of the Mesta. It was under the command of General Tochev, whose headquarters were at Xanthē.¹

The 11th “German” and 1st Bulgarian Armies formed the army group of General Stolz, whose headquarters were at Skoplje, while the 2nd and 4th Bulgarian Armies were under the orders of General Jekov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army, with headquarters at Kyustendil.

The reserves at the disposal of the Bulgarian forces amounted

¹ Off the map, to the east.

144 THE COLLAPSE OF THE BULGARIAN FRONT

to 36 battalions, and their total fighting strength was therefore 225 Bulgarian infantry battalions, 14 battalions of pioneers, 3 German battalions, 45 Bulgarian and 3 German squadrons, 230 Bulgarian and 51 German batteries, 2,813 Bulgarian and 153 German machine-guns.

The German troops and guns were distributed solely among the 11th German and 1st Bulgarian Armies.

The Bulgarian headquarters, as early as the middle of the summer of 1918, were aware that an important operation was being prepared by the Entente, between the Cherná and the Vardar. This assumption was confirmed by aerial observations and from the statements of prisoners. Being determined to keep on the defensive, the Bulgarian command attempted to regroup the forces at its disposal. Secondary and less important sections of the front were to be garrisoned by weaker forces, permitting the formation of reserves, which were to be further strengthened by the arrival of troops from the Dóbruja. These reserves were to be concentrated in the sectors of the front most exposed to attack. The carrying out of this plan was, however, rendered impossible by the events on the Western Front. The Germans were forced to withdraw practically all their infantry and the greater part of their artillery from the Macedonian front, and their places were taken by the Bulgarian troops arriving from the Dóbruja, which it had been intended to keep as reserves. Another event which hindered the working out of the Bulgarian plan was the defeat sustained by the Austro-Hungarians in Albania in July 1918, and their retreat, which forced the Bulgarian command to extend its front west of Lake Ohrida, in order to secure the flank of their own Army. After this unexpected extension of their lines of defence the process of thinning out the front with the object of constituting reserves was no longer practicable, for the length of the front was already not commensurable with the strength of the forces defending it.


As early as July 24 the commander of the 2nd Division, in whose section the main attack occurred, disquieted by the preparations of the Entente troops, reported to his German superior that it was essential to strengthen the positions occupied by the Bulgarian troops, and to garrison certain strategic points which, if seized by the enemy, would break the continuity of the front. The German command, however, instead of complying with this request, retorted that it did not dispose of sufficient reserves, though the Austrians might have been warned that it was necessary for them to reoccupy their former posi-

tions west of Lake Okhrida and relieve the "Mixed" Bulgarian Division which was then in occupation of that sector. This was within the power of the Austrians, for immediately after the Bulgarian collapse they rushed forward sufficient forces to fill in the gap created by the falling back of this "Mixed" Bulgarian Division. Even if it had been impossible to withdraw the whole of this Division, at least parts of it might have been detached and sent to strengthen the more threatened sections of the front, all the more since the Entente did not consider the sector west of Lake Okhrida suitable for attack, and had withdrawn its 75th Division from that region, an event which must have been known to the Germans.

To this negligence of the German command should be ascribed the fact that when the Entente attack was launched against the Dobro Polje positions the Bulgarians, though fully aware of what was coming, were holding a front of 13 miles with only two brigades, belonging to the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, and only 47 guns. Eight French and Serbian divisions participated in the attack on the Bulgarian positions, supported by an artillery overwhelmingly superior to that of the Bulgarians. The artillery preparation began on September 14. On the following day at dawn the Entente infantry advanced to the assault. By September 18 the breach in the Bulgarian position was wide enough to permit of its strategic utilisation, and the Entente troops poured in, advancing northwards towards the Vardar. On the same day, to prevent the Bulgarians from sending any reinforcements from the rest of their front, the British and Greek forces delivered attacks on the Doiran positions, but without being able to penetrate them. On September 22 the Entente troops had already reached the Vardar at Demir-Kapu, and on the following day had crossed that river. Owing to the duality of the command and the weakened *moral* of the Bulgarian Army, no concerted action with the object of arresting the Entente advance seems to have been possible. The inactivity of the four divisions of the 11th German Army, forming the extreme right wing of the Bulgarian front during the fateful days when the Entente troops pierced the Dobro Polje positions and were advancing on the Vardar, remains inexplicable; for they were in a position to undertake a counter-offensive which, even if it did not arrest the victorious advance of the Entente troops, might have considerably relieved the hard-pressed 2nd and 3rd Bulgarian Divisions, and given time to the rest of the Bulgarian Army on the west of the Vardar to fall back in order and take

up fresh positions. It is obvious that the German command was not aware of the extreme gravity of the situation, for it even delayed to issue the order for the retreat of these four divisions in the extreme western sector (the 1st, 6th, 302nd and "Mixed"), thus enabling the Entente troops to penetrate into Skoplje and cut their line of retreat.

The passivity of the German command was most likely due to its conviction that no serious military operations would be undertaken in the Balkan theatre of war, and that a partial success of the Entente was desirable, from the German point of view, as it would render the Bulgarians more dependent on the Germans, and therefore more amenable to German desires. It seems that the German command had good reason to doubt the possibility of the Entente undertaking any operations on a large scale in Macedonia, aware as it was of the existing dissatisfaction among the Greek troops, which constituted a large proportion of the Entente forces. Owing to its close connection with King Constantine, it was inclined perhaps to exaggerate this apparent weakness in the ranks of the Entente Army, and to draw altogether unwarranted conclusions. The fact, however, remains that there was a considerable number of Greek officers in open sympathy with King Constantine, opposed to Greece's fighting the Central Powers, and who readily lent themselves to German insinuations. It cannot be gainsaid, for instance, that negotiations had, a few months before, been conducted between the German High Command and the First Greek Army Corps, which defended a sector on the Struma front. Von Falkenhausen, the former German military attaché in Athens, was formally accredited to conduct these negotiations, and on August 20 he, in company with two Greek officers from among King Constantine's adherents, crossed over from the Bulgarian to the Greek lines. On his return, Falkenhausen declared that the 1st Greek Army Corps had agreed to surrender, but would only do so to the Germans, and not to the Bulgarians. For this purpose it was arranged by the German command that the sector opposite the 1st Greek Corps should be occupied by German troops; as, however, none were available in Macedonia, Landsturm troops were despatched from Germany. They began to arrive early in September and were directed to the Struma front. The General commanding the Second Bulgarian Army was instructed to prepare the requisite supplies for the 1st Greek Corps and, that all suspicion among the Bulgarian staff might be allayed, they were officially informed by letter that the pourparlers



between the Germans and the Greeks had a purely military and no political significance.

The offensive undertaken on September 15 prevented the realisation of the scheme, all preparations for its execution having not yet been carried out, but the existence of this arrangement to some extent explains the unconcern of the Germans at the protracted preparations for the Entente offensive and the absence of any counter-preparations on their part. So certain did they seem of the Entente's inability to undertake any serious effort that even as late as September 8 they permitted the departure of the 11th Jäger Battalion for Germany.

The assumptions the Germans formed, however, which were based on the alleged weakened *moral* of the Greek troops, proved groundless, as was proved by the conduct of the latter (mostly Cretans) at the time of the offensive. And the Germans paid a heavy penalty for their error, which may be traced to the misplaced confidence they reposed in one of their Field-Marshal, King Constantine of Greece.



THE WORLD WAR.

The Beginning of the End in the Near East : the Bulgarian Peace Envoy at the British Headquarters salutes the General in Command, September, 1918.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE AGRARIAN "RENOVATORS" AT WORK

THE months following the conclusion of the Salonika armistice were an anxious time for the Bulgarian Government. The public services were disorganised, the food situation was desperate to such a degree that flour had to be imported from America, discontent was growing and Bolshevism spreading.

It was with great difficulty that order was maintained, and to do this the Government was obliged perpetually to conjure up the spectre of a Greco-Serbian invasion of the country.

Malinov resigned as a protest against the Entente's decision to install Romanian authorities in southern Dobruja, in which, according to the terms of the armistice, the Bulgarian administration and troops were to remain. He was succeeded on November 28, 1918 by Todorov, with a broad Coalition Ministry. In view of the forthcoming election of a new Chamber, as the existing one had outlived its mandate and was, moreover, impeding the passing of Bills with a reformatory or progressive tendency, Mushanov, the Democrat Minister of the Interior, set about converting his department into a vast machine for manipulating the coming elections in favour of his party. This behaviour, as well as the attempt to prevent the holding of a congress by the Agrarian party, caused a Ministerial crisis which led to a readjustment of the Cabinet in May 1919.

What the thinking public called for at the time was the formation of a strong group composed of all political elements uncommitted to the old imperialistic policy of Ferdinand and capable of assuming the difficult work of renovation with some hope of success. The old *bourgeois* parties were held up to public opprobrium on account of their connection with Ferdinand and the servility they had displayed to him in the past. The eyes of the nation were fixed on the Left parties, but few among their leaders were able to rise to the occasion, heed the dictates of their civic consciousness, or respond to the popular demand.

150 THE AGRARIAN "RENOVATORS" AT WORK

The Agrarian organisation, the most numerous and powerful of these Left parties, on which the main hope of a Bulgarian *risorgimento* rested, was rent by internecine squabbles. Stamboliiski and Dragiev, its leaders, had found it impossible to reconcile their divergent policies and view. Dragiev, whose uprightness and integrity had constrained him during the war to secede from those Agrarian deputies who had compromised themselves by their interested association with Radoslavov, insisted on the punishment or exclusion of all members of the party who had abused their position and degraded the prestige of the organisation. A party tribunal passed severe sentences on the inculpated and, had the verdicts been upheld, the Agrarian organisation, purged of what was corrupt and tainted, might have assumed the difficult task of regenerating Bulgarian public life. Unfortunately Stamboliiski, who during the whole time of his incarceration had been in close touch with the incriminated members, made use of his influence to soften or annul these sentences. Making capital out of his imprisonment by assuming the aureole of a political martyr, he was able to impose on the mass of the peasantry and at the same time managed to rally to him the major part of the Agrarian forces. He then proceeded to oust Dragiev and his adherents from the organisation, as they, claiming to represent its moral and spiritual strength, not only objected to the adventurous policy Stamboliiski wished to force on the party, but even plainly reacted against its adoption. The Agrarian organisation, having thus thrown overboard its moral ballast, gradually degenerated into a coterie of professional politicians and office-seekers, scarcely differing from the notorious Radoslavov gang, which for five consecutive years had plundered the Bulgarian nation.

The Social-Democrats formed another hopeful element in the country, but they also greatly disappointed those who had relied on them; for they applied themselves to mundane politics more than to the spread of their doctrines.

Only the attitude of the Radicals, who were more inclined to civic virtue than the rest, formed an encouraging element in the oppressive political atmosphere of Bulgaria. They offered the Agrarians and Social-Democrats a common platform and joint work at the elections, which plan, had it been adopted, would have secured an immense majority for these three parties, and would have enabled them to constitute, immediately after the elections, a strong Government capable of proceeding without loss of time with the work of renovation. The offer

of the Radicals was all the more praiseworthy as it was altruistic ; for they formally declared their disinterestedness in the question of the distribution of Ministerial portfolios, always a very thorny problem in Bulgaria. Owing to the lack of political experience of the Agrarians, the proposal of the Radicals would have proved of great value ; for not only the perpetration of a whole series of woeful blunders since committed would have been avoided, but by their participation in the Government the Radicals would have enhanced its prestige, not only on account of the indisputable intellectual gifts of their leaders, but also by the just reputation they enjoy as being the only uncompromised *bourgeois* party in Bulgaria.

Unfortunately the motives which actuated the Agrarians and Social-Democrats were not on a level with the idealism of the Radicals, and Stamboliiski could scarcely be expected to submit to the studious criticism of the Radicals ; his supporters also could hardly be said to be all men of the highest character.

The elections of August 17, 1919 did not give a predominant majority to any particular party. The 236 seats in the Chamber were distributed as follows among the various political groups : Agrarians 86, Communists 47, Social-Democrats 38, Democrats (Malinov's party) 28, Nationalists (Geshov's party) 19, Danevists 8, Radicals 8 and Radoslavists 3.¹ The Agrarians, being the more numerous party, assumed the task of forming the Ministry. Unable to obtain the support of the Communists and Social-Democrats—the former refusing their co-operation on questions of principle, the latter owing to disagreement on the apportionment of Ministerial portfolios—they finally secured the aid of Geshov's and Danev's parties, but even this assistance did not secure for the Cabinet a majority in the Chamber. This weakness of the Government reflected itself on the legislative work accomplished by the Chamber. Except for the ratification of the Treaty of Neuilly, the Chamber had little else to show to its credit ; on the other hand the Government may pride itself in having perpetrated perhaps the most corrupt action on a large scale ever recorded in the annals even of Bulgaria. This shady *affaire* of embezzlement of public funds, characteristically designated in Bulgaria as "the plundering of the arsenal," was exposed in all its

¹ The relative strength of the political parties is better grasped by a comparison of the number of votes cast for each. Out of a total of 640,169 electors the Agrarians obtained 198,444 votes, the Communists 118,671, the Social-Democrats 82,826, the Democrats 65,267, the Nationalists 54,556, the Danevists 36,566, the Radicals 33,343, the Radoslavov coalition 42,024, and various 8,462.

152 THE AGRARIAN "RENOVATORS" AT WORK

details in the *Sobranje* by Professor P. Todorov, the Radical deputy, who had the moral courage to denounce in the most scathing terms the conduct of the Agrarian Party that at present controls Bulgaria's destinies.

With the Ministers engrossed in such enterprises as the above, little attention was paid to the crying needs of the population and little done to check the fantastic increase in the cost of living. The Government, desiring to placate its supporters, took no real steps to reduce the price of agricultural produce, thus driving to desperation the town-dwellers and the State functionaries. The average cost of articles of primary necessity, taking as an index figure 100 for the year 1914, had indeed risen to 1,754 in 1919, and to 2,577 in January 1920.

This negligence on the part of the Government, by the way, reflected itself in the results of the municipal elections of December 7, 1919, which proved a veritable triumph for the Communist party. In Sofia the votes cast for the Communist increased from 3,758 obtained on August 17, 1919 to 6,081; in Varna from 2,613 to 3,849; and in Ruschuk from 1,450 to 3,224. The Social-Democrats and Communists supported by the majority of the urban population organised on December 24, 1919, all over the country, demonstrations against the Government, and on December 27 a strike of the railway and telegraph officials was declared as a protest against the high cost of living.

The Cabinet, however, was obdurate; it armed the peasantry and endeavoured to run the railways with the aid of the troops. For two months transport service was paralysed, causing much loss and suffering to the community. Finally the strike collapsed owing to the exhaustion of the strikers' fund. Stamboliiski, flushed with victory, dissolved the Chamber on February 21, 1920, and ordained the holding of fresh elections for March 28, believing that after his success with the strikers he would easily secure the election of a Chamber filled with his own adherents. The results of the elections, however, proved once more disappointing to the Agrarians, despite the intimidation of which they made use; for not only were meetings organised by the Opposition broken up, electors beaten, opposition candidates intimidated and imprisoned, but even, in many cases, tribunals were forced to disregard the law and reconsider their decisions when the verdicts they issued ran counter to the interest of the Government. There could be no more suggestive comment on the prevailing mentality of the

Agrarians than the words addressed by the Minister of the Interior to the Sobranje, in reply to complaints levelled against the organs of the administration for their demeanour at the time of the elections: "We beat and shall beat, we imprison and shall imprison."

Baulked of their aim at securing a majority in the Chamber, the Agrarians refused to take into consideration the verdict of the electorate and proceeded to manufacture a fictitious majority of 2 by invalidating the election of 13 Opposition deputies; and this although the percentage of votes cast for themselves at the general election was only 38 per cent. of the total.¹ Secure against all possible defection on the part of its followers in the Sobranje, the Government, now solely composed of Agrarians, proceeded to introduce a series of Bills intended to renovate the country. The programme of "reforms" enunciated by the Agrarians connotes, however, a tremendous outlay of public money, which was unobtainable, and the reforms proposed are not likely to materialise for the present.

An effort was made to bring about the fall of the Agrarians in June 1920 through the action of the troops; Malinov and other politicians, however, prevented the organisers from carrying out their plan for fear of the bad impression the intervention of the military in the administration might create abroad, and owing to the dread of Bulgaria's neighbours taking advantage of any internal troubles which might entail, as a consequence of such a *coup d'état*, the cutting off of further slices from her territory.

¹ The total number of votes cast was 803,652. Of these 346,949 were for the Agrarians, 181,525 for the Communists, 97,881 for the Democrats, 60,992 for the Nationalists, 57,000 for the Radoslavov coalition, 55,017 for the Social-Democrats, 52,722 for the Danevists, and 41,770 for the Radicals. The increase in the total number of electors was due to the return of prisoners of war, while the decrease in the votes cast in favour of the Social-Democrats is explainable by their having vacated the Ministry of the Interior.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE TREATY OF NEUILLY AND ITS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

MUCH has been written about the severity of the terms of peace dictated to Germany and Austria-Hungary, but these treaties, vindictive and harsh as they appear to some, are yet, in the opinion of Bulgarians, generous when compared with the treaty forced on their country. For in the case of the Germanic Empires the principle of nationality was more or less adhered to, while in the case of Bulgaria it simply went by the board. And this constitutes the cardinal defect of the Bulgarian Treaty,¹ for the economic conditions, however exacting and ruinous they may be, would have been accepted with resignation and without ill-will by the Bulgarians, while the territorial excisions Bulgaria has suffered will ever rankle in the hearts of her people.

Knowing the marked intolerance of Balkan races, and their inability to deal justly with alien populations under their rule, one may truly wonder at the immorality of the diplomatists who countenanced and sanctioned the subjugation of a third of the Bulgarian race to foreign dominion. Bulgaria loses not only Macedonia, for the liberation of which she has repeatedly risked her all, but even her outlet on the *Ægean*, which was all that her enemies allowed her to retain after the disastrous Second Balkan War. But, however bitter these losses may be, they cannot stand comparison with the pain which the amputation of the southern Dóbruja and parts of western Bulgaria has produced. For Macedonia and Thrace were only temporarily under Bulgarian sovereignty, while southern Dóbruja and western Bulgaria have formed part of the Bulgarian body politic for over forty years. Of all the acts of spoliation committed at the expense of Bulgaria, the attribution of these regions to foreign States is undoubtedly the most wanton

¹ Of Neuilly, signed November 27, 1919, ratified August 9, 1920.

and unjust, and likely to involve an immense amount of human suffering.¹ For these districts, inhabited by compact Bulgarian populations, have been thrust without regard to their wishes under an alien rule, after an independent existence of almost half a century.

Public opinion in Western Europe has manifested very little concern in the settlement of the Balkan question arrived at in Paris, for it is generally held that the Balkan peasantry constitutes an amorphous mass of humanity devoid of national consciousness. But this is an altogether gratuitous assumption, repeatedly contradicted by a whole series of facts. When the town of Pirot was ceded to Serbia in 1878, most of its inhabitants, unwilling to pass under Serbian rule, trekked into Bulgaria and founded the town of Tsaribrod, which, in spite of the manifest will its population so demonstratively displayed in 1878, is now forcibly assigned to Serbia.

The news of the cession of the south-western corner of Bulgaria to Serbia caused consternation among its inhabitants, who appealed to the Sobranje for help to emigrate to Bulgaria. These districts are shut out from Serbia by inaccessible mountains, their means of egress to the outer world lie entirely in Bulgaria, and as a result of their transfer to Serbia they will be cut off from their markets, isolated, and economically ruined. These regions are of absolutely no economic use to Serbia, who claims them for strategic reasons, and one is entitled therefore to query whether it is justifiable to condemn to destruction a population of many thousand souls in order to guard against a hypothetical Bulgarian attack on Serbia, a contingency that can hardly arise now that Bulgaria has been permanently disarmed.

What is the Bulgarian nation's guilt that it should meet with such dire punishment? That Bulgaria has proved a centre of unrest cannot be gainsaid, but it should be remembered that her modern history is simply a series of struggles for the

¹ It is hardly realised for instance that the Bulgarian populations placed under alien rule are now constrained to renounce the use of their mother-tongue. When the writer visited the Dobruja in the summer of 1920, he found that all the Bulgarian churches and schools had been closed. Bulgarian children were forced to attend Romanian schools though they did not understand a word of Romanian. Bulgarian books and newspapers were not allowed to be sold or to be introduced into the country. Even the writer's two Bulgarian books were seized on his arrival in Romania, and in spite of his remonstrances confiscated: the officials offering as an excuse that they had received strict orders from Bucharest to burn all Bulgarian script they laid hands on.

A similar state of affairs obtains in Macedonia, where all Bulgarian churches and schools have been closed.

union of members of the same family who had been separated by blundering diplomats at the Congress of Berlin. Bulgaria did all that a politically undeveloped community could do to resist the designs of its rulers to involve Bulgaria in the war on the side of the Central Powers, and receiving no outside assistance finally succumbed to the all-powerful influence of its monarch, who, moreover, was able to trade on the wrong that Bulgaria had sustained in 1913. The Bulgarian peasants never contemplated fighting the Entente; what they sought was the emancipation of what in their eyes was an undeniable part of Bulgaria's patrimony, and, confiding in the solemn and emphatic declarations of the Entente concerning its determination to respect the principle of nationality, they finally threw themselves on the discretion of those they considered more as protectors than as enemies. But the naïve trust of a backward nation in the pledges of the leaders of Europe has not been requited. The Entente in its day of triumph discarded the gospel of right it had preached for the dogma of might, and it allowed itself to be influenced by counsels inspired by passion, hatred and prejudice.

The economic conditions of the treaty have been inspired by the same blind desire to disable the organism of a former enemy State. After taking from Bulgaria her richest provinces, the tobacco-growing district of the Ægean coast, and her granary, the Dôbruja, she was asked to provide an indemnity of 2,250,000,000 francs in gold, though the country is so impoverished that it cannot raise sufficient revenue to carry on even the work of administration. In fact, only the obtuse could formulate such demands, for the evisceration to which Bulgaria has been condemned eliminates, *ipso facto*, the very idea of her paying an indemnity. Bulgaria, whose national wealth was computed at 10,500,000,000 leva¹ in 1911, is now saddled with a public debt variously estimated at 30,000,000,000 to 35,000,000,000 leva. Out of a population of 5,500,000 (estimate in 1917),² she has lost over 150,000 in killed during the Great War, and the number of the maimed is estimated at 200,000. If to these figures be added her losses in the Balkan Wars, it will be found that a proportion approaching to one-third of her manhood between the ages of 20 and 50 has been crippled or has perished. The magnitude of the losses is in

¹ The lev is the Bulgarian equivalent of the franc. The pre-War rate was 25·25 leva per £; the actual rate is about 490 per £ (Oct. 1923).

² According to the preliminary results of a census taken early in 1921 the population of Bulgaria within her new political boundaries is 4,861,339.

proportion to the intensity of the effort made by Bulgaria ; she mobilised 857,063 men, or 19.53 per cent. of her population. For a country whose chief industry is agriculture, carried on in a primitive manner, by hand and draught-cattle, and not with machines, this is an appalling blow to its productive power.

The consequences of the war will weigh heavily on the Bulgarian peasantry for many years ; it will require an immense effort to repair the damage caused by four years of careless farming, and to replace the carts, draught-cattle, etc., requisitioned for Army purposes. Industry is likewise in a pitiable condition ; the machinery is worn out by years of work, and requires renewal ; raw material is lacking. The same may be said of the railways, of communications, of the telegraphs, and of buildings in general. Everything is in a dilapidated condition, and repairs cannot be effected owing to the shortage and high cost of labour, and to the lack of materials, the latter, owing to the prohibitive rate of exchange, being unobtainable from abroad.

Financial assistance is imperatively needed to restore and renovate the impoverished agricultural inventory of the country, to repair its railways, and restart its industry, but it is obvious to all that the necessary means cannot be found locally. Already taxation has increased to a degree that renders life almost impossible for the average urban population. The annual revenue of the State, which prior to the war was of about 200,000,000 leva, was estimated in the year 1922 at 2,590,840,000, though this figure was hardly likely to be attained.¹ Expenditure, on the other hand, was estimated at 2,693,837,000, but it must be added that no provision was made for the payment of the War indemnity. The eventual deficit will certainly be much larger than the above figures warrant, for, judging from the experience of the last years, deficits have a marked tendency to grow. In 1917 the financial year closed with a deficit of 779,000,000, in 1918 with one of 1,117,000,000, in 1919 with one of 2,197,000,000, and in 1920 with one of 1,778,563,471 leva. The imposition of fresh taxes is unthinkable, and the only alternative is a levy on capital, though even this measure can only constitute a palliative ; there are few easily realisable assets in the country, as out of the total national wealth 70 per cent. consists of land, and only 30 per cent. represents the value of buildings, factories, machinery, cattle, etc.

The Treaty of Neuilly, by depriving Bulgaria of her wealthiest

¹ The enormous apparent increase is of course largely due to the heavy depreciation of the lev. — *Ed.*

provinces, has economically crippled her, and it will require superhuman efforts and sacrifices on the part of her population to make the two ends meet. For there is a point below which the reduction of individual expenditure is impossible ; and as Bulgaria is a poor and agricultural country, self-denial, pushed even to its extreme limit, will not help overmuch. The population produces very little over and above its wants, and wealth is therefore accumulated very slowly, despite the proverbial penurious thrift of the Bulgarian peasantry. The national income from all sources was estimated in 1911 at 1,600,000,000 leva ; half of this sum was consumed by the population, and most of the other half went to defray the cost of the State and municipal administration, so that the surplus left over, which might have been added to the national wealth, must have been very limited. Bulgarian industry is still in its infancy ; the total capital invested in it amounted, in 1912, to only 95,000,000 leva, with an annual production of 122,000,000, employing 15,600 hands. So that agriculture remains the mainstay of the country ; and it is therefore difficult to see how Bulgaria can raise her taxation sufficiently for the curtailment of her growing budgetary deficits and for the service of her debt.

In the eyes of many, even of those outside the country, the pauperisation to which Bulgaria has been condemned, through the amputation of productive and populous districts, is a crime against international morals. The Bulgarian peasant is doomed to remain at a low level, because his State, deprived of its principal assets, will not only be unable to provide him with the means of education and of moral uplift, but will sink to a degree of poverty which will constitute an economic if not a political menace to all the neighbouring States. This disaster, which only a revision of the terms imposed on Bulgaria can avert, will once more emphasise the incontrovertible truth contained in Taine's dictum : *L'iniquité est toujours malhable ; ce qui sort de ses mains n'est jamais viable.*

The question of a possible assimilation of all the Slav races in the Balkans into one united whole has for some time been discussed in Bulgaria. Partly with this object in view the Premier Stambolüski went in 1921 on an extended tour. He not only visited the Western Allied Powers with the hopes of inducing them to revise the Neuilly Treaty and of meanwhile providing financial assistance, but he also visited Czechoslovakia and made tentative advances towards the old enemy

in Serbia. The sore is, however, too recent, and Yugoslavia shows few signs at present of responding to the feeling of union with Bulgaria. It is not impossible that, as time goes on, such a tendency may be slowly developed. But if a really desirable change is to be effected in the ordering of Bulgarian affairs, it is necessary to begin with the masses, helping them to live a progressive life by educating and instructing them, and rendering them capable of emitting an enlightened public opinion, which would constitute the best check on abuse: and for this eminently desirable consummation it would seem at present as though the Radical party were destined to provide the best leaders.

Meanwhile it can be said that the Bulgarians are certainly better educated than any of their neighbours; or, to be precise, the average Bulgar possesses a larger amount of knowledge than either the average Serbian, Greek or Romanian, for if it comes to manners there is little to choose between the various nationalities. Among the soldier conscripts the percentage of literates was: in Bulgaria, 89 per cent., in Greece 70 per cent., in Serbia 49 per cent., and in Romania 38 per cent. In 1908 there were in Bulgaria one school to 778 inhabitants, in Romania one to 1,314, and in Serbia one to 2,127. In 1910 the percentage of the population of Bulgaria that was capable of reading and writing was 83·6 per cent. among the men, and 59 per cent. among the women—a high average in the circumstances.

The Bulgarian Government would have done a great deal more for education if it had had greater resources at its disposal. The country needs some 4,000 school buildings, and the number of teachers employed is also inadequate. This is admitted, but the country cannot provide for more; and, owing to the lack of schools, the law of compulsory education, which is in force, cannot be properly applied.

But, given all this, it may be said that for the future Bulgaria, above all, needs a recasting of her soul, a process of modification that can only be attained by the slow process of education, for all history is there to refute the delusion so fondly cherished by some rulers, that human nature and social institutions can be rapidly transformed by hasty legislation.

CHAPTER XXV

RECENT HISTORY

THE story of Bulgaria in the years immediately after the Treaty of Neuilly is the record of the struggle of a small country to recover from the effects of ten years of war, though almost crushed by the burdens that peace had imposed upon her. The aim of Stamboliiski's Government was to fulfil, as far as possible, their Treaty obligations and to live at peace with their neighbours. The conditions of the Treaty were complied with as regards evacuation of territory, destruction of arms, consignments of coal to Yugoslavia and restoration of livestock, and, by September 1921, Bulgaria had already paid over £3½ millions¹ for the upkeep of Interallied troops and Commissions established in the country. But, up to the end of 1922, she had found it impossible to pay any of the instalments due for Reparations. The Budget Estimates for 1921-22 had shown a deficit of over £11 millions, and those for the following year a deficit of over £3½ millions. In March 1922 the Interallied Reparation Commission in Sofia informed the Bulgarian Government that a moratorium could only be granted subject to the surrender of the control of the Customs, the State mines and the fiscal system. These conditions seemed to the Bulgars to compromise the independence of the State. The Bulgarian Delegation to the International Economic Conference at Genoa in April 1922 made strong representations as to the financial situation of their country, but the question of Reparation payments was still under consideration at the end of the year.

Conditions for foreign trade were of course unfavourable, and imports exceeded exports until the first half of 1922, when they became nearly equal. In 1921 Italy ranked first among the countries from which imports came and Great Britain second. The Finance Minister's Budget Speech in March 1921 was, however, gloomy in the extreme. Taxation and retrenchment had in his opinion reached their limits, and there was the Reparation debt of some £180 (later £90) millions still unpaid.

¹ All conversions are made at the approximate pre-War rate of 25 leva to the £. The rate of exchange on February 1, 1923 was about 640, and on October 6, 1923 490 leva to the £.

The relations of Bulgaria with her neighbours were much affected by the kindred problems of refugees, armed bands and treatment of the so-called Minorities in Macedonia and Thrace under Yugoslav and Greek rule. The 400,000 refugees in Bulgaria, who could only return to their homes in Macedonia and Thrace at the sacrifice of their nationality, their Church and their language, constituted a heavy economic burden to the State. The Bulgars who were now under foreign rule brought their tales of oppression by their new masters week by week to their kinsmen in Bulgaria, for the Balkan process of denationalisation is usually barbarous in the extreme. Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece, on their part, complained that the Bulgarian Government did nothing to prevent the passage of Bulgarian armed bands, who crossed the frontiers in order to stir up trouble among their compatriots or to carry out reprisals. It was not difficult for the Bulgarian Government to answer this charge. The total number of armed forces allowed to Bulgaria by the Treaty amounted to 33,000, but, owing to the dislike of the peasant to a long period of service, only about 11,000 men had been recruited, and the small number available for frontier guards was insufficient to watch a border which stretched for 900 miles chiefly through mountains and forests. The complaints of the Irredentists and the activity of the bands naturally caused friction between Bulgaria and her neighbours. The matter was brought before the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922 and discussions resulted in improved relations with the neighbouring States, while the right of the Bulgars to appeal again to the Council was recognised.

The Bulgarian Government has a difficult part to play as regards Macedonia and Thrace. If Bulgaria is to gain the friendship of the Little Entente, she must renounce all claim to territory outside her present frontiers, and there are many in the country who, after the disastrous experiences of late years, are willing to give up what is now called a policy of adventure. On the other hand, the Macedonian element is still strong in the country, and it is hardly possible that the mass of the people should ever abandon the ideal of national reunion, or, at least, of autonomy for their kinsmen. Any statesman who officially repudiated these ideals would risk assassination. The murder in October 1921 of the War Minister, A. Dimitrov, was attributed to Macedonians, who thus avenged his efforts to suppress their bands.

It was unfortunately no part of Stamboliiski's scheme to try to conciliate other elements, and party strife continued to be

peculiarly violent, both in the Sobranje and in the Press. In 1921 all the Opposition Parties, with the exception of the Communists, sank their differences for the time being, and formed a solid Bloc against the Agrarians. In accordance with a decision of the Sobranje in 1919, the members of the Radoslavov Cabinet, together with General Jekov—Radoslavov and General Bojadieff had fled the country—were brought before the High Court of Justice on the charge of having declared war without the consent of the Sobranje and of surrendering State property to the Germans; they were further accused of corrupt practices during their tenure of office. The actual trial began in October 1921. The peasants, however, were not satisfied with the prosecution of the Radoslavov Cabinet only. As they came to realise fully the disastrous situation of the country, their resentment, fostered, no doubt, unofficially by the Agrarians, rose against the Geshov and Daney Cabinets, as respectively responsible for the First and Second Balkan Wars. In August 1922 supporters of the Government attacked some of the ex-Ministers who were on their way to a meeting at Trnovo organised by the Bloc, and handled them with great indignity. In order to calm popular feeling, a plébiscite was taken to ascertain if it was the will of the people that the ex-Ministers should be tried for High Treason. Two-thirds of the voters declared in favour of the trial, and, in September 1922, about a dozen ex-Ministers, including Daney, Malinov, Todorov, Majarov and Liabchev—Geshov himself being abroad—were thrown into prison; in December they were removed to Shumla, the centre of the Agrarian organisation, where they were confined under miserable conditions, on the pretext that an attempt to rescue them might be made by their sympathisers in Sofia, which was supposed to be the stronghold of the Bourgeois Party or Bloc.

In December 1922 troubles in the Macedonian districts near the south-western Bulgarian frontier culminated in a raid on Kyustendil by the partisans of the Macedonian Internal Organisation. Certain persons accused of murdering members of the Organisation were taken out of the town and executed, but no damage was done to property, and the town was quietly evacuated a few days later, though not before considerable anxiety had been caused in Sofia by the proceedings of the "Peasant Guards," who had been called out by the Government. The acting Prime Minister, M. Daskalov, accused the Bloc of complicity in the Kyustendil incident.

Bad as this condition of things was, the legislation of the Stamboliiski Government proved less subversive than had been feared at first. There was no attempt to establish a

republic, and King Boris gained the respect and affection of his people by his tact and simplicity and his devotion to duty. One of the most interesting experiments was the law exacting a period of forced labour annually from each member of the community—with certain exceptions—on works of public utility. The system roused the suspicions of neighbouring states, but, though it is not yet fully organised, the authorities professed satisfaction with the results. Poor as she was, Bulgaria opened her doors to thousands of Russian refugees, many of whom had belonged to Wrangel's army. In their unhappy condition some of the latter allowed themselves to become the tools of political agitators and of the intensive Bolshevik propaganda which is being carried on from Moscow throughout Bulgaria and Macedonia.

Bulgaria has lost three outstanding personalities by death since the Great War: on December 30, 1920, J. D. Bourchier, for thirty-three years *The Times* correspondent in the Balkans, the devoted friend of Bulgaria, where he held a unique position; in September 1921, Ivan Vazov, the national poet and novelist, almost the only Bulgarian writer whose works have penetrated beyond her frontiers; and, in November 1922, Methodius, Metropolitan of Stara Zagora, one of the last survivors among the pioneers of Bulgarian liberty.

The result of the Lausanne Conference,¹ which was attended by Bulgarian delegates, caused profound disappointment in Bulgaria. The Bulgars had hoped for the fulfilment of Clause 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly, by which the Allies undertook "to ensure the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea." The Bulgars had assumed that the promise implied territorial possession of the outlet and access to it through their own territory. The Allies, however, only offered an enclave some eight miles west of Dede Agach, railway access to which would be controlled by an international commission. The Bulgarian Government declined to accept this offer on the ground that an international port on foreign soil, the construction of which would be very costly, "detached from Bulgaria and only accessible across Greek territory by a foreign railway," would be of no value to Bulgaria. At the close of the Conference the Bulgarian Delegation made a formal protest against the alteration of the Treaty of Neuilly by the attribution of Western Thrace to Greece—an attribution which was not justified on ethnical, geographical or economic grounds, still less on the principle of self-determination. The protest concluded with the words: "This fresh disappointment notwithstanding, the

¹ December 1922–February 1923.

Bulgarian People will remain calm. In spite of everything, it will continue to pursue its pacific policy. But, at the same time, it will remain convinced that those generous ideas which were proclaimed both during and after the Great War were never intended to be applied to Bulgaria, and that her interests —moral, national and economic—remain ignored and sacrificed."

Although M. Stamboliiski failed to secure the fulfilment of the Allied pledge in regard to an economic outlet on the Aegean, his foreign policy was not, in other ways, unsuccessful. Favourable terms were obtained for Bulgaria after long negotiations in the matter of Reparations. The total sum to be paid by Bulgaria was reduced from £90,000,000 to £22,000,000, payable over a period of sixty years, all customs revenues being placed at the disposal of the Inter-Allied Commission. The negotiations initiated by Stamboliiski with Yugoslavia with regard to the suppression of frontier bands resulted in better relations between the two countries.

At home, matters were less satisfactory. Early in February 1923 a bomb was thrown at Stamboliiski in the theatre. Differences in the Cabinet led to the resignation of the more moderate among the Ministers, and also of Raiko Daskalov,¹ the extremist with whom Stamboliiski had had considerable difficulties. On March 11 the Chamber, after authorising the prosecution of the Danev-Geshov and Malinov-Kosturkov Cabinets, was dissolved. On March 31 the sentences on the Radoslavov Cabinet and on certain generals were promulgated by the High Court; the sentences varied from terms of five years to life-long imprisonment and included loss of civil rights and heavy penalties.

The April elections resulted in an apparent triumph for the Government, the Agrarians securing 212 out of 245 seats; but these results, it cannot be denied, were obtained by the unscrupulous methods familiar in Balkan countries. Only six weeks later the Agrarian Government, which had seemed all-powerful, was overthrown by a *coup d'état*, organised with secrecy and skill by a group belonging to the intellectual and *bourgeois* classes and supported by a number of army officers. During the night of June 8-9 most of the Cabinet were quietly conveyed to prison to await civil trial for various malpractices. Stamboliiski, after an attempt to defend himself in his native village of Slavovitsa, was deserted by his supporters and was killed—it is said while endeavouring to escape; the circumstances of his death are not yet fully known. Rumours had

¹ Daskalov was murdered in Prague by a Macedonian on August 26.

been current that he had planned armed action in the near future to rid the country of all his political opponents by means of his "Orange Guards"; so this force was at once disarmed and disbanded. Except in Plevna, where a counter-movement resulted in the loss of some 200 lives, the country accepted the situation with remarkable calmness. The Agrarians had apparently lost the confidence of the people by their malversation of public funds and by the tyranny and violence of their political methods.

M. Tsankov, formerly professor of Political Economy at Sofia University, became President of the Council, with M. Kalfova, Foreign Minister. The new Government at once announced that the policy of Bulgaria—compliance with Treaty obligations and good relations with neighbouring States—would remain unchanged, but considerable nervousness as to their intentions was at first displayed at Belgrade. The position of the Government was much strengthened by the fusion of all the political parties—with the exception of the Liberals and Communists—into one group, under the name of the "Democratic Entente." M. Tsankov's Government took from the first a firm stand against Bolshevism; whilst the Russian Red Cross, which had not only carried on social propaganda, but had also, it was asserted, imported arms, organised murders and planned a revolution, was expelled from the country, much to the anger of the Soviet Government.

In September, the arrest of about a thousand Communists, who, it was alleged, had prepared a plot to overthrow the Government, was followed by serious local disturbances, which were suppressed by the troops with great severity.

Bulgaria left the Second Conference of Lausanne¹ empty-handed. She had been obliged once more to decline the Greek offer of a ninety-nine years' lease of a coastal area; for, owing to the cession of Karagach² by the Greeks to the Turks, a second foreign frontier would have intervened between Bulgaria and her desired outlet.

At Geneva the Bulgarian delegates again made it clear how warmly Bulgaria would welcome an effective control by the League of Nations over Minorities. It would certainly appear that the hope for the unfortunate Bulgarian population in Thrace and Macedonia, as well as for Bulgaria herself, must largely depend on the response that the League can make to this appeal; but for the present it has given no definite sign.

¹ The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24.

² Opposite Adrianople, on the right bank of the Maritsa.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

7th Century.	Bulgars become permanent settlers south of Danube.	1895.	Murder of Stambulov.
852.	Boris I.	1903.	Insurrection in Macedonia.
864 <i>circa</i> .	Conversion of Bulgars to Christianity.	1908.	Young Turk Revolution.
893.	Tsar Simeon. First Bulgarian Empire.	1912.	Ferdinand I proclaimed Tsar. Balkan League; First Balkan War (October 8).
963.	Shishman's Kingdom in the West.	1913.	Treaty of London (May 30). Second Balkan War (June 20). Treaty of Bucharest (August 10).
976.	Tsar Samuel. Forty Years' War against Basil II.	1914.	Outbreak of the Great War (August).
1018.	* Bulgarian lands under Byzantine rule for 150 years.	1915.	Bulgarian Treaty with Central Powers (September 6). Bulgaria mobilises (September 21) and attacks Serbia (October 11).
1218.	Tsar Asen II. Second Bulgarian Empire.	1916.	Bulgarian operations against Romania begin (November 25).
1240.	Empire dissolved into several small States.	1917.	Bulgarian Armies on the Salouka front and in the Dobruja.
1330	Serbs defeat Bulgars at Velbuzhd.	1918.	Malinov succeeds Radoslavov (June 21). Discontent with Germany (Summer). Battle of the Vardar (September 15 to 25); Bulgarians in full retreat.
1331.	Serbian Tsar Dušan's Empire.		Armistice signed (September 20); Army disbanded.
1389.	Slav peoples defeated at Battle of Kosovo by Turks under Murad I.		Ferdinand abdicates; succeeded by Boris (October 4). Todorov succeeds Malinov (November 28).
1393.	Trnovo taken. Bulgars under Ottoman rule.	1919.	Stamboliiski succeeds Todorov (August).
1676.	Conscription of Christian children for Corps of Janissaries abolished.		Treaty of Neuilly (November 27).
1767.	Archbishopric of Ohrida suppressed.	1922/3.	Lausanne Conference.
1870.	Creation of Exarchate by Imperial Firman.	1923.	Agrarian Government overthrown; Tsankov forms Bourgeois Cabinet (June 9); Stamboliiski killed (June 16); Treaty of Lausanne signed (July 24); Communist risings suppressed by the troops (September).
1876.	Bulgarian risings and massacre at Batak.		
1877.	Russo-Turkish War.		
1878.	Treaty of San Stefano (March 3). Treaty of Berlin (July 13).		
1879.	Alexander of Battenberg elected Prince of Bulgaria.		
1885.	Union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.		
1886.	War with Serbia.		
1886.	Abdication of Alexander of Battenberg.		
1887.	Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg elected Prince of Bulgaria.		

II. ECONOMICS

I. RESOURCES

BULGARIA enjoys a continental type of climate with hot summers, cold winters, and an adequate rainfall. The configuration of the country, consisting of a tableland extending north from the Balkan mountains to the River Danube, and warm valleys lying to the south of that range up to the Rhodope Mountains, lends itself to a wide range of agricultural products. In the southern parts of the country rice, cotton and tobacco are successfully grown, while in the valleys immediately south of the main range is carried on the cultivation of roses for the distillation of "attar" or essence of roses, an industry which is not elsewhere successfully practised further north than Persia.

The resources of Bulgaria are almost entirely agricultural, and agriculture is the staple industry of the country. Every Bulgarian is a farmer, and nearly everyone owns his own farm or patch of ground. The soil is fertile and gives large returns, in spite of the fact that the Bulgarian knows little about the rotation of crops, and does not use artificial manures, a return of 15 bushels of wheat or 18 bushels of maize to the acre being quite a usual occurrence. In many parts of the country, too, the implements used in agriculture are still quite primitive. This is partly due to the small size of the farms in a country where, on the death of the father, the land is divided amongst all the sons, and consequently every man has his piece of ground, which system renders the purchase of modern agricultural machinery prohibitive; and partly it is due to the Bulgarian's innate prejudice against the foreigner and foreign methods. Successive Bulgarian Governments have, however, done much to assist farming by the remission of import duties on agricultural machinery, and by providing financial assistance to the farmers, with the result that in the years immediately preceding the Balkan Wars large sums were being spent abroad annually in the purchase of agricultural machinery. Bulgaria, in normal times, exports considerable quantities of cereals to other European countries, and with the introduction of modern methods of farming and modern machinery she should become one of the important grain-exporting countries of Europe.

By far the most important crops are wheat and maize, which are cultivated chiefly in the Balkan foreland on the north side of the main Balkan range; in these two crops a large export trade is

done. Other cereals which are generally cultivated throughout the country in smaller quantities are rye, barley, oats and beans. As already stated, cotton is grown in the south, as also rice, but in neither case is the annual production yet important; the cultivation of sugar-beet has, however, begun to receive attention. Government assistance has also stimulated the cultivation of silk-worms, which do well in the southern parts of the country, where there are extensive mulberry plantations.

Special mention should be made of the rose-growing industry, to which reference has been made above. From the petals of the *Rosa Alba* and *Rosa Damascena* an essence is obtained, by distillation, which is an important ingredient in the scents used all over the world and finds a ready market, especially in France and the United States of America. Three distinct products are obtained, rose water, rose wax and rose oil. When the Balkan Wars broke out in 1912, approximately 8,000 hectares (= 20,000 acres) were under cultivation for roses, and the value of the essence exported was about 7,500,000 leva (£300,000) annually.

Sheep are reared in large quantities, and cattle to a less extent. In recent years, however, the area of land under pasture has been diminishing. There is a considerable export trade in live animals, but at present the trade in meat or carcasses is insignificant. Eggs are also exported in large quantities in normal times, the trade before the war going almost entirely to London through Germany and Belgium. A cheese known as *Kachkaval* is also produced in considerable quantities, and a good deal of it was sent to Turkey before the outbreak of war.

At one time the country was covered with extensive forests, but while the land was under the rule of the Turk large areas were destroyed, because the forests were used as places of refuge by bands of fugitives from Turkish oppression, and were therefore set fire to by the rulers of the country. The forests have also been reduced by the improvident felling of trees, and by the clearing of land for agricultural purposes. To-day they are almost entirely confined to the mountainous districts. The principal trees are the oak, ash, pine, elm, fir, beech, plane and lime, the cultivation of the beech tree (which flourishes at high altitudes) largely preponderating. Most of the forests belong to the State, the remainder being almost entirely the property of schools or religious bodies; whilst as regards their preservation, a very efficient form of supervision has been put into force. Nearly all the wood cut is used for fuel, and there are only a few factories engaged in the manufacture of wooden goods.

The mineral wealth of Bulgaria is stated by geologists to be considerable, and some of the earlier works upon the subject give indications of valuable mineral deposits in many different parts of the country. There is much evidence of mining of a primitive character having been done in ancient times, and even to-day a little work is done in some localities by old-fashioned methods.

Generally speaking, however, the minerals of the country are not being exploited commercially, certain deposits of coal and copper forming the only exception to this state of things. Both coal and copper were being worked before the war to some extent, and during the war much active development took place, mainly under German direction.

The mining industry is handicapped by difficulties with regard to fuel; for though Bulgaria possesses large deposits of coal, its calorific value is low, and without the addition of other fuel it is of little use for treating metals. The absence of railways has also contributed to make the working of the deposits unprofitable. Lack of capital and the national aversion to the intrusion of the foreigner have also proved to be stumbling-blocks in the way of the expansion of the mining industry.

Coal is being worked commercially at Bobovdol near Dupnitsa (north of Rilo) and at Pernik (south-west of Sofia); at the latter place, which is on the railway from Sofia to Kyustendil, the coal is easily won by means of adits driven into the side of the hill. Many other deposits of coal are known upon both sides of the Balkan range, but no steps have as yet been taken to develop them.

The most important copper deposits are the Plakalnitsa mine near Vrattsa, and a mine near Burgas on the Black Sea. Both of these were actively worked under German supervision during the European War.

Other minerals found in Bulgaria, but not yet developed, are iron and hematite, gold, lead, manganese, salt and zinc. A deposit of oil-shale, which is said to be of great value, was discovered some few years back; but beyond testing the value of the shale, nothing has up till now been done. So far as is at present known, Bulgaria possesses no other oil resources.

II. INDUSTRIES

It is generally agreed that the Bulgarian is the most industrious labourer in Europe; but he is a farmer and has not yet taken kindly to work in the factory. Consequently, in spite of legislation which aims at making compulsory the employment of the Bulgarian nationals in factories, a large proportion of the factory hands are composed of Greeks and Armenians and other foreigners. This is due to the fact that the Bulgarian insists on being on his farm at seedtime and harvest, and can only be induced to work in a factory upon condition that he is allowed to go away to his farm at these times. When not employed upon his own farm the Bulgarian will go abroad in search of work, and Bulgarians readily obtain employment for a portion of the year in Armenia, Turkey, Serbia and Romania.

The industries of Bulgaria are few and very simple. The staple occupation being agriculture, the other industries of the country have only recently got past the stage of transition from domestic handicraft to the factory system. Successive attempts have been made to stimulate the development of industries in the country by legislation, and special privileges are granted to industries which use mechanical power and employ a minimum number of workmen; these privileges consist of the right to import machinery and raw material free of duty, the free grant of sites for factories, a preference over foreign competitors in the supply of goods for Government departments, and a reduction in railway transport charges. In certain instances also local monopolies over a prescribed area may be obtained, provided that certain conditions are complied with.

That such legislation has in a measure had the effect desired is proved by the increase in the number of factories in the country which the official returns show has taken place in recent years; but the amount of fixed capital invested in the industries of the country (other than agriculture) is still very small, and it did not exceed 120,000,000 leva (or £4,800,000) at the time of the outbreak of the Balkan War in 1912. Naturally the bulk of the capital is invested in industries engaged in the production of foodstuffs, beer and alcohol, but the textile industry is also in a healthy condition, and the manufacture of soap and the preparation of leather are becoming of importance. The textiles produced consist of woollen and cotton yarns and cloths. The native cloth known as *abas*

and *shayak* and the well-known Bulgarian shawls account for almost the whole of the production of woollen goods, though the Bulgarian carpets, which are similar in texture and design to the well-known Turkish carpets, are also becoming popular. In the cotton industry the production consists almost entirely of cotton yarns of a coarse kind, the bulk of which comes from the Prince Boris mill at Varna, which is owned by an English Company.

Sofia is the only town in which electricity is used to any extent, though the mountain-streams would render the production of electricity inexpensive. The rivers are only harnessed at present for the purpose of driving the corn-mill or the saw.

III. FINANCIAL

THERE was a marked growth in the amount of the Bulgarian State expenditure in the years immediately preceding the Balkan Wars, chiefly due to increased expenditure on the Army and upon railways, harbours, roads, etc., and also to increase of State assistance to education. In a measure the increase of expenditure is also due to the larger demands upon the revenue for the service of the Public Debt, which had risen from 203,000,000 leva (£8,120,000) in 1901 to almost three times that figure in 1913, with the result that by the latter date about 50,000,000 leva (£2,000,000) were required annually for the service of external loans.

The revenue is provided by direct taxes on land, buildings, sheep and goats, road and military taxes, and patent fees; indirect taxes upon the manufacture and sale of spirits and tobacco, import and export duties, excise duties and the revenue from Government warehouses, State-owned railways, harbours, post office, forests and other lands owned by the State, and profits received from the National Bank.

Bulgaria was living beyond her means even before the Balkan Wars, and successive Finance Ministers were only able to make the Budget balance by means of foreign loans. For instance, in each of the years 1907, 1908 and 1910 over 80,000,000 leva were raised abroad for budget purposes. This burden has been enormously increased by the war, and it is not possible to say yet what the country's external indebtedness to-day actually amounts to. The fact that Bulgaria is making more rapid strides than any other country, excepting perhaps Belgium, towards the re-establishment of her industries will prove a very material advantage to her in dealing with loans raised in Germany and Austria; but it seems doubtful whether the country can avoid having to submit to taxation which may seriously hinder her progress for many years.

The monetary units of Bulgaria are the lev (nominally 1 franc), and the stotinka (1 centime). Before the wars there were gold, silver, nickel and copper coins in circulation, but the Bulgarian gold coinage in use was quite insufficient and was largely supplemented by French 10- and 20-franc pieces. Gold bank-notes have been in circulation for many years, while silver bank-notes have now been in use for about twenty years.

Questions of currency have always proved difficult problems to

Bulgarian statesmen, and there has never been any real effort made to study the relation between gold and silver coinage or to secure an adequate supply of the former in circulation. This has resulted in a very high premium on gold, amounting at times to as much as 20 or 30 per cent., a state of affairs which has involved enormous losses to trade, particularly when, as has recently been the case, the balance of trade has been adverse.

The pre-War and post-War Budgets of Bulgaria show an amazing difference, chiefly accounted for by the lamentable fall in the exchange, which fell from about 25 leva to the pound in 1914 to the present rate of about 640.

Some figures concerning the approximate revenue and expenditure (which nearly balanced each other) for the last nine years are given below. The figures, however, especially since 1915 were but seldom realised.

—	Million leva.	Remarks.
1913	130	
1914	250	
1915	275	
1916	275	
1917	425	Deficit 779 million leva.
1918	480	" 1,117 "
1919	?	" 2,197 " "
1920	2,586	" ? † Expenditure 2,392 million leva. ‡
1921	2,123	
1922	2,590	," 2,693 " "

* Exchange 100 leva to the pound.

† Exchange 200 leva to the pound.

‡ Exchange 300-330 leva to the pound.

On June 1, 1921 Bulgaria's foreign debt was about 3,209,000,000 francs (mostly consolidated) and 25 million leva (unconsolidated); internal debt 3,100,000,000 leva (of which only 82,000,000 were consolidated). To this should be added £90,000,000 sterling as reparation under the Peace terms of Neuilly.

There are a number of small banks in Bulgaria, and several large ones, the most important being the Banque Nationale de Bulgarie—the State Bank—the capital of which has been increased from time to time, and which before the Balkan Wars amounted to about 30,000,000 leva, and which was then doing a turnover of over 6,000,000,000 leva. Other important banks are the Banque Balkanique, founded with Austrian money, Banque Générale de Bulgarie, founded with Austrian and French money, the Banque de Crédit, founded with German money, and the Banque Bulgare de Commerce, a Bulgarian concern. There is no English banking establishment in the country as yet.

In addition to these banks there are other institutions of a banking nature which have proved important in the development of the country, notably the Banque Agricole de Bulgarie and the Post Office Savings Banks. The former is an amalgamation of a number of agricultural banks which originated during the Turkish occupation of the country; it does the usual banking business, and, in addition, grants loans on the security of agricultural produce, seeds, cattle, etc., and makes advances to farmers for the purchase of agricultural goods and machinery. This Agricultural Bank was doing a very large business, and was in a sound financial condition before the Balkan Wars.

The Bulgarian Post Office Savings Banks resemble the English institution of the same name, and do a large business. They are guaranteed by the State, which has been in the habit of paying interest on deposits as an encouragement of thrift.

IV. TRADE

THOSE responsible for Bulgaria's destinies made a mistake, from which the country will take long to recover, in throwing in Bulgaria's lot with that of the Central European Powers in the European War. The result has been disastrous to the country, because it has meant the loss to Bulgaria of a seaport on the *Ægean* Sea, and without such a port the development of the country's trade must be retarded.

The peace of Bucharest, which ended the second Balkan War in 1913, had given Bulgaria (at the expense of Turkey) the whole of the *Ægean* littoral from the mouth of the River Mesta to Enos, and various important projects for the development of the country were on foot, one of which was to consist of a railway crossing the country from the River Danube on the North to Porto Lagos on the *Ægean* Sea, which port was to be developed into a harbour for large vessels ; by means of this railway and port it was intended, in addition to providing a trading port for Bulgaria's own exports and imports, to open up a trade route for Romanian goods which would capture a good deal of the Romanian trade from the Danube, owing to the shorter and quicker route which would then be made available. This line had actually been prospected, and approximate estimates of the cost had been obtained.

If the Central Powers had been successful, Bulgaria would no doubt have received Salonika as her reward, and by that means would have become possessed of an established trade-route and one capable of great expansion. To-day the whole of the *Ægean* littoral and Salonika belong to Greece, and Bulgaria, so far as her trade with the Mediterranean is concerned, is faced with the alternative of re-establishing the trade of her Black Sea ports, Varna and Burgas, or of making a trading agreement with her old enemy Greece, which will enable her to use Salonika or Dede Agach.

* If we except the River Danube, which is an international water-way of the first importance, the rivers of Bulgaria are not of any value for commercial navigation, mainly because, with the exception of the River Maritsa, all are mountainous in character : that is to say, they are heavy torrents in winter and have very little water in the summer. The River Danube is navigable from its mouth to Regensburg (Ratisbon) in Bavaria, and vessels up to 10-foot draught can be navigated as far as the Iron Gates, a distance of

580 miles from the mouth of the river. Before the war there were several lines of steamers doing a regular service up and down this river, the most important being the Austrian Danube Steam Navigation Company, a Hungarian company, and the Romanian State-owned river service; several large fleets of barges were also regularly engaged in the river trade.¹ As will be seen below, an important part of Bulgaria's foreign trade passes through her ports on the Danube.

The only river in Bulgaria itself upon which any commercial navigation is carried on is the River Maritsa, which traverses the plain of Eastern Rumelia and flows into the Ægean Sea at Enos. This river is navigable below Adrianople for barges in the winter and for flat-bottomed boats at all seasons of the year, and a certain amount of traffic passes up and down it. If its banks were built up and the river were properly confined in a regular channel it could be made navigable, probably as far as Philippopolis, without a very great expenditure of money.

A good deal of road-making was done during the European War, but Bulgaria's roads are of little value for heavy transport purposes, and modern motor-transport is quite unknown.

As regards railways, Bulgaria is only moderately equipped. The lines are single throughout the country and are badly laid. The official statistics show, however, a steady increase in the volume of traffic and merchandise carried during the years immediately preceding the Balkan Wars. The main arteries are the line which connects Constantinople with Central Europe, crossing the Danube at Belgrade and passing through Sofia and Philippopolis, and two lines which branch off eastwards from this main line, the one to the north and the other to the south of the main Balkan range of mountains and terminating at the two principal Black Sea ports, Varna and Burgas. Other lines connect the northern branch with the principal ports on the Danube, and there is an important line running from Ruschuk on the Danube to Varna, which is useful in winter when the navigation on the river is closed.

Bulgaria possesses no mercantile fleet of any importance at present. In spite of Government subsidies the only steamship line worthy of the name is the Bulgarian Steam Navigation Company, whose vessels trade between the Danube ports and the different ports of the Mediterranean. The bulk of the foreign seaborne trade of the country is carried in foreign vessels; before the war a large proportion was carried by Austrian lines, only two English lines having a regular service and a system of through rates on Bulgarian railways. Some of the trade was also carried in vessels of the French line, Fraissinet & Co., and Greek lines also did an important trade.

The principal trade-routes for both exports and imports is the Black Sea, which before the Balkan Wars did on an average about

¹ A British company is now being formed in this connection.

48 per cent. of the entire trade of the country. About 25 per cent. of the trade passed through the Danube ports and the rest of the trade was carried by rail, a very large portion of this representing imports from Germany which came almost entirely by rail. On the Black Sea only the ports of Varna and Burgas are of any importance, and the trade of the former is considerably larger than that of the latter, due to the fact that until 1908 the railway serving Burgas belonged to the Imperial Ottoman System. On the Danube the most important Bulgarian port is Ruschuk, which is far ahead of all rivals ; other ports on the river which may be mentioned are Sistova, Somovit (just west of Nikopol), Lom, Palanka and Vidin. Of all the ports above mentioned Varna alone is in any measure equipped for dealing with cargo according to modern standards.

The volume of Bulgaria's foreign trade is very small : in the year 1911, which was the best year's trade ever recorded previous to the Balkan Wars, the combined values of the exports and imports only amounted to 384,000,000 leva or just over £13,000,000. An unsatisfactory feature of the trade has been the excess of imports over exports. This is partly the result of industrial legislation by which facilities were given to persons willing to erect new factories to import the necessary plant and raw materials free of duty. Other causes which have contributed are the operation of the new Customs tariff of 1906, which introduced an improved system of valuation of imports and thus put an end to a systematic under-valuation of imports which had continued for many years. But the change is mainly due to the special expenditure of sums obtained by means of foreign loans upon the purchase of military equipment for the Army, and upon rails, rolling-stock, locomotives, bridge work, cement and machinery which were required for the railways and ports, the construction of which the Bulgarian Government had put in hand before the Balkan War.

At present agricultural and dairy produce and livestock account for over 80 per cent. of the total value of the exports, with the result that a good or bad harvest is reflected in the trade returns for the following years. The export of agricultural produce is on the increase owing to the spread of modern methods of farming and the greater use of agricultural machinery.

As already pointed out, the most important crop is wheat ; next in importance comes maize, and then barley and rye. The export of flour has steadily increased in recent years, a result which is directly traceable to Government legislation : about 40 per cent. of the output of the mills is sent abroad. The export of cheese and eggs has already been referred to. A large trade is also done in the export of livestock and, in order to improve the breed of animals, Government stations have been established in different parts of the country for horse and cattle breeding.

Apart from agricultural produce only two articles of export need be noticed, both of which have been referred to above, and are

essentially Bulgarian products, viz.: the native cloths known as *abas* and *shayak*, and attar of roses.

Before the War Bulgaria's two best customers were Belgium and Turkey. Belgium has for some years been a large buyer of cereals of all kinds from the Black Sea, and took the bulk of Bulgaria's wheat and maize, and to a less extent her eggs. The sales to Turkey consisted chiefly of live animals, butter, cheese, flour, Bulgarian homespuns and grain. Great Britain's purchases from Bulgaria were on the decline before the Balkan Wars, but those of Germany were on the increase. A fair trade was done with France, and trade with Greece was upon the upward grade, a tendency which is likely to become more marked in the near future. In spite of her close proximity and the advantages offered by the River Danube, the exports to Austria have been unimportant.

Imports into Bulgaria, as may be supposed, consist very largely of manufactured or partly manufactured goods. The only food-stuffs imported are those which the country is unable to supply in any quantity such as spices, tropical fruits, sugar and coffee. The principal raw materials imported consist of hides, coal and coke, raw wool and raw cotton.

Cotton yarns and manufactures, iron and steel goods, machinery and woollen manufactures are the most important classes of manufactured goods imported. Of these, cotton goods have for many years been first in value, and in recent years there has been a steady increase in the value of these goods imported. Manufactures consist of piece-goods, and yarn is imported for use in the factories. The import of machinery has also increased very rapidly and there has been a considerable though less marked increase in the import of metal goods. The imports of both these classes of goods are directly traceable to the steps, to which reference has already been made, to stimulate industry in the country. The increase in the purchases of coal from abroad has also been most marked, due partly to the same cause and partly to the extensions of the railways of the country.

For some years before the Balkan Wars the imports into Bulgaria were divided between Austria-Hungary, Germany, Great Britain and Turkey. In 1912 France's contribution was an important one, but was due to heavy purchases of arms, etc., which that country supplied. Austria-Hungary has in the past been the chief contributor to the country's needs, mainly the result no doubt of geographical proximity; Germany was, however, gradually overhauling her, this being in a measure due to the general expansion of that country's trade in every market of the world; but it was also to some extent due to the policy which attracted her to the Balkans and Romania in pursuit of her Asiatic railway-schemes. Both Austria and Germany contributed to most of the country's needs. The United Kingdom, which came third, has been mainly a seller of cotton yarns and goods and of coal. Turkey's trade was

TABLE I
TRADE WITH PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES: EXPORTS
Total value (merchandise only) in thousands of leva

Countries.	1906.	1907.	1910.	1911.	1919.	1920.
United Kingdom .	14,985	20,706	15,315	24,237	21,273	52,623
Austria . .	8,200	8,023	7,828	10,567	17,005	149,775
Belgium . .	20,142	26,970	20,944	53,790	140	136,276
France . .	8,977	6,991	9,039	11,119	21,401	100,091
Germany . .	15,410	17,022	14,218	22,912	20,013	171,277
Greece . .	9,721	8,019	6,340	12,650	30,953	6,686
Italy . .	3,906	3,100	1,818	3,948	—	—
Russia . .	306	249	301	336	—	—
Romania . .	1,121	923	869	1,246	12,422	30,618
Serbia . .	584	348	404	614	—	—
Turkey . .	21,699	27,283	44,283	29,210	64,046	78,914
U.S.A. . .	1,372	1,264	1,117	1,167	184,800	142,216
Other Countries .	8,150	4,697	6,576	12,838	—	—
Total Exports .						
Thousands of leva	114,572	125,595	129,052	184,634	552,253	1,642,998
Thousands of £	4,583	5,024	5,162	7,385	—	—

TABLE 2
TRADE WITH PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES: IMPORTS
Total value (merchandise only) in thousands of leva

Countries.	1906.	1907.	1910.	1911.	1919.	1920.
United Kingdom .	19,600	21,424	22,682	30,034	104,849	311,207
Austria . .	27,802	34,688	47,571	48,216	19.	65,850
Belgium . .	3,078	4,253	8,507	5,047	3	33,924
France . .	5,373	6,593	15,348	24,927	5,779	197,851
Germany . .	16,225	19,660	34,120	39,837	302	125,942
Greece . .	224	389	421	488	53,341	55,784
Italy . .	5,543	5,506	6,843	9,118	345,893	624,697
Romania . .	3,365	3,633	6,572	8,724	—	—
Russia . .	4,694	4,771	6,865	6,975	—	—
Serbia . .	1,408	2,065	2,270	1,751	—	—
Turkey . .	18,052	17,548	21,024	15,986	146,995	408,466
U.S.A. . .	—	—	—	—	195,111	130,283
Other countries .	3,155	4,140	5,134	8,242	—	—
Total Imports .						
Thousands of leva	108,474	124,681	177,357	199,345	—	—
Thousands of £	4,339	4,986	7,094	7,074	—	—

of a general nature. In 1921 the United Kingdom imported £140,679 worth of Bulgarian goods, and exported practically nothing to her.

The European upheaval has had such a devastating effect upon trade and commerce that it is impossible to predict what changes may come about in the general direction of Bulgaria's export and import trade, and commercial treaties and tariffs may give an unexpected direction to that trade. Bulgaria has advantages of climate and geographical situation and, more than either, the sovereign advantage of the natural industry of her people. If her rulers can encourage the introduction of foreign capital and foreign methods, and if peace and a balanced Budget can be secured to the country for a term of years, Bulgaria should become prosperous and her people contented; but for the present that time appears to be far distant.

III. MISCELLANEOUS

ARMY AND NAVY

THE pre-War peace strength of the Bulgarian Army was about 3,900 officers and 81,000 other ranks. Its war strength in September 1915 was 877,000 men.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly of November 27, 1919, the total military forces of Bulgaria must not in future exceed 20,000 men. All measures of mobilisation are prohibited, and in order to prevent the formation of a reserve, service in the ranks is to be for the minimum period of twelve years. Officers serving at the time when the treaty was signed must undertake to serve at least till the age of forty, and newly-appointed officers serve for at least twenty years. Voluntary service only is allowed.

A frontier guard of 3,000 men voluntarily enlisted is permitted, and, in addition, the number of armed gendarmes, police, Customs officials and forest guards must not exceed 10,000.

The maximum authorised armaments and munition supplies are :

	Per 1,000 men.	Munitions per arm.
Rifles or carbines	1,150	500 rounds
Machine guns	15	10,000 "
Trench mortars, light	2	1,000 "
Trench mortars, heavy	2	500 "
Guns or howitzers	3	1,000 "

No military or naval aircraft are permitted: civilian aircraft only under Allied supervision.

The manufacture of arms, munitions and war material is only to be carried out at one factory under State control. The importation and exportation of arms and munitions is prohibited.

Bulgaria is required to surrender all warships and submarines, but is permitted to maintain on the Danube and along her coast four torpedo-boats and six motor-boats, all without torpedoes or torpedo apparatus, for police and fishing duties.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire : Edward Gibbon (F. Warne, 1898).

History of the Byzantine and Greek Empires, 716-1453 : George Finlay (Blackwood, 1854).

The Byzantine Empire : Sir C. W. C. Oman (Unwin, 1892).

Geschichte der Bulgaren : Jireček (F. Tempsky, Prag, 1876).

Slavische Alterthumer : P. J. Šafařík (H. Wuttke, Leipzig, 1843-44).

La Turquie d'Europe : Ami Boué (Arthur Bertrand, Rue Haute-feuille 23, Paris, 1840).

Les Slaves de Turquie, ressources, tendances, etc. : Cyprien Robert (L. Passard, Paris, 1844).

Travels in European Turkey, 1850 : Edmund Spencer (Hurst & Blackett, 1851).

Correspondence respecting the Conferences at Constantinople, 1876-77, No. 2, 1877 : Foreign Office Papers (Stationery Office, 1877).

Life of Beaconsfield, Vols. V and VI : Buckle (John Murray, 1920).

The Campaign in Bulgaria, 1877-78 : F. V. Greene (Hugh Rees, Pall Mall, 1903).

The Slavonic Provinces of Turkey in Europe : Miss Muir Mackenzie and Miss A. P. Irby (Daldy, Isbister & Co., 1877).

The People of Turkey : A Consul's wife and daughter (John Murray, 1878).

Turkey and Its People : Sir Edwin Pears (Methuen, 1911).

The Balkans : W. Miller (Unwin, 1896).

The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913 : W. Miller (Cambridge Press, 1913).

Bulgarians in the Past : D. Mishev (Librairie Centrale des Nationalités, rue Caroline, Lausanne, 1919).

The Bulgarians and Anglo-Saxons : S. J. Stephano¹⁸⁹⁰ (Paul Haupt, Berne, 1919).

Turkey in Europe : Odysseus (Edward Arnold, 1895-6).

Der Kampf der Bulgaren um ihr Nationaleinkommen : A. E. von Huhn (Duncker und Humblot, Leipzig, 1885-6).

Kidnapping of Alexander of Bulgaria, His Return to Bulgaria and Abdication : A. E. von Huhn, translat^{ed} by F. Beaufort (Stanford, 1887).

The Growth of Freedom in the Balkan Peninsula : J. G. Cotton-Minchin (John Murray, 1886).

Das Fürstenthum Bulgarien : J. J. Schröder (Berlin, 1891).

The Peasant State, Bulgaria in 1894: Sir Edward Dicey (John Murray, 1894).

Stambulov: A. G. Hulme Beaman (Bliss, 1896).

La Bulgarie, 1887-1908: Drandar (Établissements généraux d'imprimerie, 14, rue d'Or, Bruxelles, 1909).

Macedonia, its Races and their Future: H. N. Brailsford (Methuen, 1905).

Nationalism, and War in the Near East: A Diplomatist (Clarendon Press, 1915).

Rise of Nationality in the Near East: R. Seton Watson (Constable, 1917).

Aspirations of Bulgaria: Balkanicus (Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton & Kent, 1915).

The Balkan League: I. E. Geshov (John Murray, 1915).

Diplomatic Reminiscences: Nekludov (John Murray, 1920).

The Campaign in Thrace: P. Howell (Hugh Rees, London, 1913).

La Guerre des Balkans de 1912-13: Lieutenant-Colonel Immanuel, du régiment d'infanterie de Danzig. No. 128 (Henri-Charles Lavauzelle, 10 rue Danton, Paris, 1913).

Questions Militaires: Bulgares contre Serbes: Anonymous (*Revue Bleue*, Paris, 1913-14).

(a) *Through Bulgaria with Prince Ferdinand*: J. D. Bourchier (*Fortnightly Review*, July 1888).

(b) *On the Black Sea with Prince Ferdinand*: J. D. Bourchier (*Fortnightly Review*, January 1891).

(c) *In Rhodope with Prince Ferdinand*: J. D. Bourchier (*Fortnightly Review*, April 1891).

(d) *The Final Settlement in the Balkans*: J. D. Bourchier (*Quarterly Review*, October 1917).

(e) *The Four Treaties of Bucharest*: J. D. Bourchier (*Quarterly Review*, July 1918).

(f) *Bulgaria*, in *Encyclopædia Britannica*: J. D. Bourchier.

Histoire de la Bulgarie (185-1913 A.D.), by R. P. Guérin Songeon (Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, Paris, 1913).

INDEX

A

Agrarians, 90, 95, 109-112, 120, 121, 133, 140, 141, 149-153, 162
 Agriculture, 13, 53, 54, 157, 169, 170
 Armistice (Salonika), 140, 149
 Army, creation of, 41; in Serbian War, 45; 57, 65; defeats Turks, 69, 70; defeated by Serbs and Greeks, 83; mobilises, 106; operations *v.* Serbia, 114-117; *v.* Romania, 123-128; 143; present state, 185
 Asen, 16, 20
 Austria (-Hungary), 26, 36, 39, 54; annexes Bosnia, etc., 61; 65; friendship, 89-91; 139, 144, 145, 154

B

Balkan League, 64-68, 76
 Balkan Wars, first, 69-75; second, 82-88
 Basil II, 18, 19
 Batak, massacres at, 34, 36
 Battenberg, Prince Alexander of, 43-48
 Bibliography, 186
 Bogomils, 31
 Boris I, 17
 Boris II, 52, 142, 163
 Bourchier, J. B., 66, 67, 163
 Bulgar, the, origin, 11; character, 13, 15, 22, 76, 169
 Bulgaria, area, 11; population, 11; early history, 11, 12-15; descriptive geography, 12, 13, 169; resources, 13, 169; industries, 14, 172; trade, 14, 177; empire, 16; folklore, 16; Church, 17, 20, 29, 155; Principality, 39; constitution, 42; army, 45, 57, 69-75, 185; independence declared, 61; minerals, 171
 Byzantine Empire, 16-20

C

Christianity introduced, 17, 28
 Chronological Table, 166
 Church, National, 17, 20, 29-33, 155; Greek, 28, 32
 Constitution, 41, 42, 44

D

Desclusières, 120, 122
 Dóbruja, 12, 22, 85, 118; campaign in the, 123-128; 129, 131, 133, 135, 138, 140, 154-156
 Dushan, 22

E

Eastern Rumelia, 13, 39, 41; union with Bulgaria, 45, 46; 49
 Education, 34, 35, 159
 Elections, 90, 91, 151-153
 Exarchate, 33, 119

F

Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, Prince and Tsar, chosen as Prince, 49; character, 50, 77; marriage, 52, 77
 Tsar, 61; abdicates, 141
 Finance, 156-158, 160, 174-176
 Forests, 12, 170

G

Germany, Pro-German campaign, 98-102; negotiations, 105-107; Bulgarian troops under v. Mackensen, 126; 137; German assistance withheld, 135, 139, 144-148
 Great War, 94-148; policy regarding, 96-102; negotiations *re*, 103-108; mobilisation, 106; treaties, 106; Bulgaria attacks Serbia, 114-117; and Romania, 123-128; friction with Allies, 131-135; *moral* of troops declining, 137-139; defeated in Macedonia, 139, 143-148; armistice, 140; Ferdinand abdicates, 141
 Greeks, in Macedonia, 61; atrocities, 64; in First Balkan War, 73-75; 79, 81, 83-86, 107, 117, 135, 146, 161

I

Industries, 14, 172, 173

K

Karavélov, 44, 47, 49
 Kavalla, 80, 135

Kósovo Polye, 22
 Kuchuk Kainarji, Treaty of, 26

L

Lausanne, Conference of, 163, 166

M

Macedonia, 51, 55-63, 66; committees, 57-60; 78, 83, 86, 88, 104, 118, 119, 154, 161, 162
 Malinov, 65, 94, 112, 136-140; resigns, 149; 162
 Minorals, 14, 170, 171
 Monasteries, 30
 Montenegro, agreement with, 67; declares war on Turkey, 68

N

Navy, 185
 Neuilly, Treaty of, 151; consequences of, 154-159; 160, 163, 185

O

Okhrida, 19, 20, 30, 80

P

Panitsa, Major, 51
 Pasvanoglu, 26, 27
 Phanariots, 32, 36
 Plevna, 37
 Pomaks, 25, 36, 46, 86
 Ports, 177, 178

R

Radoslavov, 86, 89-93, 95, 110, 112, 128-135, 162
 Resources, 13, 169-171
 Rivers, 177, 178
 Robert College, 35, 36
 Romania, 83, 99, 123-128, 161
 Rumeia, 23
 Russia, 18, 26, 27, 37, 39; influence, 41, 44, 46; plot, 47; 48, 54, 65, 81, 95, 107

S

Samuel, 18, 19, 20
 Savov, 51, 69, 82, 83, 84
 Serbia, 22, 28, 40; attacks Bulgaria, 45, 46; 54; in Balkan Wars, 73-88; attacked by Bulgaria, 82; 104, 105, 108, 113; invaded by Bulgaria, 114-117; 119, 120, 128, 145
 Shazak, 14, 173, 180
 Simeon, 18, 17, 20
 Silvntsia, 46
 Sobranje, institution of, 41; elections to, 90, 91, 151-153; German loan, 92, 93; Opposition action, 109-113; records, 129

T

Talaat Bey, 95, 131
 Thrace, 154, 161, 164
 Todorov, 114, 122, 149, 152, 162
 Trade, 14, 18, 160, 177-182
 Transport, 14, 177-179
 Treaties: Karlowitz, 1699, 26; Kuchuk Kainarji, 1774, 26; Paris, 1856, 28; Reichstadt, 1876, 36; San Stefano, 1878, 38, 40, 55; Turko-British, 1878, 39; Berlin, 1878, 39, 40, 55, 57; Bucharest, 1896, 46; Greco-Bulgarian, 51, 67, 79; Serbo-Bulgarian, 1904, 66; 1912, 78, 79; Balkan League, 84-88; London, 1913, 76; Serbo-Greek, 1913, 81; Russo-Bulgarian, 1902, 81; Bucharest, 1913, 86, 177; with Central Powers, 1915, 106; with Turkey, 1915, 106; Neuilly, 1919, 151, 154-159; Lausanne, 1922-23, 163
 Trnovo, 20, 22, 30, 37; Constituent Assembly at, 41, 43; 50, 182

Tsankov, 165
 Tsanov, 94, 130, 131
 Tsars, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 61
 Turkey, 22, 26, 35, 45, 46; in Macedonia, 59, 60, 61; Revolution, 61; Young Turks, 62, 63; beaten in First Balkan War, 70-75; 85; sounds Bulgaria, 95, 96; treaty, 106; 131; Thrace, 161
 Turkish Conquest, 22-26, 35

U

Uniate Church, 32

V

Vlachs, 56
 Vlad the Impaler, 24

W

Wars, early, 16-22; Turkish, 26, 27; Crimean, 27; Russo-Turkish, 37, 38; Serbian, 45, 46; First Balkan, 68-75; Second Balkan, 82-88; Great War, 94-148 (v. Great War)

Z

Zankov, 44, 47, 48, 51

ROMANIA

NOTE ON SPELLING

THE spelling of the name of the country (Romania, pronounced there almost Romaynia, not Romahnia) is in accordance with the recent decision of the Permanent (Official) Committee on Geographical Names. Other place-names given here are very variously spelt on even official Romanian maps.¹ The spelling is indeed still in a somewhat chaotic stage—all the more so in view of the number of different nationalities which now go to make up the country; until therefore an official list appears, authoritative spellings cannot be laid down.

N.B.—The letter *ş* is pronounced *sh*, and *ă* is.

¹ There are indeed no fewer than six official varieties of the spelling of the Capital. Bucureşti appears to be the most general version.

NOTE

THE original contribution on Romanian history was provided by Professor N. Iorga, of the University of Bucharest, ex-President, Romanian Chamber of Deputies. This has been largely recast and rewritten by Mr. Underhill, M.A., formerly Fellow and Senior Tutor of Magdalen College, Oxford, who is responsible for Chapters III and IV; and by Mr. Francis Bickley (Chapters V to XII). Acknowledgments are due by the writer of Chapters I and II both to Professor Iorga and to Mr. W. Miller's history of Romania in *The Balkans*.

The two chapters on Economics are from the pen of Dr. Marion Newbiggin, D.Sc., Editor of the *Scottish Geographical Magazine*.

The whole has been compiled under the care of Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen.

CONTENTS

A—HISTORY

	PAGE
I. GEOGRAPHICAL—HISTORICAL	199
II. FROM THE ROMAN PERIOD TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY	202
III. THE EARLY PRINCIPALITIES (1244—1590)	211
IV. FROM MICHAEL THE BRAVE (1593) TO CONSTANTINE BRANCOVAN (1714)	216
V. THE PHANARIOTS TO THE UNION (1600—1858)	223
VI. UNITED AND INDEPENDENT ROMANIA (1858—1883)	234
VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS (1877—1914)	242
VIII. TRANSYLVANIA, BUKOVINA, AND BESSARABIA	250
IX. THE ROMANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GREAT WAR	258
X. ROMANIA TAKES HER PART: THE FIRST PERIOD	265
XI. THE SECOND PERIOD: HUMILIATION	273
XII. DELIVERANCE; AND THE ROMANIAN UNION SINCE THE WAR	282
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE	291

B—ECONOMICS

I. GENERAL	295
II. THE TERRITORIAL UNITS	303
APPENDIX: SOME MISCELLANEOUS FIGURES	313

C—MISCELLANEOUS

	PAGE
DEFENCE: ARMY AND MARINE	317
BIBLIOGRAPHY	318
INDEX	319

MAPS

SKETCH-MAP OF EARLY ROMANIA AT VARIOUS PERIODS	
	<i>opp. p.</i> 222
SKETCH-MAP ILLUSTRATING CAMPAIGNS OF 1916-1918 IN	
ROMANIA	<i>p.</i> 277
ROMANIA OF TO-DAY	<i>At end</i>

A—HISTORY

CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHICAL-HISTORICAL

THE country which we now (since 1919) know as Romania, and which includes a large portion of what until the other day constituted the kingdom of Hungary, has as its central feature the uplands of Transylvania, bounded on the south by the wooded chain of the Southern Carpathians (till lately termed the Transylvanian Alps) and on the east by the Carpathians. Pierced by a number of passes, through several of which run torrential rivers, these hills for a long time concealed the strongholds of the defeated Dacians of old, and formed the cradle of several dynasties of petty princelings, many of whom from time to time rose to temporary domination over the lands both to the north and to the south.

From these two ranges innumerable streams run west, south and east, traversing the rich plains of the Banat and Walachia and the more rolling country of Moldavia, to fall at last into the magnificent flood of the Danube, which, if we except the debatable land of the Dóbruja, has for ages past formed the southern frontier of the country. On the north-east the newly restored province of Bessarabia is divided from Russia by the broad stream of the Dniester and from Moldavia by the Pruth, which together with the Sereth and its tributaries rises in the Carpathians and runs, roughly parallel with the Dniester, into the lower courses of the Danube. The latter river, from above Belgrade downwards, is unspanned by any bridge until the great railway crossing at Cernavoda is reached. Even Trajan's bridge, built east of Orsova in A.D. 104, but long since destroyed, has as yet no modern successor in the upper stretches of the Romanian Danube.

Within these natural defences of mountain and stream it might have been expected that the peoples of Romania, or at least of the territories of Walachia and Moldavia, would have rested secure, free to develop themselves and their resources. But it was precisely rumours of these resources—rumours of rich gold and unlimited agricultural wealth—which in the first

instance attracted invaders—Scythians in the very early days from the east and, later on, Romans from the south-west. The tide of national migrations was soon to follow, and from the third to the fourteenth century a series of devastating incursions from the east, north-east and north took place. Not that all these incursions were aimed at the occupation of Romania itself ; but that country lay in the direct path of the eastern and northern hordes, whose greedy eyes were fixed on the wealth of Byzantium or who were driven south-westwards by the pressure of expanding nations behind them. There was no united Romanian people to withstand them ; and rivers, however broad and swift, were of no avail as a defence against invading hosts to whom time was no object and who, whilst raiding the surrounding country, could spend months in collecting material wherewith to cross the waters.

Some of the tribes, especially the northern ones who had poured through the passes of the Transylvanian hills, remained in the country and fought each other for possession. More passed on ; but for a thousand years the country, in consequence of its geographical position, was a recordless welter of conflicting nationalities, resulting in a population without a definite history, whose origins it is indeed hard to trace. Still later the reflex movement began, and Romania was overrun by the resistless advance of Turkish armies towards the plains of Hungary and Lower Austria and towards the riper uplands of Moldavia ; whilst Bulgars, Greeks and even Albanians from the south-west have left their traces in the present population.

In these circumstances it could hardly be said that “blessed is the country that has no history” ; but whilst these alarms and excursions were taking place over the greater part of these regions, the eastern portion, owing to its favourable position and material resources, was comparatively quiet, and trade with the outside world was beginning in the flat country bordering on the lower reaches of the Danube. Much of it was, and still is, carried from the interior on the river itself, and the rich produce of the Pruth and Sereth valleys, as well as oil from the southern slopes of the Carpathians, went to swell the importance of towns such as Siliстра, Braila, Galatz and Constantsa, which during the Middle and subsequent Ages sprang into existence or were developed from earlier villages. The advance of the Russians into Bessarabia in the eighteenth century gave an impetus to the commercial growth of these parts, and since that time the possession of the Lower Danube, its ports and its mouths, has formed a strategical and com-

mercial prize for which varying nations have contended and for which more than one war has been fought.

But ever since the country took its place among the nations of Europe one main line of thought has always dominated the minds of Romanians—the desire to annex the lands north of the Southern Carpathians which held in Hungarian bondage so many of their own compatriots. When the European War had been in progress for a couple of years and the strength of Austria-Hungary was beginning to be sapped by the colossal struggle, the great opportunity seemed to have arrived. After much hesitation Romania flung herself into the fight—and was badly beaten. But, as we know, the strength of the Allies proved decisive in the end, and the Romanian purpose was, after much suffering, achieved in full. Whether the consolidation will prove to be a permanent one, time alone can show.

CHAPTER II

FROM THE ROMAN PERIOD TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

SOME time before the Christian era the new economic conditions obtaining in the Roman-Italian world became the cause of a considerable emigration towards the east. The old and typical cultivators of the soil, who had formed the backbone not only of the legions but of the Roman nation itself, found it more and more impossible to carry on ; for the wealthy upper classes were beginning to buy up or seize their lands, and to turn them either into great sporting properties or else to cut them up into parks and gardens for their villas. About the same time the many ships plying regularly between Sicily, Africa and the islands made it easy for Italy—already growing contentedly indolent—to import nearly all the necessities of life.

Many of these dispossessed Italians, drifting westwards, eventually formed the Roman basis of the population of Provence ; but a far larger number crossed over to the Balkan coast. Here they began to settle on the shores and in the mountains of Illyria, a vague district corresponding more or less to the Dalmatia and Albania of to-day, and inhabited by a primitive people whose origin is sunk in the mists of antiquity. But it was not long before they left these bare hills and moved on eastwards to more favoured territory in Macedonia and elsewhere.

At that time the inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula were classed together—though separated into widely different groups—under the general name of Thracians. To the north they spread to the confines of that steppe which, extending between the Lower Danube and the Black Sea, and including the present Dóbruja, had from time immemorial been the uncontested territory of the Scythians. The whole region of the Carpathians, together with the Transylvanian range and the adjoining provinces as well as both banks of the Danube, were inhabited by “Thracians”—in fact, they ruled supreme in the Balkans,

their dominion unchallenged save by the Greek towns on the coast. Even beyond the Bosphorus further Thracian tribes, under the names of Phrygians, Bithynians, etc., were established in the cool valleys of Asia Minor.

On the advent of the Italian immigrants, dowered as they were with all the solid Roman qualities, there followed swiftly a process of denationalisation greatly to the disadvantage of the more primitive races. The Thracians, invaded in their villages and possessing little power of cohesion, offered little or no resistance, but passively allowed themselves to be Romanised ; and Roman officialdom, first Republican and then Imperial, was constrained to keep step with this eastward movement. Illyrian piracy offered a pretext for the incursion of the Roman arms, and soon in the Serbian valleys, where colonists had already penetrated and prepared the way, numerous Roman towns began to spring up. In spite of Greek penetration, their Latin character exercised an abiding and all-pervading influence, which was destined to endure until the time of the Slav invasion, and was largely responsible for the political development of the Thracian races.

About 112 B.C. the Romans, having quelled a final Illyrian revolt, advanced north-eastwards into the territories watered by the Danube. Here they came into temporary conflict with the tribes then known to them as the Getæ, and later as the Dacians, who inhabited the country north of the great river, and extended even beyond the Carpathians.

By all accounts these Dacians, a so-called "Thracian" tribe, were already a fine and vigorous race, and would even then have formed no unworthy foe for the Roman steel. But Rome was already fully engaged elsewhere ; and had it not been for the temerity of the Dacians themselves, she would in all probability have fixed her own northern limits at the Danube.

Full of confidence, however, in themselves and in their kings, Boerobistes and Cotiso, the Dacians made repeated incursions across the Danube into the Roman territory of Mœsia (North Bulgaria) and left the colonists no rest. Augustus and Vespasian succeeded in holding them for a time at arms' length ; but a doughty chieftain arose in the person of Decebalus, who led his nation to a succession of victories. After two years of training and preparation Decebalus crossed the Danube in A.D. 86 at the head of a powerful and disciplined army, and drove the Roman garrisons headlong to the south, defeating them heavily on at least two occasions.

The Emperor Domitian himself now came to the rescue ;

but although a portion of his troops appears to have reached, and even attacked, the Dacian capital of Sarmisagethusa, diplomacy obtained the upper hand. Far from his base and uncertain of his communications, Domitian was by no means anxious to drive his enemy to desperation ; and although Decebalus surrendered to him in name, the Dacian chief obtained terms so favourable that, after the retirement of Domitian's forces, he lost no time in renewing his trans-Danubian raids on the peaceful colonists, and keeping their outposts on the *qui vive* for several years.

The accession, however, of Trajan in A.D. 98 brought a speedy change ; and, with the full intention of putting a definite stop to the nuisance, the great Emperor made ready his legions. Moving by Domitian's road, Trajan completed it along the right bank of the Danube to near Orsova—in places hewn through the solid rock, and in others supported by planks fastened to the face of the steep cliffs overhanging the river : the traces are there to this day. After many months of preparation his two divisions crossed by bridges of boats at Kostolac and Orsova, and the most desperate fighting ensued in the rocky fastnesses on the left bank. Not only were the Dacians well armed and in many cases protected by body armour, but their showers of poisoned arrows, and the huge rocks that they launched on the Romans struggling in the valleys, caused terrible havoc among the legionaries. Eventually a very severe action at Tapæ opened the way to Sarmisagethusa, and after a strenuous resistance the capital fell into Roman hands. Trajan's victory was complete, and Decebalus, apparently humbled to the ground, was obliged to accept all the ignominious terms enforced upon him.

But not for long. Decebalus, as it shortly appeared, had only accepted the Roman terms in order to get rid of his enemy the sooner ; and before long the Dacians were at their old game of raiding the colonists and forming combinations against them. This time, however, the fate of Dacian independence was sealed, for Trajan was now determined to be troubled no longer by this warlike nation which refused to acknowledge when it was beaten.

As a first step he built a magnificent stone bridge across the Danube near Turnu Severin—the work of the Syrian architect Apollodorus—a fine structure of which several piles are still to be seen on both banks. This done, war was declared.

The campaign was a short one : for the Dacian monarch did not succeed in enrolling the Sarmatians on his side, and was

moreover deserted by many of his compatriots, who feared the vengeance of Rome. After a series of short but desperate actions in which the Dacians were greatly outnumbered, the decisive battle took place just outside the walls of Sarmisagethusa. The capital was set on fire in order to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, and numbers of the Dacian warriors, including Decebalus himself, committed suicide by poison or the sword.

At last Rome could celebrate a decisive victory; and after a brilliant triumph in the streets of his capital, the conqueror was at liberty to model in relief the history of the Dacian wars on the beautiful column of Trajan which still adorns the *Foro Traiano*.

From the forests of Bohemia to the Archipelago, from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, the Empire had now not a single enemy. The province of Dacia, fortified, repopulated and civilised, dominated the vast expanse of complex territory where lived, without distinction of frontiers, the Roman people of the east, of whom the Romanians, extending from the Pindus to the Balkans and the Carpathians, were destined to be the eventual descendants. Adjoining the ancient rural *davae*¹—of the vanquished—who by this time were sufficiently familiar with their conquerors to acquiesce in their fate—Roman Dacia soon possessed towns of considerable importance, in no sense inferior to the older foundations of the Balkans. Ulpia Trajana, on the actual site of the former Dacian capital, Apulum (to-day Alba Iulia), Napoca (to-day Cluj), Potaissum (close to Turda), contained a very varied population. Even before the war was over, in certain districts such as Drobetis, a bridge-head on the Danube, many veterans had, at the conclusion of their military service, received grants of land in the new province. These dwelt amicably side by side with the Romanised Dacians. Roman functionaries had already been installed, together with colonists of mixed origin (officially established, according to the testimony of Eutropius), and numerous merchants, manufacturers and gold-seekers, who flocked thither to share in the exploitation of the various sources of wealth which the more simple barbaric spirit had left untapped.

This mixture of nationalities, among which were also some Asiatics who had served in the legions, spoke the same common Latin tongue—the same *sermo rusticus*—and shared the same Greco-Latin civilisation. It could not, however, have given a new race to humanity, a new branch to the Roman people,

¹ Villages of wooden huts.

had not its foundations rested on a more stable basis than any which could be derived from a mere influx of individuals driven before the sterile breeze of purely material interests. One could not expect to trace in these newly-arrived immigrants the essential spirit of the Romanians to-day, strongly characterised as it is in its customs and superstitions, in its mode of life and habits of thought. For the development of this spirit we must look for a definite cause ; and we find it in the village life led in common by the Romans and Thracians. In this the latter lost none of their pristine vigour, whilst at the same time they absorbed many of the purest Latin characteristics—i.e. those of the country as distinct from those of the town—from their conquerors.

This character is reflected in the Romanian language as it exists to-day ; for despite the strong Slav admixture which is probably of more ancient date than the Slav invasions of the sixth century—for it seems that even during the Dacian period there were many Slavs among the Sarmatians in Transylvania—the language remains to this day essentially Latin in origin. For all ordinary phraseology the terms used of old by the Italian peasantry have been retained. For everything concerning the activities of the countryside, the aspects of nature, the hours of the day and night, animals, plants, parts of the human body, tools and utensils in ordinary use, means of transport, foodstuffs, etc., the old names have been religiously preserved. Evidence, too, of a flourishing urban life survives in such words as *pământ*, in its general sense of ground, from the Latin *pavimentum*, designating the old Roman roads ; *impărat* from *imperator* ; *lege* from *lex* ; *țară* (meaning father-land) from *terra* ; *jude* from *judex* ; *căpitän* from *capitaneus* ; some military terms, such as *fușă* and *scut*, from *fustis* and *scutum*, are also of Latin derivation. At the same time the syntax has, in the suffixing of the article and in certain other verbal forms, been largely inherited from Thracian ancestors.

Little more than a century and a half after the colonisation of this Carpathian Dacia, the Emperor Aurelian transferred the army and the officials to the right bank of the Danube. But this measure, undertaken in view of the danger of invasion by the Goths, had but little influence on the fate of those regions ; for while it was necessarily fatal to the prosperity of the towns, it in no way disturbed the country people, who did not join in the retreat, but remained on their lands. They had no fear of the invaders, having been for long accustomed

to their proximity, and harbouring indeed a certain spirit of camaraderie towards them.

But though Goth and Dacian fraternised, and the country was more or less at peace for a century or so, worse times were in store. For a short period (about A.D. 330) Roman sovereignty was indeed again acknowledged in these regions in the shape of the Emperor Constantine, who appears to have introduced the beginnings of Christianity. But he soon withdrew from an impossible position, and within less than fifty years Gothic Dacia was overrun by hordes of savage Huns from the north-east, causing large numbers to take refuge in the hilly fastnesses of the Carpathians.

The next invaders were the Gepidae, a branch of the Goths, who drove out the Huns and remained in possession for a century or more ; but these were in their turn overwhelmed by the Lombards and Avars, who, joining hands from the north and east respectively, under the leadership of Alboin, plundered what was left of the unfortunate country. The Lombards soon passed on southwards ; but the lands on both sides of the Carpathians remained in the hands of the Avars for some eighty years—until their crushing defeat by the Emperor Heraclius in 626 drove them north-westwards out of the Balkan Peninsula.

The Bulgarians, late allies of Heraclius, now entered the country, and occupied a large portion of it for another two hundred years—till in the middle of the ninth century a swarm of Hungarians from the Asiatic plains descended on the eastern portion of the present Romania and dwelt there until driven westwards across the Carpathians. (In the eleventh century they annexed the present Transylvania.)

The next barbarian raiders were the Patzinikitai, of whom little is known ; and close on their heels followed the Kumans, a tribe of Turkish origin, who during the eleventh and twelfth centuries occupied in peace the lands between the Carpathians and the Danube.

Yet none of these barbarians—neither Slavs nor Northerners—had ever succeeded in founding a real State on the left bank of the Danube. During the early portion of the period above described the Roman domination to the south of the river had continued for some time in its primitive form. At a certain stage of its development under the Byzantine Empire it adopted the Greek language ; but in political essentials it always remained Roman. Consequently, while the Western “Romans” became known by absorption as Franks, Lom-

bards and Goths (in Spain and Southern France), in the east they preserved intact their original name, which to them was a proof of their legitimacy. The very name Români¹ borne by all the remnants of their race despite distinctions of province and political dependence goes to prove that they were never really engulfed in the waves of the successive barbarian invasions. If the Byzantine Greeks arrogated to themselves the political attributes of ancient Rome, the national attributes of the race were religiously preserved by these forsaken colonists, both by the long-since Romanised descendants of the Thracian race and by the direct descendants of the Italian immigrants.

These Români were thus by no means confined to the Dacian territories, an historical outline of which, as representing the Romania of to-day, has just been given. Indeed, during a considerable period the larger groups of these Români were to be found as far south as Thessaly and Albania; others spread, mostly as herdsmen but also here and there as agriculturists, over the central Balkans; and others again appeared in Serbia, where they were destined later to become the serfs of the royal monasteries. But when conditions in that district became more favourable for them they appeared again on the left bank of the Danube spreading even to the confines of the Carpathians. Further, they settled in the depths of Galicia, as well as in the Moravian valleys, and after that, in colonies of more recent date, in Croatia, where their long-since Slavised name of Walachians still exists, and in Istria, where a last remnant of the race finally died out.

It was not until the fourteenth century that these Romanians succeeded in founding States peculiarly their own; but as early as the tenth century there is evidence that under the title of "Walachians," a name of Keltic origin given them by the Germans and the Greeks, and later by the Hungarians, and signifying a foreign people, a number of them established in the south of the Balkan Peninsula a certain independent sovereignty under their chiefs, the *Chelnika*, some of whose names still survive.

Enjoying a practical autonomy in their hilly Thessalian "Walachia,"² they set at naught the dictates of the Byzantine Government, and engaged in border raids and forays to their hearts' content. When in the time of the Emperor Isaac Comnenus his officials refused any longer to recognise their

¹ Pronounced Romöni (not Români).

² The Kutzo-Vlachs of South Macedonia still claim to be their descendants.

privileges, the then Walachian chiefs, three brothers named Peter, Asan and Ionitsa, began a guerrilla warfare which endured for two centuries. Thus, although of Greco-Slavonic culture and religion, these Români by descent may be said to have inaugurated the first (but Southern) Walachian dynasty. About the same time certain chiefs of Romanian origin (including especially one Tatul), who dwelt in the prosperous regions between the present Silistra and the Dóbruja, vindicated their right to independence in defiance of Alexis Comnenus, Isaac's successor. They too were under the influence of the Slavonic Church and called their Romanian fatherland Walachia ; and the existence of these principalities of probably ancient date affords yet one more proof of the long-enduring vigour of Romanian vitality.

But before the country that we knew as Romania before the Great War could consolidate itself into a double principality, it was destined to undergo yet several changes of masters. The history of that period (twelfth and thirteenth centuries) is confused and vague in the extreme ; but it appears that the King of Hungary, about A.D. 1100, partially invaded, and certainly claimed jurisdiction over, the regions in question. These, though paying occasional tribute to the Kumans, were really semi-independent, and had for many years looked for their government and administration to so-called " Judges " or " Chief Men " of their own—later termed *Voivods* (equivalent to Dukes). There was certainly an early Romanian Voivodat, which succumbed to the Magyars ; but we know little about it save that the Hungarians built up a Voivodat of their own upon it, and founded a Catholic bishopric at the entrance to their new province at Alba Iulia (later called Weissenburg or Fehervar). Meanwhile numerous groups of German miners, termed generically Saxons by the inhabitants, settled on the northern slopes of the Carpathians and proceeded to found flourishing villages, and even towns, defended by a series of solid castles, many of which endure to this day.

About A.D. 1200 the government of Central Transylvania was delegated by Hungary to the Teutonic Order of Knights, with the mission of converting the heathen Kumans to Christianity. Though they established a bishopric on the Kuman border at Milkov, their efforts were not particularly successful ; but a number of sturdy Hungarian colonists were settled by the Knights on the western slopes of the Eastern Carpathians and, under the name of Szeklers, have been there ever since. A little later the Knights Hospitallers of St. John were for a

short time in authority at Severin, in Western Walachia ; but they too disappeared. Meanwhile the Walachians, Romanians, Alains—as they were variously called—formed an important military element in the Kuman army and prospered exceedingly on the Eastern Danube, where, at Vicina, they founded a bishopric.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY PRINCIPALITIES (1244-1590)

THE opportunity for creating a more or less independent Romanian State came with the sudden inroad of the Mongolian Tatars in 1241-43. Starting from the Caspian Gates, they swept all before them as far as Budapest, driving the Arpadian King of Hungary from his throne and breaking for ever the Kumanian power between the Carpathians, the Dniester and the Black Sea. When the Tatars retreated almost as suddenly as they had come, we find the oppressed Romanians of Transylvania seeking refuge from their Hungarian masters on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. There is evidence indeed of dependent Romanian voivods ruling over dependent Romanian communities in these districts at the beginning of the thirteenth century, but the first Romanian prince to assert his independence from the Hungarian dynasty was a member of the Basarab family, variously known as Radu the Black, Jugomir or Ivance, who refused to pay tribute and grandiloquently called himself "Grand Voivod of all the Romanian land." He and his successors gradually pressed southwards from Argeş (Arjesh) on the Olt, past Kimpulung and Tigrgovsht to Bucharest and the northern bank of the Danube at a time when the Serbian and Bulgarian powers were in the last stages of decay. To their new State they gave the name of Muntenia (mountain land), though their neighbours called it Walachia, the land of the Vlachs (i.e. Welsh or strangers).

Moldavia had a similar origin about a century later. About 1350 the King of Hungary settled some of his Transylvanian Romanians on the Upper Moldava as an outpost against the Tatars, who still infested the eastern plains, and placed over it a Romanian voivod named Drogosh or Sasul. A few years later a Romanian *boyar* (nobleman), Bogdan by name, drove out Sasul and rebelled against the Hungarian crown. He and his successors were able easily to extend their dominions eastwards and southwards against the retreating Tatars and occasionally even northwards—by judicious marriages or inex-

pensive oaths of fealty—at the expense of Hungary or Poland, until their Moldavia included not only the modern district of that name, but also Bessarabia and the Bukovina.

Both principalities were, however, cursed from the first with an inherent weakness: their system of succession was an impracticable combination of the hereditary and elective principles. All members of the princely family were equally eligible, and the election was made by the leading boyars and clergy and confirmed by an assembly of the people. Thus there were always rival claimants to the throne, who were only too ready to resort to violence, to political intrigue or to foreign support.

Unfortunately too the two principalities, but more especially Walachia, were throughout their independent history drawn into the long struggles of their neighbours, the Christian Powers and the Turks, which finally issued in their subjugation by the latter; still, it was owing to their situation north of the Danube and so outside the main line of march of the contending forces that their subjugation was never so complete as to turn them into mere subject *pashaliks*. They were always ruled by princes of their own, even though the princes were Turkish nominees and Greeks at that. Consequently their peoples maintained and even developed their distinct Romanian civilisation and were ready, when the opportunity arrived in the nineteenth century, to stand forth as a free and independent Romanian State. Europe indeed directly benefited from their long struggles with the Turks: for their merit, as their own historian, A. D. Xenopol,¹ puts it, “is not to have vanquished time and again the followers of Mohammed, who always ended by gaining the upper hand, but rather to have resisted with unparalleled energy, perseverance and bravery the terrible Ottoman invaders, making them pay for each step advanced a price so heavy that their resources were drained, they were unable to carry on the fight, and thus their power came to an end.”

It was the overthrow of the Serbs by Sultan Murad at Kosovo in 1389 and the conquest of Bulgaria by his successor Bayazid in 1393 that first brought the Turks face to face with the Romanians across the Danube. There is indeed no proof that the Vlachs, who on the Serbian side fought against the Turks at Adrianople in 1363 and again at Kosovo in 1398, hailed from Walachia. More probably their first contact was due to the invitation given to the Turks by some disloyal

¹ *Histoire des Roumains* (Paris, 1896), i, p. 266.

Walachian nobles in 1394 to help them expel Prince Mircea (1386-1418). The prince fled before them and sought refuge at Brasov with Sigismund, King of Hungary, who, alarmed for his own safety, was organising a Christian crusade against the infidels. Mircea followed the Christian army to the fatal field of Nicopolis (1396) and shared in Sigismund's defeat and flight, though a year later he was restored to his throne by Sigismund's Transylvanian voivod. The capture of Sultan Bayazid by Timur the Tatar at Angora (1402) resulted in a disputed succession at Constantinople. Mircea at a price—the annexation of the Dóbruja—supported one of the rival candidates, but unluckily backed the wrong horse. In revenge Mohammed I, the successful candidate, deprived him of more than he had gained, and in 1412 imposed an annual tribute on his new vassal, though he allowed him to retain full powers within his own principality and even to exercise the right of peace or war.

Mircea's chief contemporary in Moldavia was Alexander the Good (1401-32). Long the faithful vassal of King Ladislas Jagello in return for Polish support and the Polish sief of Pokutia, Alexander did much for the internal development of his country. He offered a refuge to many of the Serbian and Bulgarian monks from their Turkish oppressors: these monks brought with them and spread abroad their own Slavonic culture and liturgy and induced the prince once more to acknowledge the primacy of the Serbian Patriarch of Ohrida, which he had momentarily abandoned in favour of the Greek patriarch of Constantinople. Moreover, in imitation of the Serbian and Bulgarian monarchies, Alexander instituted for the boyars at his court different grades of office, ranging from the *logothete* or Chancellor at the top to the head janitor at the bottom—a system already adopted in Walachia. This change tended to divide the boyars into two classes, the court nobles, whose great ambition was to hold office, and the country nobles, who, despised by the courtiers, gradually sank to a position hardly distinguishable from that of the peasants.

At the time (1443-56) when the most famous of all the Romanians, John Hunyadi (who for a few years was Voivod of Transylvania, the country of his birth), was in the service of the King of Hungary, leading the Christian armies to victory after victory over the Turks, his fellow-countrymen in Walachia and Moldavia, so far from sending him aid, had lapsed into a constant state of anarchy. Walachia was a mere dependency of the Hungarian crown. Moldavia was divided among rival princes, who sought Hungarian or Polish support to secure

their claims : one of their number three times gained and lost his throne.

At last two strong men came to the front, Vlad the Impaler (1455-62) in Walachia and Stephen the Great (1457-1504) in Moldavia. Vlad's first task was to restore order in his country : by free use of his favourite punishment, which has given him his nickname, he cowed his turbulent boyars into obedience and extirpated the brigand bands who had preyed upon the miserable peasantry. Secure at home, he refused to send to the Sultan the annual tribute of 500 boys destined to recruit the Janissaries, to which his feeble predecessors had for some time submitted. Mohammed II himself headed an army to punish the rebel, but suffered a total defeat. In the midst of his triumph Vlad was attacked (1462) by Stephen, whom he had helped to his throne in Moldavia, and forced to flee to Hungary.

Stephen first restored order at home and strengthened his frontiers by a chain of fortresses at Kilia and Tighinea on the Danube, at Akerman on the Dniester, at Chotin on the Polish border and at Suczawa and Roman on the Sereth. Next, when Hunyadi's son, Mathew Corvinus, King of Hungary, suspicious of his intentions, invaded his territory, he defeated him at Baia, and forced him to become his ally and to surrender to him the eastern half of Transylvania under the guise of a fief.

His attacks on Walachia brought Stephen into conflict with the Turks. After he had deposed their puppet prince, the Beglerbeg of Rumelia invaded Moldavia with a large army, which Stephen annihilated (1475) in the marshes of the Racova near Vaslui. This was the greatest victory that a European force had as yet won over Turkish troops, and the news was greeted with acclaim at all the courts of Europe. But when he asked them for help, none was forthcoming. Next summer Mohammed II himself led his army to punish the presumptuous prince : he found Stephen alone with his boyars in the forests of Niamtzu far up the Moldava valley ; for the prince had dismissed his peasant troops to defend their homes against the Tatars. Though utterly defeated, Stephen himself managed to escape. Quickly he collected new forces and by skilful guerrilla warfare compelled the Turkish army to retreat, leaving his principality still independent, though shorn of its seaports at Kilia and Akerman. In 1497 his Christian neighbours, Ladislas, King of Hungary, and John Albert, his brother, King of Poland, conspired to divide Moldavia between them : a Polish force

invaded the country, but was overwhelmed in the forest of Kosmin.

His desertion by all the Christian powers cut the old prince to the heart: on his death-bed he advised his son Bogdan to make terms with the Turks, and to secure his son's succession ordered all the boyars whom he suspected of disloyalty to be beheaded.

Accordingly (though not till nine years after his accession) Bogdan agreed to pay tribute to the Porte (1518); in return Bayazid II guaranteed the integrity of the country, forbade the erection of mosques and the settlement of Turks within it, and granted the people the right to elect their own princes. The surrender was just a century later than the surrender of Walachia. So long, however, as Hungary remained independent—it was not till thirteen years after the battle of Mohacs (1526) that her territory was converted into a pashalik—the Romanian princes could always more or less rely on Hungarian support in any efforts they might make to regain their independence. But with the disappearance of Hungary the two principalities with one brief and glorious interval sank more and more into the position of dependent tributary states, whose princes bought their thrones at the court of their Ottoman master.

Thus, though in 1522 Radu d'Afumati (1521–29) was enabled with the help of John Zapolya, King of Hungary, to frustrate the Turkish design of reducing Walachia to a mere pashalik, in 1561 the Turks had no scruples in selling the Moldavian throne to a mere Greek adventurer, Jacobus Heraclides, who claimed descent from Heracles and kinship with the Serbian Tsars. Even John the Terrible (1572–74) gained his throne by the usual methods of purchase and intrigue, and it was only a threatened increase of tribute that goaded him to revolt at the head of his heavily-taxed Moldavian peasants. He continued to rout all the Turkish armies sent against him, till he was sold by some traitorous boyars to the enemy, who cruelly put him to death.

CHAPTER IV

MICHAEL THE BRAVE (1593) TO BRANCOVAN (1714)

THE last bid for independence, however, was made in Walachia. In 1593 Michael the Brave (1593–1601), a descendant of Vlad the Impaler, had purchased the deposition of his predecessor and the throne for himself with borrowed money. His Turkish creditors pursued him to Bucharest. There he summoned them to his palace on pretence of payment, set fire to the building and suffered not one of them to escape. His example was followed by his people and also by Aaron, Prince of Moldavia. Then, aided by Aaron and his Moldavians and by Sigismund Bathory, Prince of Transylvania, he drove the Turkish garrison and the army sent to its support across the Danube to the walls of Adrianople (1595). A second army under Sinan Pasha, the Grand Vizier, fared no better. Though Michael inflicted a severe defeat on him at Calugareni near the Danube, Sinan was still strong enough to advance to Bucharest and Tirkovshte, while Michael retreated before him to the slopes of the Carpathians, where he was reinforced by the Moldavians and Transylvanians. The tables were now completely turned: the united Christian forces drove Sinan in headlong flight across the Danube with the loss of his garrison at Bucharest and his rearguard at the river. The Sultan made no further military effort, and in 1597 he graciously reinvested Michael with the voivodship of which he had been unable to deprive him.

The subject nations south of the Danube hailed in Michael a new liberator from Turkish oppression; but the victorious Walachian soon showed that he had a more limited and practical object in view—the union under his own sway of the three Romanian peoples.

The abdication of Sigismund Bathory gave him his chance in Transylvania. Sigismund's young cousin, Cardinal Andrea Bathory, was his successor, a mere tool of the Polish Chancellor, John Zamoiski, who was in league with the Turks. Michael pointed out the danger to the German Emperor,

Rudolf II, to whom he had recently sworn fealty and rendered considerable services against the Turks. Thereupon Rudolf entrusted the task of expelling the new voivod to Michael and the Imperial general Basta. Impatient of Basta's delays, Michael suddenly invaded Transylvania, giving himself out to the Hungarian nobles and Saxons in the principality as the Imperial delegate. He defeated the Cardinal in a decisive battle near Hermannstadt (Sibiu) and made himself master of the province (1599).

Michael next turned against Moldavia, where since 1595 there had been a new voivod, another client of Zamoiski's, Jeremiah Movila, who had long plotted the annexation of Walachia and was now sheltering Sigismund Bathory. In 1600, having collected a large army on the pretext of a crusade against the Turk, Michael suddenly launched it against Movila in the name of the German Emperor and easily expelled the obnoxious prince.

Thus for a brief moment Michael had made himself lord of the whole Romanian people and proudly styled himself Prince of all Walachia, Transylvania and Moldavia. But he had not won their affections. He was a mere soldier; for his officers he relied on his own boyars and for his troops on mercenaries hired at the expense of the Walachian peasants; indeed his many warlike adventures quickened the degradation of the unfortunate tillers of the soil. Originally they had been free-proprietors of their own farms, owing tithes and feudal services to the boyars. Then when their princes began to pay tribute to the Turks and to buy their thrones at Constantinople, the money was raised by imposing taxes on the peasants, letting the boyars go free. If they could not pay, they were obliged to sell themselves and their families into serfdom; sometimes whole villages were confiscated, and the villagers were made serfs and thus chained to the soil.

Michael's success had been due to sheer audacity and to rapidity of movement; but his power, having no real roots in the soil, fell even more quickly than it had risen. The Emperor regarded his self-styled champion with suspicion; the Magyarised boyars of Transylvania looked upon him as a rustic upstart, whilst the peasantry had suffered much from the rapacity of his mercenaries. So, when General Basta, who had reasons of his own for hating Michael, arrived in Transylvania, he readily listened to the appeals of the native boyars and peasants, led his troops against their new master and defeated him at Mirashlan (1601). At the same time Moldavia

revolted from him, and Walachia, where his son was regent, fell into the hands of the Poles.

A helpless fugitive, Michael took the bold course of appealing to the Emperor at Vienna for justice against his enemies. Rudolf had little love for Michael, but even less for Sigismund Bathory, whom the Transylvanian boyars had invited to resume his voivodship. So Rudolf reappointed Michael as voivod and commissioned him to expel Sigismund. With the help of Basta he easily accomplished his mission, but himself fell a victim to the general's hatred. On August 19, 1601, at Basta's orders, he was assassinated in his tent.

Such was the end of Michael the Brave, the last of the Romanian princes to win great victories over the Turks and the first to make himself master of the three Romanian principalities. This union, brief though it was, placed an ideal before the Romanian nation which it never forgot.

Anarchy now again reigned over Walachia and Moldavia, where Turks, Greeks, Germans, Poles and Tatars all fished in the troubled waters, till about 1618 the Turks recovered their supremacy. Henceforward their demands for money, men and munitions grew more oppressive. The price to be paid for the two Romanian thrones, skilfully manipulated by the Phanariots¹ at Constantinople, rose ever higher, and the successful candidate, to repay the borrowed purchase-money, had to extort still heavier taxes from his miserable peasantry. Nor did Greek influence end there: for centuries Greeks had held high positions in the Romanian Church; now, much to the disgust of the native boyars, they were given high offices in the State. For a century the latter revolted once and again to oust these Greek interlopers, and it was not till the eighteenth century that they tamely acquiesced in the rule of Phanariot princes.

At last came a brief spell of peace: Mathew Basarab (1633–54) in Walachia, a descendant of the old reigning family, and Basil the Wolf (1634–53) in Moldavia, an Albanian adventurer, though deadly enemies from the first, always plotting and sometimes warring against each other, were also rivals in cultivating the arts of peace. Basil drew up a code of laws for his Moldavians—Draconian indeed in its severity, but a great advance on the unwritten customs which had hitherto regulated their courts of justice. Mathew did the same for his Walachians. Both princes had mounted their thrones as representatives of the native boyars; soon, however, like their predecessors, they found it necessary to propitiate the Phanariots at Constantinople

¹ Phanar was the name of the Greek quarter at Constantinople.

and their Greek emissaries within their own principalities. Basil, himself a Greek scholar, went further, founded Greek monastic schools and opened direct relations with the Greek patriarch at Constantinople. Mathew set up the first printing-press at Bucharest, and Basil, not to be outdone, one at Jassy ; and from these they issued liturgies and other religious books in Romanian for their native priests, who understood neither Greek nor Slavonic, of which the latter had been the old language of the Romanian Church.

Though both princes owed their long reigns chiefly to the preoccupation of their Turkish masters in distant wars, they showed great adroitness and sound judgment in dealing with their neighbours. In his earlier years Mathew even dreamed of throwing off the Turkish yoke, and with that end in view kept up friendly relations with the Prince of Transylvania, the German Emperor and the Venetian Republic. Basil's one ambition, never indeed realised, was to oust his Walachian neighbour ; and he frequently denounced Mathew's political intrigues at Constantinople and sought aid from the Cossacks, the Tatars and the Poles.

At last in 1653 Basil's pro-Greek policy cost him his throne : Mathew and the Prince of Transylvania conspired to set up one of the Moldavian boyars, Stephen George, in his place, and drove him from his country. Mathew himself died in the following year. His son and successor Constantine Basarab (1654-58) was the last of the old reigning family to sit on the Walachian throne.

In Moldavia the Phanariot *régime* was now complete : in the next fifty years nearly a score of these Greek nominees—three or four boyars among them, but the rest Greeks or Grecised foreigners—filled the throne in rapid succession. Walachia during the same period, though equally overrun by the Greeks and their friends, had the better luck ; for two of its princes, uncle and nephew, of Greek extraction but thoroughly Romanised, brought some measure of peace and prosperity to their down-trodden subjects.

Sherban (1678-88) belonged to a branch of the Cantacuzene family of Byzantine fame, which c. 1610 had sought a refuge from the Turks in Moldavia and had—much to the astonishment of the natives—brought their riches with them. He owed his throne to the boyars, and his wealth soon purchased Turkish acquiescence. In 1681 he dutifully sent a Walachian contingent to help the Turks in their war against the Russians, and again in 1683 to assist in their siege of Vienna. There,

however, he entered into correspondence with Leopold, the German Emperor, and contrived so much to delay the Turkish operations as to give time to John Sobieski with his Polish army to march to the relief of the city. When the Turks were driven out of Hungary four years later, Sherban schemed to raise a great Balkan revolt with Imperial aid ; Leopold indeed hinted that he might place him on the Byzantine throne of his fathers. But before he had committed any overt act, his brothers and nephew, who were opposed to his plans, got rid of him by poison. He had proved himself an enlightened ruler : not only had he restored the cathedral at Arges, the most beautiful monument of Romanian architecture, but he had lightened the burdens of his peasantry, opened schools for the boyars' sons, where Greek teachers instructed them in grammar, rhetoric and philosophy, and in the last months of his life had issued the Bible in Romanian from the press at Bucharest.

The Walachian boyars now hastily elected his nephew, Constantine Brancovan (1688-1714), in his uncle's place, in order to anticipate any Phanariot nomination. Like his uncle, Brancovan first had to purchase the Sultan's confirmation of his accession and then to buy off the Tatars, who were threatening him with invasion. By a long series of clever intrigues with the Turks, the Germans, and later the Russians, he managed to secure peace for his country, with the result, according to the evidence of a contemporary, that it reached a state of prosperity never before equalled. For his first two years he sided with the Turks, notwithstanding their recent defeats by John Sobieski, and in pursuit of this policy and in order to support the Turkish candidate for the voivodship invaded Transylvania, where he met and defeated an Austrian army. Then he opened secret negotiations with the German Emperor. Denounced at Constantinople as a traitor, he again made successful use of his gold. Then for some years he cleverly temporised between the rival Powers ; while he betrayed Turkish secrets and gave money and provisions to the Christians, at the same time through his agents in the service of the Sultan he silenced the accusations of his enemies at the Porte by a judicious distribution of bribes. This went on till the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), under which Transylvania was assigned to the Austrians and the Poles abandoned their claims over Moldavia, settled for a time the points in dispute between the Turks and the Germans. Henceforward the Romanian princes found that they had to look elsewhere for support to secure


their national existence. For the next century and more it was the rivalry between Catholic Austria and Orthodox Russia that prevented the two Romanian principalities from being merged among the pashaliks of the Turkish Empire.

The influence of Russia had come about in this wise. As early as the end of the fifteenth century a Moldavian prince had married his daughter to a son of the Grand Duke of Muscovy. Persecuted Transylvanian bishops and many Romanian priests had found a refuge at Moscow. Commercial privileges in Russia had been granted to Greek and Romanian merchants towards the middle of the sixteenth century. In 1658 George Stephen, the dethroned Prince of Moldavia, had fled for safety to the Russian Tsar. In 1674 the princes of Walachia and Moldavia had united to send an embassy to Tsar Alexis to ask for his protection over the Danubian Christians; a similar application had been made by Sherban Cantacuzene in 1688. But it was not till 1711, when Peter the Great had already made Russia a strong Power, that negotiations took a practical shape.

Since his defeat at Poltava in 1709, Charles XII of Sweden, a refugee at Bender in Bessarabia, had used every device to incite the Turkish Sultan, Ahmed III, to undertake a campaign against his Russian enemy, Peter the Great, who, already in possession of Azov, obviously aspired to expel the Turks from the Black Sea. The Sultan, long deaf to his entreaties, at last listened to the Swedish exile's persuasions and proceeded to collect a large army at Adrianople. The two Romanian princes, alarmed for their own safety, secretly reopened negotiations with the Russian Tsar. Brancovan promised to provide 30,000 men and ample stores, if Peter would bear the expense. Demetrius Cantemir, a Greek, who had bought the Moldavian throne in 1710, entered into a secret treaty with the Tsar, whereby the latter bound himself to meet the expense of maintaining a standing army in Moldavia and guaranteed the security of the principality. Reckoning on their promised support, Peter himself led a small Russian force to the banks of the Pruth near Jassy. The Moldavians, however, refused to follow their Greek prince, and the Walachians were far away. In a few days' time Peter found himself faced by an overwhelming Turkish army under command of the Grand Vizier, whilst his flanks were threatened by Tatar bands. In order, therefore, to escape utter defeat and even capture, the Tsar was forced to sign a humiliating treaty, whereby he surrendered Azov and all the advantages that he had recently won on the Black

Sea. Cantemir, to save himself, took service under the Tsar and afterwards wrote a History of the Ottoman Empire. Brancovan was less fortunate: though he protested that the army he had raised was never meant to support the Russians, the Sultan suspected otherwise. Three years later he ordered his arrest. Brancovan and his sons were carried to Constantinople and executed in Ahmed's presence. His successor, a cousin named Stephen Cantacuzene, was strangled in 1716.

Henceforward the Turkish Government paid no regard to Romanian susceptibilities, but regularly appointed Phanariot Greeks to rule over the two principalities.



CHAPTER V

THE PHANARIOTS TO THE UNION

“ ALL the families in the Fanari at Constantinople are educated for political intrigue,” wrote the Philhellenic Earl of Guilford in 1821 ; and so they had been for many generations before that date. The Phanariots, or Greeks who, as we have seen, inhabited the Phanar or lighthouse quarter of Stambul, though for the most part of humble origin, exercised no little power in Ottoman affairs. Having a natural aptitude for business, and specially for the tortuous business of diplomacy, they had become the political agents of the Porte ; and from them were chosen the chief dragomans of the Divan.

Throughout the seventeenth century, from the death, that is to say, of Michael the Brave in 1601, they had been gaining an ever-increasing influence in the Danubian principalities ; and after the flight of Demetrius Cantemir in 1711, and the successive executions of Constantine Brancovan and Stephen Cantacuzene of Walachia a few years later, it was from the Phanariots that, for more than a hundred years, the *hospodars* (rulers) of both Principalities were selected.

This imposition of alien rulers was undoubtedly an evil for Romania, though not so unmitigated an evil as has often been represented. It involved a crushing burden on the people. The hospodars had to pay heavily for the privilege of power : the cost of appointment is said to have amounted sometimes to the equivalent of about £60,000 ; and the Porte found it a lucrative source of revenue to change them frequently. Their tenure of office, therefore, was expensive, precarious and often of but two or three years’ duration ; between 1716 and 1822 thirty-three different hospodars were appointed in Moldavia and thirty-five in Walachia ; and inevitably they hastened to reimburse themselves and make profit while they might by the exaggerated taxation of their temporary subjects. At Bucharest and Jassy they lived in a luxury which they dared not display at Constantinople, and their extravagance had to be paid for.

It was the peasantry who suffered most. The boyars went free of direct taxation. But they were shorn of their old powers, and the highest offices, both political and ecclesiastical, continued to be bestowed on the Greeks who followed their fellow-countrymen into the Principalities in the hope of gain. There were thus an aristocracy without responsibilities, an alien middle-class—for trade as well as government fell into Greek hands—and an over-burdened peasantry. It is hardly to be wondered at if the years of Phanariot rule are still remembered by patriotic Romanians as a dark age in the history of their country.

On the other hand, the Phanariot hospodars were usually men of intelligence and not infrequently of good-will. In many of the families from whom they were drawn, such as the Mavrocordatos, the Ypsilantis and the Mourosis, culture was a tradition. They were scholars and linguists ; and they brought the principalities into touch with western ideas and western literature. It became fashionable for young Romanians of birth to visit Paris, and the ferment of intellectual liberalism which characterised eighteenth-century France had its echoes on the banks of the Danube. The writings of Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau were translated ; and Pope's *Essay on Man* was rendered into Romanian from a French version. Although this derivative culture is apt to be held in contempt by those who date the birth of Romanian literature from the nationalist movement of the early part of the nineteenth century, its civilising effect is hardly to be denied by an unbiassed judgment.

On the political side, too, the record of the Phanariot hospodars is not altogether black. They were in the main extortionate and severe ; insecure in their seats, they were merciless to any revolt against, or even criticism of, their authority ; but by curtailing the feudal powers of the boyars, taking from them the bands of serfs and retainers which in the past they had employed for their own turbulent ends, they immensely strengthened the central government and gave themselves opportunities, when they chose to use them, of working for good as well as for evil. Some of them, at any rate, were responsible for humarer laws than any dreamed of in the heroic days of the native voivods. Constantine Mavrocordato, who was sixteen times Hospodar of Walachia, introduced a law limiting the days of forced labour which the peasants were bound to do on their feudal lords' land to twenty-four ; while Scarlat Ghika did away with the *vakarit* or tax on horses and

cattle. Moreover, the hospodars were to a certain extent checked in their severities by fear of the Porte, which, if it had little regard for the welfare of the Romanian peasant, was ever glad of an excuse to replenish its coffers by the appointment of a new hospodar.

The years of Phanariot rule witnessed a long though intermittent struggle between Turkey and Russia for the domination of the Principalities ; with Austria at first as a jealous onlooker and later as a more active participant in the conflict. It was, as we have seen, the ambitious designs of Peter the Great which had been the cause of the substitution of foreign for native governors. In 1736 those designs were renewed by Peter's niece, the Empress Anne, who had been placed on the Russian throne after the death of Peter II and proved herself, during her short reign, a harsh and warlike ruler. She demanded from the Porte the recognition, under a Russian protectorate, of the independence of Moldavia and Walachia ; and when a demand which was obviously but the first move in an attempt to gain a footing in the Balkan Peninsula had been refused, she sent an expedition, under General Münich, against Moldavia.

Münich was an able soldier, but he lacked the elements of diplomatic tact. At first the inhabitants of the invaded country received him with sympathy ; and the Russian army found but little opposition to bar its progress to Jassy, from which the hospodar, Gregory Ghika, had retired. But the terms which Münich there dictated bore so hardly upon the people to whom he had come as an avowed liberator, he showed himself so scornful of their national prejudices and religious susceptibilities, that it became apparent to them that Muscovite protection might not, after all, be an appreciable improvement on Moslem tyranny. Deserted by her ally, Austria, and threatened by Sweden, Russia signed a treaty at Belgrade in 1739, by the terms of which Moldavia fell once more under the Sultan's undisputed sway. When Münich left, however, he carried with him thousands of poor peasants who were destined to people the barren steppes of Russia.

Catherine II, the greatest ruler of Russia since Peter, went more warily to work than her predecessor, preparing the ground by secret propaganda before embarking on open measures. When, therefore, the declaration of war against Turkey in 1768 was immediately followed by a Russian victory on the Dniester, Moldavia, forgetting the disillusionment of thirty years before, at once accepted the suzerainty of the Empress, and Walachia followed suit. Four years of military occupa-

tion, it is true, did much to temper enthusiasm for Russia in the Principalities ; but it was Austria who, alarmed at her northern rival's advance in a region where she herself coveted power, intervened to prevent their coming completely under Russian influence.

The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji, however, which was signed in 1774, though it restored the Principalities to Turkey and though few of its provisions were put into immediate effect, marked an epoch in Romanian history and had a large bearing on its subsequent course. For besides giving Russia an important acquisition of territory on the north coast of the Black Sea, together with the right of free commercial navigation, it acknowledged her competence to protect the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and, in the case of Moldavia and Walachia, to insist, at discretion, through her Ambassador at Constantinople, on political reforms. Further, the Principalities were to be exempt from tribute for two years, in consideration for the damage which they had suffered during the war ; after that to pay a less excessive tribute than hitherto ; and to enjoy the privileges which had been theirs in the time of Mohammed IV. The year 1782 saw the establishment at Bucharest of a Russian consul, whose powers, based on the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji, were very extensive. Other foreign consuls followed, though none came from Great Britain until about 1820, and their presence in the Walachian capital helped considerably to bring the country into closer touch with Western Europe.

Meanwhile, Austria was gaining more tangible advantages. Since the Peace of Karlowitz (1699) the Habsburgs had been firmly established in Transylvania ; further acquisitions on the Danube, including the five districts of Oltenia, or Little Walachia, sanctioned by the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1719, had been surrendered after twenty years of oppressive government under the terms of the Treaty of Belgrade ; but in 1776, on the pretext, among others, of the necessity of establishing a quarantine against the plague, territory in Northern Moldavia, about four thousand square miles in extent, was annexed. This district, henceforth known as the Bukovina—a Slavonic term strictly applicable only to the beech forests in its north-eastern part—included Suceava (Suczawa), the ancient capital of Moldavia, Czernowitz, a number of wealthy monasteries, and a considerable extent of rich agricultural land. The fruits of its annexation, creating, as it did, a Romania Irredenta, will be discussed in a later chapter.

Five years later Joseph II of Austria and Catherine of Russia entered into an alliance, the object of which was the expulsion of the Turks from Europe and the revival of the Byzantine Empire. Part of this ambitious scheme was the union of Moldavia and Walachia as a nominally independent kingdom, of which Patyomkin (or Potemkin), Catherine's favourite, was to be the ruler. The Sultan, who declared war on the alliance in 1789, proved no match for his powerful enemies. The fortresses of Bessarabia fell into the hands of the Russians, and the Prince of Coburg, taking advantage of the victories of Suvorov, occupied Bucharest. Nicholas Mavroghéni, Hos-podar of Walachia, was prepared to put up a gallant fight on behalf of his Ottoman overlord, but he received little support from the Romanian boyars. "The nobles refused to obey the orders of the Greek viceroy, who did not know a single word of their own language. Mavroghéni, indignant at their conduct, told his groom to lead all the horses in his stable into the courtyard. When the steeds were ready, he again called upon his nobles to mount. Not one of them showed signs of obedience, and the Greek, resolved to show his scorn for these great officials of state, who remained idle at his call, conferred upon his horses the high-sounding titles of which the boyars were unworthy. 'Degenerate descendants of Mircea, Vlad, and Michael the Brave,' he cried, 'I banish you from my presence; henceforth my horses shall hold your offices and enjoy your honours.' Some of the nobles were so moved by his reproaches that they mounted and followed him, while the rest slunk away and sought an ignominious exile."¹ Mavroghéni paid for his heroic failure by an ignominious death.

The outbreak of the French Revolution saved Turkey from complete disaster. Austria, her attention diverted westwards, withdrew from the war; and Russia, anxious to seek in Poland the advantage of her ally's preoccupation, concluded the Treaty of Jassy (1792), which advanced her borders from the Bug to the Dniester and gave her the Black Sea coast between those rivers.

So far the interference of Russia in the affairs of the Principality had done little to benefit their population. The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji remained to all intents and purposes a dead letter and, in spite of subsequent ameliorative decrees extracted from the Porte, the old abuses continued. Spoiled by years of war, the country was the prey of brigands. Everywhere misery and starvation were rife. The decade following

¹ Miller, *The Balkans*, pp. 82, 83.

the Treaty of Jassy was one of the blackest periods of Romanian history.

Then came a change for the better. Menaced by Napoleon, the Sultan found himself under the necessity of treating Russia with respect. The right of interference exacted at Kuchuk-Kainarji was more firmly established, and the Porte was forced to agree to a seven years' term of office for the hospodars, which was not to be abbreviated without serious^{*} cause. As a matter of fact, this agreement was almost immediately violated in regard to both Principalities, but Russia, backed by Great Britain, was able to enforce it and to restore the expelled governors. Nevertheless, Russia declared war, and once more her troops ravaged the Romanian lands. The peace signed by Napoleon and the Tsar at Tilsit in 1807, a year after the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, strengthened the hands of the northern Power, and for a time it seemed likely that Moldavia and Walachia, as well as part of Bulgaria, would be annexed. But the European kaleidoscope changed quickly; Russia in turn was threatened with invasion by the great man who had so recently concluded peace with her, and in 1812 she was forced to come to terms with Turkey. The new Treaty of Bucharest, however, added to the Tsar's dominions the rich and at that time purely Romanian district between the Dniester and the Pruth, known as Bessarabia. "A contemporary historian has left us a pitiful account of the heartrending scenes which took place on the banks of the Pruth, when the moment arrived for the formal cession of the well-loved land. For weeks beforehand, the people went to and fro, bidding farewell to the friends and relatives, from whom they were soon to be separated. From that moment the Pruth became, in the language of the peasants, the 'accursed river.'"¹ Thus another *irredenta* was created, to be a source of nationalist aspiration and international jealousies in the future.

The national spirit of Romania was, indeed, already rena-
cent, though it was not yet to proclaim itself in more than sporadic manifestations. Contact with the west had stimulated in many thoughtful minds in the Principalities a consciousness of their origin, and the realisation that their affinity was not with Greek, Slav or Ottoman, but with the Latin races. The movement among the Vlachs of Transylvania to gain political equality with the other "nations," Szekel, Magyar and Saxon; their secession in large numbers from the Orthodox to the Uniat Church, which, while retaining a Greek liturgy,

^{*} Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

acknowledged the supremacy of Rome ; and the foundation at Blaj of a college devoted to Latin culture, also had their effect on the Romanians still under Ottoman rule. Two men, especially, worked to arouse the sense, among their fellows, of a Romania which was a Latin island set in an alien sea : George Lazar, who had studied at Vienna and subsequently established a school of surveyors at Bucharest—an ardent and eloquent preacher of the new gospel ; and George Asachi, a mathematician, of Galician birth, who, in his own words, had journeyed to Rome “to kiss the dust of the ancestral tombs and learn their virtues,” and who founded a school at Jassy and the first printing-press to produce secular books in the Romanian language.

But the national ideal was not pursued only by peaceful and educational means. In 1821 Theodore Vladimirescu, a boyar of peasant origin, organised a revolt in Walachia, the object of which was to free the peasantry from the oppression under which they had so long groaned. At first he met with a measure of success. With his small and badly-disciplined “ army of the people ” he marched from Craiova to Bucharest, which he occupied. On the approach of the Turkish forces he retreated along the road by which he had advanced ; and during the retreat he met his inevitable doom—though not at Turkish hands.

While Vladimirescu had been planning his popular rising, another revolt, with quite other aims, had been started in Moldavia, where Alexander Ypsilanti, with the connivance of the reigning hospodar, Michael Soutzo, had raised the standard of Greek independence. Ypsilanti saw in Vladimirescu’s movement an obstacle to his own schemes, and it was into the hands of his followers that the nationalist boyar fell, and by his orders that, after the mockery of a trial, he was executed. With the death of its leader the “ army of the people ” melted away.

Ypsilanti’s rebellion was as fruitless, in its immediate result, as Vladimirescu’s. Naturally receiving but little support from the Romanians, though a certain number from both principalities joined his ranks, he was no match for the Turks. His forces were defeated at Dragutensi, at Scuteni and at Secu (Lower Sereth), and his boats on the Danube destroyed. Ypsilanti himself fled into Austria, where he was arrested and died in captivity. The war of Greek independence had only begun, but henceforth it was to be fought in the Morea.

The most notable effect of Alexander Ypsilanti’s revolt,

so far as Romania was concerned, was the end of the rule of the Phanariots. The Sultan realised the danger of putting power into the hands of men who, if they were not its active promoters, would at any rate be in sympathy with the most serious rebellion which for years had challenged his authority. In 1822, therefore, two new hospodars were chosen from among the Romanian boyars, Jonitsa Sturdza for Moldavia and Gregory Ghika for Walachia.

In this change Russia saw a new pretext for interference. The internal condition of the principalities was as deplorable as it had ever been ; for recent events had given the peasants aspirations towards liberty to which they were powerless to give substance, while the boyars, feeling their prestige raised by the return to native government, were determined to increase their privileges. Once more Russia, taking advantage of the growing weakness of the Ottoman Empire, stepped in to set, at her own price, the Romanian house in order.

By the Convention of Akerman, concluded between the Tsar and the Sultan in 1826, the election of hospodars was placed in the hands of a general assembly of the boyars, subject to the ratification of the Porte. As formerly, their term of office was to be seven years, during which they were not to be deposed until their case had been considered by the Tsar ; and they were to "take into consideration the representations of the Russian ministers and consuls on the subject of the privileges enjoyed by the Principalities."

The convention, however, was but a beginning. In 1828 Russia and Turkey went to war, and in the Treaty of Adrianople signed in the following year the Sultan, thoroughly beaten, was obliged to concede terms which made the Tsar, in fact if not in name, lord paramount of Moldavia and Walachia. The hospodars were henceforth to be elected for life. The tribute payable to the Porte was fixed. The Turks were to abandon the fortified places which they held in Walachia, while Russia was to occupy the principalities until the war indemnity had been paid, and such regulations as they might make during the occupation were to be recognised by the Porte. The Russians stayed until 1834, and during their stay they gave the principalities a constitution, the *Règlement Organique*.

This constitution, which was largely the work of Count Kiszelev, a man whose amiability and enlightenment did much to make the years of occupation pass smoothly, had in it, from the point of view of the Romanian people, elements both good and bad. It created an oligarchy of the boyars, who, besides

electing the hospodars, were given legislative powers and the exclusive right to political and military office. They were also exempted from taxation, the burden of which, as of old, was placed on the shoulders of the lower classes. On the other hand, genuine reforms were made in the administration of justice, and compulsory sanitation was introduced.

But, taken as a whole, the *Règlement Organique* was hardly calculated "to satisfy nationalist or democratic aspirations ; and these were making rapid headway. More and more young Romanians went to Paris, and brought back with them both liberal ideas and a proud consciousness of their destiny as Latins. A new literature came into being, based on national life and history ; the sense of an heroic past was stimulated by the publication of old chronicles ; newspapers and literary reviews were founded, and schools in which, as in Asachi's, their prototype, the people were instructed in the new ideals.

In spite of the suppression of the schools at the instigation of the Tsar, who viewed with apprehension all this intellectual and liberalising activity, the Principalities were therefore ripe to make their contribution to the disturbances of 1848. A rising in Moldavia was quickly stamped out ; but in Walachia, led by Constantine Rosetti and the Bratianus, the revolutionaries compelled the hospodar, George Bibescu, to sign a new constitution in which political equality and freedom from Russian control were the ruling ideas. Bibescu then abdicated, and a provisional republican government was set up. It remained in power for three months. The men who formed it and had drawn up the constitution (though there were extremists who desired nothing less than absolute independence) had declared themselves loyal to the Sultan, and when he demanded the dissolution of the provisional government and the establishment in its place of a lieutenancy of three, they bowed to his will.

Then Russia, fearful that the Porte was regaining the prestige which she had taken such pains to undermine, asserted herself once more ; the Principalities were again occupied by Muscovite troops ; and a reactionary convention was signed at Balta Liman, on May 1, 1849, according to which the hospodars were, as before the Convention of Akerman, to be nominated by the Sultan for a term of seven years, and the national assemblies were to be replaced by councils nominated by the hospodars.

From this date Romania became a factor in European, as distinct from Russo-Turkish, politics. The revolutionaries

who had left the country in 1848 carried on an active propaganda in the western capitals, which gained a sympathetic hearing, especially in France. When, therefore, after the Crimean War, the Powers entered upon the task of resettling Eastern Europe, they were ready to take the affairs of the Principalities into consideration, seeing in them, if freed from the control of St. Petersburg, a useful obstacle to a Russian *Drang nach Osten*.

The outbreak of the Crimean War saw the invasion of the Principalities by the armies of both Russia and Turkey, and three battles—at Oltenitsa, Kalafat and Giurgevo (Giurgiu)—were fought on Romanian soil, in all of which the Turks were the victors. Then the centre of action shifted to the Crimea, and the Principalities were left in peace, though until the end of the war they were occupied by Austria, who held a watching brief in the interest of the Tsar's enemies.

At the Paris Congress the question of uniting the Principalities was discussed. Union was favoured by France, Sardinia and Russia, but opposed by Great Britain, Austria and Turkey; and it was eventually agreed that the decision should be left to the Principalities themselves. By the twenty-fourth article of the Treaty of Paris, "His Majesty the Sultan promises to convoke immediately in each of the two Provinces a Divan *ad hoc*, composed in such a manner as to represent most closely the interests of all classes of society. These Divans shall be called upon to express the wishes of the people in regard to the definitive organisation of the Principalities." By a previous article the suzerainty of the Porte had been perpetuated, under which, but also "under the guarantee of the Contracting Powers," the "privileges and immunities" hitherto enjoyed by the Principalities were to be preserved. "The Sublime Porte engages to preserve to the said Principalities an independent and national administration, as well as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce and of navigation." The laws and statutes in force were to be revised by a special commission, "as to the composition of which the High Contracting Powers will come to an understanding among themselves." The Porte was debarred from military intervention in the Principalities except by agreement with the Powers; while the ambitions of Russia were checkmated by clauses providing that "no exclusive protection shall be exercised over them [the Principalities] by any of the guaranteeing Powers," and that "there shall be no separate right of interference in their internal affairs." Russia was also

obliged to restore to Moldavia the southern part of Bessarabia, and the delta of the Danube, which she had held since 1812, to Turkey. The Danube was placed under the control of an international commission, and the Black Sea neutralised.

Thus the interests of Moldavia and Walachia were safeguarded as they had never been before, and it only remained for them to express, through the "Divans *ad hoc*," one of which was to sit at Bucharest and another at Jassy, their sentiments on the question of union. The elections to the Divans were therefore held, and were flagrantly manipulated by Turkey, backed by Austria, who still occupied the Principalities, in the interests of continued separation. But France refused to countenance this violation of the spirit of the treaty, and insisted on a new election, as the result of which a practically unanimous vote was given in favour of union under an hereditary foreign prince and an assembly elected on a popular franchise.

Nevertheless, largely owing to the attitude of Great Britain, where the complete amalgamation of the Principalities was still opposed, the scheme devised at Paris in 1858 was a compromise. The Principalities were still to have their separate princes, their separate assemblies and their separate executives; while a central committee consisting of representatives from both assemblies was to meet at Focshani to deliberate on affairs common to what were henceforth to be known as the "United Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia."

To this unsatisfactory response to their demands the counter of the Principalities was as simple as it was unforeseen. They both elected the same ruler, in the person of Alexander John Cuza, member of an old Moldavian family. The Powers accepted the *fait accompli*. Austria, the most ardent opponent of union outside Turkey, was too much occupied in preparing for war in Italy to take action. The Porte, after nearly three years' delay, officially recognised the new prince; the two assemblies were fused into one, the central committee was abolished, and Bucharest was declared the capital of the new state of Romania.

CHAPTER VI

UNITED AND INDEPENDENT ROMANIA

CUZA, or (according to the official style by which he was rarely known) Prince Alexander John I, was in many ways a remarkable man. Notoriously dissolute in his private life, ambitious of power and not over-scrupulous in his methods of obtaining it, he was nevertheless genuinely interested in the welfare of the people over whom he had been called to rule. One of the first questions to which he turned his attention was that of education, which he made free to all. Elementary education he made compulsory. He founded universities at Jassy and Bucharest, besides many technical schools. He was also responsible for the improvement of the coinage and the introduction of the telegraph.

On the question of land reform Cuza, acting on the advice of his very able minister, Michael Kogalniceanu, showed himself equally advanced in his views ; and it was in this field that his schemes were most far-reaching. Unfortunately, however, in his zeal to improve the status of the peasants, who had lain so long under an intolerable burden of feudal obligations, he succeeded in alienating two other powerful classes of his subjects. By secularising the monastic lands, which amounted to no less than one-fifth of the total area of the country, he won the enmity of the priesthood. By his programme of peasant proprietorship he brought himself into conflict with the powerful boyars.

His method of dealing with opposition was high-handed. In May 1864 he abolished the General Assembly and, by means of a plébiscite, asked for, and obtained, the right of initiating legislation. He at once introduced universal suffrage, believing that, owing to his popularity with the peasantry, he would thus obtain a Chamber which would be the instrument of his will. He also created a Senate, consisting partly of members in their own right and partly of members nominated by himself. Then he proceeded to carry his land law, the benefits of which to the peasants were more apparent than real. A

class of peasant proprietors, which soon numbered 400,000, was created ; but so small were their holdings—ranging from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 15 acres—that they could not be worked economically, and the owners found themselves as dependent as ever on the great landlords. The land question is of such paramount importance in Romania, and Cuza's well-intentioned but ill-considered Act has been so far-reaching in its effects, that it seems worth while to quote at some length from a careful analysis and criticism of the measure made by a high authority :

“ With a view to ensuring, on the one hand, greater economic freedom to the land-owners, and, on the other, security for the peasants from the enslaving domination of the upper class, the rural law of 1864 proclaimed the peasant-tenants full proprietors of their holdings, and the land-owners full proprietors of the remainder of the estate. The original intention of creating common land was not carried out in the Bill. The peasant's holding in arable land being small, he not infrequently ploughed his pasture, and, as a consequence, had either to give up keeping beasts, or pay a high price to the land-owners for pasturage. Dues in labour and in kind were abolished, the land-owners receiving an indemnity which was to be refunded to the State by the peasants in instalments within a period of fifteen years. . . . Of ancient right two-thirds of the estate were reserved for the peasants ; but the new law gave them possession of no more than the strip they were holding, which barely sufficed to provide them with the mere necessaries of life. The remainder up to two-thirds of the estate went as a gift, with full proprietorship, to the boyard. For the exemption of their dues in kind and in labour, the peasants had to pay an indemnity, whereas the right of their sons to receive at their marriage a piece of land in proportion to the number of traction animals they possessed was lost without compensation. Consequently, the younger peasants had to sell their labour, contracting for periods of a year and upwards, and became a much easier prey to the spoliation of the upper class than when they had at least a strip of land on which to build a hut, and from which to procure their daily bread ; the more so as the country had no industry which could compete with agriculture in the labour market.”¹

Thus Cuza's land law pleased no one. If, as Mr. Mitrany points out, it was of practical benefit to the landed aristocracy, it robbed them of the remnants of feudal privilege which they jealously cherished ; while the peasants must soon have realised

¹ D. Mitrany, “ Rumania ” in *The Balkans* (Oxford, 1915), pp. 276, 277.

how their hopes of an ameliorated future were to be disappointed. When, therefore, the opponents of his policy, among whom were numbered both Liberals and Conservatives, determined on the Prince's deposition, there was no party to whom he could confidently appeal to rally to his support. On the night of February 23, 1866 a band of forty conspirators forced their way into his bedroom, where, in apt justification of the charge of immorality which was among the counts against him, they found him with one of his mistresses. They brought with them (besides their revolvers) pen and ink, one of their number offered his back for a writing-desk, and Cuza was asked to sign his abdication ; which, feeling the hopelessness of resistance, he did. Then he left the palace and the country, which he had governed not wisely but not wholly ill, to end his days, five years later, a forgotten exile in Paris. The bloodless revolution was over.

A provisional government was at once formed under General Golescu, leader of the conspiracy, and the Chambers were called upon to elect a prince of foreign blood. Prince Philip of Flanders, on whose behalf a Belgian agent had been at work even before the formalisation of the union, was the man of their choice ; but, finding his election frowned upon by the Powers, he refused the proffered honour. The Powers, indeed, meeting at Paris by the desire of the Sultan, declared against the election of any foreign prince ; and when, after Prince Philip's refusal, the Crown was offered to Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, a younger son of the Catholic branch of the great German house, they refused to sanction his assumption of it. But Prince Charles was strongly supported by Napoleon III, to whom, as a descendant both of Murat and of Stéphanie de Beauharnais, he was related. His candidature naturally found favour in Prussia also, and it was on Bismarck's advice that, ignoring the decision of the Paris Conference, and travelling in disguise, he went to Bucharest. Arriving on May 22, 1866, his twenty-seventh birthday, he received an enthusiastic welcome. The Sultan threatened to depose him by force of arms, but the Conference would not countenance warlike measures, and with Prussia victorious in Austria, and Crete in insurrection, the Porte was not in a position to take unsupported action. Thus, unsanctioned but unopposed by the Powers, and proclaimed by the people, Prince Charles entered upon his reign, which was destined to last for half a century and witness remarkable developments in the history of Romania.

Prince Charles was a man of very different character from his unfortunate predecessor. A soldier by training, he was also a man of great political sagacity, and he moved cautiously. Though from the beginning he hoped, when the time should be ripe, to rid his adopted country of the Turkish yoke, he at first accepted the Sultan's suzerainty without demur; nor could he be induced to give active support to the insurrectionary movements in Serbia or Bulgaria. His attitude towards the Vlachs of Transylvania, and their dream of a restored Dacian Kingdom, was equally reserved.

Shortly after the Prince's accession, Romania was given a new constitution, embodying some of the reforms which Cuza had made in 1864; and that constitution, except for certain modifications introduced in 1879 and 1884, is still in force. By it the princely office was made hereditary in the male line, and executive power was vested in the sovereign acting through ministers responsible to Parliament. The legislature consists of a Senate of 120 members, who must be over forty years old, possess an individual annual income of £376 and are, with certain exceptions, elected by two electoral colleges; and an Assembly of 183 members, for whom there is no property qualification. The franchise is universal, but the electors are divided into three colleges, of which "the first elects 75 deputies, and is composed of owners of real property returning an income of £48. The second college, which elects 70 deputies, is composed exclusively of town-electors, namely, members of the liberal professions and of the public services, persons paying a minimum direct tax of 20 lei (francs), persons in receipt of a public pension, etc. The third college elects only 38 deputies. It includes the mass of the rural population (which in 1912 formed 83·6 per cent. of the total population), and all those who enjoy political rights while not being qualified for any other college. But only literates in receipt of a yearly income of £12 are entitled to a direct vote; of the rest, fifty citizens elect one delegate, who is entitled to one vote in the constituency of the district capital. The members of the Chamber are elected for four years."¹ The power of initiating legislation belongs equally to the Sovereign, the Senate and the Assembly, but the Sovereign possesses the right of absolute veto.

"The constitution proclaims the inviolability of domicile, the liberty of the press and of assembly, and absolute liberty of creed and religion, in so far as its forms of celebration do not

¹ *Foreign Office Handbook. Rumania*, p. 62.

come into conflict with public order and decency. It recognises no distinction of class and privilege; all the citizens share equally rights and duties within the law. Education is free in the State schools, and elementary education compulsory wherever State schools exist. Individual liberty and property are guaranteed; but only Rumanian citizens can acquire rural property. Military service is compulsory, entailing two years in the infantry, three years in the cavalry and artillery, one year in all arms for those having completed their studies as far as the university stage. Capital punishment does not exist, except for military offences in time of war.”¹

The early years of Prince Charles’s reign were beset with difficulties. The popularity which he was eventually to win was of gradual growth: his marriage with Princess Pauline Elizabeth of Wied, who identified herself whole-heartedly with the country and became famous beyond its borders as “Carmen Sylva,” poetess and collector of Romanian folklore, did much to help him to it. At first, as a German and a Hohenzollern, known for the friend of his kinsman on the Prussian throne, he had to face a good deal of hostility in a land whose sympathies were mainly with France. Moreover, Cuza had left him a troubled legacy. There was a strong revolutionary spirit abroad, and Moldavia was even threatening to break the union. The two political parties, the Liberals led by C. A. Rosetti and John Bratianu, the Conservatives under Lascăr Catargiu, were bitterly opposed to one another and evenly matched. This meant that the formation of a stable government was a task of extreme difficulty, and a single year saw no less than four Cabinets in office. At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, when feeling ran so high that there was anti-German rioting in the streets of Bucharest, the Prince grew so disheartened that he decided to abdicate. That he had already won the respect of his people, however much they may have misdoubted his Germanism, was shown by the enthusiasm displayed when it was announced in Parliament that he had reconsidered his decision. From that date began a marked increase of stability in the government of Romania.

As a soldier, it was natural that Prince Charles should take a keen interest in the military organisation of the country. He obtained the Sultan’s permission to increase the number of troops from 25,000 to 30,000, and, with the aid of German instructors and German breechloaders, introduced a far higher standard of training and equipment than had hitherto obtained.

¹ Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 282, 283.

The effects of these reforms were ere long to be seen under the walls of Plevna.

In the initial stages of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 Romania took no part. But, with her dreams of complete independence, she heard with indignation the Sultan's proclamation of the unity and indivisibility of the Ottoman Empire; and on April 26, 1877 a convention was signed with the Tsar giving the Russian armies free passage through Romanian territory. The Sultan's reply was to declare Prince Charles deposed and to order his ships on the Danube to bombard Kalafat. On May 21 Romania declared war on her suzerain and proclaimed her independence.

Even then she did not at once take an active part in the war. The Prince's policy was rather to improve the defences of the country, while placing its resources at the disposal of Russia. Nor, so long as things were going well with her, did Russia display much anxiety for her ally's military assistance. It was not until Plevna, converted by Osman Pasha into an almost impregnable fortress, checked her victorious advance, that she called upon Prince Charles to come to her aid.

At the head of 28,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, the Prince displayed such military ability that he was placed in command of the combined Russian and Romanian forces. The story of the taking of Plevna, and the great part which the Romanian troops played in it, has often been told: their storming, after three sanguinary attempts, of the Grivitsa redoubt; the week of patient work which led up to the capture of the second redoubt; their final entry into the town. At Plevna Prince Charles's "new model" won its spurs.

But whatever high hopes the gallantry of their troops may have aroused in the breasts of Romanians were doomed, in a measure at any rate, to disappointment. Romania was allowed no share in the negotiations which eventuated in the Treaty of San Stefano, signed March 3, 1878, and had to look on powerless while Russia successfully claimed those three southern provinces of Bessarabia which had been incorporated with Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The acquisition of the Dóbruja, which Russia had acquired from Turkey with the express intention of exchanging it for these provinces, was regarded as an inadequate compensation. By the Treaty of San Stefano, however, the complete independence of Romania was at last recognised; and on March 26, 1881, the country was proclaimed a kingdom, and Prince Charles became King.

Charles I. His crown was wrought from the metal of the Turkish guns which his soldiers had taken at Plevna.

Against the Treaty of San Stefano Romania appealed in vain to the Berlin Congress. None of the Western Powers was sufficiently interested in her to oppose the will of Russia on her behalf. The recognition of her independence was made conditional on her acceptance of the decisions of San Stefano, and also on the abolition of the article in the constitution of 1866 which made it impossible for Jews to acquire the rights of Romanian citizens.

The Jewish question has always been one of peculiar difficulty in Romania. One result of Cuza's land law was the rise of a class of middlemen who became the leasehold tenants of the boyars and money-lenders to the peasants. These middlemen were mainly Jews, who, as trade was also to a large extent in their hands, acquired a very powerful position in the economic life of the country. Their exclusion from the rights of citizenship, and so from political equality with the Romanians, was intended to counteract that power. There was, therefore, a vigorous opposition to acceptance of the stipulations made at Berlin in their favour ; and though they were eventually accepted, such difficulties were placed in the way of members of the Jewish community acquiring naturalisation that the position was not radically altered. It was not only among the political and landed classes that feeling on the subject was strong ; the prejudice was popular also, and the serious agrarian rising of 1907 was directed in the first place against the Jewish middlemen.

The irritation against Russia provoked by the Bessarabian question made Romania the readier to look favourably on the advances of the Central Powers. An alliance between Austria-Hungary and Romania had been suggested by Count Andrassy in 1873, and two years later a commercial convention was concluded between the two countries. After the Congress of Berlin, although there was always a strong anti-German and pro-Russian party in Romania, and although much resentment was felt against the attempt of Austria to gain control of the Lower Danube, the bonds were drawn closer ; and in 1883, after John Bratianu, the Prime Minister, had met Count Kalnoky at Vienna and Bismarck at Gastein, a secret defensive treaty of alliance was arranged between Romania and the Dual Monarchy. This treaty was never brought before the Parliament, and the revelation of its terms by the King in 1914 caused no small sensation.

The political friendship thus formed was strengthened by the fact that intellectual Romania was now looking to Germany, as it had once looked to France, for education and ideas ; and it was further established by the growth of commercial and financial relations. As Mr. Mitrany writes, "That the country's foreign policy has nevertheless [in spite, that is to say, of the Transylvanian question] constantly supported the Central Powers is due, to some extent, to the fact that the generation most deeply impressed by the events of 1878 came gradually to the leadership of the country ; to a greater extent to the increasing influence of German education, and the economic and financial supremacy which the benevolent passivity of England and France enabled Germany to acquire ; but above all to the personal influence of King Carol. Germany, he considered, was at the beginning of her development and needed, above all, peace ; as Rumania was in the same position the wisest policy was to follow Germany, neglecting impracticable national ideals. King Carol outlined his views clearly in an interview which he had in Vienna with the Emperor Franz Joseph in 1883 : 'No nation consents to be bereaved of its political aspirations, and those of the Rumanians are constantly kept at fever heat by Magyar oppression. But this was no real obstacle to a friendly understanding between the two neighbouring States.' "¹

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 301, 302.

CHAPTER VII

FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1877-1914

THUS a friendship was established between Romania and the Central Powers which was to endure, in the eyes of the world, until the Balkan wars of 1912-13. When the rupture came, however, it was not in the nature of a sudden severance of well-established bonds.

To understand the variations in the sentiments and policy of the Romanians, and their outlook at the commencement of the Great War, it becomes necessary to recall for a moment their relations not only with their chief neighbours, Austria-Hungary and Russia, but with Germany, Bulgaria and other States during the thirty-five years or so which preceded the war. With the more distant ones her relations were naturally not so intimate.

With regard to France, it may be said that after an enthusiastic dawn of Pan-Latin romanticism between 1860 and 1870, and after the cataclysm of the latter year in France, Romanian policy became less preoccupied with racial questions outside her own interests. One must not, however, forget that at the time of the disaster to Napoleon's Empire, no country did so much to prove her sympathy with the cause of the vanquished as did Romania, dominated as she was in social life, in education, in literature and in art by a French influence so strong as to be almost asphyxiating. Nevertheless, at Berlin in 1878 the Republic did not prove at all sympathetic towards Romanian claims: she aided the Romanian Jews in obtaining without previous preparation the right of mass-voting; and when the question of the Danube arose, the French delegate was frankly on the Austrian side. On their part the counsellors of Prince Charles were not much inclined to renew the intimacy of the time of Napoleon III. Commercial relations also languished. French knowledge on the subject of Romania and the Romanians was, and remained, very slight.

Italy, in the time of Victor Emmanuel, had furthered the Romanian union by every means in her power. In 1877-78

however, real support on the part of the Consulate was lacking. If Italian commercial initiative proved more active than that of France, the two countries were still too slightly acquainted to be able to arrive at a political collaboration which might have been so beneficial to the Balkans.

As for England, it was only in 1913 that she abandoned the theory of Ottoman intangibility. The transport of Romanian wheat, directly or through Belgium, formed the sole important link with the United Kingdom. If German culture had by that time won for itself a place beside the older influence of France, English ideas, on the other hand, had hardly any hold at all on Romanian mentality.

William I's Germany had, in spite of Bismarck's caprices, acted towards Romania as a counsellor always—and sometimes even as a supporter. Charles had never neglected to take, together with Bismarck's own advice, that of his father, Charles Antony of Hohenzollern, and of the King of Prussia and his heir—the latter an intimate friend of the Romanian Sovereign. The rallying of the young kingdom to the Triple Alliance rendered these ties even closer.

In numerous cases—as in that of the defence of Romanian interests in Macedonia—Romanian policy marched hand in glove with the Imperial diplomacy. Cultural relations became increasingly important: instead of flocking to Paris, a great number of Romanian students betook themselves to the German universities. In the matter of industry and commerce the balance of imports from the Reich began to menace the predominant position hitherto held by Austria-Hungary. The German postal service with the Levant went through Constantsa. The principal loans were concluded on the Berlin Stock Exchange.

But although the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and even the Emperor Francis Joseph himself, came to visit their Royal friend in his capital, or at his residence at Sinaia in the mountains, William II—long expected after the repeated visits of the Romanian Royal family to Germany—did not appear. King Charles, who was very sensitive on this point, resented the refusal as a great insult. A visit from the Crown Prince did not completely appease him. The attitude of Kiderlen-Wächter, too, a pupil of Bismarck's, installed for some years past at Bucharest, and the German pretensions in the matter of Romanian petroleum, were not of a nature to improve relations.

When, however, in 1906 the old King celebrated the fortieth anniversary of his reign, he was created a Marshal of the

German Army—to which, on the very eve of the European war, Russia retorted by conferring a similar distinction. If then German prestige was very great in Bucharest in 1914, it yet lacked completely that wide popular adherence without which, in these days, apart from the calculations of diplomats, there can be no real and fruitful union.

For a long time already there had been little sympathy with Austria-Hungary, an ally for purely political reasons, even in the circles least prone to be swayed by sentiment. It is only necessary to recall the most outstanding events of recent years to perceive that, in spite of the secret treaty of 1883, every forward step on the part of the Romanian kingdom had met with opposition from the neighbouring Monarchy.

More than once Andrassy, as Francis Joseph's Chancellor, had tried to impose on the statesmen of Bucharest—whom he also sought to influence by cutting witticisms at the expense of the stupidity of his own Magyars—a policy which would have definitely isolated them from all intercourse with their kinsmen who dwelt beyond the Carpathians. Before the war which resulted in Romanian independence the all-powerful Minister had tried to convince the counsellors of Prince Charles that there could be nothing in common between the natural tendencies of the Romanian race, between its qualities and its historical traditions, on the one side, and on the other, the Slav and Greek races who, in the Balkans, were fighting against Turkish domination. When in 1877 Romania saw approach the inevitable hour of her intervention, Vienna had employed every artifice to prevent a collaboration with the Russian army. The decision to send the Prince's troops across the Danube was regarded almost as a violation of a tacit convention: the Government of Bucharest had to bear all the consequences. When, after the taking of Plevna, the Romanians manifested their intention of annexing Vidin—already attacked by their army—and also the surrounding territory, the Imperial and Royal Cabinet offered resolute opposition. Nor did Austria refrain, at the time when discord broke out between the great and the little ally, from hastening the rupture by every possible means, although—had it eventuated—no real help for Romania was assured on the part of the Monarchy. Before the supreme decision had been taken at the Berlin Congress, Bratianu appealed vainly to his good counsellors of Vienna: he received the reply that, although retaining their well-known sympathy with the Principality, they could only recommend submission to fate!

A little later, in 1885, the question of the Danube had been opened by Austria-Hungary, who hoped to make herself mistress of the Lower Danube. Side by side with the Danubian Commission established by the Treaty of Paris, first from the Delta to Galatz, and subsequently at Braila, the Dual Monarchy—although it did not even own land on that reach of the river—claimed the presidency of the second Commission, to which the supervision of the waters of the Danube from Braila to Orsova was to be confided. It claimed for its own Hungarian engineers the execution of the works at the Iron Gates, with all the advantages necessarily incidental thereto. It even desired to establish controlling agencies on Romanian territory at Severin. At the London Conference the Austrian point of view was admitted, and it required nothing less than Romania's declaration that she would never consent to certain clauses of the convention being put into execution to prevent these encroachments. There remained rancours and apprehensions which were destined to be increased by subsequent events.

We will not touch, until the next chapter, on the reasons for irritation which resulted from the Magyar policy in regard to the Romanians of Transylvania; but it is necessary to consider the projects of economic expansion elaborated at the same time both at Vienna and at Budapest. About 1890 a scheme for developing Romanian commerce under State protection was in the act of formation, and the Liberal party then in power was in favour of national independence in this direction also. Austria-Hungary, who, to flatter Romanian patriotism and initiate the work of independence, had been the first, in 1875, to consent to the conclusion of a Trade Convention (not a Treaty) with her neighbour, who was then still a vassal of the Porte, would not now make concessions or cede privileges in her favour. Consequently on the Romanian side an autonomous tariff was applied, inaugurating a customs war which ended in the ruin of Hungarian and Saxon trade in Southern Transylvania. This was hardly likely to draw closer the bonds between the two countries, and the "rift in the lute" began slowly to widen.

Romanian policy towards Russia had varied but little since 1877. At St. Petersburg the kingdom was considered as being definitely won to Germanism, actively furthering the *Drang nach Osten*. Alexander III even went so far as to ask the Romanian Minister "whether the King spoke Romanian."

The accession of Nicholas II had favourable results towards a *rapprochement*. At Warsaw King Carol reviewed the regi-

ments of which he had already acquired knowledge in the war against Turkey. Apart, however, from the fact that the character of the new Tsar was entirely different from his father's, one must also take into account the family tie established by the marriage of Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Romania and nephew to King Carol, with Marie, daughter of the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh, through her father a granddaughter of Queen Victoria and, through her mother, of Alexander II.

Relations with Bulgaria became strained even during the early portion of the period discussed, for that country had not razed the fortifications on the Romanian frontier in accordance with the terms of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, and even in official Bulgaria the Dóbruja was spoken of as "Bulgaria Irredenta." The triangular question of the Kutzo-Vlachs of Macedonia had also not only increased the tension with Bulgaria, but had even led to diplomatic ruptures with Greece between 1905 and 1910. It was not, however, till the formation of the Balkan League that Romania put forward a claim for the rectification of the Dóbruja frontier, which was but ill satisfied by the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference at St. Petersburg after the crushing of Turkey in 1912.

The prospect of a fresh quarrel between Bulgaria and Serbia—Romania's only possible ally in the event of trouble with Hungary—now became serious; and after a warning to Bulgaria the Romanian armies overran the northern portion of her territories, though without coming into actual collision with her troops or entering Sofia. As a result Romania obtained by the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) a large slice of the Bulgarian Dóbruja, the new frontier reaching from Turtucaia (on the Danube) to Ekrene, only fifteen miles north of Varna (*vide* map on p. 87). This action, taken at a moment when Bulgaria was beset by enemies on all sides, roused in the minds of the Bulgarians a bitter resentment, which was only to be appeased by their subsequent Dóbrujan campaign of 1916.

For some time past only a superficial observer could have mistaken the radical, if barely perceptible, change which was taking place in Romanian policy, and which was at the first opportunity to bring about a definite rupture with those Austro-German allies to whom Romanian interests had been too long made subservient, and the most obvious needs of a nation in the throes of development too long sacrificed. The ties existing from the most remote period between the Romanians—and the kindred populations dwelling beyond the Danube, who were related to them as much by Thracian origin as by Roman

elements, had at last been recognised. Memories were reawakened of a common past underlying all the hegemonies and concentrations of States which succeeded each other from the Carpathians to the Archipelago : a past common to Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Slavo-Byzantines, Bulgarians, Serbians and, finally, to Ottomans.

Apprehension for the Balkan equilibrium had certainly been a cause of Romanian intervention in the Balkan War of 1913, but there was further a prevision of alliance which might be renewed between the Balkan nations divided by foreign intrigue, both Russian and Austrian. The part played by the cultural and religious hegemony of Romanians, Walachians and Moldavians during the era of oppression and obscurantism under the Turkish régime was recalled. If such an alliance was not favourable to a very active commerce between the States—still, an *entente* seemed necessary to safeguard the essential interests which were threatened by the invasion of western industry and by the attempts of an adventurous capitalism. Within its limitations science worked to bring about a reconciliation, a task rendered more difficult for the politicians by reason of the memory of the recent desperate war.

The Bulgarians, however, whom the war had confined within a frontier more restricted than would satisfy their aspirations, were not inclined to abandon any of their pretensions. Mr. Radoslavov, who succeeded Messrs. Geshov and Danev, reputed authors of the second Balkan War (*vide* p. 80), from the very first engaged in a secret entente with Austria-Hungary which gave him the opportunity for revenge, and prepared his country for the moment when it should be able to throw itself against each of its enemies in turn. The Turkish alliance was to be purchased by cessions on the Adrianople side, which would give liberty to Bulgaria to attack one by one the Serbians, the Greeks and the Romanians. Between Romania and Greece the links remained fragile in spite of the efforts of Mr. Venizelos, who desired a formal alliance between those who at the expense of the Bulgarians had profited by the clauses of the Treaty of Bucharest. From this policy was to result the impossibility of concerted action at the moment when that blow was aimed at Serbia which was designed not only to wrest from her her conquests, but to deprive her of all political importance.

As a result of their common successes in 1913, there was a reciprocity of friendly feeling between Serbians and Romanians. At Belgrade an alliance was desired, but Romania under the conservative régime of Messrs. Majorescu and Take Ionescu,

who had signed the peace, as under that of the Liberal John Bratianu, wished to preserve full liberty of action.

In 1913 a solemn pact seemed to set a seal on a real Russo-Romanian *entente*, destined, it was thought, to prevent all recuperative movement on the part of the discredited Bulgarians. In the month of June 1914, less than a year after the signature of the Treaty, the Tsar appeared at Constantsa, as though in this manner to consecrate the Romanian dominion over the Dóbruja, which was so ardently coveted at Sofia, despite the offer made by Danev in 1912 formally to recognise the rights of Romania therein. The ceremonies of Constantsa, where King Charles—already very much aged and enfeebled by a long illness—led the troops of which he was so proud in review before his powerful Russian neighbour, in order that this most unusual guest might salute in the Romanian tongue the fine cavalry which filed past him, made a deep impression abroad. In this event a fresh proof was seen of the renaissance of that Russian policy in the Balkans which for some time its rivals had almost succeeded in thwarting. Even in Romania, where, as will soon be seen, antipathy to Austria and Hungary was growing rapidly, the interview was warmly acclaimed.

Public opinion went so far as to hope that the Tsar would follow the advice for long urged by the Russian Durnovo and other far-seeing minds, and return Bessarabia to Romania. It would have been a suitable wedding gift had there been a marriage between Charles, eldest son of the Crown Prince, and the Grand Duchess Olga, eldest daughter of Nicholas—a marriage of which there was common talk at the time, although without serious foundation. But after these festivities on Romanian territory the Tsar went on to Kishinyev (Chisinau, capital of Bessarabia). Here he was received with the utmost deference, and deeply wounded Romanian susceptibilities by taking part in the inauguration of the memorial to his ancestor, the “conqueror” of that province.

Nevertheless it was hoped that some arrangement would be come to with this neighbour. According to the general opinion a new Russian alliance was of more value than the maintenance of the old Austro-German alliance, which was beginning to weigh as heavily almost as a real protectorate. The difference of race, and all the obstacles to genuine collaboration which resulted therefrom, were not overlooked; the community of Orthodox religion was little valued; commerce with Russia figured very low on the ladder of international trade and there seemed no prospect of its increasing. Finally, between the

Romanian intellectuals and the modern Russian civilisation there was little sympathy apart from the influence exercised on the most recent Romanian writers by French translations of the Russian novels. And yet, if only to gain the liberty necessary for more energetic action on behalf of the Transylvanian Romanians, there was an inclination to forget all that which in the distant past, or in more recent events, had made the name of Russia abhorrent to a people who had in reality but very rarely been able to reap the benefits promised by the Tsars in order to win the Christian nations of Eastern Europe to their scheme of Byzantine restoration. In certain circles, as will be seen later, there was an attempt to revive the memory of all these losses and all these offences, but the majority of the public visualised, almost without apprehension, in the Russia of Nicholas II one of the most powerful instruments for the work of Transylvanian liberation in Austria-Hungary.

When, by her intervention in 1913, Romania won a dominating position in the Balkan Peninsula, in spite of the Austrian proposal that she should unite with the Monarchy against the Serbians, who were hated by the politicians of Vienna, the antagonism between the policies of the two countries became only more evident. Austria-Hungary made formal reservations in regard to the Treaty of Bucharest, and proposed, in favour of the Bulgarians, a European Conference to revise the clauses. Romania's peremptory response discouraged these intentions, and even at Berlin the proposition was judged by no means politic. As King Charles himself said to Prince Fürstenberg—Imperial and Royal Minister at Bucharest—“Between those who want a small Serbia and a greater Bulgaria, and those who want a diminished Bulgaria and an enlarged Serbia, no collaboration can be possible.”

The Great War started therefore with estranged relations between the two nations.

CHAPTER VIII

TRANSYLVANIA, BUKOVINA AND BESSARABIA

AFTER the participation of the Romanians of Transylvania in the revolution of 1848, as upholders of the dynasty of the young Emperor, their somewhat inadequate reward was the creation, in 1851, of a metropolitan see established at Blaj (or Karlsburg, bearing the ancient name of Alba-Iulia), and subject to the Apostolic Throne ; and subsequently, in 1864, by that of an Orthodox metropolitan see at Sibiu, created in favour of the enterprising bishop Andre Saguna, a Macedonian Romanian by birth, and an adherent of the House of Habsburg. More than this was not possible, although the Austrians, victors as much by the help of Russian intervention as by the devotion of the Romanians and Serbians, would willingly have included in the reorganisation of their kingdom a Transylvania distinct from Hungary. There was therefore neither recognition of the Romanian policy, administrative reunion of the Romanian territory with that of the Bukovina, nor proclamation of a Grand Duke of Romania, which title would have been held by the Emperor himself.

The creation of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy in 1867, by putting an end to the restored Transylvanian principality, and delivering the Romanians (already compromised by their services to the Habsburgs) to the vengeance of the Magyars, gave the final touch to a discontent which bordered on revolt. From the moment when, under the influence of Deák, Francis Joseph accepted the old crown of St. Stephen, he ceased to be for the Romanians "their" Emperor, on whom all their hopes were centred, and to whom they looked for all benefits.

The policy of Saguna, whose every hope had been centred on Vienna, towards which he had at any price to preserve an absolute political loyalty, was about to be abandoned. The great archbishop—undoubtedly the most powerful figure produced by Ultramontane Romania in the domain of public life in the nineteenth century, was destined to end his days almost

in isolation, his great merits forgotten. His rival of Blaj was not strong enough to play a national part at this moment of supreme crisis.

Therefore the Romanians, for the furtherance of their ends, severed themselves from the old and venerable Church which up till then had protected and maintained their existence both spiritual and material. Access to public office being conditional on renunciation of nationalistic policy, numerous young men of the lawyer class founded a party in opposition to the old régime. At first, in continuance of the ancient traditions, they took part in the elections, and their representatives gave expression in the Diets of Pest to the anxieties of the masses.

But John Ratiu speedily gained a considerable ascendancy over his older comrades. The struggle was waged energetically, as much in defence of that Transylvania which, by the Act of Union, had become a mere province of the united Hungarian State, as to safeguard the largely democratic organisation of the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church with which all popular culture was closely bound up. A new Press consecrated itself to the work of Romanian renaissance in the Kingdom of St. Stephen, and there was also a revival of polemical literature.

When the National party was formed in 1881, it included not only the Romanians of Transylvania, but also those of the territory extending to the west of that province as far as the Tisza, and more especially those of the Banat, where the Romanian population was mainly composed not of the old serfs but of nobles of ancient stock and colonists settled on lands wrested from the conquering Turks.

Gradually the idea of political "passivity" gained ground. It was recognised that neither complaints nor attacks in Parliament achieved any important result. If in resolving no longer to take part in the elections for the Diet it had not been at the same time decided to refuse to participate in those for the District Assemblies and the Communal Councils, much richer results might have been attained. Nevertheless, the relinquishing of militant parliamentarianism brought about a more rapid progress in the civilisation and general welfare of the Romanians, who soon produced one of the greatest of their modern poets—George Cosbuc—second only to the Moldavian Michel Eminescu.

The success of their brothers in the kingdom on the other side of the Carpathians only encouraged the Transylvanians in their resistance. Thus in 1878 a passive policy had become obligatory.

This did not, however, deter the Magyar overlords from taking measures tending to the destruction of the stronghold of educational and ecclesiastical organisation. From 1878 the children in the primary schools had to learn the "language of the State," and the other scholastic institutions had to submit to the same tyrannical obligation. All appeals to the King-Emperor were vain. Nevertheless, in 1892 a last effort was attempted in the shape of a memorandum designed to inform Francis Joseph of a state of things with which he was already well acquainted. But when the delegates of the Romanian people presented themselves before their revered sovereign at Vienna, they found the doors shut in their faces, and their document was returned to them unopened, through the "constitutional" channel of the Magyar Minister.

Violent demonstrations were made against certain members of the deputation, and they were soon called before the tribunal which was to judge their act of "high treason." They were imprisoned without scruple, just as had been imprisoned those other students, headed by an eminent philosopher, Aurelle Popovici, who had dared to defend themselves against a formal accusation made by their Magyar colleagues.

By a decree of the Minister, Wekerle, the National party itself was formally dispersed in 1894.

Nevertheless that party did not cease to exist. For about ten years, while all the time preserving a passive attitude, it was able by its newspapers, and by the direct action of its members, to keep alive the solidarity and sense of nationality of all Romanians throughout Hungarian territory. During those ten years, which were filled with events of the greatest importance for the Romanian kingdom, the direction of the movement passed into the hands of a new generation which took the place of Ratiu and his associate, Lacaciu, the popular preacher; and later Messrs. Theodore Mihali, Alexander Vaida and Jules Maninu gained the leadership in this unceasing struggle. Their policy, which comprised the administrative autonomy of Transylvania and the recognition of the Romanians as a constitutional nation, necessarily underwent a certain change. The progress of Romanian civilisation, peculiar to all the provinces—a wider knowledge of their common past, the awakening of the masses—all tended to more vigorous action.

The Hungarian Government tried by various means to quell the movement. Education laws were passed to give the State a more effective control of the schools. An attack was made on ecclesiastical influence by the establishment of a Hungarian

bishop at Hadju-dorogh. The Press was used for purposes of propaganda, and elections were shamelessly falsified. Conciliation was also attempted. To this end a "modern" party, led by Basile Mangra, Vicar of Oradfa-Mare, was founded; but it was repudiated by the whole nation, and a move which, while offering apparent concessions, in reality was intended to destroy Romanian solidarity in Hungary, was frustrated by popular opposition.

And now, in pursuance of her general political ends, Germany at last intervened in the final phase of the Romanian question, to re-enforce the pronouncedly anti-Magyar policy of the Archduke heir-presumptive, who had for some time managed to impress his prospective Romanian subjects with the idea that he was their very good friend, and the sure saviour of their future. In the beginning of the year 1914, by the intermediary of M. Erzberger, propositions of an extraordinarily wide scope, including a whole scheme of local autonomies and national concessions, especially in the sphere of education, were presented to the National Council. But it was too late: the tide was setting in quite a different direction.

When Austria in 1775 annexed the northern part of Moldavia, she had arbitrarily given the name of the Bukovina to that territory. This name, as we have seen, was derived from the beech-forests, which, however, covered only the eastern portion of that beautiful province. Here, further, were situated, as has been already stated, the old Moldavian capital of Suceava, and the finest of the convents due to the munificence and the artistic taste of the ancient Romanian voivods, such as Putna, containing the tomb of Stephen the Great, and Sucevita, ornamented with beautiful frescoes dating from the end of the sixteenth century.

The new régime commenced with a dual policy destined to be pursued for nearly a century and a half. It consisted in the attempt to destroy, in so far as was possible, all memory of the Romanian tradition, and in installing in the most favourable conditions, as in the Banat, already colonised since about 1720, inhabitants of foreign origin. The hierarchical ties of the Bishops of Raduti with the metropolitan see of Jassy were broken, and that bishopric, removed to Cernauti—the new Czernowitz, a straggling village on the banks of the Pruth—was reduced to a subordinate position. A large number of monks were expelled from the country. All literary activity, and even all educational activity in the Romanian sense, ceased

to exist. At the same time a vast number of immigrants—Jews in the towns, and Ruthenians from Galicia in the villages—swooped down on this fragment of Moldavian ground. The ecclesiastical properties were made subject to secular officials, and the military administration, destined to endure for many years, did its utmost to introduce, together with Austrian diplomatic customs, the secular German culture dating from the time of the Emperor Joseph.

As for the Moldavian boyars, the greater number of them refused to countenance the new régime, and departed to join their fellows in that part of Moldavia which had remained under Turkish rule.

Prevented from communicating with their brothers who had remained in what was still Moldavia, subject to the authority of a Slav bishop, influenced by a teaching which tended towards Catholicism, these Romanians, torn violently from their ancient fatherland, were even, from 1786 to 1790 and again, after an interval of autonomy, from 1817 to 1849, united to Galicia.

During the troubled times in 1848 the idea arose of reuniting this corner of Austrian Moldavia with Transylvania, but Bishop Hacman did not care to be subordinated to Saguna. The responsibility which he refused to undertake, namely, the initiation of a new national life, thus fell to the sons of a boyar, Doxaki Harmuzaki, who, having been very carefully educated in this sense, remained obstinate partisans of the Romanian tradition, and were partially successful in their object.

The Bukovina thus became an autonomous duchy in 1849 ; the bishop received the strange title of Metropolitan of that district and of Dalmatia ; but nothing further was obtained.

Intercourse with Transylvania became very rare after the proclamation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual monarchy, and the demand for a national congress was obstinately refused. But in 1871 a National party came into existence in the Bukovina. It may be said to have been inaugurated at the moment when the young generation organised a feast of all the Romanians at the tomb of Stephen the Great.

The creation of the German university of Czernowitz (endowed later with a Romano-Slav theological faculty for the benefit of the Ruthenians, of whom the number was increasing owing to a slow process of denationalisation between the Pruth and the Dniester) seemed to be a provocative reply to these standard-bearers of the purely Romanian tradition ; and every attempt to create a Church with a national character was thwarted by the Government,

At last, towards 1890, the young party took their stand on a purely national programme, without, however, declaring war on the Ruthenians, whom they regarded as brothers. The Church was also intended to play a part in the great changes it was desired to introduce ; but this time also the rulers of the country proved obdurate. The Governor, Pace, and afterwards his still more unscrupulous successor Bourguignon, were entrusted with the task of combating, by the most inquisitorial methods, what was considered an irredentist agitation. As these methods proved no more successful than the others, recourse was had to the policy of *divide et impera*. To the National party of Georges Popovici and Jean Floudor was opposed therefore not only an aristocracy of country squires, endowed with titles and honours and half Germanised, but also a democracy strongly opposed to all separation from Austria. A truce was made between the two parties in 1900, but soon the struggle was renewed with more violence than ever, for a new generation had become imbued with Nationalist aspirations.

Bessarabia, gained in 1812 by the Tsar Alexander I, passed in the beginning through an autonomous era intended to make separation from Moldavia more acceptable.

During this time the Bishop Gabriel Banulescu Bodoni, having become an archbishop subject to the Synod of Moscow, and having a suffragan at Akerman (Cetatea-Alba), was able to safeguard the Romanian character of the province. For a long period—up to 1840—the Moldavian tongue was used even in official documents, and the Church missals were printed in Romanian. The ancient traditions were preserved intact in the small towns, and especially in the countryside.

Apart from the old Ruthenian colonists who had settled near Chotin in the seventeenth century, the population had remained fundamentally Romanian.

But already some of the boyars had left this new "Bessarabia." Those who remained took service in the army and in the Government offices of the foreign overlords, and their children were brought up in Russian surroundings. If Scarlat Sturdza, a governor of the province, had dreamed before 1820 of a "Romanian Empire" including Transylvania, the Banat and the Bukovina as well as Bessarabia, there were very few among the nobles of the succeeding generation who had the courage to preserve the ideals of their predecessors. After the death of Archbishop Gabriel the Church fell into foreign

hands, and, although up till 1870 her missals were still printed in Romanian, Archbishop Paul Chichagov, an ex-officer of Cossacks, banned without hesitation that "Gipsy" tongue as unworthy of being used in divine service. After Constantine Stamati, Alexander Hasdeu and Sarbu, the series of Bessarabian writers was interrupted, and the educated Romanians of the province henceforward wrote in Russian.

It was the peasants who, in a country where popular education was systematically neglected, alone preserved their Moldavian heritage. The impoverished descendants of the old boyars still retained their properties, and if, under the official pressure which in 1812 drove many of them to sell their lands rather than resign themselves to dwelling under the sceptre of the Tsar, a large number of the big estates passed into the hands of foreign adventurers, the peasants did their utmost to fill the place of their old masters. Many colonists, however, Bulgarians, Germans, Lipovans and Russians (Old Believers), obtained land formerly owned by the Tatars, whilst the considerable peasant class, which about 1890 numbered more than two millions, did not succeed in obtaining either the use of their own language in divine service nor the creation of "Moldavian" primary schools.

The Treaty of Paris in 1856 restored the three southern districts of Bessarabia to Moldavia, with the natural result that Romanian influence, the greater in that a bishop from the Lower Danube was installed at Ismail, increased in the provinces remaining under Russian rule. It was impossible to prevent the formation of business and family relations with free Romania. The retrocession of the ceded provinces to Russia in 1878 put an end to this movement, but already the young Bessarabians were establishing themselves in the kingdom, and their influence tended naturally to revive the national spirit of those of their kinsmen who had remained at home. When the war with Japan broke out, the despatch of Bessarabian soldiers to the front roused considerable discontent.

The experiment in constitutional government in Russia under Nicholas II was not without influence on Bessarabia. Many young scholars and students, many society women, and even some of the nobility united to publish the first newspapers printed in the Romanian tongue, to introduce the language into the Law Courts, and to organise its use in the theatres. The denationalised alone opposed the idea of Romanian teaching, for even the foreign element ranged itself

on the side of this ardent youthful party, which included such eminent names as those of Pelivan, Inculeț, etc. The revolution failed, the newspapers were suppressed, and the Church was re-engulfed by Russian tradition ; but the achievements of a few months left an imperishable memory, capable of rousing the boldest hopes for the future.

CHAPTER IX .

THE ROMANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GREAT WAR

ALL the new Romanian literature, after the period of reasoned criticism and calculated "objectivity" represented by the review *Entretiens Littéraires* (founded in 1867), was inspired by memories of past struggles and sufferings, and impregnated with the ideal of Romanian unity, fundamental and irreducible, demanding practical realisation in the domain of political life.

For a long time past the persecution of the Transylvanian Romanians, and the slow process of denationalisation accomplished at the expense of the Romanian subjects of Austria in the Bukovina, had profoundly stirred public opinion in the kingdom. Intercourse between the Romanian populations on either side of the Carpathians could not be arrested by such puerile methods as those contained in a clause of the commercial treaty which closed the frontiers to the herdsmen (*mocans*) travelling with their flocks towards the plains of Walachia and the banks of the Danube. Furthermore, the proof of vitality given by the expedition into Bulgaria, and the great success of the Peace of Bucharest of 1913, had inspired the highest hopes. As has been admitted, there had been for some time a rumour of an independent Romanian policy which would seek fraternal support in that part of the Balkans which had also been the victim of the rivalry between Russia and Austria. Into this atmosphere came Austria's new menace of war against Serbia—guilty (as was solemnly affirmed at Vienna on the day following the event) of complicity in the assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke heir-presumptive and his wife.

Now, in the Balkans, the ally on whom Romania chiefly relied in the event of a prospective war, which war already appeared inevitable as a result of the disturbance of equilibrium in the south-east of Europe, was that same Serbia, her ally of 1913, whom Austria-Hungary had regarded with distrust even in the best days of an ephemeral alliance. Serbia was vitally

concerned in the abolition of the anachronistic monarchy which by its policing régime dominated all the millions of Yugoslavs together with an equal number of Romanians.

Popular opinion demanded that Romania should support Serbia, whose very existence was now menaced. Should Austria gain an initial success in her attack on Serbia, it would be an earnest that on the first plausible pretext the domains of King Carol would meet with a similar fate. That was, in fact, admitted at Vienna, at a time when the General Staff was cynically regretting that it had not given to Italy, a far more powerful member of the Alliance, a blow from which she could never have recovered. But the authority of King Carol was still very great in Romanian political life, and the Romanians were accustomed to obedience. When, therefore, with the express permission of Germany, Austria-Hungary risked provocative action in the Balkans, he, as an old friend of Francis Joseph, never doubted for a moment that Germany, *so efficiently prepared in every detail, would be victorious in the war on two fronts, the French and the Russian, which it seemed must inevitably result from this provocation* ; and, as was natural in a prince of German origin, who had seen the foundation of that formidable empire, he cherished in his heart the idea of a splendid victory for his race, and the vision of a triumph which would gild his old age with reflected glory.

The Liberal party was now in power, having succeeded the Government of Majorescu and Take Ionescu, which had proved incapable of carrying out the extensive reforms on which depended not only the prosperity but the very existence of the country. Agrarian reform took the first place in their programme, for, as has been pointed out, Prince Cuza's land law had not achieved its object. The delicate work of expropriation and partition had been carried out in an incompetent and often arbitrary fashion ; the distribution of the pasture lands and the establishment of forest rights still awaited a radical solution. The great abortive peasant rising of 1907 might perhaps have achieved that solution, but M. Bratianu's party, composed mainly of landed proprietors, big farmers and rich bourgeois, had stopped short at a timid legislation which confined itself to fixing the conditions of agricultural labour while leaving in the hands of the holders of the land themselves the task of allotting to the villages their just share of the pastoral lands.

It now became essential to take more vigorous action, and at the same time to take into consideration the danger of an

almost permanent government of a single party organised under the strict discipline of an undisputed head. This all-powerful Liberal party, which, by the way, had entirely discarded the mysterious black hat and the romantic red cloak of the republican conspirators, aimed at electoral reform, no longer with the idea of uniting the three colleges into one college, but with that of replacing it by a universal suffrage which should be extended even to the illiterate, of whom there were still, unfortunately, a large number in the country districts.

Thus preoccupied with measures of reform, this party had made little or no preparations for a prospective war. The measures taken by M. Filipescu, one of the chiefs of the Conservative party, were already out of date, and, although the campaign in Bulgaria had made evident the fundamental disabilities under which the Romanian army laboured, no steps had been taken to supplement its deficiencies. Also, from the very beginning the attitude of the Government was embarrassed and indecisive. It was inevitable that with the difficulties arising on every side, with which the diplomatic talents of M. J. J. Bratianu seemed insufficient to cope, fears should be entertained for the duration of the Treaty of Bucharest, on which had been based such ambitious projects for the future.

The Boyar party had long ceased to exist ; many of its most influential members had passed over to the camp of Bratianu during his ten years of office. Although in protest against the abuses of a semi-despotic régime the young Conservatives had attempted a more or less successful revolt in 1888, neither this combative young opposition, nor the "Juminist" reactionaries (at first members of the literary circle of the "Jumineu," or "Youth", which had already for some years been associated with them, but who retained their main principles, their disdain of the masses, in spite of protestations of a Bismarckian "State socialism," and their leanings towards Germany, their "spiritual home"), nor even the last representatives of the old and new nobility (the Manu, the Lahovarys, etc.) had shown themselves capable of giving a stable government to the country. Old Liberals, such as M. Take Ionescu, had come to swell their ranks at a time when the Liberal party received into its hospitable bosom the first of the former Socialists.

In this Neo-Conservative party of such varied elements all serious orientation in the domain of foreign politics was lack-

ing. Those of its members who had been educated in France retained memories and hopes which must inevitably, sooner or later, lead them, with Filipescu at their head, to the side of the French and British Allies, even were it in company with the Russians, beloved of none of them. The "Juminists," however, remained obstinately pro-German, and very soon, led by M. P. P. Carp, who had been several times President of the Council, they were to begin to act frankly in German interests. This action found support in the agitation promoted by M. C. Stere, a Bessarabian, and an influential member of the Liberal party, for whom hatred of the persecuting Russians was the prime incentive.

As for M. Take Ionescu, who some years previously had founded a "democratic" party with certain Conservative elements, he was soon to sever the old ties with German policy in order to support Filipescu in his protests against the supineness of the Liberal party.

The Socialists of the new generation remained, as ever, pacifists, opponents of all war; their leader was Rakovski, a Bulgarian citizen of Romania, but obsessed by Russian ideals tending towards Communism. This party was accused of taking bribes from the German Socialist agitators.

The new middle-class party of Nationalists was not yet sufficiently consolidated to be able to influence the policy of the country; but the idealistic programme which it had pursued for the last twenty years was, like that of the "Cultural League of Unity of all the Romanians," founded at the time of the indictment of the authors of the Transylvanian memorandum, an essential factor in the development of the national conscience; and it was largely instrumental in preventing a fatal *démarche* on the side of the Central Powers. The League had a committee composed of the chief members of the Opposition, which also founded other associations, namely the "National Action" and "National Federation," to combat by journalistic propaganda and by every method of pen and speech the insidious penetration of German influences.

At the beginning of August 1914 the King summoned the principal representatives of the Government and the "historic" parties to a Crown Council at Bucharest. He was convinced of being able to enlist them on the side of the Central Powers, and, at the critical moment, he produced as a decisive argument the actual text of the treaty of 1883 with the Triple Alliance, which text some of his ministers had never even seen. He encountered, however, an opposition which was the most

painful surprise of his life, and this, together with the news of the failure of the "infallible" attack on Paris, did much to shorten his days.

Carp alone shared his point of view and prophesied political and military disaster for the country should it decide to pursue any other course than that laid down in the treaties. His former lieutenant, Alexander Marghiloman, held a different opinion. The Liberal Ministers opposed the King's policy. In order to overcome his scruples they pointed out, not without reason, that it was not a question of the defensive war provided for in the treaty, but of a war of aggression, on which moreover Romania had not even been consulted, although she was now asked to take part in the adventure, and was promised Bessarabia as a reward.

The decision, then, was made in favour of neutrality: a provisional neutrality in the opinion of some, a definite neutrality in that of others, whose opinions were destined later to undergo a radical change, especially at the moment when the check to the German advance on the Marne and the big success of the Russians in Galicia had revived more strongly than ever the hope of a Romanian national union—the moment which Filipescu called "the crucial moment of Lemberg." In any case it was an armed neutrality, and as such demanded a general reconstruction of the army; this was to be mobilised not only with a view to events which might at any moment prove decisive, but also with a view to a war of a quite novel character, which required that it should be supplied with the necessary means for combating the formidable "scientific" apparatus of the Germans and their allies the Austro-Hungarians, the latter of whom, having survived the first shock of battle, were now being solidly reorganised.

This task was entrusted to General Iliescu, a friend and old comrade of M. Bratianu, who insisted that the diplomatic negotiations as well as the military preparations should be under his direct supervision. This officer, who after the defeat of 1916 was universally condemned by popular opinion, has lately published a document in his own defence, which, however, only proves the numerical increase of the army—not that it was supplied with the necessary equipment; and, whatever may have been his intentions and his efforts, they were nullified by that same lack of equipment which rendered it impossible for Romania to take action at the moment which she would, in her own interests, have selected to join forces with the Allies.

In the opinion of many all this delay was due to the jealousy of Russia, who, as in 1877, did not wish the little kingdom to play a big part in a war which was to decide the whole future of the world, and who, moreover, had her own reasons for fearing the effect of a victorious Romanian intervention on the fate of that piece of Romanian territory which she insisted on retaining. But in order to explain the lack of heavy artillery, of supplies, of ammunition and even of rifles, one must take into consideration the more or less inevitable delays of diplomatic negotiation which the Russian problem rendered doubly delicate and difficult.

Early in the month of October 1914 King Charles, torn between his sense of duty to a country to which he had consecrated his whole life and the most deep-rooted instincts of his soul, succumbed to his anxieties. Ferdinand I, who succeeded him, did not hold the same point of view as his uncle, who had been almost a father to him, and whom he revered, though he did not agree with him. Ferdinand had been educated in Romania, and, subject to the same influences as the rising generation, he nourished aspirations similar to theirs ; he had also towards the war an impersonal attitude lacking in his predecessor. Nor must one forget the unflinching faith in the victory of the Allies (regarded also as the triumph of right, and held by every idealistic soul), which, in this time of trial, so strongly distinguished the new Queen Marie, whose Anglo-Russian family relationships are so well known.

Manifestations of public opinion became more and more insistent, unsparing even of the last days of a Sovereign who had for so long been reverenced by all political parties without distinction. On several occasions it was necessary to employ official force to prevent demonstrations in the streets. All who appeared to favour the Central Powers were regarded with aversion ; and the actions of their agents sojourning in or travelling through a neutral country, access to which could not be forbidden them, were carefully watched. The greatest indignation was felt towards all who held a view opposed to this overwhelming national sentiment, even if they were not suspected of having been seduced by alien propaganda. The police had to protect the offices of the newspaper *Ziua* (*The Day*), which was edited by a Transylvanian writer of great renown. He, together with the "Juminists," who in their paper *Moldavia* pleaded for a war which should restore Bessarabia to the mother-country, made himself the mouth-piece of those who were called contemptuously the "Nemtzo-

phils," Neamt being the Romanian nickname for the Germans. A whole literature sprang up in defence of the national cause.

To this overwhelming tide of national feeling emanating from the depths of the national conscience must be attributed Romania's participation in the world-war, and without this mighty support the country could never have survived its appalling sufferings and disasters. The strength of this movement was increased by the advent of those Romanian refugees from Austro-Hungarian territory who had refused to support the foreign overlord in a war of conquest destined also to be, for the small nationalities, a war of destruction. Even though, by means of threats, signatures of doubtful authenticity were obtained to resolutions of adherence to the Hungarian cause ; though the newspapers of Transylvania and the Bukovina were reduced to employing the language of allegory and to unimaginable expedients in order to tell the truth and to express their convictions, it was yet impossible to prevent the departure from Transylvania of these late witnesses of Magyar oppression. These "deserters," these "turncoats," became thus a prime factor in arousing the spirit which impelled a whole nation to seek, in the face of great perils, the realisation of its most sacred ideals.

CHAPTER X

ROMANIA TAKES HER PART: THE FIRST PERIOD

FOR some time after the declaration of neutrality Romanian policy maintained an irreproachable attitude towards the two groups of belligerent Powers. Even if the Government could not prevent the unlawful passage of disguised German sailors who were to form the crews of those famous ships of war the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, which had taken refuge at Constantinople, yet, as Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador, who knew all the secrets of the Young Turkish party, has recently declared in his Memoirs, the reiterated demands that Romania should allow military communication between Germany and her new Turkish ally were invariably refused at Bucharest.

But in September King Charles was still alive, and there were no indications of his early demise. As early as September 20, 1914 M. J. J. Bratianu had concluded a secret treaty with Russia, the treaty of the Allied Powers, of which the secret clauses were dreaded, and not without reason. Romania had already prevented the passage of a small Russian detachment across North-East Moldavia, near the Austrian frontier, but this document pledged her to transform her armed neutrality into a benevolent neutrality, and gave the Russians the right to "occupy," but not subsequently to retain, the Austro-Hungarian territories inhabited by a Romanian majority, with the exception of the Bukovina, whose frontiers were to be defined later by a mixed Commission. The Russians were already victorious in Galicia, and they had even invaded the Bukovina and reached the Maramaros Pass. Further, a loan was shortly afterwards concluded in London on the condition that the funds thus obtained should never be used against England or her allies.

On October 10, the King having succumbed to an acute attack of his incurable malady, the new reign was inaugurated in the midst of the anxious expectations of the whole nation.

The new King, in taking the oath before the Legislative Assembly, vowed solemnly to be, before all else, a "good Romanian"; and no one doubted what was, for him, the meaning of that formula. For the rest, the Austrian "Red Book" shows that already on September 23, as heir to the throne, Prince Ferdinand had declared to Count Czernin, the former Austrian Minister, who had been sent on a special mission to Bucharest, that public opinion was vigorously opposed to all action on the side of the Central Powers, and that it was consequently impossible to send Romanian troops to support them. Czernin had to confine himself to a vigorous protest, but he went so far as to threaten that this action, being contrary to the treaty of alliance recently confirmed by the Majorescu Government, would be regarded as an ignoble "act of treason."

The great wave of public feeling was irresistible. The news which came from Transylvania; the belief that regiments, mostly composed of Romanians, were thrown first against the enemy, and that the soldiers thus sacrificed were ill-treated and insulted by their commanders; that the chief representatives of the Romanian nation in Hungary were forced to sign declarations in violation of their conscience,—all this served to increase the hatred of the Central Powers. This hatred was soon to be yet further inflamed by the disgraceful actions of Colonel Fischer, Chief of the Police in the Bukovina, who, after the return of the Austrians to their lost provinces, daily caused a large number of peasants to be hanged on the feeble pretext of some unsupported denunciation. Further, the German treatment of the Belgians and the French in the invaded provinces had raised a cry of horror from one end of the country to the other. The moral guilt of the Germanic Powers was unquestioned.

In the month of November, on the eve of the meeting of the Romanian Parliament, the Austrians, who had at first amused themselves with bombarding Belgrade without the slightest regard for the unfortunate civil population, came to the conclusion that, having regained Galicia and the Bukovina, they could now again turn their attention to Serbia—author of all the evil. Once again it became a question for Romania if she could permit this "punitive expedition" against one of her neighbours, whose fate, by the same token, she would inevitably share on the first favourable occasion. The policy of Greece, too, waited on that of the Romanians. But military preparations were not nearly far enough advanced. Conse-

quently the Imperial and Royal troops of Austria-Hungary were able to enter Belgrade on November 19.

Notwithstanding the still nervous attitude of the leaders of the Romanian opposition and the decision of the Government to renounce all discussion of foreign politics, in spite even of a partial demobilisation of the army, Count Czernin continued to complain of the King, of the Ministers, of the political parties, and of public feeling. At Vienna—perhaps too at Berlin, where the need for access to the Romanian petroleum supply was doubtless an incentive—a deliberate rupture was desired with a country the chance of whose adherence had been definitely renounced.

In March 1915 the Russians were seeking in the Carpathians a road to Budapest, and Romanian impatience was thereby naturally increased. Had the psychological moment for the second time arrived? But the Prime Minister Bratianu's negotiations for entry into the war were not yet terminated. He was trying to gain in the Bukovina the prospective frontier of the Pruth, and in the Banat that of the Theiss (Tisza). Briefly, a further delay seemed essential, and as Italy on her side was conducting her *pourparlers* very deliberately, the spring was well advanced without any decision being reached.

When at last, towards the middle of May, the delays at Rome were brought to an end by the pressure of public opinion inflamed by the speeches of d'Annunzio, Romania found herself blocked by the Allies' violent attack in the Dardanelles and by the victorious advance of Mackensen, who had just succeeded in chasing the Tsar's troops from the Carpathians and in freeing the whole of Galicia.

Once more it was necessary to wait. Those who were living at that long-awaited moment when the Italian standards were raised against Austria will never forget its profound bitterness. It seemed as though Romania, enervated by her accumulated disillusionments, would give way to despair. It was questioned whether the great work of national unity was not reserved for a more fortunate generation.

Up to the month of August 1915 the Romanians had to resign themselves to witnessing the success of the Austro-Germans, who, by sacrificing, as was the report, the regiments of Transylvanian Romanians, had broken the protecting girdle of Russia.

In September Bulgaria refused to acquiesce in the Russian ultimatum which demanded the rupture of her relations with

Germany, and some days later, with the connivance of their old Bulgarian rival, the Central Powers attacked Serbia in order to open up the road to Constantinople, which, on the Carpathian side, was barred by the Romanians. Once again Romania experienced a moment of supreme anguish.

Notwithstanding the still-pending question of the Banat, of which a great portion had been claimed by the Serbians, many Romanians desired to march to their rescue ; but the evacuation of Gallipoli and the state of affairs in Greece, where Venizelos had been obliged to abandon his post, made it clear that no help could be given to that agonised country. Before the end of the month the Austrian standard flew once more from the royal palace of Belgrade, and the remnants of King Peter's army sought refuge through the frozen mountain-passes of Albania.

The furious assaults against Verdun in the spring of 1916, together with the possibility of a German victory on that front, acted as the final test of the Romanian spirit. A whole party—that of M. Marghiloman, which had severed itself from M. Filipescu on the question of foreign policy—now openly declared itself on the side of the Central Powers, who appeared to be invincible. They eagerly claimed Bessarabia, which they thought could be easily wrested from the Russians ; these, however, were back at Czernowitz. They hoped without any sacrifice to obtain the Bukovina, which, nevertheless, Count Czernin curtly refused. Yet, as to Transylvania, had not Count Tisza, the great Hungarian leader, declared in 1914, in a letter to the orthodox Romanian Metropolitan of that province, that he would grant concessions in the matter of the use of the Romanian language and in the organisation of the electoral districts ?

The situation, however, underwent a change towards the beginning of June, owing to the vigorous offensive of General Brusilov, who brought the Russians back to the immediate neighbourhood of the Romanian frontiers. A fresh offensive had been launched on the Somme ; whilst the Italians, invited to take part in an attack which it was hoped to make general, made themselves in August masters of Gorizia. Romania was invited to participate in a violent assault on the eastern front, for General Sarrail was to quit Salonika and go to the rescue of Serbia so soon as Brusilov should have recaptured the old road which might lead by the way of the Maramaros Pass to Budapest. The Russian note to the Cabinet at Bucharest made them also foresee in the event of further vacillation the

cancelling of the treaty of 1914, which had permitted the occupation of Austro-Hungarian territory.

Negotiation could no longer be delayed. The secret convention of August 17 with the Entente required of Romania that she should attack Austria-Hungary, and close her markets against Germany. In exchange, she was to receive the whole of the Bukovina and the Banat as far as the Theiss, on the condition that she did not raise offensive works against Belgrade. Two Russian divisions of infantry were to assist in defending the Dóbruja against a Bulgarian offensive, which it must be admitted was by no means anticipated. The army of Salonika was to launch an offensive a week before the Romanian mobilisation. As for the Russian attack, it was indicated as immediate and infallible. The goal of the Romanian offensive was to be Budapest itself.

There followed on August 28 the declaration of war. The Romanian advanced-guard crossed the Carpathians by all the passes. It was to concentrate in Transylvania and form a southern army destined to occupy Brasov and Sibiu, and an eastern army operating across the Szekler country towards the Maros line, which was to be attained and consolidated without delay.

It should not be imagined that the Austro-Hungarians had not anticipated this decisive action ; they had indeed already begun the removal of the archives from their Legation at Bucharest. But Transylvania was only defended by a very weak force, which had been ordered to retire. Nevertheless it was not without encountering some resistance that the Romanians were able to occupy the city of Brasov and the small town of Fogaras. At Sibiu, where the first Romanian bullets had caused a panic, it was anticipated that the entry of King Ferdinand's troops would not be delayed.

At this moment, before the situation could be cleared up and consolidated, two events occurred which were destined to prevent for a long time the "triumphal march" of which the Russians had spoken so lightly—those Russians who now, for military reasons incomprehensible to the Romanians, confined themselves to acting as little more than mere spectators. These two events were the German-Bulgarian attack on the Danube, and the German attack on the Carpathians to the south of Transylvania. Germany had hastened to declare war on Romania.

The first of these coups, destined to put an end to the Romanian advance in Transylvania, had been long since pre-

pared. Mackensen was himself to lead the first-line Bulgarian troops, which were well organised and armed, and supervised by German officers. The attack was launched on September 5 on the stronghold of Turtucaia (Tutrakan), on the right bank of the Danube, in the territory annexed by Romania in 1913. The fortifications were inadequate and heavy artillery was lacking. The machine-guns which were to have come from Russia had not arrived. Aviation was faulty ; the quality of the troops, whose number, although considerable,¹ has been exaggerated, was inferior, since they were largely composed of raw reservists who had had no previous training ; whilst the leadership, confided to generals who had had no previous experience of commanding in the field, was execrable. All the same, it took two days of obstinate assault to conquer Turtucaia, where the Bulgarians wrought a work of massacre similar to that which had disgraced the Balkan campaign of 1912-13, a massacre in which the Bulgarian civil population also participated. Germany hastened to celebrate with extraordinary rejoicings the capture (September 7) of this old Danubian stronghold, which was made out to be a regular Verdun, and further, a formidable bridge-head for Romania.

Once Turtucaia was lost, the Romanians had to abandon—almost without firing a shot—not only Siliстра, whose ancient importance was completely nullified by the new conditions of warfare, but the whole southern Dóbruja where, nevertheless, but for this lightning surprise attack, they would have been able to put up a resistance. The old Dóbruja was invaded in its turn : it was therefore necessary, in order to check the extremely rapid advance of the conquerors, to recall a portion of the regiments which were operating in Transylvania ; for, despite their formal asseverations, the Russians had only supplied a single division of troops, and a certain number of Cossacks, to which were added some thousands of heroic Serbian soldiers of Hungarian origin who were to allow themselves to be massacred to the last man. Sarrail had not stirred—he was only later to begin his advance on Monastir.

In Transylvania itself the attempt to reach the River Maros was only arrested after the middle of September, at the moment when in the Dóbruja a stand had been made on the Rasova-Cobadin-Tuzla line, corresponding to the old wall of Trajan.

Suddenly the Romanian advance northwards collapsed in the Jiu Valley, where General Falkenhayn's first German troops had appeared—Bavarian Alpine soldiers accus-

¹ About 18,000 men.—ED.

tomed to fight in regions similar to those which now opened before them. The Vulcan Pass was occupied by the enemy. But the real retreat was only to begin—in circumstances particularly difficult, though not yet disastrous—after the Germans had advanced by mountain-paths, unknown to the Romanians, in the rocky environs of Sibiu. For several days the ill-equipped soldiers of the western army resisted the furious thrust. Having succeeded in forcing a road towards the former frontier, the invaders appeared at the pass of the Rother Thurm, which led by the old *Via Carolina* into Oltenia. From Fogaras, and even from Brasov, the Romanian army was not driven until later (October 4), and after obstinate fighting ; and for a long time General Prezau maintained his position in the Szekler country to the north-east.

Soon after this the invasion of Romania was held up for several weeks. While resisting in the Dóbruja, where General Averescu had, during the second half of September, succeeded to a great extent in repulsing Mackensen's attack, whilst Constantsa was held till the third week of October, the Romanians were able to maintain a line of defence in the valley of the Jiu as well as in the valleys of the Olt and the Prahova, and at Predeal. The enemy troops who had succeeded in penetrating into the Bacau district in Moldavia were driven out. A Bavarian division which had passed the defile of Surduk was, even as late as October 28, completely annihilated.

In spite of the insufficiency of munitions of war, and more especially of the fact that, in the general inaction of the Allies, all the forces of the Central Powers could be directed against the Romanians, the crushing of whom was to give Germany the chance of offering, as an "act of magnanimity," terms of peace to her enemies, this success was hailed as the beginning of a great campaign of revenge.

In the first half of November the Germans succeeded in reaching Tîrgu-Jiu. Then, as it was not possible to oppose them with troops strong enough to arrest their impetus, the invaders were able to advance as far as Craiova (November 21). But what really decided the fate of Wallachia and the first phase of the Romanian war was Mackensen's crossing of the Danube, and his advance towards Bucharest.

On the advice of General Berthelot, who had hastened to help in the reorganisation of the Romanian army, a great battle in defence of the capital was risked on the Arges, N.W. of Bucharest (November 30). With that fatality which seemed to dog these brave troops, the Romanian plan of

action was captured from an officer taken prisoner on the eve of the combat. Although they had defeated a whole division of Turks, the defenders of Bucharest were forced to retreat. Thus on December 6 the Germans entered the open town which, in the interests of their diplomacy, they chose to represent as a formidable fortress.¹

Despite the peculiarly trying climatic conditions of that rigorous winter, the Romanians retired in good order from Bucharest and all the defiles towards Moldavia, where they were to prepare their last stand. Behind a panic-stricken population which accompanied their tragic exodus, the petroleum wells of the Ploëști district were blazing. The Russians, who had hastened up in great force as far as the Sereth, yet remained indifferent spectators of this disaster, and only fought as a matter of form. Neither the Ramnic (Rimnik) River nor the port of Braila seemed to inspire them with the memory of all that their ancestors had accomplished on that ground.

¹ There were rings of forts round Bucharest, but insufficient men to hold them.—ED.



THE WORLD WAR

The famous Rumanian Regiment of the Bull with its mascot

CHAPTER XI

THE SECOND PERIOD : HUMILIATION

THE retreat of the Romanians left in the hands of the Germans and their Turkish and Bulgarian auxiliaries neither the number of prisoners nor the amount of booty hoped for. General Averescu, who was defending the Predeal pass, was able to save the greater part of the units entrusted to his command. The division which had advanced in the Banat and occupied Orsova still resisted for several weeks and, with the assistance of the inhabitants, successfully maintained a guerrilla warfare. The detachments of which this division was composed only surrendered, on December 7, after every means of resistance had been exhausted.

Once installed at Bucharest, the conquerors put the country under a rigorous levy. They were determined to leave to the miserable population only what was strictly necessary for bare subsistence, and, aided by a host of spies installed before the declaration of war or else recruited from the alien element of the population, they proceeded to despoil the unfortunates who remained in their power. Houses which had been abandoned by their owners were generally pillaged ; valuable collections of foodstuffs, etc., were sent off to Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey ; and the parcels of 5 kilogrammes in weight which every soldier had the right to send to his people at home slowly depleted the country of nearly all its remaining produce.

But the Russian defence on the Sereth was being solidly organised, thus giving the Romanians time to rally and reconstruct their forces. At Namoloasa, where it had been necessary to turn the system of fortifications originally directed against the Russians towards the south, the German thrust was repulsed. There was danger only on the Putna side, where the natural line of defence supplied by a great river was lacking. Moreover, since it marked the easiest passage through the Carpathians, this district was invaded by General Arz's best Austrian troops—the Bosnians. On that side it was necessary to push up as far as the Trotus line, which more than

once was endangered, Ocna (Tîrgul Okna), with its great salt-works, having been transformed by the enemy artillery into a heap of ruins. As for the Dôbruja, where the Russians alone had remained in the breach, the province had been completely abandoned after the battles at Macin (December 30, 31). In the Putna region the Romanians still held the line at the end of the year.

In spite of accumulated misfortune ; in spite of the suspicion that the Russians were betraying the common cause ; in spite of the rumours that Stürmer, President of the Council, in connivance with the members of that secret faction which dominated the Tsar's Court, had agreed with the Germans that Russia should cede Walachia to the Austrians while keeping Moldavia for herself, it was determined at Jassy, to which place the King, the Queen (heart and soul of this heroic resistance), the Ministers, and the Parliament had retired, never to give up a struggle which, although military opportunity had been lost, and even political aims, it would seem, also would have to be abandoned, yet remained a supreme moral duty which none dreamed of relinquishing.

In Parliament, which had been convened in December at the time when Braila was in enemy occupation and the battle of Ramnicu-Sarat was ending in a forced retreat, the determination to continue to the end on the political lines already laid down was affirmed in the most vigorous fashion. The Ministry was reconstructed with M. Take Ionescu as Vice-President. The Liberal party and the Conservative party united with the democratic factions and voted solidly in favour of a vigorous prosecution of the war. On January 1, 1917 (Old Style), in a stirring "Order of the Day" the King, whom the French Press called "Ferdinand the Loyal," exhorted his army to continue its sacrifices ; and never, despite the fact that hope seemed far distant, had the Royal family enjoyed such touching popularity as surrounded them in their retreat at Jassy.

The reconstruction of the army was actively carried on. The advent of the first soldiers, whose torn garments and pale emaciated faces bore the unforgettable imprint of defeat, was far from encouraging. It was feared that, in spite of the continual arrival of the Russians, who in January gained some small successes in the Bukovina, it would be impossible ever to rally regiments which had suffered so cruelly. At the same time the health of the soldiers, as well as that of the enormous refugee population in Jassy itself and in some of the other

Moldavian towns, was desperate. Every morning in the freezing cold the corpses of those who had succumbed during the night had to be collected from the horrible dens where these unfortunates were massed together ; and in the hospitals, where patients sought in vain for a place in the beds, they were found dead on the bare boards thick with encrusted filth.

Communication was extremely difficult ; weeks passed before news came of what was happening at Bucharest. A shudder of indignation ran through the crowd of refugees when they learned that although the venerable Carp, and more especially his old friend Majorescu, maintained an attitude of dignified reserve in their relations with the chiefs of the army of occupation, other politicians, such as M. Marghiloman, adducing the sufferings of the civil population as their excuse, treated the Germans as their guests, and even regarded them as future allies for a country which up till now had followed the wrong path.

General Berthelot's French mission remained in the midst of this difficult work of salvage and reconstruction, and the military representatives of the Allies encouraged it with their presence. But the munitions, aircraft, heavy artillery and machine-guns did not arrive from Russia, where—and indisputable proofs of this were not to be long delayed—many things were done to prevent the resuscitation of the Romanian army.

One great consolation in the days of that dreadful winter was the news in the beginning of February that the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, who refused to forgo the unrestricted use of her submarines. Brazil's decision, which followed instantly, seemed to announce a coalition of the neutral countries against those who by the methods they employed had brought dishonour on the name of war. Very soon came the news of the strong Anglo-French attack which forced the Germans to fall back on the Aisne. Still more encouraging was President Wilson's Note, which laid down as a dominating principle of a future peace that " no nation should be governed against its will, and no Government shall be able to exercise a domination over a people without their consent."

Nevertheless the Russian Revolution in March dealt a heavy blow at the reconstructional efforts of the Romanians. The Russian troops then in Moldavia became completely demoralised. At Jassy the soldiers paraded the streets wearing huge red cockades. They established their Soviet at Secola, near


the capital, and even went so far as to adopt a threatening attitude towards the King, the Queen, and the Romanian officers.

The Austrian offer of peace to the new Republic seemed to have sealed the fate of Transylvania and the Bukovina at the time when the Allies were winning great victories on the western front, and had advanced as far as the "Siegfried line."

On May 23, however, King Ferdinand was able to review the regiments of his army, which was now completely re-formed and again ready to fight for the honour and liberation of the country. He had found in the nation itself the support necessary to assist him in escaping the Russian stroke aimed at him on St. George's Day, and he had promised the peasants in his army the distribution—too long deferred, in spite of the agrarian agitation of 1907—of the lands which were to be bought back from the big proprietors. The emissaries of the Allies, Messrs. Albert Thomas, Vandervelde, and an American General were also present, and were able to appreciate the valiant bearing of these troops, all ready again to march against the foe.

The new Romanian offensive force consisted of two armies, comprising five army corps, completely reorganised, each corps having three divisions, and each division four regiments of infantry, a brigade of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, in addition to auxiliary services. In all they had at their disposal some 300,000 men, already experienced in warfare and determined at any sacrifice to recapture the rich countries in enemy occupation. This army was to collaborate with Russian troops (composed partly of Bessarabians of the same race as themselves) in an effort to be made first at Putna, and then on the Sereth as well, to break through the lines of an enemy who, while renewing the offensive in the West, still retained a sufficient number of soldiers to defend the precious lands that he had conquered.

Before prosecuting this offensive the Romanian Parliament, in session at Jassy, occupied itself for two months with the peasant question. The solution which the King imposed on the two chief parties, who, as has already been seen, were both represented in the Ministry itself, comprised the expropriation of two million hectares, the distribution of which was to form the object of a future law, the former proprietors of the land retaining the mineral rights. In spite of the inadequacy of this reform, which was subjected to much criticism, it made a strong impression on public opinion. It greatly endeared



the King to the soldiers, who were already filled with admiration for the Queen, the brave and indefatigable consoler of their sufferings ; and these sentiments were destined to act as the chief moral factor in the future victory.

Meanwhile, the Germans were getting exhausted by their repeated attacks on the Chemin des Dames, while the main Austrian force was held up by Italian assaults on the Vodice side. At the beginning of June 1917 Brusilov, whose collaboration had completely failed in 1916, took command of the Russian troops operating against Austria. Then, as though to indicate to the Romanians the splendid final goal towards which their efforts were to be directed, President Wilson declared to the Socialist Kerenski, head of the Russian Government, who had just ousted the last of the *bourgeoisie* from the Provisional Government, that "every people was to be delivered from the aggressions of autocratic violence in such fashion as, while totally changing the *status quo*, should henceforward render impossible the old injustices which were inimical to international peace ; and no nation was to be forced against its will to remain under the domination of another."

When he received the Romanian volunteers, former subjects of Austria-Hungary, who had just left the prison camps in Russia, the King spoke to them of "the hopes of a long series of centuries" and of "the will of a whole people, which this time would not be again frustrated." Even the deputy Stephen Pop dared in the Chamber at Pest to demand rights for the Romanians of Transylvania.

The Russian campaign in Galicia started brilliantly, the Austrians falling back in disorder and yielding ground in the battles of Brzezany and Kaminczy (first week of July). But very soon the spirit of the Red Armies was invaded by a panic, inexplicable did one not realise the demoralisation already resulting from Bolshevik propaganda. However, at the very moment when Brusilov's army was taking up its stand on the Lomnica and at Kalisz, where they were to encounter the Austrian offensive, conducted and supported by the Germans, the Romanians under General Averescu, at Marasti (near Namoloasa), with the help of those of their allies who had remained faithful to their duty, launched a great attack, so long and so well prepared that it was to open to them the road to Braila and Buzau, primary objectives of the operation.

The bulletin published on July 23 proclaimed the breaking through on a front of 20 kilometres in length and 3 in depth

and the occupation of a group of villages. The enemy—the Austrians in particular—had fled in disorder to the line of the old frontier, abandoning, in addition to a limited number of prisoners, 43 guns. The advance continued for five days, but was arrested by the news of the Russian disaster in Galicia: Brusilov's front had been broken at Zloczow, and the fugitives were making for Kolomea, pursued by the Austro-Germans eager to regain the Bukovina, and thus in the north to open a road to long-coveted Moldavia. The 1st Army, which, on the Sereth, awaited the signal to advance, had, after the offensive had been prepared by a violent bombardment, definitely to renounce its allotted mission.

Thus on the morrow of a signal victory which had been hailed by the public with unspeakable enthusiasm, and by the soldiers with the fervent hope of being able to return to their villages, it was necessary once more to consider a defensive at the cost of the cruellest sacrifices. Already the conquerors of the Russians were arriving in the Suceava district. They menaced Dorohoi and Botoșani, whence they would be able to reach Jassy. The Romanian troops which had replaced their allies in Southern Bukovina were not strong enough to resist for long; and at the same time Marshal Mackensen, chief of the army of occupation in Walachia, was assembling all the troops at his disposal in order to launch at Marasesti on the Sereth the great decisive coup by which he intended not only to gain possession of Moldavia, but also, after the capitulation of the new Romanian army, to force a road to Bessarabia, to Odessa and to Southern Russia.

The German offensive, begun on August 4, gained ground chiefly by reason of the unlooked-for retreat of the first-line Russian regiments. The Romanians near Tecucuiu (Tecuci), hurriedly warned of this defection, brought up the 8th Regiment of Infantry and the 3rd Rifles, supported by the 32nd Infantry, and stopped the breach made by the violent thrust of the Bavarians. But the invaders were not to be so easily repulsed. Day after day, supported by formidable artillery, they renewed their attacks. The 5th and the 9th Romanian divisions resisted successfully—the 9th Rifles were almost annihilated. The ruins of the little town of Marasesti, and the forest of Osmesti shattered by shells, bear witness to these furious conflicts which, up to the middle of September, took place in defence not only of the remnants of Romania's territory, but of the whole future of the nation. The final result was the defeat of Mackensen, who had to abandon his objec-

tives. Five Romanian divisions had held their ground during August and September against ten divisions of the Central Powers. In the Ocna Mountains some ground was lost, but in this other field of operations the Austrians did not succeed in gaining their goal, despite the crushing superiority of the forces with which they opposed the 2nd Army.

The Times gave due recognition to the series of actions as battles in which Romanian heroism had been gloriously vindicated in a defence only equalled in valour by that of the Belgians or the Serbians ; and Mr. Lloyd George in his speech at Birkenhead affirmed that the Allies would never forget the brilliant manner in which Romania had fulfilled her duty. The English statesman might further have referred to the immensity of the sacrifices made by the Romanians in the invaded portions of their country.

But the Russian army, seduced by the mirage of a " peace without annexations and without compensations," existed no longer except in name. It was broken up into pillaging bands, who even went so far as, at Folticeni (Foltești) and at Galatz, to take possession of Romanian towns : it was necessary to chase them out at the point of the bayonet.

During the autumn of 1917, the Allies' attempt to restore the Ukraine was defeated by the treason of the Government of Kiev. Eventually General Shcherbachév, commander in name rather than in reality of the Romanian front, hastened to offer the Germans an armistice which was accepted (armistice of December 10). He had thought, as deputy of King Ferdinand, to be able to make his offer also in the name of the Romanian troops, at the time when at Brest-Litovsk the peace negotiations were being long drawn out, and Mackensen was imperiously demanding that the Romanians should make an immediate decision.

The Prime Minister M. Bratianu, with M. Take Ionescu, resigned in January 1918, and General Averescu came into power. To him fell the sad task of making terms with Kühlmann—the German Minister for Foreign Affairs sent specially to Bucharest for this purpose—and with the vindictive Count Czernin, who was determined to be revenged on " criminal " Romania. During the negotiations at Buftea (near Bucharest) the abandonment of the Dóbruja was demanded, the southern portion to revert immediately to the Bulgarians and the remainder to form a perquisite of the victors. Further, the enemy claimed the sacrifice of the whole line of the ridge of the Carpathians, and there were foreshadowed future economic



M. BRATIANU, RUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER.

Peace Conference Delegate for Rumania.

clauses which amounted to slavery. The preliminary " peace " was signed on March 5, and Germany insisted on the conclusion of a definite treaty. M. Marghiloman was summoned from Bucharest to try to obtain some mitigation of the rigour of the clauses which, in an interview on March 19, Count Czernin had communicated directly to the King himself. On May 7 he was obliged to initial the Peace of Bucharest.

CHAPTER XII

DELIVERANCE ; AND THE ROMANIAN UNION SINCE THE WAR

THE Treaty of Bucharest had the great advantage of proving to the Allies, and indeed to the whole world, what were the German intentions in regard to any country which they succeeded in conquering, and any people thus made subject to their will. The army was to be demobilised, or rather annihilated, unless Romania consented to the military alliance so ardently desired at Berlin. The very small proportion of it which might remain in addition to the eight divisions at peace strength (about 30,000 men) would only be retained "up to the time when, following on the military operations executed by the Central Powers in the Ukraine, the frontiers of Romania should be no longer in danger. . . ." All instruments of warfare were to be "held" by the Germans until a general peace was concluded. The same measures were taken in regard to the uniforms of which, when they returned to their homes, the soldiers, and even the officers, were brutally despoiled in order that they might be readjusted to meet the needs of the Turks or the Bulgarians. No Romanian uniform whatever was tolerated in the occupied territory, the complete evacuation of which was subject to complicated clauses of the treaty and thus indefinitely delayed.

The Romanian boats were to be "placed at the disposal of the agents charged with the task of policing the rivers" on the basis of a special Convention. The organisation of the "economic exploitation"—such is the term used even in the Romanian version of the treaty—was to remain at Bucharest and in the Walachian villages with the same functions as before, and the "administration of occupation" would remain until the ratification; and even after that period, until the end of the occupation, "the Romanian Government having so desired," a civil functionary of this administration should be added to the Romanian public services. Until a new disposition was made, "all means of communication and correspondence would

belong to the military administration aforesaid." The "high command" would take part in the conduct of the National Bank, and in the Caisse Centrale of the public banks. Romanian courts of law were not to try even the civil actions of the German soldiers and their assistants, and German martial law alone would deal with contraventions of the military regulations. Permission for the return of the emigrants into Moldavia would be conditional on the importation of sufficient provisions for "their maintenance." Requisitions would continue throughout the year 1918, and the Romanian Government must undertake to execute the orders issued on this subject by the victors. After the ratification, the army of occupation must be supported by Romania; over and above the provisions required for this purpose, the remaining produce of the country should, for eight years, be at the disposal of Germany, and that at her own price, fixed unalterably, and subject to no subsequent revision.

A special chapter reduced the European Commission of the Danube to a mere agency for the owners of riverside property, and foreshadowed the passing at Munich of a new Act dealing with all property on the banks of the river. The works at Severin were to be ceded to Austria-Hungary at a ridiculously low price. Under some kind of formula Germany took for herself the port of Giurgiu (Giurgevo). The monopoly of the petroleum-producing lands was secured to a German company created *ad hoc*, which would enjoy the free disposal of all rights connected with them.

These clauses were all extremely onerous; but what was most sadly resented was the loss of the Dóbruja, across which despoiled Romania was offered a free path to the sea, and the loss of those richly-wooded mountains where were situated the finest of the monasteries which from time immemorial had belonged to the country.

The Marghiloman Ministry, held responsible for the signing of such a ruinous and humiliating treaty—the ratification of which, however, one must remember, thanks in particular to the King's resistance, was delayed—was regarded with intense dislike by the great majority of the nation, who had anticipated from a victory of the Allies the liberation of the country and the attainment of that ideal to which had been sacrificed 800,000 men—killed in battle, dead of wounds and disease, of defeat and misery, prisoners in lands from which they were never to return, or struck down by epidemics in their own villages. The Parliament elected under pressure of the alien

occupiers of the country carried no weight, and the new agrarian reforms—reactionary in trend—did much to discredit this legislative body, whose whole work was eventually to be annulled by the King.

The popularity of General Averescu was, in spite of the fact that to him were attributed the sanguinary repression of the agrarian riots of 1907 and the too rapid conclusion of the “preliminaries” at Buftea, in the ascendant ; and the Conservative party took advantage of the esteem in which he was held by joining, in company of the great mass of the peasantry, his “People’s League,” which only in 1920 was to become a genuine “party.”

Very soon the new Allied offensive was begun in the west. At Jassy the progress, slow but sure, of General Foch was followed with feverish impatience ; it could not be concealed from the inhabitants of the occupied territory, although by newspapers which stopped at nothing in order to discredit the Entente and its Romanian friends every effort was made to corrupt their *moral*. Already in September the hopeless condition of William II’s armies and the desperate expedients to which they were reduced were common knowledge, and very soon the defection of Bulgaria, by opening to the troops from Salonika a road to devastated and tyrannised Serbia, announced to the Romanians also the hour of deliverance.

This hour was to be also that of National Union. General Berthelot’s soldiers, who after the tragedy of Buftea had been obliged to quit the country, now reappeared on the Danube. The quite unexpected departure of Mackensen’s troops, in spite of the fact that they carried with them a great part of the still available riches of the kingdom, partook of the nature of a flight.

At Jassy, M. Marghiloman had been obliged to resign ; his Ministry was replaced by one formed of generals and officials, with General Coanda as President, and as War Minister the victor of Marăsești, General Jeremiah Grigorescu. War was instantly declared on the Central Powers ; and the Romanian army began its advance. The rapidity, however, with which the evacuation was carried out prevented all chance of a battle. At the beginning of December General Berthelot welcomed the King and Queen and the members of the Royal family at the gates of Bucharest ; and an enraptured multitude which had menacingly accompanied the German exodus now streamed in exultation past the sovereigns of whose return they had dreamed for so long.

As early as the spring of 1917, in the midst of the calamities which overwhelmed the mother-country, Bessarabia had taken steps which were definitely to separate her from Russia, to which she had been reunited by force. At a National Assembly held at Odessa in the month of April of that year, at a meeting of Moldavian soldiers from the Romanian front, the preliminary decisions had been taken ; and in October a National Council was established to administer a province which thus became entirely autonomous.

On January 24, 1918, the Bessarabian " Republic " formally severed itself from the Russian republican organisations. Russia thereupon declared war on Romania, whence Romanian troops had already been summoned to stem the chaos caused by the retreating Bolshevik soldiers. There was a good deal of fighting on the frontier, and a pitched battle was waged at Bender. But Russia, once more in conflict with Germany, could not maintain this war as well and peace was concluded after a few weeks. On March 27, the National Council voted for the union of Bessarabia with Romania. The conditions of such union were to be decided later.

Mention has already been made of the declaration of one of the Romanian deputies to the Parliament at Pest claiming not only the indefeasible rights of the nation, but also requesting the intervention of the Allies in order that those rights should be formally recognised and duly guaranteed. In Transylvania, exhausted by a war undertaken against all the interests of the subject nationalities, the old " traditional policy," which consisted in looking to the Viennese Court and the Habsburg dynasty for the redress of wrongs inflicted by Hungary, had already been abandoned.

When it became known that the reply given to the German Ambassador's demand for intervention was in favour of an " equitable " peace—a point of view both new and frankly revolutionary, and confirming that formerly held of the complete liberty of every nation in regard to its future destiny—hope grew still brighter.

In December 1918 the heads of the National party convened a great Assembly at Alba-Iulia, the transient capital of Michael the Brave—that old city whose very name holds something almost of magic for the Romanian people. Even the Socialists attended this Assembly, and after explanations, enthusiastically received, of the situation as it now stood, those decisions were unanimously taken which to-day form the basis of legislation for emancipated Transylvania. The union of the

province with the mother-country was proclaimed, and at the same time the non-Romanian members of the population were promised the widest consideration for their rights in all the territories concerned. MM. Maniu and Vaida, together with the future Orthodox Metropolitan, Nicholas Balan, went to present the Act of Union to King Ferdinand.

The Saxon colonies of Transylvania duly recognised this "Greater Romania," to which henceforward they entrusted their future. These descendants of the merchants of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries were well aware that reunion would open the old channels of commerce in the direction of the Danube and the Black Sea, and they hoped to be able to combine all the units of their race living within the frontiers of the new State into a single political organisation capable of imposing their point of view on the Government at Bucharest ; and in this, as a matter of fact, they were successful. The Magyars alone remained irreconcilable. They could not, and still cannot, believe in the reality of the catastrophe which tore from them the land which they had dominated and exploited for eight centuries. Headed by the chiefs of their two religions Calvinist and Catholic, they awaited the moment they believed imminent when the troops of the Hungarian Republic would make a triumphant re-entry into Transylvania.

The Bukovina, where in recent times the Ruthenians threatened to monopolise even the Church, which was of old Romanian foundation, had passed through the same trials only to arrive at a similar result. The Austrian party, those who, like M. Aurelle Onciul, hoped to be able to bring the whole Romanian race under the sceptre of the Habsburgs, ventured on a final effort of opposition to the march of history ; but, led by MM. J. Floudor and J. Nistor, the Romanians of the Bukovina in November acclaimed the Union, and the Romanian troops were prepared to guarantee it. The Germans of the province also announced their adherence to this *fait accompli*.

The Romanian troops did not enter Transylvania until after the solemn declaration of the Union ; it was not, therefore, a conquest that the army of the kingdom undertook. As Allies of the Entente the Romanians came to occupy the territory as far as the River Maros, in accordance with a military convention concluded by General Franchet d'Esperey with the Hungarian Government. In view of the critical position in which a large part of the Romanian population of Upper Transylvania and the neighbouring districts found itself, it became necessary to proceed further and advance as far as the

line running from Baia-Mara (Nagy-Banya) to Huedin (Vajda-Hunyad). But, after having occupied this line of demarcation, the sufferings of their co-nationals who still remained beyond it demanded intervention.

The army, rapidly reorganised under General Prezau, who had also been active in these regions in 1917, accomplished his task by means of a swift offensive which carried the Romanian standards as far as the Tisza (April 16, 1919), the only natural frontier towards the west. Everywhere was encountered evidence of the violence and the outrages committed by the so-called Hungarian Communists, who, however, were more often simply Magyars thirsting to avenge themselves as soon as possible on the despised "Walachians."

A decisive action was necessary to consolidate the situation. From May to September Bela Khun's Government ceaselessly prepared for a renewed offensive against the Romanians. An attack on the Tisza seemed to promise these invaders the victory of which they already discounted the fruits. The troops of Generals Mardarescu and Mosiou fell back, only to advance again with all their force. Not only were the soldiers of the Magyar Commune thrown back beyond the border, but, taking advantage of the impetus gained, the conquerors traversed the plains with extraordinary rapidity, and made for Budapest, which was occupied. This action was conceived less as an act of revenge for the installation of the Central Powers at Bucharest than as an elementary measure of protection against a nation which had shown itself loath to recognise the doctrine of self-determination, and against a régime which dreamed only of extending the hand of friendship to its Russian comrades at Moscow across a Romania revolutionised and subjected by force of arms to fresh economic exploitation (August 1919).

At this time, and for nearly a year afterwards, the internal conditions of the kingdom, and more especially of the provinces which had formed part of it before the war, were far from satisfactory. The enemy occupation had left wounds which were slow to heal. Provisions had become scarce ; clothing was lacking ; wages rose continually, nor were the demands of the workers thereby diminished. The hand of the foreigner fomenting trouble in order to crush the work of the Union could be distinctly discerned.

In Bessarabia General Poetas was killed in a revolt, the instigators of which came from beyond the Dniester. Chotin,

where the Russian Bolsheviks had entrenched themselves, had to be taken by assault. Romanian Socialism showed visible links with the new rulers of Russia. Values fell unceasingly. Legitimate business languished, but that did not prevent the post-war pirates from realising criminal fortunes in hazardous speculations. From all of which resulted a condition of lassitude and discouragement, the more acute in that M. J. J. Bratianu, who had again come into power in the autumn of 1918, did not see fit to form a new Parliament, that of Jassy, deserted by its members who had fled abroad, having been dissolved. The victory over the Magyars served, however, to raise the public spirit.

But relations with the Allies were still strained, and the attitude taken by the Powers towards the invasion of Hungary was strongly resented. An attempt had been made to prevent the Romanian army from marching on Budapest, and, that town once occupied, their speedy departure was insistently urged, and their booty strictly limited, regardless of the state of destitution to which the Central Powers themselves had reduced Romania in 1916-18. The loss of the western portion of the Banat, which had been allotted to Serbia, and the restriction of the Romanian frontiers in the north, also roused bitter emotion. Although the Serbs in the Banat were admittedly more numerous than the Romanians, it was argued by the latter that the Swabians, who together with the Romanians outnumbered the Serbs, desired to be reunited with their kinsmen, the Saxons of Transylvania. Neither side considered the wishes of the Magyars, whose numbers were also considerable. Apprehensions arose as well concerning the administration of the Danube and the petroleum policy, while in the Statute of Nationalities imposed on the united kingdom the Romanians seemed to see an attack on their sovereign rights.

When, after a long and fruitless sojourn, M. Bratianu returned from Paris, he posed as a determined opponent of this policy of surrender and encroachment. Faced in October with an ultimatum from the Allies, he resigned, and the King formed a new Cabinet of generals and officials, of which General Vaitoanu was the head, with a mandate to call a general election.

At this election, in which, owing to the unorthodox character of the Ministry, M. Take Ionescu's followers abstained from taking part, General Averescu's "League," formed of incongruous elements, together with the Socialists, gave a strong

majority to the new parties of the old kingdom—the Peasant party and the National Democratic party.

The representatives of Transylvania, Bessarabia and the Bukovina united to form a democratic section, and for the first time the monarch had to seek from the ranks of a parliamentary majority the personnel of his Cabinet, of which the head was Dr. A. Vaida-Voevod. This Cabinet took upon itself, by signing peace with Austria-Hungary and with Germany, the task of dispelling misunderstandings with the Entente, as well as that of giving to the country great social and administrative reforms. An Agrarian Act was passed for Bessarabia.

Dr. Vaida-Voevod's term of office was, however, short. He was vigorously opposed by the Bessarabian and Transylvanian parties, and while he was in Paris negotiating with the Supreme Council for their recognition of the union between Romania and Bessarabia, his deputy at Bucharest, M. S. Pop, resigned office without previously consulting him. General Averescu returned to power, and at the subsequent general election his party—the People's party—supported by the National Liberals and by the Conservative Democrats under M. Take Ionescu, gained a victory which placed them in a strong position. M. Take Ionescu was appointed Foreign Minister, and in the autumn of 1920 a defensive alliance was formed between Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, thus forming the "Little Entente."

In 1921 General Averescu's Government carried two important measures. One dealt with the age-old, burning question of the land. By it the State was empowered to acquire all estates of more than 300 hectares in extent, with the exception of vineyards, forests, orchards and oil-fields. The land thus acquired was to be divided among the peasants, who were to pay for it in instalments spread over a long period of years.¹ In the same year the alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were placed on a more definite basis, and a provisional defensive alliance was arranged with Poland.

In December General Averescu resigned, and was succeeded by M. Take Ionescu, who, however, defeated on a vote of confidence, resigned in the following month. He died a few months later.

Political conditions were gradually becoming more normal. The numerous parties which, in Romania as elsewhere, the war and its aftermath had brought into existence, disappeared or

¹ See p. 301.

were absorbed. The Liberals, who, under M. Bratianu, returned to power after the resignation of M. Take Ionescu, had a solid working majority. Their most important measures during 1922 were financial. The budget, for the first time since the war, showed a credit balance,¹ and the floating debt, created by the extensive issue of treasury bills payable in foreign currency, was consolidated. Nevertheless, largely owing to the heavy taxation of exports, the leu (franc) continued to fall in value, and there was considerable distress throughout the country.² It must inevitably be some years before Romania can completely recover from the ravages which she suffered during the war, or adjust herself to the new conditions involved in the sudden acquisition of territories which, though the majority of their population is of kindred blood, contain a large alien, and in some cases a hostile, element. But in favourable circumstances, and under stable government, her rich internal resources should secure to the country a prosperous future.

¹ Revenue 6,226,900, expenditure 5,545,411 thousand lei.

² Exchange (December 1923) about 850 lei to the £ sterling.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

B.C.

840 *circa.* The Getae (Dacians) cross the Danube into Walachia.
111. Advent of the Romans.

A.D.

86. Decebalus drives back the Romans; Domitian's indecisive campaign follows.

101. Trajan's first expedition.

106. Trajan conquers the Dacians.

212 *circa.* Caracalla defeats Dacian invaders.

247. Goths invade the country.

274 *circa.* Romans retire.

375. Invasion by the Huns.

454 *circa.* Invasion by the Gepidae.

550 *circa.* Invasion by the Lombards and Avars.

626. Avars defeated by Heraclius.

810-1018. Bulgarians occupy Western Romania.

889. Hungarians occupy Eastern Romania.

1020 *circa.* Hungarians annex Transylvania.

1050 *circa.* Kumans occupy Romania.

1220 *circa.* Advent of Teutonic Knights and Knights of St. John for a few years.

1250-1350 *circa.* Gradual formation of the Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia.

1294. *circa.* The Turks first enter Walachia and slowly reduce it to a tributary State (*circa* 1456).

1457-1504. Stephen the Great, Prince of Moldavia; defeats the Turks at Racova (Vaslui) in 1475.

1513. Moldavia becomes tributary to the Turks.

1593. Michael the Brave, Prince of Walachia, drives out the Turks and makes himself Prince of Walachia, Transylvania and Moldavia.

1620 *circa.* The Turks reassert their supremacy in the two Principalities.

1638-54. Prosperity of the Principalities during the peaceful reigns of the contemporaries, Mathew Basarab and Basil the Wolf.

1699. Peace of Karlowitz: Transylvania assigned to Austria.

1711. Russia first intervenes unsuccessfully in Moldavia.

1714. The Turks depose and execute Constantine Brancovan, Prince of Walachia.

A.D.

1714-16. Beginning of the Phanariot régime.
 1739. Moldavia invaded by Russia. Peace of Belgrade.
 1768. Principalities swear allegiance to Catherine of Russia.
 1774. Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji.
 1777. The Bukovina ceded to Austria.
 1806-12. Russo-Turkish War. The Principalities occupied by Russia.
 1812. Treaty of Bucharest. Russia retains Bessarabia.
 1822. Ypsilanti's rebellion in Moldavia. End of Phanariot rule.
 1826. The Convention of Akerman.
 1829. Treaty of Adrianople.
 1849. Convention of Balta Liman.
 1856. Treaty of Paris. Southern Bessarabia restored to Moldavia. Guarantee of the Powers.
 1859. Union of the Principalities under John Alexander Cuza.
 1866. Abdication of Cuza. Election of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. New constitution drawn up.
 1877-8. Independence of Romania proclaimed. Romania cooperates in Russo-Turkish War. Siege of Plevna.
 1878. Congress of Berlin. Bessarabia returned to Russia. Romania acquires the Dóbruja.
 1881. Romania proclaimed a kingdom.
 1883. Secret defensive alliance between Romania and Austria-Hungary.
 1907. Agrarian revolt.
 1913. Silistra granted to Romania. Invasion of Bulgaria. Treaty of Bucharest.
 1914. Death of King Charles and accession of King Ferdinand (October).
 1916. Treaty between Romania and Allies (July). Romania enters the war. Fall of Bucharest (December).
 1917. Armistice with Central Powers (December).
 1918. Bolshevik Government declares war on Romania (January). Peace of Bucharest (May). Union of Transylvania and the Bukovina with Romania (November, December).
 1919. Union of Bessarabia with Romania (April). Invasion of Hungary. Budapest occupied (August).
 1920. Defensive alliance between Romania, Czecho-Slovakia, and Yugoslavia.
 1922. Marriage of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and Princess Marie of Romania. Coronation of King Ferdinand and Queen Marie at Alba Iulia.

B—ECONOMICS

CHAPTER I

GENERAL

BEFORE the War the kingdom of Romania had an area of approximately 53,500 sq. miles, with a population of under 8,000,000. The Peace Treaties have added Bessarabia, the Bukovina, Transylvania and parts of Eastern Hungary, with the result that the area is more than doubled (about 122,300 sq. miles¹), as is also the population, which is now estimated as nearly 17,400,000. The new State thus bears to the old much the same relation as the new Yugoslav State bears to the old kingdom of Serbia ; in both cases, also, the old kingdoms form the largest single element in the new States.

The old kingdom of Romania, however, showed one marked contrast with the kingdom of Serbia. It was an important feature of the latter—and one which had profoundly influenced alike its political and its economic history—that it had no seaboard, and further, that it faced an area which had no need of its products. On the other hand, the old kingdom of Romania had a considerable stretch of coastline, with the important port of Constantsa, and had also access to the Lower Danube, an admirable waterway, with good ports near its mouth. By means of these ports the country had free communication with the great sea-routes of Europe, and could export its produce to a relatively distant market ; Serbia, on the other hand, could only export across land-frontiers, and was liable to have her external commerce checked or interrupted by artificial barriers, such as tariffs or, in the case of livestock, burdensome sanitary regulations.

Two features of the pre-war foreign trade of Romania are explained, at least partially, by the access to the Mediterranean and thus to the great ocean-ways. These are its importance (relative to that of the other Balkan States), and the enormous preponderance of grain and flour in the exports. As to the first point we find that the total foreign trade of Romania was greater than that of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria combined, a

¹ That is, slightly larger than the United Kingdom.

fact not wholly accounted for by the greater fertility of the land. Among the exports, cereals accounted for nearly 80 per cent. of the total (average of period 1910-11). Among the other three States only Bulgaria, with a total export trade of less than a quarter of that of Romania, shows an approach to this condition, cereals forming in the same period about 68 per cent. of the total exports. Romanian cereals found their chief market in North-western Europe, over one-third of the total going to Belgium, though part of this total was re-exported to Britain and to the Rhine countries. Other important customers were England, Holland and France.

The whole economic system of pre-war Romania was based upon this export of grain and flour to North-western Europe. We have already seen that as a result of the war a very large increase of territory has been obtained. But before we can consider, with any profit, the resources of these new lands—or indeed of the old—we have to face a much more fundamental problem. This is the question whether the addition of these new lands is likely to render it easier, or more difficult, for development to continue along the old lines. Before the war Romania, despite financial crises due to occasional bad harvests, appeared to be prosperous and stable. The market for its agricultural products seemed inexhaustible and these exports were steadily increasing. Is it probable that the new territories will fit into the old framework, so that development will be continuous?

Any attempt to answer this question involves a consideration of three sets of facts. It is clear, in the first place, that the answer depends upon the nature of the new lands and the occupations of their inhabitants at the time when they were taken over. Secondly, since Romania's pre-war prosperity depended upon her water-borne trade, the question of the economic relations of the new territories is important. If these economic relations have been ruptured by the redistribution of frontiers, the establishment of new ones must obviously be a slow process, and may encounter considerable physical and political obstacles. Finally, since the absorption of so great a bulk of territory must present great difficulties to a small State, ever under the most favourable conditions, and therefore much more after a devastating war which has shaken the old kingdom to its foundations, we have to consider Romania's response to the new claims made upon her, and the effect this is likely to have on the economic stability of the new unit.

As regards the first point we may say that, broadly speaking, the new territories are similar in character to the old. Differences there are, which will have to be considered later in some detail. Meantime it is sufficient to say that while certain areas, notably Transylvania, add greatly to Romania's forest wealth; while others, including both Bessarabia and Transylvania, rear livestock on a scale far greater than that practised in the old kingdom; while, finally, parts of Transylvania and the Romanian Banat not only add to the kingdom's mineral resources but show at least the beginnings of large-scale industry: yet, nevertheless, the inhabitants of the new Romania, like those of the old, are predominantly engaged in agriculture, and the agriculture is of the same general type, yielding, in most cases, a surplus of cereals.

The second point, the question of the pre-war economic relations of the lands added, demands somewhat fuller consideration. The new territories have been obtained on the one hand from Austria-Hungary and on the other from Russia, and the direction of their pre-war commerce was determined largely by political considerations. Since Hungary and Romania alike produced a surplus of cereals, they were potential economic rivals. Before the war a certain condition of equilibrium between the two had been attained, thanks to Romania's marine outlets, while on the other hand friction between Serbia and Hungary was more or less chronic. The position then was that the internal market of Austria-Hungary was practically reserved to Hungary. That country also exported agricultural products to the adjacent lands of Central Europe, and reached the west through Fiume. Romania's cereals, on the other hand, as we have already seen, went chiefly to Western Europe by the seaway. In other words, the mountain border of the Old Romania was, to a large extent, a parting between two streams of trade, one directed landwards and the other seawards.

In considering the probable effects of the frontier changes upon future trade we must, in the first instance, be careful not to force the analogy of the mountain trade-parting to such an extent as to suggest the existence of an actual physical obstacle to trade. Railways, of course, already exist across the Transylvanian Alps, and it might at first sight appear a simple matter, in view of the demand for cereals in Western Europe, to divert the internal traffic to the ocean route. But we have to bear in mind, not only what is called geographical inertia—that is, the fact that it is never easy to deflect traffic suddenly

from an old route—but the effects of war devastation in Old Romania. Not only have railways and bridges been damaged—the great bridge over the Danube which feeds Constantsa was destroyed during the war, and had to be repaired—but rolling-stock on the railways and boats on the Danube have alike suffered severely, so that transport has become a serious problem. As a result of the war, indeed, the old kingdom is scarcely in a position to carry on export trade on anything like the old scale, and for the moment at least is finding it difficult to direct the surplus of the new territories towards her own outlets.

It may be said, however, that these new territories, in so far as they are ex-Hungarian, might continue to supply their old markets. But here the new frontiers and the political conditions impose a great obstacle. An example may serve to make these multiple difficulties clear.

The old kingdom, as a result of the war, has had its resources in livestock—never very great—seriously depleted. Transylvania, a great livestock-rearing area, and one spared by the war, has a large surplus of cattle. In the early summer of 1921 the breeders found that their pasture-lands would not feed all the cattle within the country, and that an outlet must be found. In view of the shortage in Old Romania, it would seem that an obvious market lay close at hand. But, although permission was granted to the Transylvanian breeders to export cattle, they found the adjacent market practically closed, first by the opposition of the Romanian meat trust, which feared a sudden fall in price, and second by the transport difficulty.

In Austria, however, the demand for meat was very great, and arrangements were made to solve the transport problem by sending the necessary rolling-stock to the Romanian frontier. But Hungary refused the necessary permission for the export to take place, or, in other words, reacted to Romanian Transylvania in the same way as in earlier days, she had acted towards Serbia. A way out of the impasse was found to some extent by exporting the surplus cattle to Italy through Yugoslav territory; but it is probable that the livestock industry of Transylvania has received a check from which it may take some time to recover.

Turn next to Bessarabia, formerly a part of the great Russian Empire. Bessarabia, under Russian rule, had a surplus of grain and flour. Part of this, especially that from the western half, of the province, found an exit by Galatz on the Danube.

This trade will therefore probably continue to follow its old route. Another part, that from the east of the province, went to Odessa, and was exported from that port along with the produce of other Russian provinces, in the days when Russia was a great grain-exporting country. This trade will have to find a new orientation. The province had also a large livestock industry, the products of which found an exit chiefly over the old Austro-Hungarian border. This trade is apparently continuing to follow much the same route as before, for a considerable export is now taking place to Poland. Finally, Bessarabia had a considerable fruit-growing industry, including the vine, an inferior brand of wine being made on a considerable scale. Both fruit and wine found their market within Russia, where the demand was great ; for it will be recollected that the Black Sea coast of that country, the region where fruit grows best, is narrow, and Bessarabia and the Crimea between them supplied much of the large Russian market. The change in allegiance is likely to have an unfavourable effect on this industry.

It seems needless to elaborate the general subject in greater detail, for the point to be made is simple. The addition of the new territories has led to an apparent great increase in the resources of Romania. But to estimate those resources by adding the pre-war production of the old kingdom to that of the new lands is to run the risk of arriving at fallacious conclusions. The frontier changes have been made on racial grounds, and a community of race does not necessarily involve a community of economic interest. The rupture of old trade-relations is bound to lead, perhaps only for a time, to diminished production, and pre-war figures should be looked at with this caution in mind. To make a new, stable, economic unit of the combination of the old kingdom with so vast a stretch of additional land, reft from two great empires, is a problem which will require great skill and statesmanship ; and it is by no means certain that these are available.

Finally, Romania's most obvious response to post-war conditions is bringing in its train fresh economic difficulties. To understand this response it is necessary to bear in mind a fact which can hardly be too much emphasised in dealing with Eastern Europe, the fact that the acuteness of the racial conflict there is largely due to the way in which it is bound up with the agrarian question. The old kingdom had not solved the latter problem within its own borders, where it was not complicated by a racial one. It is her misfortune that she is

now required to face it simultaneously within her new frontiers and her old. To attach the Romanians, largely peasants, of the new lands to her she must free them from their dependence on the usually non-Romanian landowners, and has at the same time to solve the land question by consent within, where Romanian peasants seek "liberation" from Romanian lords. This has to be done also at a time when the restoration of production is the first economic need.

The essence of the agrarian problem, as it existed before the war, may be briefly stated. In the old kingdom, as indeed in most parts of Eastern Europe, a poor, depressed peasantry, largely mediæval in outlook, was opposed to a land-owning aristocracy, largely westernised, without the intervention either of a native middle-class or of a class of prosperous yeoman-farmers. The place of a native middle-class was largely taken by Jews, mainly of Polish (Russian) or Austrian origin. These held most of the fluid capital of the country, but were denied political rights, and were thus prevented from merging in the general community. Economically they were necessary alike to landowners and peasants; practically, however, they were disliked by both, and made the scapegoats of the evils inseparable from the general social polity.

The peasant as agricultural labourer was badly paid, the average wage for men being under a shilling a day; ill-fed also, for maize, the cereal most widely grown, is not a very satisfactory substitute for wheat, and the pig, so important a source of animal food in Serbia, was not largely kept: in consequence they were relatively inefficient. The estates on which they were employed were often of considerable size, the average estate in the grain-growing department of Braila, for instance, exceeding 5,000 acres in extent; the landlords were often absentees, and the estates frequently heavily mortgaged.

Peasant holdings did occur in considerable numbers, but were mostly too small to afford an adequate livelihood to their owners. Thus about 42 per cent. of the cultivable area, including about 8,200,000 acres, was distributed among over one million proprietors. A proportion of these, however, owned 25 acres, with the result that of the total 45 per cent. had less than 5 acres. On the other hand, 48 per cent. of the cultivable area, or about 9,350,000 acres, was divided among about 4,450 proprietors. As in Eastern Europe generally, acute land-hunger existed, and peasant risings, in the years before the war—especially in 1907—were not infrequent. Various unsuccessful attempts had been made to solve the land problem.

Part of the difficulty in doing this lay in the fact that large-scale production of cereals, especially of wheat, the most valuable, was carried on chiefly by the great landowners. They, and they alone, had the necessary capital to provide the requisite machinery and fertilisers, and to take the risk of bad harvests, not infrequent in Romania, and the knowledge and capacity required in a large-scale industry whose product supplied a foreign market. Thus any attempt to settle the agrarian question by distributing land to the peasants involved the risk of shattering the basis of the country's prosperity.

After the war, however, it became clear that a radical solution must be found, if only to render possible the absorption of the new territories. In these, as already suggested, the large owners were usually non-Romanians, often Magyars. It was to the interest of the central Government to weaken the power of these alien elements within the new State, and at the same time to strengthen the power of the Romanian element. This could best be attained by a division of the lands. But since the old kingdom had been largely occupied by the enemy and ravaged by the war, the restoration of cereal production there was also a prime need, and the original problem as to whether an uneducated peasantry could produce a large surplus of wheat for export remained. The first draft of the new Agrarian Law, in consequence, contemplated, not individual peasant proprietorship, but a system of co-operation among the peasants. This proposal, however, met with so much opposition from the peasants that it had to be abandoned. The plan at present being carried out, in pursuance of the measure adopted in 1921 (see p. 289), is that a certain amount of land, obtained by expropriation from the large estates, is to be divided out among the peasants. The landowners are to be compensated by annuities, half to be paid by the new owners and half by the State. The amount of land which each peasant is to obtain varies with the density of the population in the particular area concerned. Similarly, while originally it was proposed that no landowner should be allowed to retain more than about 250 acres of land, a more elastic arrangement has now been adopted, allowing of properties up to 300 hectares (about 740 acres) being held.

No details of the working-out of the proposed reform can yet be given—and it is too early to prophesy the probable result—but it is worth note that one of the minor difficulties which the old kingdom is facing at present is that the peasants show a certain reluctance to undertake the task of cultivation.

Among the minor causes of this is the fact that, owing to the breakdown of the transport system, there is a great demand for the peasants' draught animals for cartage purposes, and they find this a speedier and less laborious mode of earning money than using the animals for ploughing.

The new Agrarian Law is to apply not only to the old kingdom but to the new territories, and, taken in combination with the direct effects of the war, it is likely, at least in the immediate future, to result in a diminution of cereal production, as compared with the pre-war period. In view of the new resources in minerals and in power it has been suggested that the economic orientation of the country may be altered, and that it may become more nearly self-supporting, in place of exporting cereals and importing manufactured goods from the industrialised parts of Europe. But the establishment of a number of large industrial concerns in the country at present offers great difficulties, more especially in view of the collapse of the Romanian franc.¹

To sum up, then, we may say that while, as the following chapter shows in detail, the potential resources of Romania have been very greatly increased since the war, little can be said with any certainty as to the probable economic position of the new State in the immediate future. The war left the old kingdom in an apparently exhausted condition, and, within certain limits, recovery has been fairly rapid. This is shown by the fact that export of cereals, if on a much smaller scale than before, is already taking place. It is probable, however, that wheat at least will not meantime be produced there on the same scale as before. As regards the new State as a whole, it has to be remembered that Eastern Europe generally is still in a state of great unrest. Within what were the boundaries of Russia many different methods of solving the land question are being tried, and the ideals prompting the promoters of these must necessarily affect Romania, which includes territory formerly Russian, and has as her neighbour the new Hungary, still largely an uncertain quantity.

¹ About 850 lei (frances) to the £ (December 1923).

CHAPTER II

THE TERRITORIAL UNITS

THE OLD KINGDOM.—Historically Old Romania (i.e. before the Great War) may be said to consist of three parts, Walachia, Moldavia and the Dóbruja ; from the economic standpoint, however, it is better to regard it as composed of the three elements of the mountains, the hill-country and the plains. Since 1878 the last have been by far the most important ; but it was not always so. These plains have generally very fertile soil, and have been proved to be capable of bearing heavy crops of cereals, especially wheat and maize. But until Romania's independence was recognised they were thinly peopled, and in parts even presented the appearance of deserts. This was due to a combination of political and geographical causes. They are but a continuation of the vast plains of Southern Russia, and formed for centuries one of the main ways into the Balkan Peninsula from Russia and the lands beyond. They were thus too unsafe for settlement ; even Rome, it will be remembered, failed, save for a brief period, to maintain her rule here.

Geographically, also, their disadvantages seemed for long almost unsurmountable. Except along the rivers, water is scarce, making settlement very difficult. Even to-day scattered homesteads cannot be built, and the inhabitants live in large villages round a water-supply. There is little or no wood, also, so that fuel and building material are alike hard to obtain.

In contrast to the plains the wooded foot-hills, the natural home of the Romanian people, offer many advantages. Wood and water are plentiful ; the form of the land gives shelter both from foes and from the forces of nature. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, several kinds of cultivation can be carried on simultaneously. The slopes support vines and fruit-trees ; pastures are available for livestock ; in the valleys cereals and many kinds of vegetables can be grown. Of the cereals, maize is the most important, and even where he has descended to the plain the Romanian peasant retains his

preference for this plant, which yields him, in *mamaliga*, a kind of porridge, his chief article of diet. Maize is not only suited to the climatic conditions, but it is at once a highly productive crop—much more so than wheat—and also a far less exhausting one than the latter. In the hill-country, therefore, a small patch of land will support a family in tolerable comfort.

The third element, the mountain rim, is on the whole less important in the old kingdom than in Transylvania. It is unsuited for permanent settlement, owing to the severity of the winter climate. On the other hand it supplies summer pasturage, the shepherds migrating upwards as the snow melts, and descending to the lower grounds in winter. But these migratory herdsmen came rather from the northern than from the southern side, the inhabitants of the old kingdom not keeping livestock on a very large scale. Further, the mountains still carry, in many parts, their virgin forests, and are thus a source of timber. In the old kingdom, however, scientific forestry was little practised, and destructive fellings were permitted.

If these facts are correlated with what has been already said as to Romania's pre-war export of wheat, the basis of the country's prosperity since 1878 becomes at once apparent. The political possibility of colonising the plains coincided with an increasing demand for cheap food in Western Europe. Large areas of fertile land were available, combined with cheap, unorganised labour. Wheat, the food most in demand in the west, was little used within the country, save by the townspeople, and thus was chiefly exported. Maize was grown in quantities sufficient to supply not only the home demand but to leave a large margin for export. But the large-scale production of either wheat or maize could only be carried on with success on large estates, and successive increases of territory, e.g. in the Dóbruja area, have not led to a notable raising of the standard of life among the peasants—hence the increasing dissatisfaction among them. For, without knowledge and capital, a small holding in the plains is not of great value to its owner.

To make clear the importance of Romania's pre-war grain trade we may note that the country occupied the fifth place in the list of wheat-exporting areas, being surpassed only by Russia, Canada, Argentina and the United States of America. The following table is based on the statistics for the period 1909-14:

		Metric tons.
Russia	.	4,348,900
Canada	.	2,124,200
Argentina	.	2,118,200
United States	.	1,677,200
Romania	.	1,358,100

The export of maize in the same period was relatively even more important, for it considerably surpassed that of the United States and was inferior only to that of Argentina, the greatest maize-exporting country in the world—

		Metric tons.
Argentina	.	3,193,000
Romania	.	1,193,800
United States	.	1,010,100

Apart from grain and flour, the only items of any importance in Romania's list of exports were petroleum and wood. So much stress was laid during the war on the petroleum wells of the country that it may be a surprise to many to learn that in the period 1910-11 oil and its products only accounted for under 6 per cent. of the total exports, as against 80 per cent. for grain and flour. Wood, obtained from the Carpathian forests, amounted to under 4 per cent. of the total exports, the internal demand being great. All other exports were insignificant.

The import trade showed the same general characters as that of the other Balkan States. Thus food imports were quite small, proving not only that the country was self-supporting in this respect, but that the great bulk of the population did not manifest that dependence on tropical and sub-tropical produce which is so striking in Western Europe. In other words, coffee, tea, cocoa in its various forms, and so forth can only have been consumed on a very small scale in the towns, whilst for sugar, tobacco and fruit the country was mainly dependent on home supplies.

By far the most important items in the list of imports before the war were textile and metal goods, the latter including iron, steel and machinery. Germany's virtual monopoly of the supply of these latter goods—her share forming 33 per cent. of the total imports, while Great Britain supplied only 14½ per cent. (chiefly coal) and Belgium 4 per cent.—was due generally to quicker overland communications and the systematic commercial penetration of the country. Since the war the exchange has given Germany an additional advantage over ourselves and Belgium, and it is probable that trade will continue to follow the old lines.

It may be mentioned that Romania imported 88,000 tons of metal goods, value 850,000,000 lei, mostly from Germany, in 1920 ; while in the same year the exports to Great Britain amounted to £8,000,000, and the imports from Great Britain to over £7,000,000, out of a total of £137,000,000 exports and £276,000,000 imports. The latest returns (1922) show a considerable falling off from these amounts, the British figures totalling less than half of the above.

To complete the tale of natural resources in Old Romania, a word may be said about petroleum and minerals.

As is well known, the *petroleum* industry has of late years been greatly developed. The oil-fields are considered by experts to be practically continuous all along the line where the Carpathian foot-hills merge into the plains of Walachia and Moldavia. At present they are chiefly exploited in the departments of Dambovița (Dimbovitză—central Walachia), Prahova (north of Bucharest), where about 90 per cent. of the total is produced, Buzău, and Bacău (Moldavia). The oil is obtained partly from hand-dug wells and partly from bore-holes, the various processes and machinery being thoroughly up-to-date.

The annual production before the war increased from 493,000 tons in 1904 to nearly 1,850,000 tons in 1913 ; and though a large number of the wells were destroyed during the war in order to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands, the Germans re-started many of them during their occupation. Recent figures show a production of 1,034,000 tons in 1920 and 1,161,000 in 1921. The pipe-line to Constantsa has been relaid, whilst the refining industry has its seats chiefly at Ploesti, Bucharest, Cernavoda, Galatz and Constantsa. The export of oil in 1920 amounted to about 250,000 tons. Much foreign capital is sunk in these oil-fields, two of the chief companies being English and one American, whilst Holland and, especially, Germany are also strongly represented.

Regarding minerals, there is in Old Romania a certain amount of *coal*, the production amounting in 1912 to 242,000 tons, and to 1,785,000 tons (New Romania) in 1921. Most of it is lignite—an inferior brown coal found in patches in the eastern half of Walachia and in the Dóbruja. *Copper* is found in the Tulcea (Tulcha) district of the Northern Dóbruja, and in Northern Moldavia ; but its production is not extensively developed. Traces of *gold* are found in some rivers, and its extraction would probably pay.

There are considerable *iron* deposits in the Bistritza valley (North-west Moldavia) as well as in the Bukovina, but they

are not being worked commercially. The working of *salt* is, however, more fully developed, the mineral being found plentifully, and sometimes in thick beds 80 to 100 feet underground, among the foot-hills of the Eastern Carpathians. The average annual production is now about 233,000 tons (New Romania). *Quicksilver* of excellent quality, *ozokerit*, *sulphur*, *manganese* and *gypsum*, are also found, and there are extensive beds of *marble* and *granite* in the Dóbruja.

(The minerals of Transylvania, etc., are described under the respective headings.)

BESSARABIA.—Geographically this province is but a part of Moldavia and, save for the absence of the mountain belt, consists of the same topographical elements, having similar social and economic characters. But the plain-country, especially the belt nearest the Black Sea, is, like the Dóbruja, definitely steppe-like, a fact reflected in the great development of the livestock industry. Up till the early part of the nineteenth century it presented over wide areas the appearance of a desert, and after the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 it, no less than the province as a whole, was deliberately colonised by the Russian Government. The colonists include Germans and Bulgars, as well as peoples from various parts of the Russian Empire. Farther north Romanians predominate, though the population is everywhere mixed. The Russian census of 1897 gave a Romanian percentage of about 48, but the figures are contested by Romanian authorities.

Under Russian rule rather more than 50 per cent. of the total area was occupied by large estates, belonging either to great landowners or to religious foundations.

The province as a whole produced a large surplus of grain, which was derived chiefly from the large estates, on which alone machinery and modern methods were used to any extent. As in the old kingdom, maize was the chief cereal, followed, in most years, by wheat; but there was also a large production of barley. Much of the land worked by the peasants was held by the communes, not by individuals; but the methods were on the whole less slovenly than in the rest of Russia. In the years before the war, also, attempts were being made to establish peasant proprietorship, and a considerable amount of land purchase had taken place.

To the German and Bulgarian colonists is especially to be ascribed the province's wealth in livestock—a form of capital of great value in cereal production. Horses were reared on a large scale, and replaced the oxen of the old kingdom for farm

work. Pigs were also extensively reared ; and though cattle were not very numerous, good breeds were kept. These colonists also, in the areas where the conditions permitted, devoted much time and trouble to their gardens and orchards, and the large production of fruit, and of wine, which has been already mentioned, was in part due to them. Fruit, vegetables and wine were, however, also produced extensively on the large estates, especially on church lands.

As a whole the province is poor in wood, as one would expect from the climate and surface. In some parts of the hill-country, however, there are fairly extensive forests of oak, beech and ash.

THE BUKOVINA.—Like Bessarabia, this province is contiguous with Moldavia, of which geographically it forms but a part. But if the surface in Bessarabia may be said to consist of hill-country and plains only, the mountain belt being absent, in the Bukovina, on the other hand, it is the plains which are practically not represented, while the mountain belt, with the associated forests and summer pasturages, is conspicuous. Forests are naturally most important, covering over 40 per cent. of the total area, which is roughly two-thirds of that of Yorkshire. In consequence timber, in the pre-war days, was the only important export. The logs were, as was to be expected, chiefly floated downstream, the Pruth and the Sereth being especially used for their transport. On reaching Romanian territory they were in part used within the country, and in part exported by the Danubian ports to Turkey and elsewhere.

Only about 25 per cent. of the surface was devoted to agricultural crops, and even this figure includes a considerable acreage of hay-fields. There was thus little surplus to export. As usual the chief crop is maize, but the effect of climate and relief is seen in the fact that wheat is the least important of the cereals, being surpassed in acreage by oats, barley and rye, all hardier plants ; potatoes were also cultivated extensively. Cattle were reared on a fairly large scale, but the Bukovina is especially noted for its horses ; pigs were kept to a much greater extent than in the old kingdom. A certain amount of dairy produce and meat was exported ; but, though no precise figures are obtainable, the trade can only have been small.

The oil and salt deposits of the old kingdom are continued into the Bukovina, and various other minerals are known to occur ; save for the manganese beds, however, such minerals as occur were little worked.

The predominating element in the population, so far as numbers go, is Ruthenian (Little Russian), and not Romanian, the Ruthenians forming 38 per cent. of the total (about 800,000). Though the north and west are almost solidly Ruthenian these are not limited to this area, but occur everywhere mingled with Romanians. For the most part, however, the Ruthenian element consists of miserably poor and illiterate peasants, and it is not likely, especially if the land question is dealt with in a satisfactory fashion, that they will be difficult to assimilate. They speak a Russian dialect, and mostly belong to the Orthodox Church. The Romanians are not greatly inferior in numbers, forming 34 per cent. of the total.

TRANSYLVANIA.—This is the largest single element in the new territories, for it has an area of 22,300 sq. miles, and a population of nearly 2,700,000, as compared with Bessarabia's area of 17,000 sq. miles and population of 2,350,000. It should be noted, however, that since 1867 Transylvania had ceased to be a unit, having been regarded as consisting merely of fifteen Hungarian counties. This has practical importance in that the Hungarian statistics refer to the country as a whole, and do not permit of detailed figures being given, save in a few cases, for Transylvania alone.

But if political unity had disappeared before the region was assigned to Romania, the old autonomy had a geographical basis. Transylvania indeed formed a bastion on Hungary's eastern flank, and the mixed nature of the population is largely an effect of the topography and position.

The region may be said to consist of an upland basin, practically surrounded by mountains. The mountain rim is breached by the three large rivers which drain the basin—the Olt (Aluta), the Maros and the Szamos, the last a factor of the Tisza. The Olt finds its way through the Transylvanian Alps, by means of the Red Tower pass, into Romania, and this pass is the most important of those putting the latter country into communication with Transylvania. The Maros—a great river—finds an exit to the west, and thus connects Transylvania with the Hungarian plain proper and with the Banat. Finally, the Szamos enters the Hungarian plain in the extreme north-west. The presence of these rivers and their tributaries has led to the interior of the basin being cut up into hills and valleys, so that it is not flat, but undulating. On the course of the rivers alluvial flats are frequent, and some of these reach a considerable size, and are well fitted for the growth of cereals. The most important are the plain of Gyergyó, on the Upper Maros,

and a chain of three—Csik, Haromszek and Fogaras—strung along the winding course of the Transylvanian Olt.

These geographical facts are essential to the understanding of the economics of the country, no less than of its social conditions. From them the main resources can be readily deduced. We should expect, in the first place, that forests would be extensive, in view of the amount of elevated land. In point of fact, 38 per cent. of the total area is under forest, the best forests being nearest the old Romanian frontier. Before the war, however, the timber appears to have been largely absorbed within Hungary. Again, it is clear that arable land can only be of limited extent. It covered, in point of fact, about 29 per cent. of the total area. The effect of this is shown in a striking fashion by the cereal production, as compared with that of the old kingdom. Pre-war Romania had an area under two and a half times that of Transylvania, and in both the chief cereal crops were first maize and second wheat. But Romania produced more than ten times as much maize as Transylvania, and nine times as much wheat (figures for the year 1918). On the other hand, potatoes, a crop little cultivated in Romania, were grown in Transylvania on a considerable scale, and, like oats, were more important by weight than wheat.

Again, as one would expect from the nature of the surface, the meadows and pastures of Transylvania are extensive, and this is reflected in the numbers of sheep and cattle.

The mountains of Transylvania, which are partly volcanic, give it another source of wealth in its minerals, which are much more varied than those of the old kingdom. The metallic minerals include gold and silver, the deposits of the former being of some importance, with smaller quantities of other associated metals, such as copper, lead and manganese; while the valuable iron ores of the Eastern Banat are also continued into the country. In contrast to the Banat there is little true coal, but brown coal or lignite is abundant. The rock-salt beds of the old kingdom are continued into Transylvania, and the deposits in the latter country are very rich. Petroleum also occurs, though it has not been much worked. More important is the natural gas, which has been already used for lighting purposes, and is a possible source of industrial power in the future. Transylvania's resources in water-power appear also to be great. Associated with the presence of iron there is a considerable metallurgical industry, and the German colonists carry on a textile industry, based upon the local supplies of wool.

It is obvious from the above account that the natural wealth of Transylvania is considerable, and that, further, the livestock industry, the forests, and the minerals form a very useful supplement to the resources of the old kingdom. But we have to bear in mind that the nature of the population, itself a result of geographical and historical conditions, places certain difficulties in the way of the rapid absorption of this part of the new territory.

Whereas in the old kingdom the population was solidly Romanian, with only small percentages of non-Romanian elements, that of Transylvania is heterogeneous. The Romanians, or Vlachs, are in a majority, forming 55 per cent. of the total, but, at least till quite recently, they were predominantly peasants. Further, though, when Hungary is considered as a whole, the distribution of the land does not show that sharp contrast between very large and very small holdings which was so striking a feature in pre-war Romania. Romanians were only represented to a small extent among the holders of land. Generally they occupied an inferior position towards the two other important racial elements, the Magyars, forming 34 per cent. of the total, and the Germans, who constituted only about 9 per cent., but had an amount of influence out of proportion to their actual numbers. The Magyars occur especially in the far east of the country; the Germans, or Saxons, chiefly in compact communities, especially along the course of the Olt; the Romanians chiefly in the north, west and south; but there is a considerable amount of intermixture. The Magyars include most of the landowners, and have hitherto been the dominant element. The Saxons, though they have lost most of their earlier privileges, are generally well-educated and efficient, and have played a large part in the industrial development of the country, so far as this has gone. As has been already suggested, it is to the interest of the Romanian Government to favour the Vlach element, as against both Magyars and Saxons, neither of whom are likely to take kindly to the new régime. The tendency, therefore, is to seek a more radical solution of the agrarian problem in the country than in the old kingdom. This, in itself and in its reflex effect in the old kingdom, combined with the breaking of the old commercial relations with what remains of Hungary, is bound to give rise to difficulties.

THE OTHER EX-HUNGARIAN TERRITORIES.—The new Romanian frontier has been so drawn as to take in, in addition to

Transylvania, a strip of the Hungarian plain, in the areas known as Crisana and Maramuresh, as well as the eastern part of the Banat of Temesvar. Of the first two little can be said beyond the fact that they are also cereal-producing regions, with a population which is not wholly Romanian. The part of the Banat which falls to Romania, on the other hand, owes its importance chiefly to its mineral wealth. The three areas combined cover about 25,000 sq. miles, with a population of over 3,500,000.

The Banat as a whole is sharply divided into an eastern mountain-belt, forming part of the Carpathian chain, and the western plains. Broadly speaking, it may be said that in the south the new frontier follows, fairly closely, the mountain edge, and the limit of predominantly Romanian population. Farther north, in the region of the town of Temesvar, it is so drawn as to give Romania a considerable strip of the plain-country, with its dense and mixed population.

In the plains and foot-hills the conditions resemble those in Hungary generally. Thus cereals, especially maize and wheat, are extensively grown, in combination with other crops, such as sugar-beet. Horses, cattle and pigs are reared, the pigs in the pre-war days finding their market in Budapest. In the foot-hills vines and fruit-trees are grown. As usual in Hungary the Romanian element was not conspicuously represented among the landowners. The mountain-belt, again, is richly wooded, and affords pasture also for large flocks of sheep. The real significance of the mountain region lies, however, in its wealth of coal and iron, the deposits occurring not far from the old Romanian frontier. The coal is pit-coal; in some cases it is of a good coking variety, and its presence close to iron, and to deposits of limestone and clay, increases its value. The yearly output before the war was over 400,000 tons; for the sake of comparison it may be noted that in the year 1913 the United Kingdom produced over 287,000,000 tons. The iron ore is of good quality, and about 200,000 tons were raised annually.

The presence of these minerals in the Eastern Banat accounted for an iron industry which, if small, is relatively at least of importance in view of Romania's large pre-war import of iron goods and machinery. But the number of persons employed was not large, and it may be well to repeat that there is little reason to believe that Romania's dependence on foreign trade for the great bulk of the necessary manufactured goods will diminish notably in the immediate future.

Summing up, we may say that the old kingdom of Romania had a predominantly agricultural population, and maintained itself by exporting its surplus grain to Western Europe by the Black Sea and Danubian ports. The new territories have essentially similar characters, and add a large acreage of grain-producing lands, in addition to valuable resources in forests, livestock and minerals. But while the old population was nearly homogeneous, that of the new territories is mixed. Again, while the old kingdom had throughout easy access to the Lower Danube or to the port of Constantsa, the trade of the new lands in the pre-war period took for the most part other directions, and must, even if only for a time, suffer from the frontier changes. Finally, as already stated, the attempts made to solve the agrarian problem will, in all probability, lead, in the old and new lands alike, to a, perhaps temporary, fall in the production of grain, especially wheat.

APPENDIX

Some Miscellaneous Figures

FINANCE

THE finances were in a healthy state down to the year 1912, the annual revenue showing a slight surplus over the expenditure. In the year before the war the budget was over 530,000,000 lei (£21,000,000). The budget for 1921-22 is given on p. 290; the estimates for 1923 provide for a balancing Budget of about 10½ milliards of lei (i.e. about £12,350,000 at present rate of exchange).

The public debt in 1921 amounted to over 20 milliards of lei, exclusive of about 10 milliards of Austro-Hungarian and Russian public debts assumed by Romania.

In 1922 the production of all Romania was 2,600,000 tons of wheat and 2,360,000 of maize.

INDUSTRIES

Beyond those of petroleum and salt, already described, the industries of the country are of comparatively little value. The electrical industry, flour-milling and the manufacture of the cheaper form of textiles are perhaps the most important of them, while tanneries, sugar, chemical and glass factories take a secondary place. The metallurgical industry is insignificant.

There is a great deal of water-power (estimated at 150,000 h.p.) available; but little use is made of it.

COMMUNICATIONS

Before the war there were 2,300 miles of railway in existence, and 28,000 miles of nominally metalled roads; but a large proportion of the latter are of little use for transport, and at certain times of the year are practically impassable.

The State now owns in New Romania over 7,200 miles of railway, besides a commercial navigation-service on the Danube and Black Sea.

RELIGION

Full liberty of religion is assured to all, the proportions, out of about 17,400,000 souls, being approximately 11,000,000 Orthodox, 1,500,000 each of Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics and Protestants, 1,000,000 Jews, and the rest Mohammedans, Armenians, etc.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

The latest figures available (for 1920) total about 800,000 tons of imports, value 7 milliards of lei, and 1,500,000 tons of exports (of which over a million are cereals), value 3½ milliards of lei.

C—MISCELLANEOUS

DEFENCE

MILITARY service is compulsory and universal from the ages of twenty-one to forty-six. The normal terms are two years in the infantry and three years in the other arms, followed by five or four years in the active Reserve, ten years in the second line, and four years in the Territorial force—total twenty-one years.

Approximate peace-strength (1923), 200,000.

The Army at present is organised in 7 Corps, consisting of 21 Divisions, 2 Rifle Divisions, and 2 Cavalry Divisions.

An Infantry Division consists of 2 Brigades, each of 2 regiments of 3 battalions, 1 Rifle battalion, one artillery brigade (2 regiments of field artillery and a group of howitzers) and divisional troops.

A Cavalry Division consists of 2 brigades, each of 2 regiments, 2 batteries of Horse Artillery, and Cavalry Divisional troops.

The Infantry is armed with the Mannlicher rifle.

The Field Artillery is armed mostly with French guns, but there are also many of the Krupp type. The heavy artillery is also mostly of French pattern.

Military budget for 1922-23, 1,700,000,000 lei.

The Marine consists of 7 river (600-ton) monitors, 8 torpedo-boats, 4 gun-boats, and about 20 smaller craft.

Naval base at Sulina.

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

La Roumanie dans la Guerre et dans la Paix: Nicolas Basilico (Paris, 1919).

Cambridge Modern History, vol. xii (Cambridge).

Histoire de la Roumanie contemporaine (1822–1900): Frédéric Damé (Paris, 1900).

Encyclopædia Britannica, article “Rumania.”

The Balkans: Neville Forbes, etc. (*Rumania*, by D. Mitrany.) (Oxford, 1915).

Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. No. 28 “Rumania” (London, 1920).

Histoire des Roumains et de leur Civilisation: N. Jorga (Paris, 1920). Contains full bibliographical notes.

Histoire des Relations entre la France et les Roumains: N. Jorga (Paris, 1918).

Domestic Life in Rumania: Dorothea Kirke (London, 1916).

The Balkans: William Miller. Third edition, with new chapter containing their history from 1896 to 1922 (London, 1923).

The Balkans: D. Mitrany (Oxford, 1915).


La Roumanie nouvelle: A. Muzet (Paris, 1920).

La Roumanie: Eugène Pittard (Paris, 1917).

Roumania and the Great War: R. W. Seton-Watson (London, 1915).

La Terre et les Races roumaines: Alexandre A. C. Sturdza (Paris, 1905).

Histoire des Roumains: A. D. Xénopol (2 vols, Paris, 1896).



INDEX

Adrianople, Treaty of, 230
 Agriculture (v. also Cereals), 297, 313
 Akerman, 214; Treaty of, 230, 231; 255
 Alains, 210
 Alba Iulia, 209, 229, 250, 285
 Albania, 200, 202, 208
 Alexander the Good, 213
 Andriassy, Count, 244
 Area, 295
 Arges, 211, 220, 271
 Army, 238, 260, 262; 270-287; 317
 Arpadian, 211
 Ait, 253
 Aurelian, Emperor, 206
 Austria, 225-227, 232, 233, 240; relations with, 243-245, 249, 266, 287; 289
 Averescu, General, 271, 273, 278, 280, 284, 288, 289
 Balkan War, 1912-13, 246, 247
 Balta Liman, Convention of, 231
 Banat, 199, 251, 253, 268; economics, 312
 Basarab, 211; Mathew, 218, 219; Constantino, 219
 Basil the Wolf, 218
 Basta, General, 217, 218
 Batharys, 216, 217
 Belgrade, Treaty of, 225, 226; 266
 Berlin Congress, 240, 242, 244
 Berthelot, General, 271, 275, 284
 Bessarabia, 199, 200, 212, 227, 228, 233; allotted to Russia, 239; 248, 255-257, 262, 285; economics, 298, 299, 307, 308
 Bismarck, 236, 240, 243
 Blaj, v. Alba Iulia
 Boerobistes, 203
 Bogdan, 211; son of Stephen, 215
 Boyars, 211, 213, 224, etc.
 Brancovan, Constantine, 220-223
 Bratianu, John, M., 240, 244, 248, 259, 260, 265, 288, 290
 Brusilov, General, 268, 278, 279
 Bucharest, spelling of, 193; 211, 220, 223, 227; treaty of 1812, 228; 233; treaty of 1913, 246-249, 253, 260; fall of, 272; treaty of 1918, 281-283; 306
 Budapest, 211, 269; occupation of, 287, 288, 292; 312
 Bukovina, 212, 226, 250, 253-255, 265, 266, 286; economics, 308, 309
 Bulgaria, 203, 207; relations with, 246, 247; 287
 Byzantium, 200, 207
 Cantemir, 221-223
 "Carmen Sylva," 238
 Carp, M., 261, 262, 275
 Carpathians, 199, 201, 207, 273
 Catherine II, Empress, 226, 227
 Coreals, 295-297, 301, 303, 308, 312, 314
 Cernavoda, 199, 298
 Charles of Hohenzollern, elected Prince, 236; becomes King, 230; pro-German views, 259; 261-263; death, 203, 265
 Church, Romanian, 218-220, 228, 250, 251, 255, 314
 Coal, 306, 310, 312
 Communications, 314
 Comnenus, Emperors, 208, 209
 Constantine, Emperor, 207
 Constantza, 200, 248, 295, 298, 306
 Constitution, first, 230; second, 237, 238
 Cotiso, 203
 Crimean War, 232
 Cuza, Prince Alexander John, 233-236
 Czernin, Count, 266
 Czernowitz (Cernauti), 253, 254, 280, 281
 Dacians, 199, 203-208
 Danube, the, 199, 200, 203; internationalised, 233; 245, 283, 298
 Decebalus, 203-205
 Dóbruja, the, 199, 202, 209; Romania acquires, 239; 246; campaign in, 270, 274; 283
 Domitian, Emperor, 203, 204
 Economics, 295-314
 Education, 234, 238, 241, 243

Exchango, 290, 302
 Exports, 295, 296, 305, 306, 314

Ferdinand, Crown Prince, 216; King, 263, 266, 274, 278, 292
 Filipescu, M., 260, 261, 268
 Finance, 290, 313
 Forests, 304, 305, 308, 310
 France, relations with, 231, 232, 242
 Francis Joseph, Emperor, 243, 244, 250, 252
 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 243

Gepidae, 207
 Germans, settlement, 209; influence, 241-244; attack Romania, 269-272
 Getæ, 203
 Ghikat, Gregory, 230
 Gold, 199, 306, 310
 Goths, 206-208
 Great Britain, relations with, 243
 Great War, 258-284; entry into, 269; Germany declares war, 269; Romanian advance northwards, 269, 270; Turtucia lost, 270; German invasion, 271, 272; and occupation, 273-284; enemy attacks towards Moldavia, 273-276; Romanian recuperation, 276; attack, 278, 279; Armistice, 280; Peace Treaty, 281; trouble with Russia, 285
 Greeks, 203, 207-209, 218, 219, 224; relations with, 247
 Grivitsa redoubt, 239

Heraclius, Emperor, 207
 Hos'podars, 223, etc.
 Hungary, 207, 209, 211; relations with, 245, 250, 251, 252; 286, 287; economic rivalry, 287; 311
 Huns, 307
 Hunyadi, 213, 214

Ilieșeu, General, 262
 Illyria, 202, 203
 Imports, 305, 306, 324
 Independence declared, 239
 Industries, 313
 Iron, 305, 310, 312
 Italians, 202, 203, 208; relations with, 242, 243; in Great War, 267, etc.

Jagello, 213
 Jassy, Treaty of, 227, 228; 229, 233, 274
 Jews, treatment of, 240, 242, 300
 John the Terrible, 215
 John Zapolya, 215
 "Juminists," 260, 261, 268

Karlowitz, Treaty of, 220, 226
 Kosovo, 212
 Kuchuk Kainarji, Treaty of, 226-228
 Kumana, 207, 209-211
 Kutzo-Vlachis, 208, 246

Land question, 234, 235, 240, 259, 276, 284, 289, 300-302, 313
 Legislature, 234, 237
 Literature, 224, 229, 231, 242, 251, 256, 258
 "Little Entente," the, 289
 Livestock, 298, 307, 308, 310, 312
 Lombards, 207

Mackensen, General, 270, 271, 279, 284

Magyars, v. Hungary
 Maize, 303-305, 310, 313
 Majorescu, M., 247, 256, 275
 Mărghiloman, M., 262, 268, 275, 281-284
 Maria, Queen, 246, 263, 274, 278, 292
 Marino, 317
 Mathew Corvinus, 214
 Metals, 305, 306, 310, 313
 Michael the Brave, 216-218, 223
 Minerals, 306, 307, 310
 Mircea, 213
 Moldavia, beginnings of, 199, 211-213; etc.
 Münich, General, 225

Napoleon I, 228; III, 230, 242
 Nicopolis, 213

Oil, v. Petroleum
 Orsova, 199, 204, 273

Paris, Treaty of, 1856, 232, 239, 256
 Passarowitz, Treaty of, 226
 Patzinkitei, 207
 Peasants, 300-304
 Peter the Great, 221
 Petroleum, 305, 306, 308, 310
 Phanariots, 218, 219, 222-230
 Plevna, 239
 Poles, 213, 214, 218, 220
 Population, 295, 307, 309, 311, 312
 Predeal Pass, 271, 273

Radu d'Afumati, 215
 Radu the Black, 211
 Railways, 314
 Règlement Organique, 230, 231
 Religion, 314
 Rising, peasant, 1907, 240, 259
 Roads, 314
 Români, 208, 209

Romania, spelling of, 193 ; geographical, 199-200 ; ambition, 201 ; origin of language, 205, 206 ; of name, 208 ; founding of the two Principalities, 211-220 ; under the Turks, 215-231 ; Phanariot rule, 222-230 ; Russian occupation, 230-231 ; Union, 233 ; Russo-Turkish War, and independence, 230 ; relations with foreign Powers, 212-269 ; Great War, 269-284 ; restoration, 281 ; annexation of Transylvania, etc., 285, 286 ; invasion of Hungary, 286 ; 287 ; Peace signed, 289

Romans, emigration, conquest of Dacia, etc., 202-207

Rother Thurm pass, 271, 309

Rudolf II, Emperor, 217, 218

Russia, 221, 225-230 ; occupies Principalities, 230 ; war with Turkey, 239 ; relations with, 245, 246, 248, 249 ; 263, 270, 274 ; Revolution, 275 ; demoralisation, 278

Saguna, Archbishop, 250, 251

St. John, Knights of, 209

Salt, 307, 310

San Stefano, Treaty of, 239, 240

Sarmatians, 204, 206

Sarmisagathusa, 204, 205

Saul, 211

“Saxons,” 200, 245, 286, 288, 311

Scythians, 200, 202

Serbia, 203, 208 ; relations with, 247, 258, 260 ; 266, 268, 288, 295

Severin, 204, 210, 245, 283

Shorban, 219-221

Sibiu, 250, 271

Sigismund of Hungary, 213

Sinan Pasha, 216

Slav invasion, 203, 206, 207

Slavonic church, etc., 213

Sobieski, John, 220

Stephen the Great, 214, 215, 254

Sturdza, Jonitsa, 230

Szeklers, 209

Takó Jonescu, M., 247, 250, 261, 274, 288, 289

Tatars, 211, 214, 220, 221, 256

Tatul, 200

Toutonic Order, 209

Thracians, 202, 203, 206

Tilsit, Treaty of, 228

Tinber, v. Forests

Tisza, Count, 268

Trade, 295, 299, etc.

Trajan, Emperor, conquest of Dacia, 204, 205 ; bridge of, 204 ; Column, 205 ; Wall, 270

Transylvania, 199-207, 220, 226, 228, 245, 246 ; question of, 240-253 ; 265 ; annexation of, 285, 286 ; economics, 298, 309-311

Treaties, secret ; with Austria (1883), 240, 261 ; with Russia (1914), 265, 268 ; with Entente (1916), 269

Turks, 207, 212, 218 ; rule in Romania, 215-230 ; war with Russia, 230 ; 247, 251

Turtucaia, 216 ; capture of, 270

Ulpia Trajana, 205

Union of Principalities, 233

Universities, 234

Venizelos, M., 247, 268

Vlaachs (v. also Walachia), 208, 211, 212, 228, 311

Vlad the Impaler, 211

Vojvodas, 209, 213, etc.

Vulcan Pass, 271

Walachia, 199 ; origin of, 208, 209, 211, 212, etc.

Water-power, 310, 313

Wheat, 304, 305, 310, 313

Wilson, President, 275, 278

Wine, 299, 308

Ypsilanti, rebellion of, 229

